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STONEWALL JACKSON 


VOL. II. 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


AND THE 


AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


BY 
LIEUT.-COL. G. F. R. HENDERSON 


MAJOR THE YORK AND LANCASTER REGIMENT 


PROFESSOR OF MILITARY ART AND HISTORY, THE STAFF COLLEGE 
AUTHOR OF ‘THE BATTLE OF SPICHEREN, A TACTICAL sTUDY’ 
AND ‘THE CAMPAIGN OF FREDERICKSBURG’ 


WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY FIELD-MARSHAL 
THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P.,G.C.B., G.C.M.G. &c. 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 


IN TWO VOLUMES—VOL. II. 


WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND PLANS 


New IMPRESSION 


LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
839 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 


1900 


All rights reserved 


g @ 
oe 


J’ CONTENTS 


OF 


THE SECOND VOLUME 


CHAPTER PAGE 
XIII. Tue Seven Days. Gartnes’ Minn : . ‘ : 1 
XIV. THe Seven Days. FRayser’s Farm AND MALVERN 

Hin. : ‘ : : ‘ ; : ¢ te ee 
XV. Crpar Ron . ; : : ; ‘ ; ; iy 
XVI. GROVETON AND THE SECOND Manassas . : a Pe 
XVII. Tue Seconp Manassas (continued) . : : - OL6F 
XVIII. Harper’s Ferry . : ; : as ee Leo 
XIX. SHARPSBURG . : : : : ; - . 239 
XX. FREDERICKSBURG . : ; : > : oy. Pade 
XXI. THe Army or NoRTHERN VIRGINIA . : : . 3838 
XXIT. WINTER QUARTERS . ‘ : ‘ . : ea dare 

XXIII. CHANCELLORSVILLE d ; : , : : . 404 

XXIV. CHANCELLORSVILLE (continued) : ; p Sy theo 
XXY. THE SoLDIER AND THE MAN : : ; ; . 476 


INDEX : , } ‘ ; : : : br 6U5 


owiehe \ my 


+ 


shor per nee vt ie 


Oo ai i i Aire by sf 


ILLUSTRATIONS IN VOL. II 


ev lis EM 
MAPS 

Environs or Ricumonp. : ; ; . . To face p. 25 
BatTtLeE oF Gaines’ Minn. ; : ; ’ : es 42, 
THE SEVEN Days. JUNE 26—JuLy 2, 1862 i ; x 48 
BattLE oF Matvern Hin ; ; : : than ‘ 64 
ENVIRONS OF WARRENTON . ’ , ‘ , ; +s 80 
BatTrLe OF CEDAR RuN . : Y ‘ ; nite 96 
SITUATION ON AuGuUST 27 (SUNSET), 1862 . : 3 3 138 
SrruaTIon on Avaust 28 (suNSET), 1862 ; ang “ 144 
Positions on Auaust 29, 1862 . ; ‘ ‘ ‘ 3 158 
GROVETON AND SECOND Manassas . : a gi ee a 168 
Positions on Avuaust 80, 1862, In THE ATTACK ON 

JACKSON . ’ : : , ’ : ‘ : $3 174 
Positions on Avaust 380, 1862 . i : ayes" ‘; 176 
HarPer’s FERRY . P : ‘ i : : : a 220 
SHARPSBURG : ' ; : . , : pine - 240 
PosITIONS DURING THE ATTACKS OF HOOKER AND Mans- 

FIELD AT SHARPSBURG. ; d : j : - 248 
FREDERICKSBURG . : ene ‘ 4 oi iY 310 
Hooxker’s PLAN OF CAMPAIGN ; x : : ‘ ‘ 404. 


BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE . ‘ ‘ ‘ eiike s 468 


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STONEWALL JACKSON 


CHAPTER XIII 
THE SEVEN DAYS. GAINES’ MILL 


Tue region whither the interest now shifts is very different 
from the Valley. From the terraced banks of the Rappa- 
igg9, fannock, sixty miles north of Richmond, to the 
shining reaches of the James, where the capital of 

the Confederacy stands high on her seven hills, the lowlands 
of Virginia are clad with luxuriant vegetation. The roads 
and railways run through endless avenues of stately trees ; 
the shadows of the giant oaks lie far across the rivers, and 
ridge and ravine are mantled with the unbroken foliage of 
the primeval forest. In this green wilderness the main 
armies were involved. But despite the beauty of broad 
rivers and sylvan solitudes, gay with gorgeous blossoms and 
fragrant with aromatic shrubs, the eastern, or ‘ tidewater,’ 
counties of Virginia had little to recommend them as a 
theatre of war. They were sparsely settled. The wooden 
churches, standing lonely in the groves where the congrega- 
tions hitched their horses; the solitary taverns, half inns and 
half stores; the court-houses of the county justices, witha few 
wooden cottages clustered round them, were poor substi- 
tutes for the market-towns of the Shenandoah. Here and 
there on the higher levels, surrounded by coppice and 
lawn, by broad acres of corn and clover, the manors of 
the planters gave life and brightness to the landscape. 
But the men were fighting in hee’s ranks, their families 

VOL. II. B 


2 STONEWALL JACKSON 


had fled to Richmond, and these hospitable homes showed 
signs of poverty and neglect. Neither food nor forage was 
to be drawn from the country, and the difficulties of 
supply and shelter were not the worst obstacles to military 
operations. At this season of the year the climate and 
the soil were persistent foes. The roads were mere tracks, 
channels which served as drains for the interminable forest. 
The deep meadows, fresh and green to the eye, were damp 
and unwholesome camping-grounds. Turgid streams, like 
the Chickahominy and its affluents, winding sluggishly 
through rank jungles, spread in swamp and morass across 
the valleys, and the languid atmosphere, surcharged with 
vapour, was redolent of decay. 

Through this malarious region the Federal army had 
been pushing its slow way forward for more than six weeks, 
June, 22d 105,000 men, accompanied by a large siege train, 

lay intrenched within sight of the spires of Richmond. 
30,000 were north of the Chickahominy, covering the York 
River Railway and waiting the coming of McDowell. The 
remainder, from Woodbury’s Bridge to the Charles City © 
road, occupied the line of breastworks which stood directly 
east of the beleaguered city. So nearly was the prize within 
their grasp that the church bells, and even the clocks 
striking the hour, were heard in the camps; and at 
Mechanicsville Bridge, watched by a picket, stood a 
sign-post which bore the legend: ‘ To Richmond, 44 miles.’ 
The sentries who paced that beat were fortunate. For 
the next two years they could boast that no Federal soldier, 
except as a prisoner, had stood so close as they had to the 
rebel stronghold. But during these weeks in June not a 
single soul in McClellan’s army, and few in the Confederacy, 
suspected that the flood of invasion had reached high-water 
mark. Richmond, gazing night after night at the red 
glow which throbbed on the eastern vault, the reflection 
of countless camp-fires, and listening with strained ears 
to the far-off call of hostile bugles, seemed in perilous 
case. No formidable position protected the approaches. 
HKarthworks, indeed, were in process of construction; but, 
although the left flank at New Bridge was covered by the 


McCLELLAN 8 


Chickahominy, the right was protected by no natural 
obstacle, as had been the case at Yorktown; and the lines 
occupied no commanding site. Nor had the Government 
been able to assemble an army of a strength sufficient 
to man the whole front. Lee, until Jackson joined him, 
commanded no more than 72,500 men. Of these a large 
portion were new troops, and their numbers had been re- 
duced by the 7,000 dispatched under Whiting to the Valley. 
But if the Federal army was far superior in numbers, it 
was not animated by an energy in proportion to its strength. 
The march from the White House was more sluggish than 
the current of the Chickahominy. From May 17 to June 26 
the Army of the Valley had covered four hundred miles. 
Within the same period the Army of the Potomac had 
covered twenty. It is true that the circumstances were 
widely different. McClellan had in front of him the lines of 
Richmond, and his advance had been delayed by the rising 
of the Chickahominy. Hehad fought a hard fight at Seven 
Pines ; and the constant interference of Jackson had kept 
him waiting for McDowell. But, at the same time, he had 
displayed an excess of caution which was perfectly apparent 
to his astute opponent. Hehad made no attempt to use his 
superior numbers ; and Lee had come to the conclusion that 
the attack on Richmond would take the same form as the 
attack on Yorktown,—the establishment of great batteries, 
the massing of heavy ordnance, and all the tedious processes 
June11, Of a siege. He read McClellan like an open book. 
He had personal knowledge both of his capacity and 
character, for they had served together on the same staff 
in the Mexican war. He knew that his young adversary 
was a man of undoubted ability, of fascinating address, and 
of courage that was never higher than when things were at 
their worst. But these useful qualities were accompanied by 
marked defects. His will was less powerful than his imagina- 
tion. Bold in conception, he was terribly slow in execution. 
When his good sense showed him the opportunity, his 
imagination whispered, ‘ Suppose the enemy has reserves of 
which I know nothing! Is it not more prudent to wait until 
Ireceive more accurate information?’ Andso‘{ dare not, 
k 2 


a STONEWALL JACKSON 


inevitably waited on ‘I would.’ He forgot that in war it 
is impossible for a general to be absolutely certain. It is 
sufficient, according to Napoleon, if the odds in his favour 
are three to two; and if he cannot discover from the 
attitude of his enemy what the odds are, he is unfitted for 
supreme command. 

Before Yorktown McClellan’s five army corps had been 
held in check, first by 15,000 men, then by 53,000, 
protected by earthworks of feeble profile The fort at 
Gloucester Point was the key of the Confederate lines.? 
McClellan, however, although a division was actually under 
orders to move against it, appears to have been unwilling 
to risk a failure.2 The channel of the York was thus 
closed both to his transports and the gunboats, and he did 
nothing whatever to interfere with Johnston’s long line of 
communications, which passed at several points within 
easy reach of the river bank. Nor had he been more active 
since he had reached West Point. Except for a single ex- 
pedition, which had dispersed a Confederate division near 
Hanover Court House, north of the Chickahominy, he had’ 
made no aggressive movement. He had never attempted to 
test the strength of the fortifications of Richmond, to hinder 
their construction, or to discover their weak points. His 
urgent demands for reinforcements had appeared in the 
Northern newspapers, and those newspapers had found 
their way to Richmond. From the same source the 
Confederates were made aware that he believed himself 
confronted by an army far larger than his own; and when, 
on the departure of Whiting’s division for the Valley, he 
refused to take advantage of the opportunity to attack 
Lee's diminished force, it became abundantly clear, if 
further proof were wanting, that much might be ventured 
against so timid a commander. 

From his knowledge of his adversary’s character, and 

1 *No one but McClellan would have hesitated to attack.’ Johnston to 
Lee, April 22,1862. O. R., vol. xi., part iii., p. 456. 

2 Narrative of Military Operations, General J. E. Johnston, pp. 112, 113 

3 The garrison consisted only of a few companies of heavy artillery, and 


the principal work was still unfinished when Yorktown fell. Reports of 
Dr. Comstock, and Colonel Cabell, C.S.A. O. R., vol. xi., part i. 


McCLELLAN 5 


still more from his attitude, Lee had little difficulty in 
discovering his intentions. McClellan, on the other hand, 
failed to draw a single correct inference. And yet 
the information at his disposal was sufficient to enable 
him to form a fair estimate of how things stood in 
the Confederate camp. He had been attacked at Seven 
Pines, but not by superior numbers; and it was hardly 
likely that the enemy had not employed their whole 
available strength in this battle ; otherwise their enterprise 
was insensate. Furthermore, it was clearly to the interests 
of the Confederates to strike at his army before McDowell 
could join him. They had not done so, and it was there- 
fore probable that they did not feel themselves strong 
enough todo so. It is true that he was altogether misled 
by the intelligence supplied as to the garrison of Richmond by 
his famous detective staff. 200,000 was the smallest number 
which the chief agent would admit. But that McClellan 
should have relied on the estimate of these untrained 
observers rather than on the evidence furnished by the 
conduct of the enemy is but a further proof that he lacked 
all power of deduction.! 

It may well be questioned whether he was anxious at 
heart to measure swords with Lee. His knowledge of his 
adversary, whose reputation for daring, for ability, for 
strength of purpose, had been higher than any other in 
the old army, must needs have had a disturbing influence 
on his judgment. Against an enemy he did not know 
McClellan might have acted with resolution. Face to face 
with Lee, it can hardly be doubted that the weaker will 
was dominated by the stronger. Vastly different were their 
methods of war. McClellan made no effort whatever either 
to supplement or to corroborate the information supplied 
by his detectives. Since he had reached West Point his 
cavalry had done little.2 Lee, on the other hand, had found 


} In one sense McClellan was not far wrong in his estimate of the Con- 
federate numbers. In assuming control of the Union armies Lincoln and 
Stanton made their enemies a present of at least 50,000 men. 

2 It must be admitted that his cavalry was very weak in proportion to 
the other arms. On June 20 he had just over 5,000 sabres (O. R., vol. xi., 
part iii., p. 238), of which 3,000 were distributed among the army corps. The 


6 STONEWALL JACKSON 


means to ascertain the disposition of his adversary’s troops, 
and had acquired ample information of the measures which 
had been taken to protect the right wing, north of the 
Chickahominy, the point he had determined to attack. 
Karly on June 12, with 1,200 horsemen and a. 
section of artillery, Stuart rode out on an enterprise of a ~ 
Tice 9 kind which at that time was absolutely unique, 
' and which will keep his memory green so long as 
cavalry is used in war. Carefully concealing his march, 
he encamped that night near Taylorsville, twenty-two 
miles north of Richmond, and far beyond the flank of 
the Federal intrenchments. The next morning he turned 
June 13, Castward towards Hanover Court House. Here 
he drove back a picket, and his advanced-guard, 
with the loss of one officer, soon afterwards charged 
down a squadron of regulars. A few miles to the south-east, 
near Old Church, the enemy’s outposts were finally dispersed ; 
and then, instead of halting, the column pushed on into the 
very heart of the district occupied by the Federals, and soon | 
found itself in rear of their encampments. Stuart had 
already gained important information. He had learned that 
McClellan’s right flank extended but a short way north of 
the Chickahominy, that it was not fortified, and that it rested 
on neither swamp nor stream, and this was what Lee 
had instructed him to discover. But it was one thing to 
obtain the information, another to bring it back. If he 
returned by the road be had come, it was probable he 
would be cut off, for the enemy was thoroughly roused, and 
the South Anna River, unfordable from recent rains, 
rendered a détour to the north impracticable. To the 
south and west of him lay the Federal army, some of the 
infantry camps not five miles distant. It was about 


Confederates appear to have had about 3,000, but of superior quality, 
familiar, more or less, with the country, and united under one command. It 
is instructive to notice how the necessity for a numerous cavalry grew on the 
Federal commanders. In 1864 the Army of the Potomac was accompanied 
by a cavalry corps over 13,000 strong, with 32 guns. It is generally the case 
in war, even in a close country, that if the cavalry is allowed to fall below the 
usual proportion of one trooper to every six men of the other arms the 
army suffers. 


STUART'S RIDE 7 


four o'clock in the afternoon. He could hardly reach 
Hanover Court House before dark, and he might find 
it held by the enemy. To escape from the dilemma he 
determined on a plan of extraordinary daring, which in- 
volved nothing less than the passage of the Chickahominy 
in rear of the enemy, and a circuit of the entire Federal army. 

The audacity of the design proved the salvation 
of his command. The enemy had assembled a strong 
force of both cavalry and infantry at Hanover Court 
House, under Stuart’s father-in-law, General Cooke; but, 
misled by the reports brought in, and doubtless perplexed 
by the situation, the latter pursued but slowly and 
halted for the night at Old Church. Stuart, meanwhile, 
had reached Tunstall’s Station on the York River Railway, 
picking up prisoners at every step. Here, routing the 
guard, he tore up the rails, destroyed a vast amount of 
stores and many waggons, broke down the telegraph and 
burnt the railway bridge, his men regaling themselves on 
the luxuries which were found in the well-stored establish- 
ments of the sutlers. Two squadrons, despatched to 
Garlick’s Landing on the Pamunkey, set fire to two 
transports, and rejoined with a large number of prisoners, 
horses, and mules. Then, led by troopers who were 
natives of the country, the column marched south-east by 
the Williamsburg road, moving further and still further 
away from Richmond. The moon was full, and as the troops 
passed by the forest farms, the women, running to the 
wayside, wept with delight at the unexpected apparition 
of the grey jackets, and old men showered blessings 
on the heads of their gallant countrymen. At Talleysville, 
eight miles east, Stuart halted for three hours; and shortly 
after midnight, just as a Federal infantry brigade reached 
Tunstall’s Station in hot pursuit, he turned off by a country 
road to the Chickahominy. At Forge Bridge, where he 
June 14, 2tTived at daylight, he should have found a ford ; 
’ but the river had overflowed its banks, and was 
full of floating timber. Colonel Fitzhugh Lee, not the 
least famous member of a famous family, accompanied by a 
few men, swam his horse at imminent peril over to the 


8 STONEWALL JACKSON 


other bank ; but, although he re-crossed the swollen waters 
in the same manner, the daring young officer had to report 
that the passage was impracticable. It was already light. 
The enemy would soon be up, and the capture of the whole 
column seemed absolutely certain. Hitherto the men, 
exhilarated by the complete success of the adventure, had 
borne themselves as gaily as if they were riding through 
the streets of Richmond. But the danger of their situation 
was now forcibly impressed upon them, and the whole 
command became grave and anxious. Stuart alone was 
unmoved, and at this juncture one of his scouts informed 
him that the skeleton of an old bridge spanned the stream 
about a mile below. An abandoned warehouse furnished 
the materials for a footway, over which the troopers 
passed, holding the bridles of their horses as they swam 
alongside. Half the column thus crossed, while the remain- 
der strengthened the bridge so as to permit the passage of 
the artillery. By one o’clock the whole force was over 
the Chickahominy, unmolested by the enemy, of whom only 
small parties, easily driven back by the rear-guard, had 
made their appearance. 

Thirty-five miles now to Richmond, in rear of the left 
wing of the Northern army, and within range, for some 
portion of the march, of the gunboats on the James River ! 
Burning the bridge, with a wave of the hand to the 
Federal horsemen who covered the heights above Stuart 
plunged into the woods, and without further misadventure 
brought his troops at sunset to the neighbourhood of 
Charles City Court House. Leaving his men sleeping, 
after thirty-six hours in the saddle, he rode to Richmond to 
June1s, report to Lee. Before dawn on the 15th, after 

covering another thirty miles, over a road which 
was patrolled by the enemy, he reached head-quarters. His 
squadrons followed, marching at midnight, and bringing 
with them 165 prisoners and 260 captured horses and mules. 

This extraordinary expedition, which not only effected 
the destruction of a large amount of Federal property, 
and broke up, for the time being, their line of supplies, but 
acquired information of the utmost value, and shook the con- 


STRENGTH OF LEE’S ARMY 9 


fidence of the North in McClellan’s generalship, was accom- 
plished with the loss of one man. These young Virginia 
soldiers marched one hundred and ten miles in less than 
two days. ‘There was something sublime,’ says Stuart, 
‘in the implicit confidence and unquestioning trust of the 
rank and file in a leader guiding them straight, apparently, 
into the very jaws of the enemy, every step appearing to 
them to diminish the hope of extrication.’! Nor was the 
influence of their achievement on the moral of the whole 
Confederate army the least important result attained. A 
host of over 100,000 men, which had allowed a few 
squadrons to ride completely round it, by roads which 
were within hearing of its bugles, was no longer considered 
a formidable foe. 

On receiving Stuart’sinformation, Lee drew up the plan of 
operations which had heen imparted to Jackson on the 22nd. 

It was a design which to all appearance was almost fool- 
hardy. The Confederate army was organised as follows :— 


Longstreet . é : , : . Ln a OG 
Ah Eats. : : : . 14,000 
Magruder . : ; ; ‘ ‘ . 18,000 
Huger ‘ : : ; ‘ ; : 9,000 
Holmes. : ; ; : ; ; 6,500 
UP eS MAL SB : i ‘ ‘ i . 10,000 
Jackson . ; , ; ; 2 Ta ee 586) 
Cavalry. . ; : . : 3,000 
Reserve Artillery . : ; ‘ sii. BOO 
86,500 ” 


On the night of June 24 the whole of these troops, with 
the exception of the Valley army, were south of the Chicka- 
June 94, hominy, holding the earthworks which protected 
Richmond. Less than two miles eastward, strongly 
intrenched, lay four of McClellan’s army corps, in round 

numbers 75,000 officers and men.® 
To attack this force, even after Jackson’s arrival, 


1 Stuart’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part 1. 

2 This estimate is rather larger than that of the Confederate historians 
(Allan, W. H. Taylor, &c., &c.), but it has been arrived at after a careful 
examination of the strength at different dates and the losses in the various 
engagements. 

3 Return of June 20, O. R., vol. xi., part i., p. 238. 


10 STONEWALL JACKSON 


was to court disaster. The right was protected by the 
Chickahominy, the left rested on White Oak Swamp, a 
network of sluggish streams and impassable swamps, 
screened everywhere by tangled thickets. It needed not 
the presence of the siege ordnance, placed on the most 
commanding points within the lines, to make such a posi- 
tion absolutely impregnable. 

North of the Chickahominy, however, the Federals were 
less favourably situated. The Fifth Army Corps, 25,000 
strong,’ under General FitzJohn Porter, had been pushed 
forward, stretching a hand to McDowell and protecting the 
railway, in the direction of Mechanicsville; and although 
the tributaries of the Chickahominy, running in from the 
north, afforded a series of positions, the right flank of 
these positions, resting, as Stuart had ascertained, on 
no natural obstacle, was open to a turning movement. 
Furthermore, in rear of the Fifth Corps, and at an oblique 
angle to the front, ran the line of supply, the railway to 
West Point. If Porter’s right were turned, the Confede- 
rates, threatening the railway, would compel McClellan to 
detach largely to the north bank of the Chickahominy in 
order to recover or protect the line. 

On the north bank of the Chickahominy, therefore, 
Lee’s attention had been for some time fixed. Here was 
his adversary’s weak point, and a sudden assault on Porter, 
followed up, if necessary, by an advance against the 
railway, would bring McClellan out of his intrenchments, 
and force him to fight at a disadvantage. To ensure 
success, however, in the attack on Porter it was necessary 
to concentrate an overwhelming force on the north bank ; 
and this could hardly be done without so weakening the force 
which held the Richmond lines that it would be unable 
to resist the attack of the 75,000 men who faced it. If 
McClellan, while Lee was fighting Porter, boldly threw 
forward the great army he had on the south bank, the rebel 
capital might be the reward of his resolution. The danger 


1 The Fifth Army Corps included McCall’s division, which had but 
recently arrived by water from Fredericksburg. Report of June 20, O. R., 
vol. xi., part i., p. 238. 


LEE’S DARING 11 


was apparent to all, but Lee resolved to risk it, and his 
audacity has not escaped criticism. It has been said that 
he deliberately disregarded the contingency of McClellan 
either advancing on Richmond, or reinforcing Porter. 
The truth is, however, that neither Lee, nor those generals 
about him who knew McClellan, were in the least 
apprehensive that their over-cautious adversary, if the 
attack were sudden and well sustained, would either see or 
utilise his opportunity. 

From Hannibal to Moltke there has been no great 
captain who has neglected to study the character of his 
opponent, and who did not trade on the knowledge thus 
acquired, and it was this knowledge which justified Lee’s 
audacity. 

The real daring of the enterprise lay in the in- 
feriority of the Confederate armament. Muskets and 
shot-guns, still carried by a large part of the army, were 
ill-matched against rifles of the most modern manu- 
facture; while the smooth-bore field-pieces, with which 
at least half the artillery was equipped, possessed neither 
the range nor the accuracy of the rifled ordnance of the 
Federals. 

That lLee’s study of the chances had not been 
patient and exhaustive it is impossible to doubt. He was 
no hare-brained leader, but a profound thinker, following 
the highest principles of the military art. That he had 
weighed the disconcerting effect which the sudden appear- 
ance of the victorious Jackson, with an army of un- 
known strength, would produce upon McClellan, goes with- 
out saying. He had omitted no precaution to render the 
surprise complete, and although the defences of Richmond 
were still too weak to resist a resolute attack, Magruder, 
the same officer who had so successfully imposed upon 
McClellan at Yorktown, was such a master of artifice that, 
with 28,000 men and the reserve artillery,! he might be 
relied upon to hold Richmond until Porter had been dis- 


1 Magruder’s division, 13,000; Huger’s division, 9,000; reserve artil- 
lery, 3,000 ; 5 regiments of cavalry, 2,000. Holmes’ division, 6,500, was still 
retained on the south bank of the James. 


12 STONEWALL JACKSON 


posed of. The remainder of the army, 2,000 of Stuart’s 
cavalry, the divisions of Longstreet and the two Hills, 35,000 
men all told, crossing to the north bank of the Chickahominy 
and combining with the 18,500 under Jackson, would be 
sufficient to crush the Federal right. 

The initial operations, however, were of a somewhat 
complicated nature. Four bridges! crossed the river on 
Lee’s left. <A little more than a mile and a half from 
Mechanicsville Bridge, up stream, is Meadow Bridge, 
and five and a half miles further up is another passage 
at the Half Sink, afterwards called Winston’s Bridge. 
Three and a half miles below Mechanicsville Bridge 
is New Bridge. The northern approaches to Mechanics- 
ville, Meadow, and New Bridge, were in possession of the 
Federals ; and it was consequently no simple operation to 
transfer the troops before Richmond from one bank of the 
Chickahominy to the other. Only Mechanicsville and 
Meadow Bridges could be used. Winston’s Bridge was too 
far from Richmond, for, if Longstreet and the two Hills 
were to cross at that point, not only would Magruder be 
left without support during their march, but McClellan, 
warned by his scouts, would receive long notice of the 
intended blow and have ample time for preparation. To 
surprise Porter, to give McClellan no time for reflection, 
and at the same time to gain a position which would 
bring the Confederates operating on the north bank into 
close and speedy communication with Magruder on the 
south, another point of passage must be chosen. The 
position would be the one commanding New Bridge, for 
the Confederate earthworks, held by Magruder, ran due 
south from that point. But Porter was already in posses- 
sion of the coveted ground, with strong outposts at 
Mechanicsville. To secure, then, the two centre bridges 
was the first object. This, it was expected, would be 
achieved by the advance of the Valley army, aided by 
a brigade from the Half Sink, against the flank and 
rear of the Federals at Mechanicsville. Then, as soon 


1 Lee’s bridge, shown on the map, had either been destroyed or was not 
yet built. 


LEE’S ORDERS 18 


as the enemy fell back, Longstreet and the two Hills 
would cross the river by the Meadow and Mechanics- 
ville Bridges, and strike Porter in front, while Jackson 
attacked hisright. A victory would place the Confederates 
in possession of New Bridge, and the troops north of the 
Chickahominy would be then in close communication with 
Magruder. 

Lee’s orders were as follows :—‘ Headquarters, Army of 
Northern Virginia, June 24, 1862. General Orders, 
No. 75. 

‘I.—General Jackson’s command will proceed to-morrow 
(June 25) from Ashland towards the Slash (Merry Oaks) 
Church, and encamp at some convenient point west of the 
Central Railroad. Branch’s brigade of A. P. Hill’s division 
will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the Chicka- 
hominy, near Half Sink. At three o’clock Thursday 
morning, 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the 
road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his 
march to General Branch, who will immediately cross the 
Chickahominy, and take the road leading to Mechanics- 
ville. As soon as the movements of these columns 
are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest of 
his division, will cross the Chickahominy at Meadow 
Bridge, and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his 
advance the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at 
the proper time open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. 
The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville and the 
passage of the bridge being opened, General Longstreet, 
with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, will cross 
the Chickahominy at or near that point; General D. H. 
Hill moving to the support of General Jackson, and General 
Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill; the four 
divisions keeping in communication with each other, and 
moving en échelon on separate roads if practicable ; the left 
division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters 
extending in their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy, 
and endeavour to drive the enemy from his position above 
New Bridge, General Jackson bearing well to his left, 
turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction towards 


14 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Cold Harbour. They will then press forward towards the 
York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy’s rear, and 
forcing him down the Chickahominy. An advance of the 
enemy towards Richmond will be prevented by vigorously 
following his rear, and crippling and arresting his 
progress. 

‘{[.—The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder 
will hold their position in front of the enemy against 
attack, and make such demonstrations, Thursday, as to 
discover his operations. Should opportunity offer, the 
feint will be converted into a real attack. ... . 

‘TV.—General Stuart, with the 1st, 4th, and 9th 
Virginia Cavalry, the cavalry of Cobb’s Legion, and the 
Jeff Davis Legion, will cross the Chickahominy to-morrow 
(Wednesday, June 25), and take position to the left of 
General Jackson’s line of march. The main body will be 
held in reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and 
left. General Stuart will keep General Jackson informed 
of the movements of the enemy on his left, and will co- 
operate with him in his advance. .... 

On the 25th Longstreet and the two Hills moved 
towards the bridges; and although during the movement 
June 95, MeClellan drove back Magruder’s pickets to their 

' trenches, and pushed his own outposts nearer 
Richmond, Lee held firmly to his purpose. As a matter 
of fact, there was little to be feared from McClellan. 
With a profound belief in the advantages of defensive and 
in the strength of a fortified position, he expected nothing 
less than that the Confederates would leave the earthworks 
they had so laboriously constructed, and deliberately risk 
the perils of an attack. He seems to have had little 
idea that in the hands of a skilful general intrenchments 
may form a ‘pivot of operations,’! the means whereby he 
covers his most vulnerable point, holds the enemy in front, 
and sets his main body free for offensive action. Yet 


1 «The meaning of this term is clearly defined in Lee’s report. ‘It was 
therefore determined to construct defensive lines, so as to enable a part of 
the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free to operate on the 
north bank.’ O. R., vol. xi., part i., p. 490. 


A FAILURE IN CO-OPERATION 15 


McClellan was by no means easy in his mind. He knew 
Jackson was approaching. He knew his communications 
were threatened. Fugitive negroes, who, as usual, either 
exaggerated or lied, had informed him that the Confederates 
had been largely reinforced, and that Beauregard, with a 
portion of the Western army, had arrived in Richmond. 
But that his right wing was in danger he had not the 
faintest suspicion. He judged Lee by himself. Such a 
plan as leaving a small force to defend Richmond, and 
transferring the bulk of the army to join Jackson, he 
would have at once rejected as overdaring. If attack 
came at all, he expected that it would come by the 
south bank ; and he was so far from anticipating that an 
opportunity for offensive action might be offered to himself 
that, on the night of the 25th, he sent word to his corps 
commanders that they were to regard their intrenchments 
as ‘the true field of battle.’ ? 

Lee’s orders left much to Jackson. The whole opera- 
tion which Lee had planned hinged upon his movements. 
On the morning of the 24th he was at Beaver Dam Station. 
The same night he was to reach Ashland, eighteen miles 
distant as the crow flies. On the night of the 25th he was to 
halt near Slash Church, just west of the Virginia Central 
Railroad, and six miles west of Ashland. At three o’clock, 
June 26. however, on the morning of the 26th, the Army of 

3am. the Valley was still at Ashland, and it was not 
till nine that it crossed the railroad. Branch, on hearing 
10.30 am, hat Jackson was at last advancing, passed the 
Chickahominy by Winston’s Bridge, and driving 

the Federal pickets before him, moved on Mechanicsville. 
General A. P. Hill was meanwhile near Meadow Bridge, 
waiting until the advance of Jackson and Branch should 
turn the flank of the Federal force which blocked his 
passage. At 8 p.m., hearing nothing from his 
colleagues, and apprehensive that longer delay 
might hazard the failure of the whole plan, he ordered his 
advanced-guard to seize the bridge. The enemy, already 
threatened in rear by Branch, at once fell back. Hill followed 

1 O. B., vol. xi., part iii., p. 252. 


3 P.M. 


16 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the retiring pickets towards Beaver Dam Creek, and after a 
short march of three miles found himself under fire of the 
Federal artillery. Porter had occupied a position about 
two miles above New Bridge. 

The rest of the Confederate army was already crossing 
the Chickahominy ; and although there was no sign of 
Jackson, and the enemy’s front was strong, protected by a 
long line of batteries, Hill thought it necessary to order an 
attack. A message from Lee, ordering him to postpone all 
further movement, arrived too late.! There was no artillery 
preparation, and the troops, checked unexpectedly by a wide 
abattis, were repulsed with terrible slaughter, the casualties 
amounting to nearly 2,000 men.? The Union loss was 360. 

Jackson, about 4.80 p.m., before this engagement had 
begun, had reached Hundley’s Corner, three miles north 
430pm_, Of the Federal position, but separated from it by 

dense forest and the windings of the creek. On 
the opposite bank was a detachment of Federal infantry, 
supported by artillery. Two guns, accompanied by the 
advanced- guard, sufficed to drive this force to the 
shelter of the woods; and then, establishing his 
outposts, Jackson ordered his troops to bivouac. 

It has been asserted by more than one Southern 
general that the disaster at Beaver Dam Creek was due to 
Jackson’s indifferent tactics; and, at first sight, the bare 
facts would seem to justify the verdict. He had not reached 
his appointed station on the night of the 25th, and on the 
26th he was five hours behind time. He should have 
crossed the Virginia Central Railway at sunrise, but at 
nine o’clock he was still three miles distant. His advance 
against the Federal right flank and rear should have been 
made in co-operation with the remainder of the army. 
But his whereabouts was unknown when Hill attacked ; and 
although the cannonade was distinctly heard at Hundley’s 
Corner, he made no effort to lend assistance, and his troops 
were. encamping when their comrades, not three miles 


6 P.M. 


'! Letter from Capt. T. W.Sydnor, 4th Va. Cavalry, who carried the message. 
2 So General Porter. Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 331. 
sO. R., vol. xi., part i., pp. 38, 39. 


HIS DIFFICULT TASK 17 


away, were rushing forward to the assault. There would 
seem to be some grounds, then, for the accusation that his 
delay thwarted General Lee’s design; some reason for the 
belief that the victor of the Valley campaign, on his first 
appearance in combination with the main army, had proved 
a failure, and that his failure was in those very qualities 
of swiftness and energy to which he owed his fame. 

-General D. H. Hill has written that ‘ Jackson’s genius 
never shone when he was under the command of another. It 
seemed then to be shrouded or paralysed. . . . MacGregor 
on his native heath was not more different from MacGregor 
in prison than was Jackson his own master from Jackson 
in a subordinate position. This was the keynote to his 
whole character. The hooded falcon cannot strike the 
quarry.’ ! 

The reader who has the heart to follow this chronicle 
to the end will assuredly find reason to doubt the acumen, 
however he may admire the eloquence, of Jackson’s brother- 
in-law. When he reads of the Second Manassas, of 
Harper’s Ferry, of Sharpsburg and of Chancellorsville, he 
will recall this statement with astonishment ; and it will not 
be difficult to show that Jackson conformed as closely to 
the plans of his commander at Mechanicsville as else- 
where. 

The machinery of war seldom runs with the smoothness 
of clockwork. The course of circumstances can never be 
exactly predicted. Unforeseen obstacles may render the 
highest skill and the most untiring energy of no avail; 
and it may be well to point out that the task which was 
assigned to Jackson was one of exceeding difficulty. In 
the first place, his march of eight-and-twenty miles, from 
Frederickshall to Ashland, on June 28, 24, and 25, was 
made over an unmapped country, unknown either to 
himself or to his staff, which had lately been in occu- 
pation of the Federals. Bridges had been destroyed and 
roads obstructed. The Valley army had already marched 
far and fast; and although Dabney hints that inexperienced 
and sluggish subordinates were the chief cause of delay, 

1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 889, 390. 
VOL. IL. C 


18 STONEWALL JACKSON 


there is hardly need to look so far for excuse.' The march 
from Ashland to Hundley’s Corner, sixteen miles, was little 
less difficult. It was made in two columns, Whiting and the 
Stonewall division, now under Winder, crossing the railway 
near Merry Oaks Church, Ewell moving by Shady Grove 
Church ; but this distribution did not accelerate the march. 
‘The midsummer sun blazed fiercely down on the dusty 
roads ; the dense woods on either hand shut out the air, and 
interruptions were frequent. The Federal cavalry held a 
line from Atlee’s Station to near Hanover Court House. 
The 8th Illinois, over 700 strong, picketed all the woods 
between the Chickahominy and the Totopotomoy Creek. 
Two other regiments prolonged the front to the Pamunkey, 
and near Hundley’s Corner and Old Church were posted 
detachments of infantry. Skirmishing was constant. ‘The 
Federal outposts contested every favourable position. Here 
and there the roads were obstructed by felled trees; a 
burned bridge over the Totopotomoy delayed the advance for 
a full hour, and it was some time before the enemy’s force 
at Hundley’s Corner was driven behind Beaver Dam Creek. 

At the council of war, held on the 28rd, Lee had left 
it to Jackson to fix the date on which the operation against 
the Federal right should begin, and on the latter deciding on 
the 26th, Longstreet had suggested that he should make 
more ample allowance for the difficulties that might be pre- 
sented by the country and by the enemy, and give himself 
more time.” Jackson had not seen fit to alter his decision, 
and it is hard to say that he was wrong. 

Had McClellan received notice that the Valley army 
was approaching, a day’s delay would have given him a 
fine opportunity. More than one course would have been 
open to him. He might have constructed formidable in- 
trenchments on the north bank of the Chickahominy and 


' Dr. White, in his excellent Life of Lee, states that the tardiness of the 
arrival of the provisions sent him from Richmond had much to do with the 
delay of Jackson’s march. 

* ‘Tee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy.’ By General D. H. Hill. 
Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 347. General Longstreet, however, rom 
Manassas to Appomattox, says Jackson appointed the morning of the 25th, 
but, on Longstreet’s suggestion, changed the date to the 26th. 


= 


HIS DIFFICULT TASK 19 


have brought over large reinforcements of men and guns; 
or he might have turned the tables by a bold advance on 
Richmond. It was by no means inconceivable that if he 
detected Lee’s intention and was given time to prepare, he 
might permit the Confederates to cross the Chickahominy, 


_ amuse them there with a small force, and hurl the rest of 


his army on the works which covered the Southern capital. 
lt is true that his caution was extreme, and to a mind 
which was more occupied with counting the enemy’sstreneth 
than with watching for an opportunity, the possibility 
of assuming the offensive was not likely to occur. But, 
timid as he might be when no enemy was in sight, 
McClellan was constitutionally brave; and when the 
chimeras raised by an over-active imagination proved to 
be substantial dangers, he was quite capable of daring 
resolution. Time, therefore, was of the utmost im- 
portance to the Confederates. It was essential that Porter 
should be overwhelmed before McClellan realised the 
danger; and if Jackson, in fixing a date for the attack 
which would put a heavy tax on the marching powers of his 
men, already strained to the utmost, ran some risks, from 
a strategical point of view those risks were fully justified. 
In the second place, an operation such as that which 
Lee had devised is one of the most difficult manceuvres 
which an army can be called upon to execute. According to 
Moltke, to unite two forces on the battle-field, starting at 
some distance apart, at the right moment, is the most brilliant 
feat of generalship. The slightest hesitation may ruin the 
combination. Haste is even more to be dreaded. There is 
always the danger that one wing may attack, or be attacked, 
while the other is still far distant, and either contingency 
may be fatal. The Valley campaign furnishes more than 
one illustration. In their pursuit of Jackson, Shields and 
Frémont failed to co-operate at Strasburg, at Cross Keys, 
and at Port Republic. And greater generals than either 
Shields or Frémont have met with little better success in 
attempting the same manceuvre. At both Hylau and Bautzen 
Napoleon was deprived of decisive victory by his failure to 
ensure the co-operation of his widely separated columns. 
G2 


20 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Jackson and A. P. Hill, on the morning of the 26th, 
were nearly fifteen miles apart. Intercommunication at 
the outset was ensured by the brigade under Branch ; 
but as the advance progressed, and the enemy was 
met with, it became more difficult. The messengers 
riding from one force to the other were either stopped by 
the Federals, or were compelled to make long détours ; 
and as they approached the enemy’s position, neither 
Hill nor Jackson was informed of the whereabouts of the 
other. 

The truth is, that the arrangements made by the 
Confederate headquarter staff were most inadequate. 
In the first place, the order of the 24th, instructing 
Jackson to start from Slash Church at 8 a.m. on the 
26th, and thus leading the other generals to believe that he 
would certainly be there at that hour, should never have 
been issued. When it was written Jackson’s advanced- 
guard was at Beaver Dam Station, the rear brigades 
fifteen miles behind; and to reach Slash Church his 
force had to march forty miles through an intricate 
country, in possession of the enemy, and so little known 
that it was impossible to designate the route to be fol- 
lowed. ‘To fix an hour of arrival so long in advance was 
worse than useless, and Jackson cannot be blamed if he 
failed to comply with the exact letter of a foolish order. 
As it was, so many of the bridges were broken, and so 
difficult was it to pass the fords, that if Dr. Dabney had 
not found in his brother, a planter of the neighbourhood, 
an efficient substitute for the guide headquarters should 
have provided, the Valley army would have been not hours 
but days too late. In the second place, the duty of keeping 
up communications should not have been left to Jackson, 
but have been seen to at headquarters. Jackson had 
with him only a few cavalry, and these few had not 
only to supply the necessary orderlies for the subordinate 
generals, and the escorts for the artillery and trains, but to 
form his advanced-guard, for Stuart’s squadrons were on 
his left flank, and not in his front. Moreover, his cavalry 
were complete strangers tothe country, and there were no 


SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STAFF 21 


maps. In such circumstances the only means of ensuring 
constant communication was to have detached two of 
Stuart’s squadrons, who knew the ground, to establish a 
series of posts between Jackson’s line of march and the 
Chickahominy; and to have detailed a staff officer, whose sole 
duty would have been to furnish the Commander-in-Chief 
with hourly reports of the progress made, to join the Valley 
army.’ It may be remarked, too, that Generals Branch 
and Ewell, following converging roads, met near Shady 
Grove Church about 3p.m. Noreport appears to have been 
sent by the latter to General A. P. Hill; and although Branch 
a little later received a message to the effect that Hill had 
crossed the Chickahominy and was moving on Mechanics- 
ville,” the information was not passed on to Jackson. 

Neglect of these precautions made it impracticable to 
arrange a simultaneous attack, and co-operation depended 
solely on the judgment of Hill and Jackson. In the action 
which ensued on Beaver Dam Creek there was no co- 
operation whatever. Hillattacked and was repulsed. Jack- 
son had halted at Hundley’s Corner, three miles distant from 
the battle-field. Had the latter come down on the Federal 
rear while Hill moved against their front an easy success 
would in all probability have been the result. 

Nevertheless, the responsibility for Hill’s defeat cannot 
be held to rest on Jackson’s shoulders. On August 18, 
1870, the Prussian Guards and the Saxon Army Corps 


1 Of the events of June 26 Dr. Dabney, in a letter to the author, writes 
as follows :—‘ Here we had a disastrous illustration of the lack of an organised 
and intelligent general staff. Let my predicament serveas a specimen. As 
chief of Jackson’s staff, I had two assistant adjutant-generals, two men of 
the engineer department, and two clerks. What did I have for orderlies and 
couriers? A detail from some cavalry company which happened to bivouac 
near. The men were sent to me without any reference to their local know- 
ledge, their intelligence, or their courage ; most probably they were selected 
for me by their captain on account of their lack of these qualities. Next to 
the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff should be the best 
man inthe country. The brains of an army should be in the General Staff. 
The lowest orderlies attached to it should be the very best soldiers in the ser- 
vice, for education, intelligence, and courage. Jackson had to find his own 
guide for his march from Beaver Dam Station. He had not been furnished 
with a map, and not a single orderly or message reached him during the 
whole day.’ 

2 Branch’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part ii., p. 882. 


22 STONEWALL JACKSON 


were ordered to make a combined attack on the village 
of St. Privat, the Guards moving against the front, the 
Saxons against the flank. When the order was issued the 
two corps wére not more than two miles apart. The tract 
of country which lay between them was perfectly open, the 
roads were free, and inter-communication seemed easy in 
the extreme. Yet, despite their orders, despite the facilities 
of communication, the Guards advanced to the attack an 
hour and a half too soon; and from six o’clock to nearly 
seven their shattered lines lay in front of the position, 
at the mercy of a vigorous counterstroke, without a single 
Saxon regiment coming to their aid. But the Saxons were 
not to blame. Their march had been unchecked ; they had 
moved at speed. On their part there had been no hesita- 
tion; but on the part of the commander of the Guards 
there had been the same precipitation which led to the pre- 
mature attack on the Federal position at Beaver Dam 
Creek. It was the impatience of General Hill, not the 
tardiness of Jackson, which was the cause of the Con- 
federate repulse. 

We may now turn to the question whether Jackson was 
justified in not marching to the sound of the cannon. 
Referring to General Lee’s orders, it will be seen that as soon 
as Longstreet and D. H. Hill had crossed the Chickahominy 
the four divisions of the army were to move forward in com- 
munication with each other and drive the enone from his 
position, Jackson, in advance upon the left, ‘ turning Beaver 
Dam Creek, and taking the direction of Cold Harbour.’ 

When Jackson reached Hundley’s Corner, and drove the 
Federal infantry behind the Creek, the first thing to do, as 
his orders indicated, was to get touch with the rest of the 
army. It was already near sunset; between Hundley’s 
Corner and Mechaniesville lay a dense forest, with no roads 
in the desired direction; and it was manifestly impos- 
sible, under ordinary conditions, to do more that evening 
than to establish connection; the combined movement 
against the enemy’s position must be deferred till the 
morning. But the sound of battle to the south-west intro- 
duced a complication. ‘ We distinctly heard,’ says Jackson, 


CONFLICTING EVIDENCH 23 


‘the rapid and continued discharges of cannon.’! What did 
this fire portend? It might proceed, as was to be inferred 
from Lee’s orders, from the heavy batteries on the Chicka- 
hominy covering Hill’s passage. It might mean a Federal 
counterstroke on Hill’s advanced-guard ; or, possibly, a pre- 
mature attack on the part of the Confederates. General 
Whiting, according to his report, thought it ‘indicated a 
severe battle.’? General! Trimble, marching with Ewell, heard 
both musketry and artillery; and in his opinion the command 
should have moved forward ;* and whatever may have been 
Jackson’s orders, it was undoubtedly his duty, if he believed 
a hot engagement was in progress, to have marched to the 
assistance of his colleagues. He could not help them by 
standing still. He might have rendered them invaluable 
aid by pressing the enemy in flank. But the question is, 
What inference did the cannonade convey to Jackson’s 
mind? Was it of such a character as to leave no doubt 
that Hill was in close action, or might it be interpreted 
as the natural accompaniment of the passage of the 
Chickahominy ? The evidence is conflicting. On the one 
hand we have the evidence of Whiting and Trimble, both 
experienced soldiers; on the other, in addition to the 
indirect evidence of Jackson’s inaction, we have the state- 
ment of Major Dabney. ‘We heard no signs,’ says the 
chief of the staff, ‘of combat on Beaver Dam Creek 
until a little while before sunset. The whole catastrophe 
took place in a few minutes about that time; and in 
any case our regiments, who had gone into bivouac, could 
not have been reassembled, formed up, and moved forward 
in time to be of any service, A night attack through 
the dense, pathless, and unknown forest was quite im- 
practicable.’* It seems probable, then—and the Federal 
reports are to the same effect®-—that the firing was only really 
heavy for a very short period, and that Jackson believed it 

! Jackson’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part 1., p. 553. 

2 Whiting’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part i., p. 562. 

3 Trimble’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part i., p. 614. 

* Letter to the author. 

5 Porter’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., parti, p. 222. Battles and Leaders, 
vol. ii., p. 330. 


24 STONEWALL JACKSON 


to be occasioned by Hill’s passage of the Chickahominy, 
and the rout of the Federals from Mechanicsville. Neither 
‘Trimble nor Whiting were aware that Lee’s orders directed 
that the operation was to be covered by a heavy cannonade. 

Obeying orders very literally himself, Jackson found it 
difficult to believe that others did not do the same. He 
knew that the position he had taken up rendered the line of 
Beaver Dam Creek untenable by the Federals. They would 
never stand to fight on that line with a strong force esta- 
blished in their rear and menacing their communications, 
nor would they dare to deliver a counterstroke through the 
trackless woods. It might confidently be assumed, therefore, 
that they would fall back during the night, and that the 
Confederate advance would then be carried out in that con- 
centrated formation which Lee’s orders had dictated. Such, 
in all probability, was Jackson’s view of the situation ; and 
that Hill, in direct contravention of those orders, would 
venture on an isolated attack before that formation had 
been assumed never for a moment crossed his mind.' 

Hill, on the other hand, seems to have believed that if 
the Federals were not defeated on the evening of the 26th 
they would make use of the respite, either to bring up rein- 
forcements, or to advance on Richmond by the opposite 
bank of the Chickahominy. It is not impossible that 
he thought the sound of his cannon would bring Jackson to 
his aid. That it would have been wiser to establish com- 
munication, and to make certain of that aid before attacking, 
there can be no question. It was too late to defeat Porter 
the same evening. Nothing was to be gained by immediate 
attack, and much would be risked. ‘The last assault, in 
which the heaviest losses were incurred, was made just as 
night fell. It was a sacrifice of life as unnecessary as that of 
the Prussian Guard before St. Privat. At the same time, 
that General Hill did wrong in crossing the Chickahominy 
before he heard of his colleague’s approach is not a fair 


' Longstreet, on p. 124 of his From Manassas to Appomattom, declares 
that ‘Jackson marched by the fight without giving attention, and went 
into camp at Hundley’s Corner, half a mile in rear of the enemy’s position.’ 
A reference to the map is sufficient to expose the inaccuracy of this statement. 


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THE FEDERALS RETREAT 25 


accusation. To have lingered on the south bank would have 
been to leave Jackson to the tender mercies of the Federals 
should they turn against him in the forest. Moreover, 
it was Hill’s task to open a passage for the remaining 
divisions, and if that passage had been deferred to a later 
hour, it is improbable that the Confederate army would 
have been concentrated on the north bank of the Chicka- 
hominy until the next morning. It must be admitted, 
too, that the situation in which Hill found himself, 
after crossing the river, was an exceedingly severe 
test of his self-control. His troops had driven in the 
Federal outposts; infantry, cavalry, and artillery were 
retiring before his skirmishers. The noise of battle filled 
the air. From across the Chickahominy thundered the 
heavy guns, and his regiments were pressing forward with 
the impetuous ardour of young soldiers. Ifhe yielded to the 
excitement of the moment, if eagerness for battle over- 
powered his judgment, if his brain refused to work calmly 
in the wild tumult of the conflict, he is hardly to be blamed. 
The patience which is capable of resisting the eagerness 
of the troops, the imperturbable judgment which, in the 
heat of action, weighs with deliberation the necessities of 
the moment, the clear vision which forecasts the result of 
every movement—these are rare qualities indeed. 

During the night Porter fell back on Gaines’ Mill. 
While the engagement at Beaver Dam Creek was still in 
progress vast clouds of dust, rising above the forests to the 
north-west and north, had betrayed the approach of 
Jackson, and the reports of the cavalry left no doubt 
that he was threatening the Federal rear. 

The retreat was conducted in good order, a strong 
rear-guard, reinforced by two batteries of horse-artillery, 
holding the Confederates in check, and before morning a 
second position, east of Powhite Creek, and covering two 
bridges over the Chickahominy, Alexander’s and Grapevine, 
was occupied by the Fifth Army Corps. 

New Bridge was now uncovered, and Lee’s army was in 
motion shortly after sunrise, Jackson crossing Beaver Dam 
Creek and moving due south in the direction of Walnut 


26 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Grove Church.! The enemy, however, had already passed 
June 27, eastward ; and the Confederates, well concentrated 
5am. and in hand, pushed forward in pursuit ; A. P. Hill, 
with Longstreet on his right, moving on Gaines’ Mill, while 
Jackson, supported by D. H. Hill, and with Stuart covering 
his left, marched by a more circuitous route to Old Cold 
Harbour. Near Walnut Grove Church Jackson met the 
Commander-in-Chief, and it is recorded that the staff officers 
of the Valley army, noting the eagerness displayed by 
General Lee’s suite to get a glimpse of ‘ Stonewall,’ then for 
the first time realised the true character and magnitude 
of the Valley campaign. 

About noon, after a march of seven miles, A. P. Hill’s 
scouts reported that the Federals had halted behind 
Powhite Creek. The leading brigade was sent 
across the stream, which runs past Gaines’ 
Mill, and pressing through the thick woods found the 
enemy in great strength on a ridge beyond. Hill formed 
his division for attack, and opened fire with his four 
batteries. The enemy’s guns, superior in number, at 
once responded, and the skirmish lines became actively 
engaged. The Confederate general, despite urgent mes- 
sages from his subordinates, requesting permission to 
attack, held his troops in hand, waiting till he should be 
supported, and for two and a half hours the battle was no 
more than an affair of ‘ long bowls.’ 

~The position held by the defence was emphatically one 
to impose caution on the assailants. To reach it the 
Confederates were confined to three roads, two from 
Mechanicsville, and one from Old Cold Harbour. These 
roads led each of them through a broad belt of forest, 
and then, passing through open fields, descended into a 


12 noon. 


! Jackson's division—so-called in Lee’s order—really consisted of three 
divisions: ; 


Whiting’s Division { Hones oe 


Law’s 3 
Bis 6 Stonewall Brigade | B. T. Johnson’s Brigade 
ruideat Cunningham’s ,, | Ewell’s | Elzey’s 4 
Disaingd | ee 2 ' Division } Trimble’s ty 
Lawton’s 43 , Taylor’s Bs. 


BATTLE OF GAINES’ MILL 27 


winding valley, from five hundred to a thousand yards 
in breadth. Rising near McGehee’s House, due south 
of Old Cold Harbour, a sluggish creek, bordered by 
swamps and thick timber, and cutting in places a deep 
channel, filtered through the valley to the Chickahominy. 
Beyond this stream rose an open and undulating plateau, 
admirably adapted to the movement of all arms, and with 
a slight command of the opposite ridge. On the plateau, 
facing west and north, the Federals were formed up. A 
fringe of trees and bushes along the crest gave cover and 
concealment to the troops. 60 feet below, like the ditch 
of a fortress, the creek covered the whole front; and in 
the centre of the position, east of New Cold Harbour, the 
valley was completely filled with tangled wood. 

Towards Old Cold Harbour the timber on the Con- 
federate side of the ravine was denser than elsewhere. On 
the Federal left flank the valley of the Chickahominy was 
open ground, but it was swept by heavy guns from 
the right bank of the river, and at this point the creek 
became an almost impassable swamp. 

Porter, who had been reinforced by 9,000 men under 
General Slocum, now commanded three divisions of 
infantry, four regiments of cavalry, and twenty-two 
batteries, a total of 86,000 officers and men. The moral 
of the troops had been strengthened by their easy victory 
of the previous day. Their commander had gained 
their confidence; their position had been partially in- 
trenched, and they could be readily supported by way of 
Alexander’s and Grapevine Bridges from the south bank of 
the Chickahominy. 

The task before the Confederates, even with their 
superior numbers, was formidable in the extreme. The 
wooded ridge which encircled the position afforded scant 
room for artillery, and it was thus impracticable to prepare 
the attack by a preliminary bombardment. The ground 
over which the infantry must advance was completely 
swept by fire, and the centre and left were defended by 
three tiers of riflemen, the first sheltered by the steep 
banks of the creek, the second halfway up the bluff, 


28 STONEWALL JACKSON 


covered by a breastwork, the third on the crest, occupying 
p line of shelter-trenches; and the riflemen were sup- 
ported by a dozen batteries of rifled guns. 

But Lee had few misgivings. In one respect the 
Federal position seemed radically defective. The line of 
retreat on White House was exposed to attack from Old 
Cold Harbour. In fact, with Old Cold Harbour in posses- 
sion of the Confederates, retreat could only be effected by 
one road north of the Chickahominy, that by Parker’s 
Mill and Dispatch Station ; and if this road were threatened, 
Porter, in order to cover it, would be compelled to bring 
over troops from his left and centre, or to prolong his line 
until it was weak everywhere. There was no great reason to 
fear that McClellan would send Porter heavy reinforcements. 
To doso he would have to draw troopsfrom his intrenchments 
on the south bank of the Chickahominy, and Magruder had 
been instructed to maintain a brisk demonstration against 
this portion of the line. It was probable that the Federal 
commander, with his exaggerated estimate of the numbers 
opposed to him, would be induced by this means to antici- 
pate a general attack against his whole front, and would 
postpone moving his reserves until it was too late. 

While Hill was skirmishing with the Federals, Lee was 
anxiously awaiting intelligence of Jackson’s arrival at Old 
Cold Harbour. Longstreet was already forming up for* 
battle, and at 2.380 Hill’s regiments were slipped to the 
attack. A fierce and sanguinary conflict now 
ensued. Emerging in well-ordered lines from the 
cover of the woods, the Confederates swept down the open 
slopes. Floundering in the swamps, and struggling 
through the abattis which had been placed on the banks 
of the stream, they drove in the advanced line of hostile 
riflemen, and strove gallantly to ascend the slope which 
lay beyond. ‘But brigade after brigade,’ says General 
Porter, ‘seemed almost to melt away before the concen- 
trated fire of our artillery and infantry ; yet others pressed 
on, followed by supports daring and brave as their prede- 
cessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening 

1 The remainder of the guns were in reserve. 


2.30 P.M. 


A SECOND FAILURE IN CO-OPERATION 29 


effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and 
dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing back 
in great disorder from the deadly contest.’! For over 
an hour Hill fought on without support. There were 
no signs of Jackson, and Longstreet, whom it was not 
intended to employ until Jackson’s appearance should have 
caused the Federals to denude their left, was then sent in to 
save the day. 

As on the previous day, the Confederate attack had 
failed in combination. Jackson’s march had been again 
delayed. The direct road from Walnut Grove Church to 
Old Cold Harbour, leading through the forest, was found 
to be obstructed by felled timber and defended by sharp- 
shooters, and to save time Jackson’s division struck off 
into the road by Bethesda Church. This threw it in rear of 
D. H. Hill, and it was near 2 p.m. when the latter’s 
advanced-guard reached the tavern at the Old Cold Har- 
bour cross roads. No harm, however, had been done. 
A. P. Hill did not attack till half an hour later. But when 
he advanced there came no response from the left. A battery 
of D. H. Hill’s division was brought into action, but was soon 
silenced, and beyond this insignificant demonstration the 
Army of the Valley made no endeavour to join the battle. 
The brigades were halted by the roadside. Away to the right, 
above the intervening forest, rolled the roar of battle, the 
crash of shells and the din of musketry, but no orders 
were given for the advance. 

Nor had Jackson’s arrival produced the slightest con- 
sternation in the Federal ranks. Although from his 
position at Cold Harbour he seriously threatened their line 
of retreat to the White House, they had neither denuded 
their left nor brought up their reserves. Where he was 
now established he was actually nearer White House than 
any portion of Porter’s army corps, and yet that general 
apparently accepted the situation with equanimity. 

Lee had anticipated that Jackson’s approach would 
cause the enemy to prolong their front in order to cover 
their line of retreat to the White House, and so weaken 

' Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. il., p. 337. 


30 STONEWALL JACKSON 


that part of the position which was to be attacked by 
Longstreet; and Jackson had been ordered! to draw 
up his troops so as to meet such a contingency. ‘ Hoping,’ 
he says in his report, ‘that Generals A. P. Hill 
and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals towards 
me, I directed General D. H. Hill to move his division to 
the left of the wood, so as to leave between him and the 
wood on the right an open space, across which I hoped 
that the enemy would be driven.’ But Lee was deceived. 
The Federal line of retreat ran not to the White House, 
but over Grapevine Bridge. McClellan had for some time 
foreseen that he might be compelled to abandon the York 
River Railway, and directly he suspected that Jackson was 
marching to Richmond had begun to transfer his line of 
operations from the York to the James, and his base of 
supply from the White House to Harrison’s Landing. 

So vast is the amount of stores necessary for the 
subsistence, health, and armament of a _ host like 
McClellan’s that a change of base is an operation which 
can only be effected under the most favourable circum- 
stances.? It is evident, then, that the possibility of the 
enemy shifting his line of operations to the James, 
abandoning the York River Railroad, might easily have 


1 This order was verbal; no record of it is to be found, and Jackson 
never mentioned, either at the time or afterwards, what its purport 
was. His surviving staff officers, however, are unanimous in declaring 
that he must have received direct instructions from General Lee. ‘Is it 
possible,’ writes Dr. McGuire, ‘that Jackson, who knew nothing of the 
country, and little of the exact situation of affairs, would have taken the 
responsibility of stopping at Old Cold Harbour for an hour or more, unless 
he had had the authority of General Lee to do so? I saw him that 
morning talking to General Lee. General Lee was sitting on a log, and 
Jackson standing up. General Lee was evidently giving him instructions 
for the day.’ In his report (O. R., vol. xi., part i., p. 492) Lee says: ‘ The 
arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected ; it was supposed 
that his approach would cause the enemy’s extension in that direction.’ 

2 The Army of the Potomac numbered 105,000 men, and 25,000 
animals. 600 tons of ammunition, food, forage, medical and other supplies 
had to be forwarded each day from White House to the front; and at one 
time during the operations from fifty to sixty days’ rations for the 
entire army, amounting probably to 25,000 tons, were accumulated at the 
depot. 5 tons daily per 1,000 men is a fair estimate for an army operating 
in a barren country. 


SYKES’S REGULARS 31 


escaped the penetration of either Lee or Jackson. They 
were not behind the scenes of the Federal administrative 
system. They were not aware of the money, labour, 
and ingenuity which had been lavished on the business of 
supply. They had not seen with their own eyes the 
fleet of four hundred transports which covered the reaches 
of the York. They had not yet realised the enormous 
advantage which an army derives from the command of 
the sea. 

Nor were they enlightened by the calmness with which 
their immediate adversaries on the field of battle regarded 
Jackson’s possession of Old Cold Harbour. Still, one fact 
was manifest: the Federals showed no disposition what- 
ever to weaken or change their position, and it was clear that 
the success was not to be attained by mere maneuvre. Lee, 
seeing Hill’s division roughly handled, ordered Longstreet 
forward, while Jackson, judging from the sound and 
direction of the firing that the original plan had failed, 
struck in with vigour. Opposed to him was Sykes’ division 
of regulars, supported by eighteen guns, afterwards 
increased to twenty-four; and in the men of the United 
States Army the Valley soldiers met a stubborn foe. The 
position, moreover, occupied by Sykes possessed every 
advantage which a defender could desire. Manned even 
by troops of inferior mettle it might well have proved 
impregnable. The valley was wider than further west, 
and a thousand yards intervened between the opposing 
ridges. From either crest the cornfields sloped gently to 
the marshy sources of the creek, hidden by tall timber 
and dense undergrowth. The right and rear of the 
position were protected by a second stream, running south 
to the Chickahominy, and winding through a swamp which 
Stuart, posted on Jackson’s left, pronounced impassable for 
horsemen. Between the head waters of these two streams 
rose the spur on which stands McGehee’s house, facing 
the road from Old Cold Harbour, and completely command- 
ing the country to the north and north-east. The flank, 
therefore, was well secured; the front was strong, with a 
wide field of fire; the Confederate artillery, even if it could 


32 STONEWALL JACKSON 


make its way through the thick woods on the opposite crest, 
would have to unlimber under fire at effective range, and 
the marsh below, with its tangled undergrowth and abattis, 
could hardly fail to throw the attacking infantry into dis- 
order. Along the whole of Sykes’ line only two weak points 
were apparent. On his left, as already described, a broad 
tract of woodland, covering nearly the whole valley, and 
climbing far up the slope on the Federal side, afforded a 
covered approach from one crest to the other; on his right, 
a plantation of young pines skirted the crest of McGehee’s 
Hill, and ran for some distance down the slope. Under 
shelter of the timber it was possible that the Confederate 
infantry might mass for the assault; but oncein the open, 
unaided by artillery, their further progress would be difh- 
cult. Under ordinary circumstances a thorough reconnais- 
sance, followed by a carefully planned attack, would have 
been the natural course of the assailant. The very strength 
of the position was in favour of the Confederates. The 
creek which covered the whole front rendered a counterstroke 
impracticable, and facilitated a flank attack. Holding the 
right bank of the creek with a portion of his force, 
Jackson might have thrown the remainder against 
McGehee’s Hill, and, working round the flank, have repeated 
the tactics of Kernatown, Winchester, and Port Republic. 

But the situation permitted no delay. A. P. Hill was 
hard pressed. The sun was already sinking. McClellan’s 
reserves might be coming up, and if the battle was to be 
won, it must be won by direct attack. There was no time 
for further reconnaissance, no time for manceuvre. 

Jackson’s dispositions were soon made. D. H. Hill, east- 
ward of the Old Cold Harbour road, was to advance against 
McGehee’s Hill; overlapping, if possible, the enemy’s line. 
Ewell was to strike in on Hill’s right, moving through the 
tract of woodland; Lawton, Whiting, and Winder, in the 
order named, were to fill the gap between Ewell’s right and 
the left of A. P. Hill’s division, and the artillery was ordered 
into position opposite McGehee’s Hill. 

D. H. Hill, already in advance, was the first to move. 
Pressing forward from the woods, under a heavy fire of 


AN UNFORTUNATE MESSAGE 33 


artillery, his five brigades, the greater part in first line, 
descended to the creek, already occupied by his skir- 
mishers. In passing through the marshy thickets, 
where the Federal shells were bursting on every hand, the 
confusion became great. The brigades crossed each other’s 
march. Regiments lost their brigades, and companies their 
regiments. At one point the line was so densely crowded that 
whole regiments were forced to the rear; at others there were 
wide intervals, and effective supervision became impossible. 
Along the edge of the timber the fire was fierce, for the Union 
regulars were distant no more than four hundred yards ; the 
smoke rolled heavily through the thickets, and on the right 
and centre, where the fight was hottest, the impetuosity of 
both officers and men carried them forward up the slope. An 
attempt to deliver a charge with the whole line failed in com- 
bination, and such portion of the division as advanced, 
scourged by both musketry and artillery, fell back before 
the fire of the unshaken Federals. 

In the wood to the right Ewell met with even fiercer 
opposition. So hastily had the Confederate line been formed, 
and so difficult was it for the brigades to maintain touch and 
direction in the thick covert, that gaps soon opened along 
the front; andof these gaps, directly the Southerners gained 
the edge of the timber, the Northern brigadiers took 
quick advantage. Not content with merely holding their 
eround, the regular regiments, changing front so as to 
strike the flanks of the attack, came forward with the 
bayonet, and a vigorous counterstroke, delivered by five 
battalions, drove Ewell across the swamp. Part of Trimble’s 
brigade still held on in the wood, fighting fiercely; but 
the Louisiana regiments were demoralised, and there were 
no supports on which they might have rallied. 

Jackson, when he ordered Hill to the front, had sent 
verbal instructions—always dangerous—for the remainder 
of his troops to move forward in line of battle.! The young 


4 P.M. 


1 The instructions, according to Dr. Dabney, ran as follows :— 

‘The troops are standing at ease along our line of march. Ride back 
rapidly along the line and tell the commanders to advance instantly en 
échelon from the left. Hach brigade is to follow as a guide the right 

VOL. II. D 


34 STONEWALL JACKSON 


staff officer to whom these instructions were entrusted, 
misunderstanding the intentions of his chief, communi- 
cated the message to the brigadiers with the addition 
that ‘they were to await further orders before engaging 
the enemy.’ Partly for this reason, and partly because 
the rear regiments of his division had lost touch with the 
leading brigades, Ewell was left without assistance. For 
some time the error was undiscovered. Jackson grew 
anxious. From his station near Old Cold Harbour little 
could be seen of the Confederate troops. On the ridge 
beyond the valley the dark lines of the enemy’s infantry 
were visible amongst the trees, with their well-served 
batteries on the crests above. But in the valley immediately 
beneath, and as well as in the forest to the right front, the 
dense smoke and the denser timber hid the progress of the 
fight. Yet the sustained fire was a sure token that the 
enemy still held his own; and for the first time and the last 
his staff beheld their leader riding restlessly to and fro, and 
heard his orders given in a tone which betrayed the storm 
within.’ ‘Unconscious,’ says Dabney, ‘ that his veteran bri- 
gades were but now reaching the ridge of battle, he supposed 
that all his strength had been put forth, and (what had 
never happened before) the enemy was not crushed.’ ? 
Fortunately, the error of the aide-de-camp had already been 
corrected by the vigilance of the chief of the staff, and 
the remainder of the Valley army was coming up. 

Their entry into battle was not in accordance with the 


regiment of the brigade on the left, and to keep within supporting distance. 
Tell the commanders that if this formation fails at any point, to form line 
of battle and move to the front, pressing to the sound of the heaviest firing 
and attack the enemy vigorously whereverfound. As to artillery, each com- 
mander must use his discretion. If the ground will at all permit tell them 
to take in their field batteries and use them. If not, post them in the rear.’ 
Letter to the author. 

1 It may be noted that Jackson’s command had now been increased by 
two divisions, Whiting’s and D. H. Hill’s, but there had been no increase in 
the very small staff which had sufficed for the Valley army. The mistakes 
which occurred at Gaines’ Mill, and Jackson’s ignorance of the movements 
and progress of his troops, were in great part due to his lack of staff officers. 
A most important message, writes Dr. Dabney, involving tactical knowledge, 
was carried by a non-combatant. 

* Dabney, vol. ii., p. 194. 


THE LAST CHARGE 35 


intentions of their chief. Whiting should have come in 
on Ewell’s right, Lawton on the right of Whiting, and 
Jackson’s division on the right of Lawton. Whiting led 
the way; but he had advanced only a short distance 
through the woods when he was met by Lee, who directed 
him to support General A. P. Hill! The brigades of Law 
and of Hood were therefore diverted to the right, and, 
deploying on either side of the Gaines’ Mill road, were 
ordered to assault the commanding bluff which marked the 
angle of the Federal position. Lawton’s Georgians, 3,500 
strong, moved to the support of well; Cunningham and Ful- 
kerson, of Winder’s division, losing direction in the thickets, 
eventually sustained the attack of Longstreet, and the 
Stonewall Brigade reinforced the shattered ranks of D. H. 
Hill. Yet the attack was strong, and in front of Old Cold 
Harbour six batteries had forced their way through the forest. 

As this long line of guns covered McGehee’s Hill with 
a storm of shells, and the louder crash of musketry told 
him that his lagging brigades were coming into line, 
Jackson sent his last orders to his divisional commanders: 
‘Tell them,’ he said, ‘this affair must hang in suspense no 
longer; let them sweep the field with the bayonet.’ But 
there was no need for further urging. Before the messen- 
gers arrived the Confederate infantry, in every quarter of 
the battlefield, swept forward from the woods, and a vast wave 
of men converged upon the plateau. Lee, almost at the same 
moment as Jackson, had given the word for a general 
advance. As the supports came thronging up the shout was 
carried down the line, ‘ The Valley men are here!’ and with 
the cry of ‘ Stonewall Jackson !’ for their slogan, the Southern 
army dashed across the deepravine. Whiting, with the eight 
regiments of Hood and Law, none of which had been yet 
engaged, charged impetuously against the centre. The 
brigades of A. P. Hill, spent with fighting but clinging stub- 
bornly to their ground, found strength for a final effort. 
Longstreet threw in his last reserve against the triple line 
which had already decimated his division. Lawton’s 
Georgians bore back the regulars. D. H. Hill, despite the 

1 Whiting’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part i., p. 563. 
D2 


36 STONEWALL JACKSON 


fire of the batteries on McGehee’s Hill, which, disregarding 
the shells of Jackson’s massed artillery, turned with canister 
on the advancing infantry, made good his footing on the 
ridge; and as the sun, low on the horizon, loomed blood-red 
through the murky atmosphere, the Confederate colours 
waved along the line of abandoned breastworks. 

As the Federals retreated, knots of brave men, hastily 
collected by officers of all ranks, still offered a fierce resist- 
ance, and, supported by the batteries, inflicted terrible losses 
on the crowded masses which swarmed up from the ravine ; 
but the majority of the infantry, without ammunition and 
with few officers, streamed in disorder to the rear. For a 
time the Federal gunners stood manfully to their work. 
Porter’s reserve artillery, drawn up midway across the 
upland, offered a rallying point to the retreating infantry. 
Three small squadrons of the 5th United States Cavalry 
made a gallant but useless charge, in which out of seven 
officers six fell; and on the extreme right the division of 
regulars, supported by a brigade of volunteers, fell back 
fighting to a second line. As at Bull Run, the disciplined 
soldiers alone showed a solid front amid the throng of 
fugitives. Not a foot of ground had they yielded till their 
left was exposed by the rout of the remainder. Of the 
four batteries which supported them only two guns were 
lost, and on their second position they made a deter- 
mined effort to restore the fight. But their stubborn 
valour availed nothing against the superior numbers which 
Lee’s fine strategy had concentrated on the field of battle. 

Where the first breach was made in the Federal line is 
a matter of dispute. Longstreet’s men made a magnifi- 
cent charge on the right, and D. H. Hill claimed to have 
turned the flank of the regulars; but it is abundantly 
evident that the advent of Jackson’s fresh troops, and the 
vigour of their assault, broke down the resistance of the 
Federals.! When the final attack developed, and along the 
whole front masses of determined men, in overwhelming 


1 Porter himself thought that the first break in his line was made by 
Hood, ‘ at a point where he least expected it.’— Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., 
pp. 335 and 340. 


WHITING’S ASSAULT 37 


numbers, dashed against the breastworks, Porter’s 
troops were well-nigh exhausted, and not a single regiment 
remained in reserve. Against the very centre of his line 
the attack was pushed home by Whiting’s men with extra- 
ordinary resolution. His two brigades, marching abreast, 
were formed in two lines, each about 2,000 strong. Riding 
along the front, before they left the wood, the general had en- 
joined his men to charge without a halt, in double time, and 
without firing. ‘ Had these orders,’ says General Law, ‘ not 
been strictly obeyed the assault would have been a failure. 
No troops could have stood long under the withering storm 
of lead and iron that beat in their faces as they became fully 
exposed to view from the Federal line.’! The assault was 
met with a courage that was equally admirable.? But the 
Confederate second line reinforced the first at exactly the right 
moment, driving it irresistibly forward; and the Federal 
regiments, which had been hard pressed through a long 
summer afternoon, and had become scattered in the thickets, 
were ill-matched with the solid and ordered ranks of brigades 
which had not yet fired a shot. It was apparently at this 
point that the Southerners first set foot on the plateau, and 
sweeping over the intrenchments, outflanked the brigades 
which still held out to right and left, and compelled them to 
fall back. Inspired by his soldierly enthusiasm for a gallant 
deed, Jackson himself has left us a vivid description of the 
successful charge. ‘On my extreme right,’ he says in his 
report, ‘General Whiting advanced his division through 
the dense forest and swamp, emerging from the wood into 
the field near the public road and at the head of the deep 
ravine which covered the enemy’s left. Advancing thence 
through a number of retreating and disordered regiments 
he came within range of the enemy’s fire, who, concealed in 
an open wood and protected by breastworks, poured a 
destructive fire for a quarter of a mile into his advancing 


1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 363. 

«The Confederates were within ten paces when the Federals broke 
cover, and leaving their log breastworks, swarmed up the hill in rear, carry- 
ing the second line with them in their rout.’—General Law, Battles and 
Leaders, vol. ii., p. 363. 


38 STONEWALL JACKSON 


line, under which many brave officers and men fell. 
Dashing on with unfaltering step in the face of these 
murderous discharges of canister and musketry, General 
Hood and Colonel Law, at the heads of their respective 
brigades, rushed to the charge with a yell. Moving down 
a precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clambering 
up a difficult ascent, and exposed to an incessant and 
deadly fire from the intrenchments, those brave and 
determined men pressed forward, driving the enemy from 
his well-selected and fortified position. In this charge, 
in which upwards of 1,000 men fell killed and wounded 
before the fire of the enemy, and in which 14 pieces of 
artillery and nearly a whole regiment were captured, the 
Ath Texas, under the lead of General Hood, was the first 
to pierce these strongholds and seize the guns.’ ! 

How fiercely the Northern troops had battled is told in 
the outspoken reports of the Confederate generals. Before 
Jackson’s reserves were thrown in the first line of the Con- 
federate attack had been exceedingly roughly handled. 
A. P. Hill’s division had done good work in preparing the 
way for Whiting’s assault, but a portion of his troops had 
become demoralised. Hvwell’s regiments met the same fate ; 
and we read of them ‘ skulking from the front in a shameful 
manner ; the woods on our left and rear full of troops in 
safe cover, from which they never stirred; ’ of ‘ regiment 
after regiment rushing back in utter disorder ;’ of others 
which it was impossible to rally ; and of troops retiring in 
confusion, who cried out to the reinforcements, ‘You need 
not go in; we are whipped, we can’t do anything!’ It is 
only fair to say that the reinforcements replied, ‘ Get out of 
our way, we will show you how to do it;’? but it is not to 
be disguised that the Confederates at one time came near 
defeat. With another division in reserve at the critical 
moment, Porter might have maintained his line unbroken. 
His troops, had they been supported, were still capable of 
resistance. 


1 Jackson’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part i., pp. 555, 556. 
2 Reports of Whiting, Trimble, Rodes, Bradley T, Johnson, O. R., vol. xi., 
part i. 


McCLELLAN AND PORTER 39 


McClellan, however, up tothe time the battle was lost, had 
sent but one division (Slocum’s) and two batteries to Porter’s 
support. 66,000 Federals, on the south bank of the Chicka- 
hominy, had been held in their intrenchmenis, throughout 
the day, by the demonstrations of 28,000 Confederates. 
Intent on saving his trains, on securing his retreat to the 
river James, and utterly regardless of the chances which 
fortune offered, the ‘ Young Napoleon’ had allowed his rear- 
guard to be overwhelmed. He was not seen on the plateau 
which his devoted troops so well defended, nor even at the 
advanced posts on the further bank of the Chickahominy. 
So convinced was he of the accuracy of the information fur- 
nished by his detective staff that he never dreamt of testing 
the enemy’s numbers by his own eyesight. Had he watched 
the development of Lee’s attack, noted the small number of 
his batteries, the long delay in the advance of the supports, 
the narrow front of his line of battle, he would have 
discovered that the Confederate strength had been greatly 
exaggerated. There were moments, too, during the fight 
when a strong counterstroke, made by fresh troops, would 
have placed Lee’s army in the greatest peril. But a 
‘general who thinks only of holding his lines and not of 
annihilating the enemy is a poor tactician, and McClel- 
lan’s lack of enterprise, which Lee had so accurately gauged, 
may be inferred from his telegram to Lincoln: ‘I have lost 
this battle because my force is too small.’ ! 

Porter was perhaps a more than sufficient substitute for 
the Commander-in-Chief. His tactics, as fighting a waiting 
battle, had been admirable ; and, when his front was broken, 
strongly and with cool judgment he sought to hold back the 
enemy and cover the bridges. The line of batteries he esta- 
blished across the plateau—80 guns in all—proved at first 
an effective barrier. But the retreat of the infantry, the 
waning light, and the general dissolution of all order, had its 
effect upon the gunners. When the remnant of the 5th 
Cavalry was borne back in flight, the greater part of the 
batteries had already limbered up, and over the bare surface 
of the upland the Confederate infantry, shooting down 

1 Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War. 


40 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the terrified teams, rushed forward in hot pursuit. 22 
guns, with a large number of ammunition waggons, were 
captured on the field, prisoners surrendered atevery step, and 
the fight surged onward towards the bridges. But between 
the bridges and the battlefield, on the slopes falling to the 
Chickahominy, the dark forest covered the retreat of 
the routed army. Night had already fallen. The con- 
fusion in the ranks of the Confederates was extreme, and 
it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe. All 
direction had been lost. None knew the bearings of the 
bridges, or whether the Federals were retreating east or 
south. Regiments had already been exposed to the fire of 
their comrades, and in front of the forest a perceptible 
hesitation seized on both officers and men. At this 
moment, in front of D. H. Hill’s division, which was 
advancing by the road leading directly to the bridges, loud 
cheers were heard. It was clear that Federal reinforce- 
ments had arrived; the general ordered his troops to halt, 
and along the whole line the forward movement came quickly 
to a standstill. Two brigades, French’s and Meagher’s, 
tardily sent over by McClellan, had arrived in time to 
stave off a terrible disaster. Pushing through the mass 
of fugitives with the bayonet, these fine troops had crossed 
the bridge, passed through the woods, and formed line on 
the southern crest of the plateau. Joining the regulars, 
who still presented a stubborn front, they opened a heavy 
fire, and under cover of their steadfast lines Porter’s troops 
withdrew across the river. 

Notwithstanding this strong reinforcement of 5,000 
or 6,000 fresh troops, it is by no means impossible, had 
the Confederates pushed resolutely forward, that the 
victory would have been far more complete. ‘ Winder,’ 
says General D. H. Hill, ‘thought that we ought to pursue 
into the woods, on the right of the Grapevine Bridge road ; 
but not knowing the position of our friends, nor what 
Federal reserves might be awaiting us in the woods, I 
thought it advisable not to move on. General Lawton 
concurred with me. I had no artillery to shell the woods 
in front, as mine had not got through the swamp. Winder,’ 


NEARLY CAPTURED | 41 


he adds, ‘ was right; even a show of pressure must have 
been attended with great result.2! Had Jackson been at 
hand the pressure would in all probability have been 
applied. The contagion of defeat soon spreads; and what- 
ever reserves a flying enemy may possess, if they are 
vigorously attacked whilst the fugitives are still passing 
through their ranks, history tells us, however bold their 
front, that, unless they are intrenched, their resistance 
is seldom long protracted. More than all, when night has 
fallen on the field, and prevents all estimate of the strength 
of the attack, a resolute advance has peculiar chances of 
success. But when his advanced line halted Jackson was 
not yet up; and before he arrived the impetus of victory 
had died away; the Federal reserves were deployed in 
a strong position, and the opportunity had already passed. 

It is no time, when the tide of victory bears him 
forward, for a general ‘ to take counsel of his fears.’ It is 
no time to count numbers, or to conjure up the phantoms 
of possible reserves; the sea itself is not more irresistible 
than an army which has stormed a strong position, and 
which has attained, in so doing, the exhilarating conscious- 
ness of superior courage. Had Stuart, with his 2,000 
horsemen, followed up the pursuit towards the bridges, the 
Federal reserves might have been swept away in panic. 
But Stuart, in common with Lee and Jackson, expected 
that the enemy would endeavour to reach the White House, 
and when he saw that their lines were breaking he had 
dashed down a lane which led to the river road, about three 
miles distant. When he reached that point, darkness had 
already fallen, and finding no traces of the enemy, he had 
returned to Old Cold Harbour. 

On the night of the battle the Confederates remained 
where the issue of the fight had found them. Across the 
Grapevine road the pickets of the hostile forces were in 
close proximity, and men of both sides, in search of water, 
or carrying messages, strayed within the enemy’s lines. 
Jackson himself, it is said, came near capture. Riding 
forward in the darkness, atiended by only a few staff 

1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 357. 


42 STONEWALL JACKSON 


officers, he suddenly found himself in presence of a 
Federal picket. Judging rightly of the enemy’s moral, 
he set spurs to his horse, and charging into the midst, 
ordered them to lay down their arms; and fifteen or 
twenty prisoners, marching to the rear, amused the troops 
they met on the march by loudly proclaiming that they 
had the honour of being captured by Stonewall Jack- 
son. These men were not without companions. 2,830 
Federals were reported either captured or missing; and 
while some of those were probably among the dead, a large 
proportion found their way to Richmond ; 4,000, moreover, 
had fallen on the field of battle.' 

The Confederate casualties were even a clearer proof of 
the severity of the fighting. So far as can be ascertained, 
8,000 officers and men were killed or wounded. 


Longstreet : ‘ ; : : ; . 1,850 
A. P. Hill. a : ‘ : : . 2,450 
Jackson . : 4 ‘ d : : . 98,700 
Jackson’s losses were distributed as follows :— 
Jackson’s own Division . : . ‘ . 600 
Ewell : F : : : A ; 650 
Whiting . ; : : : : ‘ . 1,020 
DH. Blk : . : ; ’ ; . 1,480 


The regimental losses, in several instances, were 
exceptionally severe. Of the 4th Texas, of Hood’s brigade, 
the first to pierce the Federal line, there fell 20 officers and 
230 men. The 20th North Carolina, of D. H. Hill’s divi- 
sion, which charged the batteries on McGehee’s Hill, lost 70 
killed and 200 wounded ; of the same division the 3rd Ala- 
bama lost 200, and the 12th North Carolina 212; while two 
of Lawton’s regiments, the 31st and the 38th Georgia, had 
each a casualty list of 170. Almost every single regiment 
north of the Chickahominy took part in the action. The 
cavalry did nothing, but at least 48,000 infantry were 
engaged, and seventeen batteries are mentioned in the 
reports as having participated in the battle. : 

1 0. B., vol. xi., part i., pp. 40-2. 


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CHAPTER XIV 
THE SEVEN DAYS. FRAYSER’S FARM AND MALVERN HILL 


THE battle of Gaines’ Mill, although the assailants suffered 
heavier losses than they inflicted, was a long step towards 
June 28, accomplishing the deliverance of Richmond. One 

1862. of McClellan’s five army corps had been disposed 
of, a heavy blow had been struck at the moral of his 
whole army, and his communications with the White 
House and the Pamunkey were at the mercy of his 
enemies. Still the Confederate outlook was not altogether 
clear. It is one thing to win a victory, but another 
to make such use of it as to annihilate the enemy. 
Porter’s defeat was but a beginning of operations; and 
although Lee was convinced that McClellan would retreat, 
he was by no means so certain that bis escape could be 
prevented. Yet this was essential. If the Federal army 
were suffered to fall back without incurring further loss, it 
would be rapidly reinforced from Washington, and resuming 
the advance, this time with still larger numbers, might 
render Gaines’ Mill a barren victory. How to compass 
the destruction of McClellan’s host was the problem that 
now confronted the Confederate leader ; and before a plan 
could be devised it was necessary to ascertain the direction 
of the retreat. 

On the morning of June 28 it was found that no formed 
body of Federal troops remained north of the Chicka- 
hominy. French, Meagher, and Sykes, the regulars form- 
ing the rear-guard, had fallen back during the night and 
destroyed the bridges. Hundreds of stragglers were 
picked up, and one of the most gallant of the Northern 


44 STONEWALL JACKSON 


brigadiers! was found asleep in the woods, unaware that 
his troops had crossed the stream. No further fighting 
was to be expected on the plateau. But it was possible 
that the enemy might still endeavour to preserve his com- 
munications, marching by the south bank of the river and 
recrossing by the railway and Bottom’s Bridges. Stuart, 
supported by Ewell, was at once ordered to seize the former ; 
but when the cavalry reached Dispatch Station, a small 
Federal detachment retreated to the south bank of the 
Chickahominy and fired the timbers. 

Meanwhile, from the field of Gaines’ Mill, long columns 
of dust, rising above the forests to the south, had been 
descried, showing that the enemy was in motion; and 
when the news came in that the railway bridge had been 
destroyed, and that the line itself was unprotected, it was 
at once evident that McClellan had abandoned his com- 
munications with White House. 

This was valuable information, but still the line of 
retreat had not yet been ascertained. The Federals might 
retreat to some point on the James River, due south, there 
meeting their transports, or they might march down the 
Peninsula to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe. ‘In the 
latter event,’ says Lee, ‘it was necessary that our troops 
should continue on the north bank of the river, and until 
the intention of General McClellan was discovered it 
was deemed injudicious to change their disposition. Ewell 
was therefore ordered to proceed to Bottom’s Bridge, and 
the cavalry to watch the bridges below. No certain indica- 
tions of a retreat to the James River were discovered by 
our forces (Magruder) on the south side of the Chicka- 
hominy, and late in the afternoon the enemy’s works were 
reported to be fully manned. Below (south of) the enemy’s 
works the country was densely wooded and intersected by 
impassable swamps, at once concealing his movements and 
precluding reconnaissances except by the regular roads, all 
of which were strongly guarded. The bridges over the 
Chickahominy in rear of the enemy were destroyed, 
and their reconstruction impracticable in the presence of 

1 General Reynolds. 


‘THE FOG OF WAR’ 45 


his whole army and powerful batteries. We were there- 
fore compelled to wait until his purpose should be de- 
veloped.’ ! 

During the day, therefore, the Confederate army re- 
mained on the battle-field, waiting for the game to bolt. 
In the evening, however, signs of a general movement were 
reported in rear of the intrenchments at Seven Pines; 
and as nothing had been observed by the cavalry on the 
Chickahominy, Lee, rightly concluding that McClellan was 
retreating to the James, issued orders for the pursuit to be 
taken up the next morning. 

But to intercept the enemy before he could fortify a posi- 
tion, covered by the fire of his gunboats, on the banks of the 
James, was a difficult operation. The situation demanded 
rapid marching, close concert, and delicate manoeuvres. 
The Confederate army was in rear of the Federals, and 
separated from them by the Chickahominy, and, to reach 
the James, McClellan had only fourteen miles to cover. 
But the country over which he had to pass was still more 
intricate, and traversed by even fewer roads, than the 
district which had hitherto been the theatre of operations. 
Across his line of march ran the White Oak Swamp, 
bordered by thick woods and a wide morass, and crossed 
by only one bridge. If he could transfer his whole army 
south of this stream, without molestation, he would find 
himself within six miles of his gunboats; and as his left flank 
was already resting on the Swamp, it was not easy for Lee’s 
army to prevent his passage. 

But 28,000 Confederates were already south of the 
Chickahominy, on the flank of McClellan’s line of march, 
and it was certainly possible that this force might detain 
the Federals until A. P. Hill, Longstreet, and Jackson should 
come up. Magruder and Huger were therefore ordered to 
advance early on the 29th, and moving, the one by the 
Williamsburg, the other by the Charles City road, to 
strike the enemy in flank. 

A. P. Hill and Longstreet, recrossing the Chickahominy 
at New Bridge, weve to march by the Darbytown road in the 

1 Lee’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part i., pp. 493, 494. 


46 STONEWALL JACKSON 


direction of Charles City cross roads, thus turning the head 
waters of the White Oak Swamp, and threatening the 
Federal rear. 

Jackson, crossing Grapevine Bridge, was to move down 
the south bank of the Chickahominy, cross the Swamp by 
the bridge, and force his way to the Long Bridge road. 

The Confederate army was thus divided into four 
columns, moving by four different roads; each column at 
starting was several miles distant from the others, and a 
junction was to be made upon the field of battle. The 
cavalry, moreover, with the exception of a few squadrons, 
was far away upon the left, pursuing a large detachment 
which had been observed on the road to the White 
House.! 

McClellan had undoubtedly resolved on a most haz- 
ardous mancuvre. His supply and ammunition train 
consisted of over five thousand waggons. He was en- 
cumbered with the heavy guns of the siege artillery. He 
had with him more than fifty field batteries ; his army was 
still 95,000 strong; and this unwieldy multitude of men, 
horses, and vehicles, had to be passed over White Oak 
Swamp, and then to continue its march across the front 
of a powerful and determined enemy. 

But Lee also was embarrassed by the nature of the 
country.? If McClellan’s movements were retarded by the 
woods, swamps, and indifferent roads, the same obstacles 
would interfere with the combination of the Confederate 
columns; and the pursuit depended for success on their 
close co-operation. 


1 This detachment, about 3,500 strong, consisted of the outposts that had 
been established north and north-east of Beaver Dam Creek on June 27, of 
the garrison of the White House, and of troops recently disembarked. 

2 Strange to say, while the Confederates possessed no maps whatever, 
McClellan was well supplied in this respect. ‘Two or three weeks before 
this,’ says General Averell (Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 431), ‘three 
officers of the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry, and others, penetrated the region 
between the Chickahominy and the James, taking bearings and making 
notes. Their fragmentary sketches, when put together, made a map which 
exhibited all the roadways, fields, forests, bridges, the streams, and houses, 
so that our commander knew the country to be traversed far better than 
any Confederate commander.’ 


GLENDALE 47 


The first day’s work was hardly promising. The risks 
of unconnected manceuvres received abundant illustration. 
Magruder, late in the afternoon, struck the enemy’s rear- 
guard near Savage’s Station, but was heavily repulsed by two 
Federal army corps. Huger, called by Magruder to his 
June 29,  a8sistance, turned aside from the road which had 

been assigned to him, and when he was recalled 
by an urgent message from lee, advanced with the 
timidity which almost invariably besets the commander of 
an isolated force in the neighbourhood of a large army. 
Jackson, whose line of march led him directly on Savage’s 
Station, was delayed until after nightfall by the necessity 
of rebuilding the Grapevine Bridge.! Stuart had gone 
off to the White House, bent on the destruction of the 
enemy’s supply depot. Longstreet and Hill encamped 
south-west of Charles City cross roads, but saw nothing of 
the enemy. Holmes, with 6,500 men, crossed the James 
during the afternoon and encamped on the north bank, near 
Laurel Hill Church. During the night the Federal rear- 
guard fell back, destroying the bridge over White Oak 
Swamp ; and although a large quantity of stores were either 
destroyed or abandoned, together with a hospital containing 
2,500 wounded, the whole of McClellan’s army, men, guns, 
and trains, effected the passage of this dangerous obstacle. 

The next morning Longstreet, with Hill in support, 
moved forward, and found a Federal division in position 
June 30, “ear Glendale. Bringing his artillery into 

’ action, he held his infantry in hand until Huger 
should come up on his left, and Jackson’s guns be heard 
at White Oak Bridge. Holmes, followed by Magruder, was 
marching up the Newmarket road to Malvern House; and 
when the sound of Jackson’s artillery became audible to the 
northwards, Lee sent Longstreet forward to the attack. <A 
sanguinary conflict, on ground covered with heavy timber, 
and cut up by deep ravines, resulted in the Federals holding 


' Jackson had with him a gang of negroes who, under the superin- 
tendence of Captain Mason, a railroad contractor of long experience, per- 
formed the duties which in regular armies appertain to the corps of 
engineers. They had already done useful service in the Valley. 


VOL. II. E 


48 STONEWALL JACKSON 


their ground till nightfall; and although many prisoners 
and several batteries were captured by the Confederates, 
McClellan, under cover of the darkness, made good his 
escape. 

The battle of Glendale or Frayser’s Farm was the 
crisis of the ‘Seven Days.’ Had Lee been able to con- 
centrate his whole strength against the Federals it is 
probable that McClellan would never have reached the 
James. But Longstreet and Hill fought unsupported. 
As the former very justly complained, 50,000 men were 
within hearing of the guns but none came to co-operate, 
and against the two Confederate divisions fought the . 
Third Federal Army Corps, reinforced by three divi- 
sions from the Second, Fifth, and Sixth. Huger’s 
march on the Charles City road was obstructed by felled 
trees. When he at last arrived in front of the enemy, he 
was held in check by two batteries, and he does not 
appear to have opened communication with either Lee or 
Longstreet. Magruder had been ordered to march down 
from Savage Station to the Darbytown road, and there to 
await orders. At 4.30 p.m. he was ordered to move to New- 
market in support of Holmes. This order was soon 
countermanded, but he was unable to join Longstreet until 
the fight was over. Holmes was held in check by Porter’s 
Army Corps, minus McCall’s division, on Malvern Hill; and 
the cavalry, which might have been employed effectively 
against the enemy’s left flank and rear, was still north of 
the Chickahominy, returning from a destructive but useless 
raid on the depot at the White House. Nor had the conduct 
of the battle been unaffected by the complicated nature of 
the general plan. Longstreet attacked alone, Hill being 
held back, in order to be fresh for the pursuit when 
Jackson and Huger should strike in. The attack was 
successful, and McCall’s division, which had shared the 
defeat at Gaines’ Mill, was driven from its position. 
But McCall was reinforced by other divisions ; Longstreet 
was thrown on to the defensive by superior numbers, and 
when Hill was at length put in, it was with difficulty that 
the fierce counterblows of the Federals were beaten off. 


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A FOURTH FATLURE IN CO-OPERATION 49 


Jackson had been unable to participate in the con- 
flict. When night fell he was still north of the White Oak 
Swamp, seven miles distant from his morning bivouac, 
and hardly a single infantry man in his command had 
pulled a trigger. According to his own report his troops 
reached White Oak Bridge about noon. ‘Here the enemy 
made a determined effort to retard our advance and 
thereby to prevent an immediate junction between General 
Longstreet and myself. We found the bridge destroyed, 
the ordinary place of crossing commanded by their 
batteries on the other side, and all approach to it barred 
by detachments of sharp-shooters concealed in a dense 
wood close by. ... A heavy cannonading in front an- 
nounced the engagement of General Longstreet at Fray- 
ser’s Farm (Glendale) and made me eager to press forward ; 
but the marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the 
bridge over the marsh and creek, and the strong position 
of the enemy for defending the passage, prevented my 
advancing until the following morning.’ ! 

Such are Jackson’s reasons for his failure to co-operate 
with Longstreet. It is clear that he was perfectly aware 
of the importance of the part he was expected to play ; and 
he used every means which suggested itself as practicable 
to force a crossing. The 2nd Virginia Cavalry, under 
Colonel Munford, had now joined him from the Valley, and 
their commanding officer bears witness that Jackson 
showed no lack of energy. 

‘When I left the general on the preceding evening, he 
ordered me to be at the cross-roads (five miles from White 
Oak Bridge) at sunrise the next morning, ready to move in 
advance of his troops. The worst thunderstorm came up 
about night I ever was in, and in that thickly wooded 
country one could not see his horse’s ears. My command 
scattered in the storm, and I do not suppose that any 
officer had a rougher time in any one night than I had to 
endure. When the first grey dawn appeared I started 
off my adjutant and officers to bring up the scattered 
regiment ; but at sunrise [had not more than fifty men, 

1 O. R., vol. xi., part i., pp. 556, 557. 


50 STONEWALL JACKSON 


and I was half a mile from the cross-roads. When I 
arrived, to my horror there sat Jackson waiting for me. 
He was ina bad humour, and said, ‘Colonel, my orders 
to you were to be here at sunrise.’’ I explained my 
situation, telling him that we had no provisions, and that 
the storm and the dark night had conspired against me. 
When I got through he replied, ‘‘ Yes, sir. But, Colonel, 
I ordered you to be here at sunrise. Move on with your 
regiment. If you meet the enemy drive in his pickets, and 
if you want artillery, Colonel Crutchfield will furnish you.” 

‘T started on with my little handful of men. As others 
came straggling on to join me, Jackson noticed it, and sent 
two couriers to inform me that ‘‘my men were straggling 
badly.” I rode back and went over the same story, hoping 
that he would be impressed with my difficulties. He 
listened to me, but replied as before, ‘“ Yes, sir. But I 
ordered you to be here at sunrise, and I have been waiting 
for you for a quarter of an hour.”’ 

‘Seeing that he was in a peculiar mood, I determined 
to make the best of my trouble, sent my adjutant back, 
and made him halt the stragglers and form my men as 
they came up; and with what I had, determined to give 
him no cause for complaint. When we came upon the 
enemy’s picket we charged, and pushed the picket every 
step of the way into their camp, where there were a large 
number of wounded and many stores. It was done so 
rapidly that the enemy’s battery on the other side of White 
Oak Swamp could not fire on us without endangering their 
own friends. 

‘When Jackson came up he was smiling, and he at 
once (shortly after noon) ordered Colonel Crutchfield to 
bring up the artillery, and very soon the batteries were at 
work. After the lapse of about an hour my regiment had 
assembled, and while our batteries were shelling those of 
the enemy, Jackson sent for me and said, ‘‘ Colonel, move 
your regiment over the creek, and secure those guns. I 
will ride with you to the Swamp. When we reached the 
crossing we found that the enemy had torn up the bridge, 
and had thrown the timbers into the stream, forming a 


WHITE OAK SWAMP 51 


tangled mass which seemed to prohibit a crossing. I said 
to General Jackson that I did not think that we could cross. 
He looked at me, waved his hand, and replied, “ Yes, 
Colonel, try it.” In we went and floundered over, and 
before I formed the men, Jackson cried out to me to move 
on at the guns. Colonel Breckenridge started out with 
what we had over, and I soon got over the second squadron, 
and moved up the hill. We reached the guns, but they had 

an infantry support which gave us a volley; at the same 
_ time a battery on our right, which we had not seen, opened 
on us, and back we had to come. I moved down the 
Swamp about a quarter of a mile, and re-crossed with 
great difficulty by a cow-path.’ ! 

The artillery did little better than the cavalry. The 
ground on the north bank of the Swamp by no means 
favoured the action of the guns. To the right of the road 
the slopes were clear and unobstructed, but the crest 
was within the forest; while to the left a thick pine wood 
covered both ridge and valley. On the bank held by the 
Federals the ground was open, ascending gently to the ridge ; 
but the edge of the stream, immediately opposite the cleared 
sround on the Confederate right, was covered by a belt of 
tall trees, in full leaf, which made observation, by either 
side, a matter of much difficulty. This belt was full of 
infantry, while to the right rear, commanding the ruined 
bridge, stood the batteries which had driven back the cavalry. 

After some time spent in reconnaissance, it was 
determined to cut a road through the wood to the right 
of the road. This was done, and thirty-one guns, moving 
forward simultaneously ready-shotted, opened fire on the 
position. The surprise was complete. One of the 
Federal batteries dispersed in confusion; the other dis- 
appeared, and the infantry supports fell back. Jackson 
immediately ordered two’ guns to advance down the 
road, and shell the belt of trees which harboured the 


1 ‘Jackson himself,’ writes Dr. McGuire, ‘accompanied by three or four 
members of his staff, of whom I was one, followed the cavalry across the 
Swamp. The ford was miry and deep, and impracticable for either artillery 
or infantry.’ 

UNIVERSITY OF 


ILLINOIS LIBRARY 


52 STONEWALL JACKSON 


enemy’s skirmishers. These were driven back; the 
divisions of D. H. Hill and Whiting were formed up 
in the pine wood on the left, and a working party 
was sent forward to repair the bridge. Suddenly, from 
the high ground behind the belt of trees, by which they 
were completely screened, two fresh Federal batteries— 
afterwards increased to three—opened on the line of Con- 
federate guns. Under cover of this fire their skirmishers 
returned to the Swamp, and their main line came forward 
to a position whence it commanded the crossing at effec- 
tive range. The two guns on the road were sent to the 
right-about. The shells of the Federal batteries fell into the 
stream, and the men who had been labouring at the bridge 
ran back and refused to work. The artillery duel, in 
which neither side could see the other, but in which both 
suffered some loss, continued throughout the afternoon. 

Meantime a Confederate regiment, fording the stream, 
drove in the hostile skirmishers, and seized the belt of trees; 
Wright’s brigade, of Huger’s division, which had joined 
Jackson asthe guns came into action, was sent back to force 
a passage at Brackett’s Ford, a mile up stream; and recon- 
naissances were pushed out to find some way of turning the 
enemy’s position. Every road and track, however, was 
obstructed by felled trees and abattis, and it was found 
that a passage was impracticable at Brackett’s Ford. Two 
companies were pushed over the creek, and drove back the 
enemy’s pickets. ‘I discovered,’ says Wright, ‘that the 
enemy had destroyed the bridge, and had completely 
blockaded the road through the Swamp by felling trees 
in and acrossit. . . . L ascertained that the road debouched 
from the Swamp into an open field (meadow), commanded 
by a line of high hills, all in cultivation and free from 
timber. Upon this ridge of hills the enemy had posted 
heavy batteries of field-artillery, strongly supported by 
infantry, which swept the meadow by a direct and cross’ 
fire, and which could be used with terrible effect upon my 
column while struggling through the fallen timber in the 
wood through the Swamp.’ ! 

10 R,, vol. xi., part i., pp. 810, 811. 


HIS ACTION JUSTIFIED 53 


Having ascertained that the enemy was present in great 
strength on the further bank, that every road was obstructed, 
and that there was no means of carrying his artillery over 
the creek, or favourable ground on which his infantry 
could act, Jackson gave up all hope of aiding Longstreet. 

That the obstacles which confronted him were serious 
there can be no question. His smooth-bore guns, 
although superior in number, were unable to beat down 
the fire of the rifled batteries. The enemy’s masses were 
well hidden. The roads were blocked, the stream was 
swollen, the banks marshy, and although infantry could 
cross them, the fords which had proved difficult for the 
cavalry would have stopped the artillery, the ammunition 
waggons, and the ambulances ; while the Federal position, 
on the crest of a long open slope, was exceedingly strong. 
Jackson, as his report shows, maturely weighed these diffi- 
culties, and came to the conclusion that he could do no 
good by sending over his infantry alone. It was essential, 
it is true, to detain as many as possible of the enemy on 
the banks of the Swamp, while Longstreet, Hill, Huger, 
and Magruder dealt with the remainder; and this he fully 
realised, but it is by no means improbable that he con- 
sidered the heavy fire of his guns and the threatening 
position of his infantry would have this effect. 

It is interesting to note how far this hope, supposing 
that he entertained it, was fulfilled. Two divisions of 
Federal infantry and three batteries—a total of 22,000 
men—defended the passage at White Oak Bridge against 
27,000 Confederates, including Wright; and a detached 
force of infantry and guns was posted at Brackett’s 
Ford.! On the Confederate artillery opening fire, two 

1 Genera! Heintzleman, commanding the Federal 3rd Corps, reports that 
he had placed a force at Brackett’s Ford (O. R., vol. xi., part ii., p. 100). 
General Slocum (6th Corps) sent infantry and a 12-pounder howitzer (O. R., 
vol. xi., part ii., p. 485) to the same point; and Seeley’s battery of the 3rd 
Corps was also engaged here (O. R., vol. xi., part ii., p. 106). The force 
at White Oak Bridge was constituted as follows: = 


Smith’s Division . : A . of the 6th Corps. 
Richardson’s Division . ; : », 2nd Corps. 


Dana’s Brigade . 
Sully’s Brigade } Sedgwick’s Division ,, 2nd Corps. 
Naglee’s Brigade, Peck’s Division » 4th Corps. 


54 STONEWALL JACKSON - 


brigades were sent up from near Glendale, but when 
it was found that this fire was not followed up by an 
infantry attack, these brigades, with two others in 
addition, were sent over to reinforce the troops which 
were engaged with Longstreet. When these facts became 
known; when it was clear that had Jackson attacked 
vigorously, the Federals would hardly have dared to weaken 
their line along White Oak Swamp, and that, in these 
circumstances, Longstreet and A. P. Hill would probably 
have seized the Quaker road, his failure to cross the creek 
exposed him to criticism. Not only did his brother- 
generals complain of his inaction, but Franklin, the 
Federal commander immediately opposed to him, writing 
long afterwards, made the following comments :— 
| ‘Jackson seems to have been ignorant of what General 
Lee expected of him, and badly informed about Brackett’s 
Ford. When he found how strenuous was our defence 
at the bridge, he should have turned his attention to 
Brackett’s Ford also. A force could have been as quietly 
gathered there as at the bridge; a strong infantry move- 
ment at the ford would have easily overrun our small force 
there, placing our right at Glendale, held by Slocum’s 
division, in great jeopardy, and turning our force at the 
bridge by getting between it and Glendale. In fact, it is 
likely that we should have been defeated that day had 
General Jackson done what his great reputation seems to 
make it imperative he should have done.’! But General 
Franklin’s opinion as to the ease with which Brackett’s 
Ford might have been passed is not justified by the facts. 
In the first place, General Slocum, who was facing Huger, 
and had little to do throughout the day, had two brigades 
within easy distance of the crossing ; in the second place, 
General Wright reported the ford impassable; and in the 
third place, General Franklin himself admits that directly 
Wright’s scouts were seen near the ford two brigades of 
Sedewick’s division were sent to oppose their passage. 
General Long, in his life of Lee, finds excuse for 
Jackson in a story that he was utterly exhausted, and that 
1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 381. 


SCRUPULOUS REGARD FOR TRUTH 55 


his staff let him sleep until the sun was high. Apart from 
the unlikelihood that a man who seems to have done 
without sleep whenever the enemy was in front should 
have permitted himself to be overpowered at such a crisis, 
we have Colonel Munford’s evidence that the general was 
well in advance of his columns at sunrise, and the regimental 
reports show that the troops were roused at 2.30 a.m. 

Jackson may well have been exhausted. He had cer- 
tainly not spared himself during the operations. On the 
night of the 27th, after the battle of Gaines’ Mill, he went 
over to Stuart’s camp at midnight, and a long conference 
took place. At 3.30 on the morning of the 29th he visited 
Magruder, riding across Grapevine Bridge from McGehee’s 
House, and his start must have been an early one. In 
a letter to his wife, dated near the White Oak Bridge, 
he says that in consequence of the heavy rain he rose 
‘about midnight’ on the 30th. Yet his medical director, 
although he noticed that the general fell asleep while 
he was eating his supper the same evening, says that he 
never saw him more active and energetic than during 
the engagement;! and Jackson himself, neither in his 
report nor elsewhere, ever admitted that he was in any 
way to blame. 

It is difficult to conceive that his scrupulous regard for 
truth, displayed in every action of his life, should have yielded 
in this one instance to his pride. He was perfectly aware 
of the necessity of aiding Longstreet ; and if, owing to the 
obstacles enumerated in his report, he thought the task 
impossible, his opinion, as that of a man who as diffi- 
culties accumulated became the more determined to over- 
come them, must be regarded with respect. The critics, it 
is possible, have forgotten for the moment that the condi- 
tion of the troops is a factor of supreme importance in 
military operations. General D. H. Hill has told us that 
‘Jackson’s own corps was worn out by long and exhausting 
marches, and reduced in numbers by numerous sanguinary 
battles ;’? and he records his conviction that pity for his 


1 Letter from Dr. Hunter McGuire to the author. 
2 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 389. 


56 STONEWALL JACKSON 


troops had much to do with the general’s inaction. Hill 
would have probably come nearer the truth if he had said 
that the tired regiments were hardly to be trusted in a 
desperate assault, unsupported by artillery, on a position 
which was even stronger than that which they had stormed 
with such loss at Gaines’ Mill. 

Had Jackson thrown two columns across the fords— 
which the cavalry, according to Munford, had not found easy, 
—and attempted to deploy on the further bank, it was 
exceedingly probable that they would have been driven 
back with tremendous slaughter. The refusal of the 
troops to work at the bridge under fire was in itself a sign 
that they had little stomach for hard fighting. 

It may be argued that it was Jackson’s duty to sacrifice 
his command in order to draw off troops from Glendale. 
But on such unfavourable ground the sacrifice would have 
been worse than useless. The attack repulsed—and it 
could hardly have gone otherwise—Franklin, leaving a 
small rear-guard to watch the fords, would have been free 
to turn nearly his whole strength against Longstreet. It is 
quite true, as a tactical principle, that demonstrations, such 
as Jackson made with his artillery, are seldom to be relied 
upon to hold an enemy in position. When the first alarm 
has passed off, and the defending general becomes aware 
that nothing more than a feint is intended, he will 
act as did the Federals, and employ his reserves else- 
where. A vigorous attack is, almost invariably, the only 
means of keeping him to his ground. But an attack which 
is certain to be repulsed, and to be repulsed in quick time, 
is even less effective than a demonstration. It may be the 
precursor of a decisive defeat. 

But it is not so much for his failure to force the pas- 
sage at White Oak Swamp that Jackson has been criti- 
cised, as for his failure to march to Frayser’s Farm on 
finding that the Federal position was impregnable. ‘ When, 
on the forenoon of the 30th,’ writes Longstreet, ‘ Jack- 
son found his way blocked by Franklin, he had time to 
march to the head of it (White Oak Swamp), and across 
to the Charles City road, in season for the engagement at 


HIS OWN EXPLANATION 57 


Frayser’s Farm [Glendale], the distance being about four 
miles.” ! 

Without doubt this would have been a judicious course 
to pursue, but it was not for Jackson to initiate such a 
movement. He had been ordered by General Lee to move 
along the road to White Oak Swamp, to endeavour to force 
his way to the Long Bridge road, to guard Lee’s left 
flank from any attack across the fords or bridges of the 
lower Chickahominy, and to keep on that road until he 
received further orders. These further orders he never 
received; and it was certainly not his place to march to 
the Charles City road until Lee, who was with Longstreet, 
sent him instructions to do so. ‘ General Jackson,’ says 
Dr. McGuire, ‘demanded of his subordinates implicit, blind 
obedience. He gave orders in his own peculiar, terse, 
rapid way, and he did not permit them to be questioned. 
He obeyed his own superiors in the same fashion. At 
White Oak Swamp he was looking for some message from 
General Lee, but he received none, and therefore, as a 
soldier, he had no right to leave the road which had been 
assigned to him. About July 13, 1862, the night before we 
started to Gordonsville, Crutchfield, Pendleton (assistant- 
adjutant-general), and myself were discussing the campaign 
just finished. We were talking about the affair at Frayser’s 
Farm, and wondering if it would have been better for Jackson 
with part of his force to have moved to Longstreet’s aid. The 
general came in while the discussion was going on, and curtly 
said: ‘‘ If General Lee had wanted me he could have sent for 
me.” It looked the day after the battle, and it looks to me 
now, that if General Lee had sent a staff officer, who could 
have ridden the distance in forty minutes, to order Jackson 
with three divisions to the cross roads, while D. H. Hill and 
the artillery watched Franklin, we should certainly have 
crushed McClellan’s army. If Lee had wanted Jackson to 
give direct support to Longstreet, he could have had him 
there in under three hours. The staff officer was not 
sent, and the evidence is that General Lee believed 
Longstreet strong enough to defeat the Federals without 


1 From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 150. 


58 STONEWALL JACKSON 


direct aid from Jackson.’! Such reasoning appears in- 
controvertible. Jackson, be it remembered, had been 
directed to guard the left flank of the army ‘until further 
orders.’ Had these words been omitted, and he had been 
left free to follow his own judgment, it is possible that he 
would have joined Huger on the Charles City road with 
three divisions. But in all probability he felt himself tied 
down by the phrase which Moltke so strongly reprobates. 
Despite Dr. McGuire’s statement Jackson knew well that 
disobedience to orders may sometimes be condoned. It 
may be questioned whether he invariably demanded ‘ blind ’ 
obedience. ‘ General,’ said an officer, ‘you blame me for 
disobedience of orders, but in Mexico you did the same 
yourself.’ ‘ But I was successful,’ was Jackson’s reply; as 
much as to say that an officer, when he takes upon himself 
the responsibility of ignoring the explicit instructions of 
his superior, must be morally certain that he is doing what 
that superior, were he present, would approve. Apply 
this rule to the situation at White Oak Swamp. Jor any- 
thing Jackson knew it was possible that Longstreet and 
Hill might defeat the Federals opposed to them without his 
aid. In suchcase, Lee, believing Jackson to be still on the 
left flank, would have ordered him to prevent the enemy’s 
escape by the Long Bridge. What would Lee have said 
had his ‘further orders’ found Jackson marching to the 
Charles City road, with the Long Bridge some miles in 
rear? The truth is that the principle of ‘marching to 
the sound of the cannon,’ though always to be borne in 
mind, cannot be invariably followed. The only fair 
criticism on Jackson’s conduct is that he should have 
informed Lee of his inability to force the passage across 
the Swamp, and have held three divisions in readiness 
to march to Glendale. ‘This, so far as can be ascertained, 
was left undone, but the evidence is merely negative. 
Except for this apparent omission, it cannot be fairly 
said that Jackson was in the slightest degree responsible 
for the failure of the Confederate operations. If 
the truth be told, Lee's design was by no means 
1 Letter to the author. 


McCLELLAN RETREATS 59 


perfect. It had two serious defects. In the first 
place, it depended for success on the co-operation of 
several converging columns, moving over an_ intricate 
country, of which the Confederates had neither accurate 
maps nor reliable information. The march of the columns 
was through thick woods, which not only impeded inter- 
communication, but provided the enemy with ample 
material for obstructing the roads, and Jackson’s line of 
march was barred by a formidable obstacle in White Oak 
Swamp, an admirable position for a rear-guard. In the 
second place, concentration at the decisive point was not 
provided for. Thestaff proved incapable of keeping the divi- 
sions in hand. Magruder was permitted to wander to and 
fro after the fashion of D’Erlon between Quatre Bras 
and Ligny. Holmes was as useless as Grouchy at 
Waterloo. Huger did nothing, although some of his 
brigades, when the roads to the front were found to be 
obstructed, might easily have been drawn off to reinforce 
Longstreet. The cavalry had gone off on a raid to the 
White House, instead of crossing the Chickahominy and 
harassing the enemy’s eastward flank; and at the decisive 
point only two divisions were assembled, 20,000 men all 
told, and these two divisions attacked in succession instead 
of simultaneously. Had Magruder and Holmes, neither 
of whom would have been called upon to march more 
than thirteen miles, moved on Frayser’s Farm, and had 
part of Huger’s division been brought over to the same 
point, the Federals would in all probability have been 
irretrievably defeated. It is easy to be wise after the 
event. The circumstances were extraordinary. An army 
of 75,000 men was pursuing an army of 95,000, of which 
65,000, when the pursuit began, were perfectly fresh troops. 
The problem was, indeed, one of exceeding difficulty ; but, 
in justice to the reputation of his lieutenants, it is only 
fair to say that Lee’s solution was not a masterpiece. 
During the night which followed the battle of Frayser’s 
Farm the whole Federal army fell back on Malvern Hill—a 
strong position, commanding the country for many miles, 
and very difficult of access, on which the reserve artillery, 


60 STONEWALL JACKSON 


supported by the Fourth and Fifth Corps, wasalready posted. 
Fay The Confederates, marching at daybreak, passed 

over roads which were strewn with arms, blankets, 
and equipments. Stragglers from the retreating army were 
picked up at every step. Scores of wounded men lay un- 
tended by the roadside. Waggons and ambulances had been 
abandoned; and with such evidence before their eyes it 
was difficult to resist the conviction that the enemy was 
utterly demoralised. That McClellan had seized Malvern 
Hill, and that it was strongly occupied by heavy guns, Lee 
was well aware. But, still holding to his purpose of anni- 
hilating his enemy before McDowell could intervene from 
Fredericksburg, he pushed forward, determined to attack ; 
and with his whole force now well in hand the result 
seemed assured. Three or four miles south of White 
Oak Swamp Jackson’s column, which was leading the 
Confederate advance, came under the fire of the Federal 
batteries. The advanced-guard deployed in the woods on 
either side of the road, and Lee, accompanied by Jackson, 
rode forward to reconnoitre. 

Malvern Hill, a plateau rising to the height of 150 feet 
above the surrounding forests, possessed nearly every 
requirement of a strong defensive position. The open 
eround on the top, undulating and unobstructed, was a 
mile and a half in length by half a mile in breadth. To 
the north, north-west, and north-east it fell gradually, the 
slopes covered with wheat, standing or in shock, to the edge 
of the woods, which are from eight to sixteen hundred yards 
distant from the commanding crest. The base of the hill, 
except to the east and south-east, was covered with dense 
forest ; and within the forest, at the foot of the declivity, 
ran a tortuous and marshy stream. The right flank was 
partially protected by a long mill-dam. The left, more 
open, afforded an excellent artillery position overlooking a 
broad stretch of meadows, drained by a narrow stream 
and deep ditches, and flanked by the fire of several gun- 
boats. Only three approaches, the Quaker and the river 
roads, and a track from the north-west, gave access to the 
heights. 


BATTLE OF MALVERN -HILL 61 


The reconnaissance showed that General Porter, com- 
manding the defence, had utilised the ground to the best 
advantage. A powerful artillery, posted just in rear of 
the crest, swept the entire length of the slopes, and under 
cover in rear were dense masses of infantry, with a strong 
line of skirmishers pushed down the hill in front. 

Nevertheless, despite the formidable nature of the 
Federal preparations, orders were immediately issued for 
attack. General Lee, who was indisposed, had instructed 
Longstreet to reconnoitre the enemy’s left, and to report 
whether attack was feasible. Jackson was opposed to a 
frontal attack, preferring to turn the enemy’s right. 
Longstreet, however, was of a different opinion. ‘The 
spacious open,’ he says, ‘along Jackson’s front appeared to 
offer a field for play of a hundred or more guns... . I 
thought it probable that Porter’s batteries, under the 
cross-fire of the Confederates’ guns posted on his left and | 
front, could be thrown into disorder, and thus make way 
for the combined assaults of the infantry. I so reported, 
and General Lee ordered disposition accordingly, sending 
the pioneer corps to cut a road for the right batteries.’ 

It was about four o’clock that the line of battle was 
formed. Jackson was on the left, with Whiting to the left 
of the Quaker road, and D. H. Hill to the right; Ewell’s 
and Jackson’s own divisions werein reserve. Nearly half a 
mile beyond Jackson’s right came two of Huger’s 
brigades, Armistead and Wright, and to Huger’s left 
rear was Magruder. Holmes, still on the river road, was 
to assail the enemy’s left. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were 
in reserve behind Magruder, on the Long Bridge road. 

The deployment of the leading divisions was not effected 
without loss, for the Federal artillery swept all the roads 
and poured a heavy fire into the woods; but at length 
D. H. Hill’s infantry came into line along the edge of the 
timber. 

The intervening time had been employed in bringing 
the artillery to the front; and now were seen the tremen- 
dous difficulties which confronted the attack. The swamps 

' From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 143. 
VoL. II, F 


4 P.M. 


62 STONEWALL JACKSON 


and thickets through which the batteries had to force 
their way were grievous impediments to rapid or orderly 
movement, and when they at last emerged from the cover, 
and unlimbered for action, the concentrated fire of the 
Federal guns overpowered them from the outset. In front 
of Huger four batteries were disabled in quick succession, 
the enemy concentrating fifty or sixty guns on each of them 
in turn; four or five others which Jackson had ordered to 
take post on the left of his line, although, with two excep- 
tions, they managed to hold their ground, were powerless 
to subdue the hostile fire. ‘The obstacles,’ says Lee in his 
report, ‘ presented by the woods and swamp made it imprac- 
ticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose 
successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by 
the enemy, while the field itself afforded us few positions 
favourable for its use and none for its proper concentration.’ 
According to Longstreet, when the inability of the 
batteries to prepare the way for the infantry was demon- 
strated by their defeat, Lee abandoned the original plan of 
attack. ‘He proposed to me to move ‘round to the left 
with my own and A. P. Hill’s division, and turn the Federal 
right.” I issued my orders accordingly for the two divi- 
sions to go around and turn the Federal right, when in 
some way unknown to me the battle was drawn on.’ ! 
Unfortunately, through some mistake on the part of 
Lee’s staff, the order of attack which had been already 
issued was not rescinded. It was certainly an extraordinary 
production. ‘ Batteries,’ if ran, ‘have been established 
to rake the enemy’s line. If it is broken, as is pro- 
bable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, 
has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same.’? This 
was to D. H. Hill and to Magruder, who had under his 
command Huger’s and McLaws’ divisions as well as his own. 
So, between five and six o’clock, General D. H. Hill, 
530 pu, believing that he heard the appointed signal, broke 
forward from the timber, and five brigades, in one 
irregular line, charged full against the enemy’s front. The 


1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 403. 
2 O. R.., vol. xi., part i., p. 677. 


A FIFTH FAILURE IN CO-OPERATION 63 


Federals, disposed in several lines, were in overwhelm- 
ing strength. Their batteries were free to concentrate 
on the advancing infantry. Their riflemen, posted in the 
interval between the artillery masses, swept the long slopes 
with a grazing fire, while fence, bank, and ravine, gave 
shelter from the Confederate bullets. Nor were the enormous 
difficulties which confronted the attack in any way mitigated 
by careful arrangement on the part of the Confederate staff. 
The only hope of success, if success were possible, lay in one 
strong concentrated effort; in employing the whole army ; 
in supporting the infantry with artillery, regardless of loss, 
at close range; and in hurling a mass of men, in several 
successive lines, against one point of the enemy’s position. 
It is possible that the Federal army, already demoralised 
by retreat, might have yielded to such vigorous pressure. 
But in the Confederate attack there was not the slightest 
attempt at concentration. The order which dictated it 
gave an opening to misunderstanding ; and, as is almost 
invariably the case when orders are defective, misunder- 
standing occurred. The movement was premature. Ma- 
gruder had only two brigades of his three divisions, Armi- 
stead’s and Wright’s, in position. Armistead, who was 
well in advance of the Confederate right, was attacked by 
a strong body of skirmishers. D. H. Hill took the noise 
of this conflict for the appointed signal, and moved for- 
ward. The divisions which should have supported him 
had not yet crossed the swamp in rear; and thus 10,500 
men, absolutely unaided, advanced against the whole 
Federal army. The blunder met with terrible retribution. 
On that midsummer evening death reaped a fearful har- 
vest. The gallant Confederate infantry, nerved by their suc- 
cess at Gaines’ Mill, swept up the field with splendid deter- 
mination. ‘It was the onset of battle,’ said a Federal officer 
present, ‘ with the good order of a review.’ But the iron 
hail of grape and canister, laying the ripe wheat low as if 
it had been cut with a sickle, and tossing the shocks in 
air, rent the advancing lines from end to end. Hundreds 
fell, hundreds swarmed back to the woods, but still 
the brigades pressed on, and through the smoke of battle 


FQ 


64 _ STONEWALL JACKSON 


the waving colours led the charge. But the Federal 
infantry had yet to be encountered. Lying behind their 
shelter they had not yet fired a shot; but as the Confederates 
reached close range, regiment after regiment, springing to 
their feet, poured a devastating fire into the charging 
ranks. The rush was checked. Here and there small 
bodies of desperate men, following the colours, still pressed 
onward, but the majority lay down, and the whole front of 
battle rang with the roar of musketry. But so thin was 
the Confederate line that it was impossible to overcome 
the sustained fire of the enemy. The brigade reserves 
had already been thrown in; there was no further support 
at hand; the Federal gunners, staunch and resolute, held 
fast to their position, and on every part of the line Porter’s 
reserves were coming up. As one regiment emptied its 
cartridge-boxes it was relieved by another. The volume of 
fire never for a moment slackened; and fresh batteries, 
amongst which were the 82-prs. of the siege train, un- 
limbering on the flanks, gave further strength to a front 
which was already impregnable. 

Jackson, meanwhile, on receiving a request for rein- 
forcements, had sent forward three brigades of his own 
division and a brigade of Hill’s. But a mistake had been 
committed in the disposition of these troops. The order 
for attack had undoubtedly named only D. H. Hill’s 
division. But there was no good reason that it should 
have been so literally construed as to leave the division un- 
supported. Whiting was guarding the left flank, and was 
not available; but Ewell and Winder were doing nothing, 
and there can be no question but that they should have 
advanced to the edge of the woods directly D. H. Hill 
moved forward, and have followed his brigades across the 
open, ready to lend aid directly his line was checked. As 
it was, they had been halted within the woods and beyond 
the swamp, and the greater part, in order to avoid the 
random shells, had moved even further to the rear. It 
thus happened that before the reinforcements arrived 
Hill’s division had been beaten back, and under the tre- 
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FURTHER BLUNDERS 65 


While Hill was retiring, Huger, and then Magruder, 
came into action on the right. It had been reported to 
Lee that the enemy was beginning to fall back. This 
report originated, there can be little doubt, in the with- 
drawal of the Federal regiments and batteries which had 
exhausted their ammunition and were relieved by others ; 
but, in any case, it was imperative that D. H. Hill should 
be supported, and the other divisions were ordered forward 
with all speed. Huger’s and Magruder’s men attacked 
with the same determination as had been displayed by Hill’s, 
but no better success attended their endeavours. The 
brigades were not properly formed when the order arrived, 
but scattered over a wide front, and they went in piecemeal. 
Magruder’s losses were even greater than Hill’s; and with 
his defeat the battle ceased. 

Had the Federals followed up the repulse with a strong 
counter-attack the victory of Malvern Hill might have 
been more decisive than that of Gaines’ Mill. It is true 
that neither Longstreet nor A. P. Hill had been engaged, 
and that three of Jackson’s divisions, his own, Whiting’s 
and Hwell’s, had suffered little. But Magruder and D. H. 
Hill, whose commands included at least 30,000 muskets, one 
half of Lee’s infantry, had been completely crushed, and 
Holmes on the river road was too far off to lend assistance. 
The fatal influence of a continued retreat had paralysed, how- 
ever, the initiative of the Federal generals. Intent only on 
getting away unscathed, they neglected, like McClellan at 
Gaines’ Mill, to look for opportunities, forgetting that 
when an enemy is pursuing in hot haste he is very apt 
to expose himself. Jackson had acted otherwise at Port 
Republic. 

The loss of over 5,000 men was not the worst which had 
befallen the Confederates. ‘The next morning by dawn,’ 
says one of Ewell’s brigadiers, ‘I went off to ask for orders, 
when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder— 
‘thousands of straggling men were asking every passer-by 
for their regiments; ambulances, waggons, and artillery 
obstructing every road, and altogether, in a drenching rain, 
presenting a scene of the most woeful and disheartening 


66 STONEWALL JACKSON 


confusion.’' The reports of other officers corroborate 
General Trimble’s statement, and there can be no question 
that demoralisation had set in. Whether, if the Federals 
had used their large reserves with resolution, and, as the 
Confederates fell back down the slopes, had followed with 
the bayonet, the demoralisation would have increased and 
spread, must be left to conjecture. Not one of the 
Southern generals engaged has made public his opinion. 
There is but one thing certain, that with an opponent so 
blind to opportunity as McClellan a strong counterstroke 
was the last thing to be feared. After witnessing the 
opening of the attack, the Federal commander, leaving the 
control of the field to Porter, had ridden off to Harrison’s 
Landing, eight miles down the James, whither his trains, 
escorted by the Fourth Army Corps, had been directed, 
and where he had determined to await reinforcements. 
The Federal troops, moreover, although they had with- 
stood the charge of the Confederate infantry with 
unbroken ranks, had not fought with the same spirit as 
they had displayed at Gaines’ Mill. General Hunt, 
McClellan’s chief of artillery, to whose admirable dis- 
position of the batteries the victory was largely due, wrote 
that ‘the battle was desperately contested, and frequently 
trembled in the balance. The last attack . . . was nearly 
successful; but we won from the fact that we had kept 
our reserves in hand.’? Nor had McClellan much con- 
fidence in his army. ‘My men,’ he wrote to Washington 
on the morning of the battle, ‘are completely exhausted, 
and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh 
troops. If possible, I shall retire to-night to Harrison’s 
Landing, where the gunboats can render more aid in 
covering our position. Permit me to urge that not an 
hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More 
sunboats aremuch needed. . . . I now pray for time. My 

' Trimble’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part i., p. 619. 

* Three horse-batteries and eight 32-pr. howitzers were ‘ brought up to 
the decisive point at the close of the day, thus bringing every gun of this 
large artillery force (the artillery reserve) into the most active and decisive 


use. Not a gun remained unemployed: not one could have been safely 
spared. —Hunt’s Report, O. R., vol. xi., part ii., p. 239. 


A BEATEN ARMY 67 


men have proved themselves the equals of any troops in 
the world, but they are worn out. Our losses have been 
very great, we have failed to win only because overpowered 
by superior numbers.’ ! 

Surely a more despairing appeal was never uttered. 
The general, whose only thought was ‘more gunboats and 
fresh troops,’ whatever may have been the condition of his 
men, had reached the last stage of demoralisation. 

The condition to which McClellan was reduced seems 
to have been realised by Jackson. The crushing defeat of 
his own troops failed to disturb his judgment. Whilst the 
night still covered the battle-field, his divisional generals 
came to report the condition of their men and to receive 
instructions. ‘Hvery representation,’ says Dabney, ‘ which 
they made was gloomy.’ At length, after many details of 
losses and disasters, they concurred in declaring that 
McClellan would probably take the aggressive in the morn- 
ing, and that the Confederate army was in no condition to 
resist him. Jackson had listened silently, save when he 
interposed a few brief questions, to all their statements ; but 
now he replied: ‘No; he will clear out in the morning.’ 

The forecast was more than fulfilled. When morning 
dawned, grey, damp, and cheerless, and the Confederate 
sentinels, through the cold mist which rose from the sodden 
yaiyD, woods, looked out upon the battle-field, they saw 
that Malvern Hill had been abandoned. Only 
a few cavalry patrols rode to and fro on the ground which 
had been held by the Federal artillery, and on the slopes 
below, covered with hundreds of dead and dying men, 
the surgeons were quietly at work. During the night 
the enemy had fallen back to Harrison’s Landing, and 
justification for Lee’s assault at Malvern Hill may be 
found in the story of the Federal retreat. The confusion of 
the night march, following on a long series of fierce engage- 
ments, told with terrible effect on the moral of the men, 
and stragglers increased at every step. ‘It was like 
the retreat,’ said one of McClellan’s generals, ‘of a 
whipped army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep, and a 

1 O. B., vol. xi., part ili, p. 282. 


68 STONEWALL JACKSON 


few shots from the rebels would have panic-stricken the 
whole command.’! At length, through blinding rain, the 
flotilla of gunboats was discovered, and on the long 
peninsula between Herring Run and the James the ex- 
hausted army reached a resting-place. But so great was 
the disorder, that during the whole of that day nothing 
was done to prepare a defensive position; a ridge to the 
north, which commanded the whole camp, was unoccupied ; 
and, according to the Committee of Congress which took 
evidence on the conduct of the war, ‘nothing but a heavy 
rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their 
artillery, saved the army from destruction.’? McClellan’s 
own testimony is even more convincing. ‘The army,’ he 
wrote on July 8, the second day after the battle, ‘is 
thoroughly worn out and requires rest and very heavy 
reinforcements. . . . [am in hopes that the enemy is as 
completely worn out as we are. ... The roads are now 
very bad; for these reasons I hope we shall have enough 
breathing space to reorganise and rest the men, and get 
them into position before the enemy can attack again. . . . 
It is of course impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but 
I doubt whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men 
with the colours.’ ° 

As his army of 105,000 men, during the whole of the 
Seven Days, lost only 16,000, the last admission, if accurate, 
is most significant. Nearly half the men must either have 
been sick or straggling. 

It was not because the Confederates were also worn out 
that the Federals were given time to reorganise and to 
establish themselves in a strong position. Jackson, the 
moment it was light, rode through the rain to the front. 
Learning that the enemy had evacuated their position, he 
ordered his chief of staff to get the troops under arms, 
to form the infantry in three lines of battle, and then to 
allow the men to build fires, cook their rations, and dry 
their clothes. By 11 o’clock the ammunition had been 


1 Report on the Conduct of the War, p.580. General Hooker’s evidence. 
? Report on the Conduct of the War, p. 27. 
3 O. R., vol. xi., part i., pp. 291, 292. 


A MOMENTOUS INTERVIEW 69 


replenished, and his four divisions were formed up. Long- 
street’s brigades had pushed forward a couple of miles, 
but no orders had reached the Valley troops, and Major 
Dabney rode off to find his general. ‘I was told,’ he 
writes, ‘that he was in the Poindexter House, a large 
mansion near Willis’ Church. Lee, Jackson, Dr. McGuire, 
and Major Taylor of Lee’s staff, and perhaps others, were 
in the dining-room. Asking leave to report to General 
Jackson that his orders had been fulfilled, [ was introduced 
to General Lee, who, with his usual kindness, begged me 
to sit by the fire and dry myself. Here I stayed much of 
the day, and witnessed some strange things. Longstreet, 
wet and muddy, was the first to enter. He had ridden 
round most of the battle-field, and his report was not par- 
ticularly cheerful. Jackson was very quiet, never volun- 
teering any counsel or suggestion, but answering when 
questioned in a brief, deferential tone. His countenance was 
very serious, and soon became very troubled. After a time 
the clatter of horses’ hoofs was heard, and two gentlemen 
came in, dripping. They were the President and his 
nephew. Davis and Lee then drew to the table, and 
entered into an animated military discussion. Lee told 
the President the news which the scouts were bringing in, 
of horrible mud, and of abandoned arms and baggage- 
waggons. They then debated at length what was to be 
done next. McClellan was certainly retiring, but whether 
as beaten or as only manceuvring was not apparent, nor 
was the direction of his retreat at all clear. Was he 
aiming for some point on the lower James where he 
might embark and get away? or at some point on the 
upper James—say Shirley, or Bermuda Hundred—where he 
could cross the river (he had pontoons and gunboats) and 
advance on Richmond from the south? Such were the 
questions which came up, and at length it was decided that 
the army should make no movement until further informa- 
tion had been received. The enemy was not to be pursued 
until Stuart’s cavalry, which had arrived the previous 
evening at Nance’s Shop, should obtain reliable information. 

‘Jackson, meanwhile, sat silent in his corner. I 


70 STONEWALL JACKSON 


watched his face. The expression, changing from surprise 
to dissent, and lastly to intense mortification, showed 
clearly the tenor of his thoughts. He knew that 
McClellan was defeated, that he was retreating and not 
manoeuvring. He knew that his troops were disorganised, 
that sleeplessness, fasting, bad weather, and disaster must 
have weakened their moral. He heard it said by General 
Lee that the scouts reported the roads so deep in mud that 
the artillery could not move, that our men were wet and 
wearied. But Jackson’s mind reasoned that where the 
Federals could march the Confederates could follow, and 
that a decisive victory was well worth a great effort.’ } 

The decision of the council of war was that the army 
should move the next morning in the direction of 
jae Harrison’s Landing. Longstreet, whose troops 

had not been engaged at Malvern Hill, was’ to 
lead the way. But the operations of this day were with- 
out result. The line of march was by Carter’s Mill and 
the river road. But after the troops had been set in 
motion, it was found that the river road had been 
obstructed by the enemy, and Lee directed Longstreet to 
countermarch to the Charles City cross roads and move on 
Kvelington Heights.? But ignorance of the country and 
inefficient guides once more played into the enemy’s hands, 
and when night closed the troops were still some distance 
from the Federal outposts. 

The delay had been exceedingly unfortunate. At 9 
A.M. Stuart’s cavalry had occupied the Evelington Heights, 
and, believing that Longstreet was close at hand, had opened 
fire with a single howitzer on the camps below. The 
consternation caused by this unlooked-for attack was 
ereat. But the Federals soon recovered from their surprise, 
and, warned as to the danger of their situation, sent out 
infantry and artillery to drive back the enemy and 
secure the heights. Stuart, dismounting his troopers, held 
on for some time; but at two o’clock, finding that the 
Confederate infantry was still six or seven miles distant, 


1 Letter to the author. Dr. McGuire writes to the same effect. 
2 Evelington Heights are between Rawling’s Mill Pond and Westover. 


STUARTS MISTAKE 71 


and that his ammunition was failing, he gave up the 
Heights, which were immediately fortified by the enemy. 
Had the cavalry commander resisted the temptation of 
spreading panic in the enemy’s ranks, and kept his 
troops under cover, infantry and artillery might possibly 
have been brought up to the Heights before they were 
occupied by the Federals. In any case, it was utterly 
useless to engage a whole army with one gun and a few 
regiments of cavalry, and in war, especially in advanced- 
guard operations, silence is often golden.t It was not till 
they were warned by the fire of Stuart’s howitzer that the 
Federals realised the necessity of securing and intrenching 
the Evelington Heights, and it is within the bounds of 
possibility, had they been left undisturbed, that they might 
have neglected them altogether. McClellan, according to his 
letters already quoted, believed that the condition of the 
roads would retard the advance of the enemy ; and, as is 
evident from a letter he wrote the same morning, before 
the incident took place, he was of opinion that there was no 
immediate need for the occupation of a defensive position.? 
During this day the Valley divisions, crawling in rear of 
Longstreet, had marched only three miles; and such sluggish 
progress, at so critical a moment, put the climax to Jackson’s 
discontent. His wrath blazed forth with unwonted vehem- 
ence. ‘That night,’ says Dabney,’ ‘he was quartered in 
a farmhouse a mile or two east of Willis’ Church. The 
soldier assigned to him as a guide made a most stupid report, 
and admitted that he knew nothing of the road. Jackson 
turned on him in fierce anger, and ordered him from his 
presence with threats of the severest punishment. On 
retiring, he said to his staff, ‘‘ Now, gentlemen, Jim will have 
breakfast for you punctually at dawn. I expect you to be 
up, to eat immediately, and be in the saddle without delay. 
We must burn no more daylight.’ About daybreak I heard 
him tramping down the stairs. I alone went out to meet 
him. All the rest were asleep. He addressed me in 


1 The military student will compare the battles of Weissembourg, Vion- 
ville, and Gravelotte in 1870, all of which began with a useless surprise. 
2 O. R., vol. xi., part iii., pp. 291-2. 8 Letter to the author. 


72 STONEWALL JACKSON 


stern tones: ‘ Major, how is it that this staff never will be 
punctual?” TI replied: ‘“‘I am in time; I cannot control 
the others.” Jackson turned in a rage to the servant: 
“Put back that food into the chest, have that chest in the 
wageon, and that waggon moving in two minutes.” I sug- 
gested, very humbly, that he had better at least take some 
food himself. But he was too angry to eat, and repeating 
his orders, flung himself into the saddle, and galloped off. 
Jim gave alow whistle, saying: “ My stars, but de general 
is just mad dis time; most like lightnin’ strike him !”’’ 

With the engagement on the Evelington Heights the 
fighting round Richmond came to an end. When Lee 
July 4, came up with hig advanced divisions on the 
morning of the 4th, he found the pickets already 
engaged, and the troops formed up in readiness for action. 
He immediately rode forward with Jackson, and the two, dis- 
mounting, proceeded without staff or escort to make a careful 
reconnaissance of the enemy’s position. Their inspection 
showed them that it was practically impregnable. The 
front, facing westward, was flanked from end to end by the 
fire of the gunboats, and the Evelington Heights, already 
fortified, and approached by a single road, were stronger 
ground than even Malvern Hill. The troops were therefore 
withdrawn to the forest, and for the next three days, with 
the exception of those employed in collecting the arms and 
stores which the Federals had abandoned, they 
remained inactive. On July 8, directing Stuart to 
watch McClellan, General Lee fell back to Richmond. 

The battles of the Seven Days cost the Confederates 
20,000 men. The Federals, although defeated, lost no more 
than 16,000, of whom 10,000, nearly half of them wounded, 
were prisoners. In addition, however, 52 guns and 35,000 
rifles became the prize of the Southerners; and vast as 
was the quantity of captured stores, far greater was the 
amount destroyed. 

But the defeat of McClellan’s army is not to be 
measured by a mere estimate of the loss in men and in 
matériel. The discomfited general sought to cover his 
failure by a lavish employment of strategic phrases. The 


July 8. 


REINFORCEMENTS FOR McCLELLAN 73 


retreat to the James, he declared, had been planned before 
the battle of Mechanicsville. He had merely manceuvred 
to get quit of an inconvenient line of supply, and to place his 
army in a more favourable position for attacking Richmond. 
He congratulated his troops on their success in changing 
the line of operations, always regarded as the most 
hazardous of military expedients. Their conduct, he said, 
ranked them among the most celebrated armies of history. 
Under every disadvantage of numbers, and necessarily 
of position also, they had in every conflict beaten back their 
foes with enormous slaughter. They had reached the new 
base complete in organisation and unimpaired in spirit.' 

It is possible that this address soothed the pride of his 
troops. It certainly deluded neither his own people nor 
the South. Theimmediate effect cf his strategic manceuvre 
was startling. 

5,000 men, the effective remnant of Shields’ division, 
besides several new regiments, were sent to the Peninsula 
from the army protecting Washington. General Burnside, 
who had mastered a portion of the North Carolina coast, 
was ordered to suspend operations, to leave a garrison in New 
Berne, and to bring the remainder of his army to Fortress 
Monroe. Troops were demanded from General Hunter, who 
had taken the last fort which defended Savannah, the port 
of Georgia.” The Western army of the Union was asked 
to reinforce McClellan, and Lincoln called on the Northern 
States for a fresh levy. But although 300,000 men were 
promised him, the discouragement of the Northern people 
was so great that recruits showed no alacrity in coming 
forward. The South, on the other hand, ringing with the 
brilliant deeds of Lee and Jackson, turned with renewed 
vigour to the task of resisting the invader. Richmond, the 
beleaguered capital, although the enemy was in position 
not more than twenty miles away, knew that her agony 
was over. The city was one vast hospital. Many of 
the best and bravest of the Confederacy had fallen in the 
Seven Days, and the voice of mourning hushed all sound 


1 O. B., vol. xi., part iii., p. 299. 
2 The forces under Burnside and Hunter amounted to some 35,000 men. 


74 STONEWALL JACKSON 


of triumph. But the long columns of prisoners, the 
captured cannon, the great trains of waggons, piled high 
with spoil, were irrefragable proof of the complete defeat of 
the invader. 

When the army once more encamped within sight of 
the city it was received as it deserved. Lee and Jackson 
were the special objects of admiration. All recognised the 
strategic skill which had wrought the overthrow of 
McClellan’s host ; and the hard marches and sudden blows 
of the campaign on the Shenandoah, crowned by the swift 
transfer of the Valley army from the Blue Ridge to the 
Chickahominy, took fast hold of the popular imagination. 
The mystery in which Jackson’s operations were involved, 
the dread he inspired in the enemy, his reticence, his piety, 
his contempt of comfort, his fiery energy, his fearlessness, 
and his simplicity aroused the interest and enthusiasm of 
the whole community. Whether Lee or his lieutenant was 
the more averse to posing before the crowd it is difficult to 
say. Both succeeded in escaping all public manifestation 
of popular favour ; both went about their business with an 
absolute absence of ostentation, and if the handsome features 
of the Commander-in-Chief were familiar to the majority 
of the citizens, few recognised in the plainly dressed soldier, 
riding alone through Richmond, the great leader of the 
Valley, with whose praises not the South only, but the 
whole civilised world, was already ringing. 


75 


CHAPTER XV 


CEDAR RUN 


Tue victories in the Valley, the retreat of Banks, Shields, 
and Frémont, followed by the victory of Gaines’ Mill, had 
raised the hopes of the South to the highest pitch. 

When McClellan fell back to the James the capture or 
destruction of his army seemed a mere matter of time, and 
it was confidently expected that a disaster of such magni- 
tude would assuredly bring the North to terms. But the 
slaughter of the Confederates at Malvern Hill, the unmo- 
lested retreat of the enemy to Harrison’s Landing, the 
fortification of that strong position, induced a more sober 
mood. The Northern soldiers had displayed a courage 
for which the South had not yet given them credit. On 
the last of the Seven Days they had fought almost as stub- 
bornly as on the first. Their losses had been heavy, but 
they had taught their adversaries that they were no 
longer the unmanageable levies of Bull Run, scattered by 
the first touch of disaster to the four winds. It was no 
frail barrier which stood now between the South and her 
independence, but a great army of trained soldiers, 
seasoned by experience, bound together by discipline, and 
capable of withstanding a long series of reverses. And 
when it became clear that McClellan, backed by the fleet, 
had no intention of losing his grip on Richmond; when 
the news came that Lincoln had asked for 300,000 fresh 
troops; and that the Federal Army of the West, un- 
disturbed by Lee’s victories, was still advancing through 
Tennessee,! the power and persistency of the North were 
revealed in all their huge proportions. 

1 After the repulse of the Confederates at Malvern Hill, and the un- 


molested retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Harrison’s Landing, Lincoln 
cancelled his demand for troops from the West. 


VOL. ET G 


76 STONEWALL JACKSON 


But the disappointment of the Southern people in no 
way abated their gratitude. The troops drank their fill of 
praise. The deeds of the Valley regiments were on every 
tongue. The Stonewall Brigade was the most famous 
organisation in the Confederacy. ‘To have marched 
with Jackson was a sure passport to the good graces 
of every citizen. Envied by their comrades, regarded 
as heroes by the admiring crowds that thronged the 
camps, the ragged soldiers of the Shenandoah found 
ample compensation for their labours. They had indeed 
earned the rest which was now given them. For more 
than two months they had been marching and fighting 
without cessation. Since they left Hlk Run, on April 29, 
until they fell back to the capital on July 8, their camps 
had never stood in the same spot for more than four days 
in succession. 

But neither they nor their general looked forward to a 
long sojourn within the works round Richmond. The men 
pined for the fresh breezes of their native highlands. 
The tainted atmosphere of a district which was one vast 
battle-ground told upon their health, and the people of 
Richmond, despite their kindness, were strangers after all. 
Nor was Jackson less anxious to leave the capital. The 
heavy rain which had deluged the bivouac on the Chicka- 
hominy had chilled him to the bone. During the whole of 
the pursuit, from White Oak Swamp to Westover, he had 
suffered from fever. But his longing for a move westward 
was dictated by other motives than the restoration of 
his health. No sooner had it become evident that 
McClellan’s position was impregnable than he turned 
his thoughts to some more vulnerable point. He would 
allow the enemy no respite. In his opinion there 
should be no ‘letting up’ in the attack. The North 
should be given no leisure to reorganise the armies or 
to train recruits. A swift succession of fierce blows, 
delivered at a vital point, was the only means of bringing 
the colossus to its knees, and that vital point was far from 
Richmond. 

Before the Confederate troops marched back to Rich- 


HIS VIEW OF THE SITUATION 77 


mond he laid his views before the member of Congress 
for the Winchester district, and begged Mr. Boteler to 
impress them on the Government. ‘ McClellan’s army,’ 
he said, ‘was manifestly thoroughly beaten, incapable of 
moving until it had been reorganised and reinforced. 
There was danger,’ he foresaw, ‘ that the fruits of victory 
would be lost, as they had been lost after Bull Run. The 
Confederate army should at once leave the malarious 
district round Richmond, and moving northwards, carry 
the horrors of invasion across the border. ‘This,’ he 
said, ‘ was the only way to bring the North to its senses, 
and to end the war. And it was within the power of 
the Confederates, if they were to concentrate their re- 
sources, to make a successful bid for victory. 60,000 men 
might march into Maryland and threaten Washington. 
But while he was anxious that these views should 
be laid before the President, he would earnestly disclaim 
the charge of self-seeking. He wished to follow, and 
not to lead. He was willing to follow anyone—Lee, or 
Ewell, or anyone who would fight.’ ‘Why do you not 
urge your views,’ asked Mr. Boteler, ‘on General Lee ?’ 
‘I have done so,’ replied Jackson. ‘ And what does he say 
to them?’ ‘He says nothing,’ was the answer; ‘but do 
not understand that I complain of this silence ; it is proper 
that General Lee should observe it. He is wise and 
prudent. He feels that he bears a fearful responsibility, 
and he is right in declining a hasty expression of his 
purpose to a subordinate like me.’ ! 

Jackson was perfectly right in his estimate of the 
Federal army. McClellan had 90,000 men, but 16,000 
were sick, and he was still under the delusion that he had 
been defeated by more than twice his numbers. His letters 
to the President, it is true, betrayed no misgiving. He 
was far from admitting that he had been defeated. His 
army, he wrote, was now so favourably placed that an 
advance on Richmond was easy. He was full of confidence. 
He was watching carefully for any fault committed by the 
enemy, and would take advantage of it. The spirit of his 

1 Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 230, 231. 
@ 2 


78 STONEWALL JACKSON 


army, he declared, was such that he felt unable to restrain it 
from speedily assuming the offensive. He had determined 
not to fall back unless he was absolutely forced to do so. 
He was ready for a rapid and heavy blow at Richmond. 
But to strike that blow he required heavy reinforcements, 
and while waiting their arrival he was unwilling to leave 
his strong position. ! 

Jackson’s views were considered by Mr. Davis. For 
the present, however, they were disregarded. The situa- 
tion, in the opinion of the Government, was still critical. 
McClellan might be reinforced by sea. He might be super- 
seded by a more energetic commander, and the Federals 
might then cross to the right bank of the James, cut the 
railways which connected Richmond with the South, 
and turn the line of fortifications. The losses of the 
Seven Days had reduced the Confederate strength to 
60,000. Under such circumstances it was not considered 
safe to remove the army from the capital. Jackson, 
however, was entrusted with a more congenial duty 
than watching an enemy who, he was absolutely 
convinced, had no intention of leaving his intrench- 
ments. His longing for active work was gratified 
July 13. by an order to march westward. lee, finding 

McClellan immovable, had recourse to his former 
strategy. He determined to play once more on Lincoln’s 
fears. The Army of Virginia, under the command of 
Pope, defended Washington. Would the Northern Govern- 
ment, when the news came that Stonewall Jackson 
was returning to the Shenandoah, deem this force 
sufficient to protect the capital? Would they not 
rather think if necessary to recall McClellan? The 
experiment was worth trying. After some delay in 
recovering from the disorganisation caused by the 
disasters in the Valley, Pope had assembled his army 
east of the Blue Ridge, near the sources of the Rappahan- 
nock. Sperryville, his advanced post, was no more than 
forty miles north of the Virginia Central Railway, and his 
cavalry was already advancing. It was essential that 

1 O. R., vol. xi., part ii., p. 306. 


JACKSON ASKS FOR REINFORCEMENTS 79 


the railway, the chief line of supply of the Confederate 
army, should be protected ; and Jackson was instructed 
July 16. to halt near Gordonsville. On the 16th his 
leading brigades reached their destination. Their 
arrival wasopportune. The Federal cavalry, with a strong 
infantry support, was already threatening Gordonsville. 
On learning, however, that the town was occupied they at 
once fell back. 

Jackson, as soon as his command was up, and he had had 
time to ascertain the Federal strength, applied for reinforce- 
ments. His own numbers were very small. The divisions 
of D. H. Hill and Whiting had remained at Richmond. 
The Army of the Valley, reduced to its original elements, 
was no more than 11,000 strong. Pope’sarmy consisted of 
47,000 men.! But the Federals were scattered over a wide 
front. Sigel, a German who had succeeded F'rémont, was 
near Sperryville, and Banks lay close to Sigel. Hach of 
these officers commanded an army corps of two divisions. 
Of McDowell’s army corps, Ricketts’ division held Warren- 
ton, twenty-five miles east of Banks ; while King’s division 
was retained at Fredericksburg, forty miles south-east of 
Ricketts’. Such dispersion seemed to invite attack. Lee, 
however, found it impossible to comply with his lieu- 
tenant’s request for such aid as would enable him to assume 
the offensive. The army covering Richmond was much 
smaller than McClellan’s, and the Confederates were aware 
that a large reinforcement for the latter, under General 
Burnside, had landed in the Peninsula. But assistance 
was promised in case Pope advanced so far south that troops 
could be detached without risk to Richmond. Pope, in fact, 
was too far off, and Jackson was to entice him forward. 

A week, however, passed away without any movement 
on the part of McClellan. He knew that Lee’s army was 
diminished ; and it was believed at his headquarters that 
‘Jackson had started towards the Valley with 60,000 to 
80,000 troops.’? He knew that there was no large force 


1 Sigel, 13,000 ; Banks, 11,000; McDowell, 18,000 ; Bayard’s and Buford’s 
cavalry, 5,000. 
2 O. R., vol. xi., part iii., p. 334. 


80 STONEWALL JACKSON 


within ten miles of his outposts, and if the President would 
send him 20,000 or 30,000 more men he said that he was 
ready to march on Richmond. But, as yet, he had not 
observed the opportunity for which, according to his own 
account, he was so carefully watching. Pope was far more 
enterprising. His cavalry had burned the railway depot 
at Beaver Dam, destroyed some Confederate stores, cut the 
line at several points, and threatened Hanover Junction. 
Stuart, with his cavalry division, was immediately sent 
northwards, and Lee ordered A. P. Hill to Gordonsville. 

Jackson’s letters to headquarters at this period are 
missing. But Lee’s answers indicate the tenor of the 
views therein expressed. On July 27 the Commander-in- 
Chief wrote :— 

‘I have received your dispatch of the 26th instant. I 
will send A. P. Hill’s division and the Second Brigade of 
Louisiana volunteers to you. . . . I want Pope to be sup- 
pressed. ... A. P. Hill you will, I think, find a good 
officer, with whom you can consult, and by advising with 
your division commanders as to your movements, much 
trouble will be saved you in arranging details, and they 
can act more intelligently. I wish to save you trouble 
from my increasing your command. Cache your troops 
as much as possible till you can strike your blow, and be 
prepared to return to me when done, if necessary. I will 
endeavour to keep General McClellan quiet till it is over, 
if rapidly executed.’ 

This letter, besides containing a delicate hint that 
extreme reticence is undesirable, evidently refers to some 
plan proposed by Jackson. Whatever this may have been, 
it is certain that both he and Lee were in close accord. 
They believed that the best method of protecting the 
railway was, in Lee’s words, ‘to find the main body of the 
enemy and drive it,’ and they were agreed that there should 
be no more Malvern Hills. ‘ You are right,’ says Lee on 
August 4, ‘in not attacking them in their strong and chosen 
positions. They ought always to be turned as you propose, 
and thus force them on to more favourable ground.’ 

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joined Jackson, Pope, under instructions from Washington, 
moved forward. His cavalry occupied the line of Robertson 
River, within twenty miles of the Confederate lines, and it 
became clear that he intended advancing on Gordonsville. 
His infantry, however, had not yet crossed Hazel Run, 
and Jackson, carefully concealing his troops, remained 
on the watch for a few days longer. His anxiety, however, 
to bring his enemy to battle was even greater than usual. 
Pope had already gained an unenviable notoriety. On 
taking over command he had issued an extraordinary 
address. His bombast was only equalled by his want of 
tact. Not content with extolling the prowess of the 
Western troops, with whom he had hitherto served, he 
was bitterly satirical at the expense of McClellan and 
of McClellan’s army. ‘I have come to you,’ he said to 
his soldiers, ‘from the West, where we have always seen 
the backs of our enemies—from an army whose business 
it has been to seek the adversary, and beat him when 
found, whose policy has been attack and not defence. .. . 
I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same 
system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my 
purpose to do so, and that speedily. ... Meantime, I 
desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, 
which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I 
hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding 
them—of lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. Let 
us discard such ideas. .. . Let us study the probable 
line of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take 
care of themselves. Let us look before and not behind. 
Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame 
lurk in the rear.’ ! 

Even the Northern press made sport of Pope’s ‘ ’Ercles 
vein,’ and the Confederates contrasted his noisy declama- 
tion with the modesty of Lee and Jackson. ‘To the South 
the new commander was peculiarly obnoxious. He was the 
first of the Federal generals to order that the troops should 
subsist upon the country, and that the people should be 
held responsible for all damage done to roads, railways, and 

1 O. R., vol. xii., part iii., p. 474. 


82 STONEWALL JACKSON 


telegraphs by guerillas. His orders, it is true, were 
warranted by the practice of war. But ‘ forced requisitions,’ 
unless conducted on a well-understood system, must in- 
evitably degenerate into plunder and oppression ; and Pope, 
in punishing civilians, was not careful to distinguish between 
the acts of guerillas and those of the regular Confederate 
cavalry. ‘These orders,’ says a Northern historian, ‘ were 
followed by the pillaging of private property, and by insults 
to females to a degree unknown heretofore during the war.’ 
But in comparison with a third edict they were mild 
and humane. On July 23 Pope’s generals were instructed 
to arrest every Virginian within the limits of their 
commands, to administer the oath of allegiance to the 
Union, and to expel from their homes all those who 
refused to take it. This order was preceded by one from 
General von Steinwehr, a German brigadier, directing the 
arrest of five prominent citizens, to be held as hostages, 
and to suffer death in the event of any soldiers being shot 
by bushwhackers. The Confederate Government retaliated 
by declaring that Pope and his officers were not entitled to 
be considered as soldiers. If captured they were to be 
imprisoned so long as their orders remained unrepealed ; 
and in the event of any unarmed Confederate citizens being 
tried and shot, an equal number of Federal prisoners were 
to behanged. It need hardly be added that the operations 
north of Gordonsville were watched with peculiar interest 
by the South. ‘This new general,’ it was said to Jackson, 
‘claims your attention.’ ‘And, please God, he shall have 
it,’ was the reply. | 
Nevertheless, with all his peculiar characteristics, 
Pope was no despicable foe. The Federal cavalry were 
employed with a boldness which had not hitherto been 
seen. Their outposts were maintained twenty miles in 
advance of the army. Frequent reconnaissances were 
made. A regiment of Jackson’s cavalry was defeated 
at Orange Court House, with a loss of 60 or 70 men, 
and scouting parties penetrated to within a few miles of 
Gordonsville. Even Banks was spurred to activity, and 
learned at last that information is generally to be obtained 


HALLECK COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 83 


if it is resolutely sought.! Very little that occurred within 
the Confederate lines escaped the vigilance of the enemy; 
and although Jackson’s numbers were somewhat overesti- 
mated, Pope’s cavalry, energetically led by two able young 
officers, Generals Buford and Bayard, did far better service 
than McClellan’s detectives. Jackson had need of all his 
prudence. Including the Light Division, his force amounted 
to no more than 24,000 men; and if Pope handled his 
whole army with as much skill as he used his cavalry, it 
would go hard with Gordonsville. 24,000 men could 
hardly be expected to arrest the march of 47,000 unless 
the larger force should blunder. 

During the first week in August events began to thicken. 
Stuart made a strong reconnaissance towards Fredericks- 
burg, and administered a check to the Federal scouting 
parties in that quarter. But McClellan threw forward a 
division and occupied Malvern Hill, and it became evident 
that Pope also was meditating a further advance. 

Jackson, for the purpose of luring him forward, and 
also of concealing Hill’s arrival, had drawn back his cavalry, 
and moved his infantry south of Gordonsville. Pope was 
warned from Washington that this was probably a ruse. 
His confidence, however, was not to be shaken. ‘ Within 
ten days,’ he reported, ‘unless the enemy is heavily re- 
inforced from Richmond, I shall be in possession of Gordons- 
ville and Charlottesville.’ 

Although such an operation would carry Pope far from 
Washington there was no remonstrance from headquarters. 
Lincoln and Stanton, mistrustful at last of their ability as 
strategists, had called to their councils General Halleck, 
who had shown some evidence of capacity while in command 
of the Western armies. Thenew Commander-in-Chief had 
a difficult problem to work out. It is impossible to deter- 
mine how far Jackson’s movement to Gordonsville influenced 
the Federal authorities, but immediately on Halleck’s arrival 

1 «We must constantly feel the enemy, know where he is, and what he 
is doing. Vigilance, activity, and a precaution that has a considerable 
mixture of audacity in it will carry you through many difficulties.’ Such 


were his instructions to an officer of the regular army! It was unfortunate 
he had not acted on those sound principles in the Valley. 


84 STONEWALL JACKSON 


at Washington, about the same date that the movement 
was reported, he was urged, according to his own account, 
to withdraw McClellan from the Peninsula. ‘I delayed 
my decision,’ he says, ‘as long as I dared delay it ;’ but on 
August 8 his mind was made up, and McClellan, just after 
Hill joined Jackson, was ordered to embark his army at 
Fortress Monroe, sail to Aquia Creek, near Fredericksburg, 
and join Pope on the Rappahannock. The proposed 
combination, involving the transfer by sea of 90,000 men, 
with all their artillery and trains, was a manceuvre full of 
danger.! The retreat and embarkation of McClellan’s troops 
would take time, and the Confederates, possessing ‘ the 
interior lines,’ had two courses open to them :— 

1. Leaving Jackson to check Pope, they might attack 
McClellan as soon as he evacuated his intrenched position 
at Harrison’s Landing. 

2. They might neglect McClellan and concentrate 
against Pope before he could be reinforced. 

Halleck considered that attack on McClellan was the 
more likely, and Pope was accordingly instructed to threaten 
Gordonsville, so as to force Lee to detach heavily from 
Richmond, and leave him too weak to strike the Army of 
the Potomac. 

On August 6 Pope commenced his advance. Banks 
had pushed a brigade of infantry from Sperryville to 
Aue.6, Culpeper Court House, and Ricketts’ division (of 

% McDowell’s corps) was ordered to cross the Rappa- 
hannock at Waterloo Bridge and march to the same spot. 
Jackson, whose spies had informed him of the enemy’s dispo- 
sitions, received early intelligence of Banks’ movement, and 
the next afternoon his three divisions were ordered forward, 
marching by roads where there was no chance of their being 
seen. ‘ He hoped,’ so he wrote to Lee, ‘ through the blessing 
of Providence, to defeat the advanced Federal detachment 
before reinforcements should arrive.’ This detachment was 


1 McClellan had received no further reinforcements than those sent from 
Washington. Burnside, with 14,000 men, remained at Fortress Monroe 
until the beginning of August, when he embarked for Aquia Creek, 
concentrating on August 5. Hunter’s troops were withheld. 


THE VALLEY ARMY 85 


his first objective; but he had long since recognised the 
strategic importance of Culpeper Court House. At this 
point four roads meet, and it was probable, from their pre- 
vious dispositions, that the Federal army corps would use 
three of these in their advance. Pope’s right wing at Sperry- 
ville would march by Woodville and Griffinsburg. His 
centre had already moved forward from Warrenton. His 
left wing at Falmouth, north of Fredericksburg, would 
march by Bealeton and Brandy Station, or by Richardsville 
and Georgetown. As all these roads were several miles 
apart, and the lateral communications were indifferent, the 
three columns, during the movement on Culpeper Court 
House, would be more or less isolated; and if the Con- 
federates could seize the point at which the roads met, 
it might be possible to keep them apart, to prevent them 
combining for action, and to deal with them in detail. | 
Pope, in fact, had embarked on a manceuvre which is - 
always dangerous in face of a vigilant and energetic enemy. 
Deceived by the passive attitude which Jackson had 
hitherto maintained, and confident in the strength of his 
cavalry, which held Robertson River, a stream some ten 
miles south of Culpeper Court House, he had pushed a small 
force far in advance, and was preparing to cross Hazel 
Run in several widely separated columns. He had no 
apprehension that he might be attacked during the process. 
Most generals in Jackson’s situation, confronted by far 
superior numbers, would have been content with occupying 
a defensive position in front of Gordonsville, and neither 
Pope nor Halleck had gauged as yet the full measure of 
their opponent’s enterprise. So confident was the Federal 
Commander-in-Chief that General Cox, with 11,000 men, 
was ordered to march from Lewisburg, ninety miles south- 
west of Staunton, to join Pope at Charlottesville.’ 


Jackson’s force was composed as follows :— 
Jackson’s Own Division ome Andes, by Winder) 38,000 


Ewe 7,550 
A. P. Hill (The Light Division) , A . 12,000 
Cavalry . : ; . 1,200 

23,750 


1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 281. 


86 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Jackson was by no means displeased when he learned 
who was in command of the Federal advance. ‘ Banks is 
in front of me,’ he said to Dr. McGuire, ‘he is always 
ready to fight;’ and then, laughing, he added as if to 
himself, ‘and he generally gets whipped.’ 

The Confederate regiments, as a rule, were very weak. 
The losses of the Seven Days, of Winchester, of Cross 
Keys, and of Port Republic had not yet been replaced. 
Companies had dwindled down to sections. Brigades 
were no stronger than full battalions, and the colonel was 
happy who could muster 200 muskets. But the waste of 
the campaign was not altogether an evil. The weak and 
sickly had been weeded out. The faint-hearted had dis- 
appeared, and if many of the bravest had fallen before 
Richmond, those who remained were hardy and experienced 
soldiers. The army that lay round Gordonsville was the 
best that Jackson had yetcommanded. The horses, which 
had become almost useless in the Peninsula, had soon 
regained condition on the rich pastures at the foot of the 
South-west Mountains. Nearly every man had seen: 
service. ‘The officers were no longer novices. The troops 
had implicit confidence in their leaders, and their moral was 
high. They had not yet tasted defeat. Whenever they 
had met the enemy he had abandoned the field of battle. 
With such troops much might be risked, and if the staff 
was not yet thoroughly trained, the district in which they 
were now operating was far less intricate than the Penin- 
sula. As the troops marched westward from Richmond, 
with their faces towards their own mountains, the country 
grew more open, the horizon larger, and the breezes 
purer. The dark forests disappeared. The clear streams, 
running swiftly over rocky beds, were a welcome change 
from the swamps of the Chickahominy. North of Gordons- 
ville the spurs of the Blue Ridge, breaking up into long 
chains of isolated hills, towered high above the sunlit 
plains. The rude tracks of the Peninsula, winding through 
the woods, gave place to broad and well-trodden highways. 
Nor did the marches now depend upon the guidance of 
some casual rustic or terrified negro. There were many in 


THE CONFEDERATES ADVANCE 87 


the Confederate ranks who were familiar with the country ; 
and the quick pencil of Captain Hotchkiss, Jackson’s trusted 
engineer, who had rejoined from the Valley, was once more 
at his disposal. Information, moreover, was not hard to come 
by. The country was far more thickly populated than the 
region about Richmond, and, notwithstanding Pope’s harsh 
measures, he was unable to prevent the people communi- 
cating with their own army. If the men had been un- 
willing to take the risk, the women were quite ready to 
emulate the heroines of the Valley, and the conduct of 
the Federal marauders had served only to inflame their 
patriotism. Under such circumstances Jackson’s task 
was relieved of half its difficulties. He was almost as 
much at home as on the Shenandoah, and although there 
were no Massanuttons to screen his movements, the hills to 
the north, insignificant as they might be when compared 
with the great mountains which divide the Valley, might 
still be turned to useful purpose. 

On August 7, starting late in the afternoon, the Con- 
federates marched eight miles by a country track, and halted 
Ae. at Orange Court House. Culpeper was still twenty 

miles distant, and two rivers, the Rapidan and 
Robertson, barred the road. ‘The Robertson was held 
by 5,000 or 6,000 Federal cavalry ; five regiments, under 
General Buford, were near Madison Court House; four, 
under General Bayard, near Rapidan Station. Hast of the 
railway two more regiments held Raccoon Ford; others 
watched the Rappahannock as far as Fredericksburg, and 
on Thoroughfare Mountain, ten miles south-west of Cul- 
peper, and commanding a view of the surrounding country 
as far as Orange Court House, was a signal station. 
e's Karly on the 8th, Ewell’s division crossed the 

' ‘Rapidan at Liberty Mills, while the other 
divisions were ordered to make the passage at Barnett’s 
Ford, six miles below. A forced march should have 
carried the Confederates to within striking distance of 
Culpeper, and a forced march was almost imperative. The 
cavalry had been in contact; the advance must already 
have been reported to Pope, and within twenty-four hours 


88 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the whole of the Federal army, with the exception of the 
division at Fredericksburg, might easily be concentrated in 
a strong position. 

Still there were no grounds for uneasiness. If the 
troops made sixteen miles before nightfall, they would be 
before Culpeper soon after dawn, and sixteen miles was no 
extraordinary march for the Valley regiments. But to 
accomplish a long march in the face of the enemy, some- 
thing is demanded more than goodwill and endurance on 
the part of the men. If the staff arrangements are faulty, 
or the subordinate commanders careless, the best troops 
in the world will turn sluggards. It was so on August 8. 
Jackson’s soldiers never did a worse day’s work during the 
whole course of his campaigns. Even his energy was 
powerless to push them forward. The heat, indeed, was 
excessive. Several men dropped dead in the ranks; the 
long columns dragged wearily through the dust, and the 
Federal cavalry was not easily pushed back. Guns and 
infantry had to be brought up before Bayard’s dismounted 
squadrons were dislodged. But the real cause of delay is © 
to be found elsewhere. Not only did General Hill mis- 
understand his orders, but, apparently offended by Jackson’s 
reticence, he showed but little zeal. The orders were 
certainly incomplete. Nothing had been said about the 
supply trains, and they were permitted to follow their di- 
visions, instead of moving in rear of the whole force. 
Ewell’s route, moreover, was changed without Hill being 
informed. The lines of march crossed each other, and 
Hill was delayed for many hours by a long column of 
ambulances and waggons. So tedious was the march 
that when the troops halted for the night, Ewell had 
made eight miles, Hill only two, and the latter was still 
eighteen miles from Culpeper. Chagrined by the delay, 
Jackson reported to Lee that ‘he had made but little pro- 
gress, and that the expedition,’ he feared, ‘in consequence 
of his tardy movements, would be productive of little 
good.’ 

How the blame should be apportioned it is difficult to 
say. Jackson laid it upon Hill, and that officer’s conduct 


UNTOWARD DELAY 89 


was undoubtedly reprehensible. The absence of Major 
Dabney, struck down by sickness, is a possible explanation 
of the faulty orders. But that Jackson would have done 
better to have accepted Lee’s hint, to have confided his 
intentions to his divisional commanders, and to have 
trusted something to their discretion, seems more than 
clear. In war, silence is not invariably a wise policy. It 
was not a case in which secresy was all-important. The 
movement had already been discovered by the Federal 
cavalry, and in such circumstances the more officers that 
understood the intention of the general-in-chief the better. 
Men who have been honoured with their leader’s confidence, 
and who grasp the purpose of the efforts they are called 
upon to make, will co-operate, if not more cordially, at least 
more intelligently, than those who are impelled by the sense 
of duty alone. 

As it was, so much time had been wasted that Jackson 
would have been fully warranted in suspending the move- 
ment, and halting on the Rapidan. The Federals were 
aware he was advancing. Their divisions were not so far 
apart that they could not be concentrated within a few 
hours at Culpeper, and, in approaching so close, he was 
entering the region of uncertainty. Time was too pressing 
to admit of waiting for the reports of spies. The enemy’s 
cavalry was far more numerous than his own, and screened 
the troops in rear from observation. The information 
brought in by the country people was not to be implicitly 
relied on; their estimate of numbers was always vague, 
and it would be exceedingly difficult to make sure that the 
force at Culpeper had not been strongly reinforced. It was 
quite on the cards that the whole of Pope’s army might 
reach that point in the course of the next day, and in that 
case the Confederates would be compelled to retreat, fol- 
lowed by a superior army, across two bridgeless rivers. 

Nevertheless, the consideration of these contingencies 
had no effect on Jackson’s purpose. The odds, he decided, 
were in his favour; and the defeat of Pope’s army in 
detail, with all the consequences that might follow, was 
worth risking much to bring about. It was still possible 


90 STONEWALL JACKSON 


that Pope might delay his concentration; it was still 
possible that an opportunity might present itself; and, 
as he had done at Winchester in March, when threatened 
by a force sevenfold stronger than his own, he resolved to 
look for that opportunity before he renounced his enterprise. 

In speed and caution lay the only chance of success. 
The start on the 9th was early. Hill, anxious to redeem 
his shortcomings, marched long before daylight, 
and soon caught up with Ewell and Winder. 
Half of the cavairy covered the advance; the remainder, 
screening the left flank, scouted west and in the direction 
of Madison Court House. Two brigades of infantry, Grege’s 
and Lawton’s, were left in rear to guard the trains, for the 
Federal horsemen threatened danger, and the army, dis- 
embarrassed of the supply waggons, pressed forward across 
the Rapidan. Pushing the Federal cavalry before them, the 
troops reached Robertson River. The enemy’s squadrons, 
already worn out by incessant reconnaissance and picket 
duty, were unable to dispute the passage, and forming a 
single column, the three divisions crossed the Locustdale 
Ford. Climbing the northern bank, the high-road to Cul- 
peper, white with dust, lay before them, and to their right 
front, little more than two miles distant, a long wooded 
ridge, bearing the ominous name of Slaughter Mountain 
rose boldly from the plain. 

Ewell’s division led the march, and shortly before noon, 
as the troops swept past the western base of Slaughter 
Mountain, it was reported that the Federal cavalry, massed 
in some strength, had come to a halt a mile or two north, 
on the bank of a small stream called Cedar Run. 

The Confederate guns opened, and the hostile cavalry 
fell back; but from a distant undulation a Federal battery 
came into action, and the squadrons, supported by this 
fire, returned to their old position. Although Cedar Run 
was distant seven miles from Culpeper, it was evident, from 
the attitude of the cavalry, that the enemy was inclined to 
make a stand, and thatin all probability Banks’ army corps 
was in support.! Harly’s brigade, forming the advanced- 

1 This was the case. Banks had reached Culpeper on the 8th. On the 


Aug. 9. 


PREPARING FOR BATTLE 91 


guard, which had halted in a wood by the roadside, 
was now ordered forward. Deploying to the right of the 
highway, it drove in the enemy’s vedettes, and came out 
on the open ground which overlooks the stream. Across 
the shallow valley, covered with the high stalks and broad 
leaves of Indian corn, rose a loftier ridge, twelve hundred 
yards distant, and from more than one point batteries 
opened on the Confederate scouts. The regiments of the 
advanced-guard were immediately withdrawn to the reverse 
slope of the ridge, and Jackson galloped forward to the 
sound of the guns. His dispositions had been quickly 
made. A large force of artillery was ordered to come into 
action on either flank of the advanced-guard. Evwell’s 
division was ordered to the right, taking post on the 
northern face of Slaughter Mountain ; Winder was ordered 
to the left, and Hill, as soon as he came up, was to form 
the reserve, in rear of Winder. These movements took 
time. The Confederate column, 20,000 infantry and fifteen 
batteries, must have occupied more than seven miles of 
road; it would consequently take over two hours for the 
whole force to deploy for battle. 

Before three o’clock, however, the first line was formed. 
On the right of the advanced-guard, near a clump of 
045 p.u, cedars, were eight guns, and on Slaughter 
Mountain eight more. Along the high-road to the 
left six guns of Winder’s division were soon afterwards 
deployed, reinforced by four of Hill’s. These 
twenty-six pieces, nearly the whole of the long- 
range ordnance which the Confederates possessed, were 
turned on the opposing batteries, and for nearly two hours 
the artillery thundered across the valley. The infantry, 
meanwhile, awaiting Huill’s arrival, had come into line. 
Ewell’s brigades, Trimble’s, and the Louisianians (com- 
manded by Colonel Forno) had halted in the woods on the 
extreme right, at the base of the mountain, threatening the 
enemy’s flank. Winder had come up on the left, and had 
posted the Stonewall Brigade in rear of his guns ; Campbell’s 


3 P.M. 


same day his advanced brigade was sent forward to Cedar Run, and was 
followed by the rest of the army corps on the 9th. 


VOL. Il. H 


92 STONEWALL JACKSON 


brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Garnett, was stationed in front, 
west, and Taliaferro’s brigade east, of theroad. The 10,000 
men of the Light Division, however, were still some distance 
to the rear, and the position was hardly secure against a 
counterstroke. The left of the line extended along a skirt of 
woodland, which ran at right angles to the road, overlooking a 
wheat-field but lately reaped, on the further side of which, 
and three hundred yards distant, was dense wood. This point 
was the most vulnerable, for there was no support at hand, 
and a great tract of forest stretched away westward, where 
cavalry was useless, but through which it was quite possible 
that infantry might force its way. Jackson ordered Colonel 
Garnett, commanding the brigade on this flank, ‘to look 
well to his left, and to ask his divisional commander for rein- 
forcements.’ The brigadier sent a staff officer and an orderly 
to reconnoitre the forest to the left, and two officers were 
dispatched to secure the much-needed support. 

But at this juncture General Winder was mortally 
wounded by ashell; there was some delay in issuing orders, 
and before the weak place in the line could be strengthened 
the storm broke. The enemy’s batteries, five in number, 
although the concentrated fire of the Confederates had 
compelled them to change position, had not yet been silenced. 
No large force of Federal infantry had as yet appeared ; 
skirmishers only had pushed forward through the corn ; but 
the presence of so many guns was a clear indication that a 
strong force was not far off, and Jackson had no intention 
of attacking a position which had not yet been reconnoitred 
until his rear division had closed up, and the hostile artillery 
had lost its sting. About five o’clock, however, General 
Banks, although his whole force, including 
Bayard’s cavalry, did not exceed 9,000 officers and 
men,! and Ricketts’ division, in support, was four miles 
distant, gave orders for a general attack.? Two brigades, 
crossing the rise which formed the Federal position, 

1 3,500 of Banks’ army corps had been left at Winchester, and his sick 
were numerous. 
2 Banks had received an order from Pope which might certainly be under- 


stood to mean that he should take the offensive if the enemy ap- 
proached.—Report of Conumittee of Congress, vol. iii., p. 45. 


5 P.M. 


A CRITICAL MOMENT 93 


bore down on the Confederate centre, and strove to cross 
the stream. Early was hard pressed, but, Taliaferro’s 
brigade advancing on his left, he held his own; and on 
the highroad, raked by a Confederate gun, the enemy 
was unable to push forward. But within the wood to the 
left, at the very point where Jackson had advised precau- 
tion, the line of defence was broken through. On the 
edge of the timber commanding the wheat-field only 
two Confederate regiments were posted, some 500 men 
all told, and the 1st Virginia, on the extreme left, was 
completely isolated. The Stonewall Brigade, which should 
have been placed in second line behind them, had not 
yet received its orders; it was more than a half-mile 
distant, in rear of Winder’s artillery, and hidden from 
the first line by the trees and undergrowth. Beyond the 
wheat-field 1,500 Federals, covered by a line of skir- 
mishers, had formed up in the wood. Emerging from the 
covert with fixed bayonets and colours flying, their long 
line, overlapping the Confederate left, moved steadily across 
the three hundred yards of open ground. The shocks of 
corn, and some ragged patches of scrub timber, gave cover 
to the skirmishers, but in the closed ranks behind the 
accurate fire of the Southern riflemen made fearful ravages. 
Still the enemy pressed forward; the skirmishers darted 
from bush to bush; the regiments on the right swung round, 
enveloping the Confederate line; and the ist Virginia, 
despite the entreaties of its officers, broke and scattered.' 
Assailed in front from the field and in flank from the 
forest, the men were struck by a sudden panic, and flying 
back through the woodland, left the way open to the very 
rear of the position. The 42nd Virginia, outflanked in turn, 
was compelled to give ground; and the Federals, without 
waiting to reform, swept rapidly through the wood, and 
bore down upon the flank of Taliaferro’s brigade and 
Winder’s batteries. 

And now occurred a scene of terrible confusion. So 
swift was the onslaught that the first warning received 
by the Confederates on the highroad was a sudden storm 

' O. R., vol. xii., part ii., p. 201. 
Wu 2 


94 STONEWALL JACKSON 


of musketry, the loud cheers of the enemy, and the rush of 
fugitives from the forest. Attacked simultaneously in front, 
flank and rear, with the guns and limbers entangled among 
the infantry, Winder’s division was subjected to an ordeal of 
which it was without experience. The batteries, by Jack- 
son’s order, were at once withdrawn, and not a gun was 
lost. The infantry, however, did not escape so lightly. The 
Federals, emboldened by the flight of the artillery, charged 
forward with reckless courage. Every regimental com- 
mander in Garnett’s brigade was either killed or wounded. 
Taliaferro’s brigade was driven back, and Early’s left was 
broken. Some regiments attempted to change front, others 
retreated in disorder. Scattered groups, plying butt and 
bayonet, endeavoured to stay the rout. Officers rushed into 
the mélée, and called upon those at hand to follow. Men 
were captured and recaptured, and, for a few moments, the 
blue and grey were mingled in close conflict amid the smoke. 
But the isolated efforts of the Confederates were of no avail. 
The first line was irretrievably broken; the troops were 
mingled in a tumultuous mass, through which the shells 
tore shrieking ; the enemy’s bayonets were surging forward 
on every side, and his well-served batteries, firing over the 
heads of their own infantry, played heavily on the road. 
But fortunately for the Virginians the Federal right wing 
was unsupported; and although the Light Division was 
still at some distance from the field, the Stonewall Brigade 
was already advancing. Breaking through the rout to the 
left of the highroad, these five staunch regiments, undis- 
mayed by the disaster, opened a heavy fire. The Federals, 
although still superior in numbers at the decisive point, had 
lost all order in their successful charge; to meet this fresh 
onset they halted and drew together, and then Jackson, 
with wonderful energy, restored the battle. 

Sending orders for Ewell and A. P. Hill to attack at 
once, he galloped forward, unattended by either staff 
officer or orderly, and found himself in the midst of his 
own men, his soldiers of the Valley, no longer presenting the 
stubborn front of Bull Run or Kernstown, but an ungovern- 
able mob, breaking rapidly to the rear, and on the very 


THE COUNTERSTROKE 95 


verge of panic. Drawing his sword, for the first time in 
the war, his voice pealed high above the din; the troops 
caught the familiar accents, instinct with resolution, and 
the presence of their own general acted like a spell. 
‘Rally, men,’ he shouted, ‘and follow me!’ ‘Taliaferro, 
riding up to him, emphatically insisted that the midst 
of the mélée was no place for the leader of an army. He 
looked a little surprised, but with his invariable ejaculation 
of ‘ Good, good,’ turned slowly to the rear. The impulse, 
however, had already been given to the Confederate troops. 
With a wild yell the remnant of the 21st Virginia rushed 
forward to the front, and received the pursuers with a 
sudden volley. The officers of other regiments, inspired by 
the example of their commander, bore the colours forward, 
and the men, catching the enthusiasm of the moment, 
followed in the path of the 21st. The Federals recoiled. 
Taliaferro and Harly, reforming their brigades, again ad- 
vanced upon the right; and Jackson, his front once more 
established, turned his attention to the counterstroke he 
had already initiated. 

Ewell was ordered to attack the Federal left. Branch, 
leading the Light Division, was sent forward to support the 
Stonewall Brigade, and Lane to charge down the highroad. 
Thomas was to give aid to Karly. Archer and Pender, 
following Branch, were to outflank the enemy’s right, and 
Field and Stafford were to follow as third line. 

Ewell was unable to advance at once, for the Con- 
federate batteries on Slaughter Mountain swept. the whole 
field, and it was some time before they could be induced to 
cease fire. But on the left the mass of fresh troops, 
directed on the critical point, exerted a decisive influence. 
The Federal regiments, broken and exhausted, were driven 
back into the wood and across the wheat-field by the 
charge of the Stonewall Brigade. Still they were not yet 
done with. Before Hill’s troops could come into action, 
Jackson’s old regiments, as they advanced into the open, 
were attacked in front and threatened on the flank. The 
4th and 27th Virginia were immediately thrown back to 
meet the more pressing danger, forming to the left within 


96 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the wood; but assailed in the confusion of rapid move- 
ment, they gave way and scattered through the thickets. 
But the rift in the line was rapidly closed up. Jackson, 
riding in front of the Light Division, and urging the 
men to hold their fire and use their bayonets, rallied 
the 27th and led them to the front; while Branch’s 
regiments, opening their ranks for the fugitives to pass 
through, and pressing forward with unbroken line, drove 
back the Northern skirmishers, and moving into the wheat- 
field engaged their main body in the opposite wood. 

Lane, meanwhile, was advancing astride the road; 
Archer and Pender, in accordance with Jackson’s orders, 
were sweeping round through the forest, and Field and 
Stafford were in rear of Branch. A fresh brigade had come 
up to sustain the defeated Federals; but gallantly as 
they fought, the Northerners could make no head against 
overwhelming numbers. Outflanked to both right and 
left, for Early and Ewell were now moving forward, 
they began to yield. Jackson rode forward to the 
wheat-field, and just at this moment Banks made a 
despairing effort to extricate his infantry. Two squad- 
rons, hitherto concealed by the woods, appeared suddenly on 
the road, and, deploying into two lines, charged full against 
the Confederate centre. The skirmishers were ridden 
down; but the troops in rear stood firm, and several 
companies, running to a fence along the highway, poured 
a devastating fire into the mass of horsemen. Out of 174 
officers and men oniy 71 rode back.! 

This brilliant episode brought no respite to the Federals. 
Archer and Pender had turned their right; Ewell was 
6.30 pu, Pressing forward against their left, scaling the 

ridge on which their batteries had been posted ; 
Karly and Lane were pressing back their centre, and 
their guns had already limbered up. Jackson, galloping 
to the front, was received with the cheers of his victorious 
troops. In every quarter of the field the enemy was in 
full retreat, and as darkness began to fall the whole 
Confederate line crossed Cedar Run and swept up the 

1 O. R., vol. xii., part ii., p. 141. 


BATTLE OF 


CEDAR RUN, Va. 
Saturday, August oth. 1862. 


Statute Miles 


% A t 


Confederate 
Cee = Federal 


Vi 


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Nanny! yy 
Lh Bi, 


2 SS GTI 
ie ENN LJ As x 
“mye “ily, ~\ 

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Ee 


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SM: 
Gy 


WS 


2 eee yu oe 


Ws 
MPink yess 4 


‘Ni ON 


Os 
[aren Ee STM 
BER 


S 
tr 
a 


SHINS 


re NGG «fo. 


ire °F alm. 
ad od 
<= 2.7?" 
Sets ae fo Rapidan Station, 5 Miles 


Garnett 


Ai RANA QF AUG.8TH, 1862. 


a 


TNS 


«Hotchkiss C.S.A, 


“Oy Lies, Ma 


/s 
¥(RicKETT'S 
fy: DIV. AUG.8TH,) 


son nH. 16M, eiuin 8 
IAF ~Ragern 


Z, ast Ss 
SHUN 
BAN Sy 


<—To Meads 


ae 


Sey 
WY, 


oo RS 


Sea 


Gi 


FEDERAL CAVALRY 
Pag, - 


Mrs. fi 


ES 


= 


SS 


Ww == 


Ate Se fo. Dr, 
SSDS 
on 


~ 
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Mitchell’s Station 


Walker & Boutall se, 


Deal 
ret 


ahi i 


| CP ae ls mee 
Poteet ia 


THE PURSUIT 97 


slopes beyond. Every yard of ground bore witness to the 
severity of the fighting. The slaughter had been very 
heavy. Within ninety minutes 3,000 men had fallen. The 
woods were a shambles, and among the corn the dead 
lay thick. Scores of prisoners surrendered themselves, 
and hundreds of discarded muskets bore witness to the de- 
moralisation of the Northerners. Nevertheless, the pursuit 
was slow. The impetuosity of the Confederates, eager to 
complete their triumph, was checked with a firm hand. 
The infantry were ordered to reform before they entered 
the dense forest which lay between them and Culpeper. The 
guns, unable to cross Cedar Run except by the road, were 
brought over in a single column, and two fresh brigades, 
Field’s and Stafford’s, which had not yet fired a shot, were 
brought forward as advanced-guard. Although Jackson had 
been careful to bring guides who knew the woodland tracks, 
there was need for prudence. The light was failing ; 
the cavalry could find no space to act; and, above all, the 
whereabouts of Pope’s main body was still uncertain. The 
Federals had fought with fine courage. Their resolute attack, 
pressed home with extraordinary dash, had rolled up the 
choicest of the Valley regiments. And yet it was evident 
that only a small portion of the Northern army had been 
engaged. The stirring incidents of the battle had been 
crowded into a short space of time. It was five o’clock when 
the Federals left their covert. An hour and a half later 
they had abandoned the field. Their precipitate retreat, the 
absence of a strong rear-guard, were sure tokens that every 
regiment had been employed in the attack, and it was 
soon discovered by the Confederate soldiers that these regi- 
ments were old opponents of the Valley army. The men 
who had surprised and outflanked Jackson’s old division 
were the same men that had been surprised at Front Royal 
and outflanked at Winchester. But Banks’ army corps 
formed only a third part of Pope’s army. Sigel and 
McDowell were still to be accounted for. 

It was possible, however, that no more formidable 
enemies than the troops already defeated would be found 
between Cedar Run and Culpeper, and Jackson, intent 


98 STONEWALL JACKSON 


upon securing that strategic point before morning,' pushed 
steadily forward. Of the seven miles that intervened 
between the battle-field and the Court House only one-and- 
a-half had been passed, when the scouts brought information 
that the enemy was in position a few hundred yards to the 
front. A battery was immediately sent forward to develop 
the situation. The moon was full, and on the far side of the 
glade where the advanced-guard, acting under Jackson’s 
orders, had halted and deployed, a strong line of fire 
marked the hostile front. Once more the woodland avenues 
reverberated to the crash of musketry, and when the guns 
opened a portion of the Federal line was seen flying in 
disorder. Pope himself bad arrived upon the scene, but sur- 
prised by the sudden salvo of Jackson’s guns, he was con- 
strained to do what he had never done in the West—to turn 
his back upon the enemy, and seek a safer position. Yet 
despite the disappearance of the staff the Union artillery 
made a vigorous reply. Two batteries, hidden by the timber, 
concentrated on the four guns of the advanced-guard, and 
about the same moment the Confederate cavalry on the: 
extreme right reported that they had captured prisoners 
belonging to Sigel’s army corps. ‘ Believing it imprudent,’ 
says Jackson, ‘to continue to move forward during the 
darkness, I ordered a halt for the night.’ 

Further information appears to have come to hand after 
midnight ; and early the next morning General Stuart, 
tae 40: who had arrived on a tour of inspection, having 

been placed in charge of the cavalry, ascertained 
beyond all question that the greater part of Pope’s 
army had come up. The Confederates were ordered to 
withdraw, and before noon nearly the whole force had 
regained their old position on Cedar Run. They were not 
followed, save by the Federal cavalry; and for two days 
they remained in position, ready to receive attack. The 
enemy, however, gave no sign of aggressive intentions. 
aber On the morning of the 11th a flag of truce 

was received, and Pope was permitted to bury 
the dead which had not already been interred. The same 

' Report. O.R., vol. xii., part ii., p. 184. 


HIS CAUTION 99 


night, his wounded, his prisoners, and the captured arms 
Rie 13: having already been removed, Jackson returned 
to his old camps near Gordonsville. His posi- 
tion on Cedar Run, tactically strong, was strategically 
unsound. The intelligence he had obtained was sub- 
stantially correct. With the exception of five regiments 
of McDowell’s cavalry, only Banks’ army corps had been 
engaged at Cedar Run. But during the evening both Sigel 
and McDowell had reached the field, and it was their 
troops which had checked the Confederate pursuit. In fact, 
on the morning of the 10th, Pope, besides 5,000 cavalry, 
had 22,000 fresh troops in addition to those which had 
been defeated, and which he estimated at 5,000 effectives, 
wherewith to bar the way to Culpeper. McDowell’s second 
division, 10,000 strong, on the march from Fredericks- 
burg, was not more than twenty miles east of Slaughter 
Mountain. 

In front, therefore, Jackson was confronted by superior 
numbers. At the least estimate, 32,000 men were posted 
beyond Cedar Run, and 10,000 under King were coming 
up from Fredericksburg. Nor was a _ preponderance 
of numbers the only obstacle with which Jackson had to 
deal. A direct attack on Pope was impossible, but a turn- 
ing movement, by way of James City, might have found him 
unprepared, or a swift advance might have crushed King. 
But for the execution of either mancuvre a large force of 
cavalry was absolutely essential. By this means alone 
could the march be concealed and a surprise effected. 
In view, however, of the superior strength of the Federal 
horsemen such a project was unfeasible, and retreat 
was manifestly the only alternative. Nevertheless, it 
was not till he was assured that no further opportunity 
would be given him that Jackson evacuated his position. 
For two days he remained on Cedar Run, within two 
miles of the Federal outposts, defying his enemy to 
battle. If an attack on the Federals promised nothing 
but defeat, it was not so sure that Pope with 27,000 infantry, 
of whom a considerable number had just tasted defeat, 
would be able to oust Jackson with 22,000 from a position 


100 STONEWALL JACKSON 


which the latter had selected ;.and it was not till King’s 
approach gave the Federals an overwhelming superiority 
that the Confederates withdrew behind the Rapidan. 

With sublime audacity, as soon as his enemy had 
disappeared, Pope claimed the battle of Cedar Run as a 
Federal success. Carried away by enthusiasm he ventured 
to forecast the future. ‘It is safe to predict,’ he de- 
clared in a general order, ‘that this is only the first of a 
series of victories which shall make the Army of Virginia 
famous in the land.’ That such language, however, was 
the natural result of intense relief at Jackson’s retreat 
may be inferred from his telegrams, which, unfortunately 
for his reputation, have been preserved in the archives of 
Washington. Nor was his attitude on the 10th and 1ith 
that of a victorious commander. For two days he never 
stirred from his position. He informed Halleck that the 
enemy was in very superior force, that Stuart and Long- 
street had joined Jackson, and while the Confederates 
were withdrawing he was telegraphing that he would 
certainly be attacked the next morning. . 

Halleck’s reply to Pope’s final dispatch, wHiong congratu- 
lated the defeated army corps on a ‘ hard-earned but brilliant 
success, must have astonished Banks and his hapless troops. 
They might indeed be fairly considered to have ‘covered 
themselves with glory.’! 9,000 men, of which only 7,000 
were infantry, had given an enemy of more than double 
their strength a hard fight. They had broken some of the 
best troops in the Confederate army, under their most 
famous leader; and if they had been overwhelmed by 
numbers, they had at least fought to the last man. Jack- 
son himself bore witness to the vigour of their onslaught, 
to their ‘temporary triumph,’ and to the ‘impetuous 
valour’ of their cavalry. The Federal defeat was more 
honourable than many victories. But that it was a 
crushing defeat can hardly be disputed. The two divisions 
which had been engaged were completely shattered, and 
Pope reported that they were no longer fit for service. 
The casualties amongst the infantry amounted to a third 

1 O. B., vol. xii., part ii., p. 135. 


LOSSES 101 


of the total strength. Of the brigade that had driven 
in the Confederate left the 28th New York lost the 
whole of its company officers ; the 5th Connecticut 17 officers 
out of 20, and the 10th Maine had 170 killed or wounded. 
In two brigades nearly every field-officer and every adjutant 
was struck down. The 2nd Massachusetts, employed in 
the last effort to hold back Jackson’s counterstroke, lost 16 
officers out of 23, and 147 men out of 451. The Ohio regi- 
ments, which had been with Shields at Kernstown and Port 
Republic, and had crossed Cedar Run opposite the Con- 
federate centre, were handled even more roughly. The 5th 
lost 118 men out of 275, the 7th 10 officers out of 14, and 
170 men out of 293. Two generals were wounded and one 
captured. 400 prisoners, three stand of colours, 5,000 
rifles and one gun were taken by the Southerners, and, 
including those suffered by Sigel and McDowell in the 
night action, the sum of losses reached 2,380. The Con- 
federates by no means came off scatheless. General 
Winder died upon the field, and the two brigades that 
stood the brunt of the attack, together with Tarly’s, 
suffered heavily. But the number of killed and wounded 
amounted to no more than 1,314, and many of the brigades 
had few losses to report. The spirit of the Valley troops 
was hardly to be tamed by such punishment as this. 
Nevertheless, Northern historians have not hesitated to 
rank Cedar Run as a battle unfavourable to the Confeder- 
ates. Swinton declares that Jackson undertook the pur- 
suit of pone, ‘under the impression that he had gained 
a victory.’! Southern writers, on the other hand, have 
classed Cedar Run amongst the most brilliant achieve- 
ments of the war, and an unbiassed investigation goes 
far to support their view. 

During the first week in August Jackson, protecting the 
Virginia Central Railroad, was confronted by a much 
superior force. He could expect no further reinforcements, 

' ITmay here express my regret that in the first edition I should have 
classed Mr. Ropes amongst the adverse critics of Jackson’s operations at this 
period. How I came to fall into the error I cannot explain. I should certainly 


have remembered that Mr. Ropes’ writings are distinguished as much by 
impartiality as by ability. 


102 STONEWALL JACKSON 


for McClellan was still near Richmond, and according to 
the latest information was actually advancing. On the 
7th he heard that Pope also was moving forward from 
Hazel Run, and had pushed a portion of his army as far 
as Culpeper. In face of the overwhelming strength of 
the Federal cavalry it was impossible, if he occupied a de- 
fensive position, that he could protect the railroad; for 
while their infantry and artillery held him in front, their 
swarming squadrons would operate at their leisure on 
either flank. Nor could a defensive position have been 
long maintained. There were no natural obstacles, neither 
river nor mountains, to protect Jackson’s flanks; and 
the railroad—his line of supply—would have been parallel 
to his front. In a vigorous offensive, then, should op- 
portunity offer, lay his best chance of success. That 
opportunity was offered by the unsupported advance 
of the Federal detachment under Banks. It is true that 
Jackson hoped to achieve more than the defeat of this 
comparatively small force. If he could have seized Cul- 
peper he might have been able to deal with Pope’s army. 
in detail; he saw before him another Valley campaign, 
and he was fully justified in believing that victory on 
the Rapidan would bring McClellan back to Washington. 
His anticipations were not altogether realised. He 
crushed the detachment immediately opposed to him, but he 
failed to seize Culpeper, and McClellan had already been 
ordered, although this was unknown to the Confederates, to 
evacuate the Peninsula. But it cannot be fairly said that 
his enterprise was therefore useless.. Strategically it was a 
fine conception. The audacity of his manceuvre was not the 
least of its merits. For an army of 24,000 men, weak in 
cavalry, to advance against an army of 47,000, including 
5,000 horsemen, was the very height of daring. But it was 
the daring of profound calculation. As it was, Jackson ran 
little risk. He succeeded in his immediate object. He 
crushed Pope’s advanced-guard, and he retreated unmo- 
lested, bearing with him the prisoners, the colours, and the 
-arms which he had captured. If he did not succeed in 
occupying Culpeper, it was not his fault. Fortune was against 


HIS TACTICS __ 103 


him. On the very day that he had moved forward Pope 
had done the same. Banks and McDowell were at Cul- 
peper on the 8th, and Sigel received orders to move the 
same day. 

Nevertheless the expedition was far from barren in result. 
If Jackson failed to defeat Pope altogether, he at least 
‘singed his beard.’ It was well worth the loss of 1,300 
men to have destroyed two whole divisions under the very 
eyes of the general commanding a superior army. A 
few days later Pope was to feel the want of these gallant 
regiments,' and the confidence of his troops in their com- 
mander was much shaken. Moreover, the blow was felt 
at Washington. There was no more talk of occupying 
Gordonsville. Pope was still full of ardour. But Halleck 
forbade him to advance further than the Rapidan, where 
Burnside would reinforce him ; and McClellan was ordered 
to hasten the departure of his troops from the Penin- 
sula. 

Jackson’s tactics have been criticised as severely as his 
strategy. Because his first line was broken it is asserted 
that he narrowly escaped a serious defeat, and that had the 
two forces been equally matched Banks would have won a 
decisive victory. This is hardly sound criticism. In the 
first place, Jackson was perfectly well aware that the two 
forces were not equally matched. If he had had no 
more men than Banks, would he have disposed his forces 
as he did? He would scarcely have occupied the same 
extent of ground with 9,000 men that he did with 20,000. 
His actual front, when Banks attacked, was two miles 
long. With smaller numbers he would have occupied a 
smaller front, and would have retained a sufficient force in 
reserve. In the second place, it is generally possible for an 
inferior force, if it puts every man into the fighting-line, to 
win some measure of success. But such success, as was 
shown at Kernstown, can seldom be more than temporary ; 
and if the enemy makes good use of his reserves must end 
in defeat. 


1 So late as August 23, Pope reported that Banks’ troops were much 
demoralised. O.H., vol. xil., part ili., p. 653. 


104 STONEWALL JACKSON 


So far from Jackson’s tactics being indifferent, it is very 
easy to show that they were exactly the contrary. Im- 
mediately he came upon the field he sent Ewell to occupy 
Slaughter Mountain, a mile distant from his line of march ; 
and the huge hill, with batteries planted on its command- 
ing terraces, not only secured his flank, but formed 
a strong pivot for his attack on the Federal right. The pre- 
liminary operations were conducted with due deliberation. 
There was no rushing forward to the attack while the 
enemy’s strength was still uncertain. The ridge occupied by 
the enemy, so far as possible, was thoroughly reconnoitred, 
and every rifled gun was at once brought up. The artillery 
positions were well selected, for, notwithstanding their 
superiority of ordnance, the Federal batteries suffered far 
more heavily than the Confederates. The one weak point 
was the extreme left, and to this point Jackson in person 
directed the attention of his subordinates. ‘ Had reinforce- 
ments,’ says Colonel Garnett, who commanded the troops 
that first gave way, ‘momentarily expected, arrived ten 
minutes sooner no disaster would have happened.’' That. 
the point was not strengthened, that the Stonewall Brigade 
was not posted in second line behind the 1st Virginia, 
and that only a staff officer and an orderly were sent 
to patrol the forest to the westward, instead of several 
companies of infantry, was in no way due to the general- 
in-chief. 

Nor was the position of A. P. Hill’s division, which, 
in conjunction with the Stonewall Brigade, averted the 
disaster and won the victory, a fortuitous circumstance. 
Before the attack began it had been directed to this 
point, and the strong counterstroke which was made by 
these fresh troops was exactly the manceuvre which the 
situation demanded. At the time it was ordered the 
Confederate left and centre were hard pressed. The 
Stonewall Brigade had checked the troops which had 
issued from the forest, but the whole Confederate line was 
shaken. The normal, though less brilliant, course would 
have been to have re-established the front, and not 

1 O. R., vol. xii., part ii., p. 201. 


HIS TACTICS 105 


till that had been done to have ventured on the counter- 
stroke. Jackson, with that quick intuition which is pos- 
sessed by few, saw and seized his opportunity while the 
Federals were still pressing the attack. One of Hill’s bri- 
gades was sent to support the centre, and, almost in the 
same breath, six others, a mass of 7,000 or 8,000 men, were 
ordered to attack the enemy’s right, to outflank it, and to 
roll back his whole line upon Ewell, who was instructed at 
the same moment to outflank the left. Notwithstanding 
some delay in execution, Ewell’s inability to advance, and 
the charge of the Federal cavalry, this vigorous blow changed 
the whole aspect of the battle within a short half-hour. 
Conceived in a moment, in the midst of wild excitement 
and fierce tumult, delivered with all the strength avail- 
able, it cannot be judged otherwise than as the mark 
of a great captain. Few battles, indeed, bear the impress 
of a single personality more clearly than Cedar Run. 
From the first cannon-shot of the advanced-guard until 
the last volley in the midnight forest, one will directed 
every movement. The field was no small one. The fight 
was full of startling changes. It was no methodical 
conflict, but a fierce struggle at close quarters, the lines 
swaying to and fro, and the ground covered with confused 
masses of men and guns, with flying batteries and broken 
regiments. But the turmoil of battle founda master. The 
strong brain was never clearer than when the storm raged 
most fiercely. Wherever his presence was most needed 
there Jackson was seen, rallying the fugitives, reinforcing 
the centre, directing the counterstroke, and leading the 
pursuit. And he was well supported. His subordinate 
generals carried out their orders to the letter. But every 
order which bore upon the issue of the battle came from 
the lips of one man. 

If Northern writers have overlooked the skill with which 
Jackson controlled the fight, they have at the same time 
misunderstood his action two days later. His retreat to 
Gordonsville has been represented as a flight. Heis said to 
have abandoned many wounded and stragglers, and to have 
barely saved his baggage. In all this there is not one word 

VoL. Il. I 


106 STONEWALL JACKSON 


of truth. We have, indeed, the report of the Federal officer 
who conducted the pursuit. ‘The flight of the enemy after 
Saturday’s fight was most precipitate and in great con- 
fusion. His old camp was strewn with dead men, horses, 
and arms. . . . A good many (Federal) prisoners, wounded 
in Saturday’s fight, were found almost abandoned. Major 
Andrews, chief of artillery to General Jackson, was found, 
badly wounded, at Crooked Run, in charge of an assistant 
surgeon.’ Itis hardly necessary to say that General Buford, 
the officer thus reporting, had not been present at the battle. 
He had been cut off with his four regiments by the advance 
of the Confederate cavalry, and had retired on Sperryville. 
He may accordingly be excused for imagining that a retreat 
which had been postponed for two days was precipitate. 
But dead men, dead horses, and old arms which the 
Confederates had probably exchanged for those which 
were captured, several wounded Federals, who had been 
prisoners in the enemy’s hands, and one wounded 
Confederate, a major of horse-artillery and not a staff- 
officer at all, are hardly evidences of undue haste or 
great confusion. Moreover, in the list of Confederate 
casualties only thirty-one men were put down as missing. 
It is true that Jackson need not have retreated so far 
as Gordonsville. He might have halted behind the Rapidan, 
where the bluffs on the south bank overlook the level 
country to the north. But Jackson’s mancuvres, whether 
in advance or retreat, were invariably actuated by some 
definite purpose, and what that purpose was he explains in 
his dispatches.' ‘I remained in position until the night of 
the 11th, when I returned to the vicinity of Gordonsville, 
in order to avoid being attacked by the vastly superior force 
in front of me, and with the hope that by thus falling back, 
General Pope would be induced to follow me until I should 
be reinforced.’ That Pope, had he been left to his own 
judgment, would have crossed the Rapidan is certain. 
‘The enemy,’ he reported, ‘has retreated to Gordons- 
ville. . . . I shall move forward on Louisa Court House 
as soon as Burnside arrives.’ He was restrained, however, 
1 QO. B., vol. xii., part ii., p. 185. 


HIS MANCGUVRES 107 


by the more wary Halleck. ‘ Beware of a snare,’ wrote the 
Commander-in-Chief. ‘Feigned retreats are ‘‘Secesh’”’ 
tactics.” How wise was this warning, and what would 
have been the fate of Pope had he recklessly crossed the 
Rapidan, the next chapter will reveal. 


in2 


108 STONEWALL JACKSON 


CHAPTER XVI 
GROVETON AND THE SECOND MANASSAS 


Durine the summer of 1862 the stirring events in the 
Western hemisphere: attracted universal attention. All 
eyes were fixed on Richmond. The fierce fighting on the 
Chickahominy, and the defeat of the invaders, excited 
Europe hardly less than it did the North. The weekly 
mails were eagerly awaited. The newspapers devoted many 
columns to narrative, criticism, and prediction. The 
strategy and tactics of the rival armies were everywhere 
discussed, and the fact that almost every single item of 
intelligence came from a Northern source served only as a 
whet to curiosity. The vast territory controlled by the 
Confederacy was so completely cut off from the outer world 
that an atmosphere of mystery enveloped the efforts of the 
defence. ‘The Southern States,’ it has been said, ‘stood in 
the attitude of a beleaguered fortress. The war was in 
truth a great siege; the fortress covered an area of more 
than 700,000 square miles, and the lines of investment 
around it extended over more than 10,000 miles.’ Within 
the circle of Federal cannon and Federal cruisers only the 
imagination could penetrate. At rare intervals some daring 
blockade-runner brought a budget of Southern newspapers, 
or an enterprising correspondent succeeded in transmitting 
a dispatch from Richmond. But such glimpses of the 
situation within the cordon did little more than tantalise. 
The news was generally belated, and had often been long 
discounted by more recent events. Still, from Northern 
sources alone, it was abundantly clear that the weaker of 
the two belligerents was making a splendid struggle. 
Great names and great achievements loomed large through 


MISGIVINGS OF THE NORTH 109 


the darkness. The war at the outset, waged by ill-trained 
and ill-disciplined volunteers, commanded by officers un- 
known to fame, had attracted small notice from -profes- 
sional soldiers. After the Seven Days’ battles it assumed a 
new aspect. The men, despite their shortcomings, had 
displayed undeniable courage, and the strategy which had 
relieved Richmond recalled the master-strokes of Napoleon. 
It was evident that the Southern army was led by men of 
brilliant ability, and the names of Lee’s lieutenants were 
on every tongue. Foremost amongst these was Stonewall 
Jackson. Tiven the Northern newspapers made no scruple 
of expressing their admiration, and the dispatches of their 
own generals gave them constant opportunities of ex- 
patiating on his skill. During the first weeks of August, 
the reports from the front, whether from Winchester, from 
Fredericksburg, or from the Peninsula, betrayed the fear 
and uneasiness he inspired. The overthrow of Pope’s 
advanced-guard at Cedar Run, followed by the unaccount- 
able disappearance of the victorious army, was of a piece 
with the mancwuyres in the Valley. What did this dis- 
appearance portend? Whither had the man of mystery 
betaken himself? Where would the next blow fall? ‘I 
don’t like Jackson’s movements,’ wrote McClellan to 
Halleck; ‘he will suddenly appear when least expected.’ 
This misgiving found many echoes. While Jackson was 
operating against Pope, McClellan had successfully com- 
pleted the evacuation of Harrison’s Landing. Embarking 
his sick, he marched his five army corps to Fortress 
Monroe, observed by Lee’s patrols, but otherwise un- 
molested. ‘The quiescence of the Confederates, however, 
brought no relief to the North. Stocks fell fast, and the 
premium on gold rose to sixteen per cent. Jor some days 
not a shot had been tired along the Rapidan. Pope’s army 
rested in its camps. Jackson had completely vanished. 
But the silence at the front was not considered a 
reassuring symptom. 

If the Confederates had allowed McClellan to escape, it 
was very generally felt that they had done so only because 
they were preparing to crush Pope before he could be re- 


110 STONEWALL JACKSON 


inforced. ‘It is the fear of this operation,’ wrote the 
Times Special Correspondent in the Northern States, 
‘conducted by the redoubtable Stonewall Jackson, that has 
filled New York with uneasy forebodings. Wall Street does 
not ardently believe in the present good fortune or the 
future prospects of the Republic.’ ! 

Neither the knowledge which McClellan possessed of 
his old West Point comrade, nor the instinct of the finan- 
ciers, proved misleading. Jackson had already made his 
plans. liven before he had lured Pope forward to the 
Rapidan he had begun to plot his downfall. ‘When we 
were marching back from Cedar Run,’ writes Major 
Hotchkiss, ‘and had passed Orange Court House on our 
way to Gordonsville, the general, who was riding in front 
of the staff, beckoned me to his side. He at once entered 
into conversation, and said that as soon as we got back to 
camp he wished me to prepare maps of the whole country 
between Gordonsville and Washington, adding that he 
required several copies—I think five. This was about 


noon on Sunday, and as we were near camp [ asked him. 


Aue. 13, lf the map was to be begun immediately, knowing 
i his great antipathy to doing anything on Sunday 
which was not a work of necessity. He replied that it was 
important to have it done at once.’? The next day, 
te fd, August 14, the exact position of the Federal army 
was ascertained. The camps were north and east 
of Slaughter Mountain, and Jackson instructed Captain 
Boswell, his chief engineer, who had lived in the neighbour- 
hood, to report on the best means of turning the enemy’s 
left flank and reaching Warrenton, thus intervening between 
Pope and Washington, or between Pope and Aquia Creek. 
The line of march recommended by Boswell led through 
Orange Court House to Pisgah Church, and crossing the 
Rapidan at Somerville Ford, ran by Lime Church and 
Stevensburg to Brandy Station. 
Aug. 15. On the night of the 15th, after two days’ 
rest, the three divisions moved from Gordonsville 
to Pisgah Church, and there halted to await reinforcements. 
1 The Times, September 4, 1862. 2 Letter to the author. 


& 


THE COUNCIL OF WAR Bel 


These were already on their way. On the 18th General 
Lee had learned that Burnside, who had already left the 
Peninsula for Aquia Creek on the Potomac, was preparing 
to join Pope, and it was reported by a deserter that part 
of McClellan’s army had embarked on the transports at 
Harrison’s Landing. Inferring that the enemy had relin- 
guished all active operations in the Peninsula, and that 
Pope would soon be reinforced by the Army of the Poto- 
mac, Lee resolved to take the offensive without delay. The 
campaign which Jackson had suggested more than a month 
before, when McClellan was still reeling under the effects 
of his defeat, and Pope’s army was not yet organised, was 
now to be begun. The same evening the railway conveyed 
Longstreet’s advanced brigade to Gordonsville, and with 
the exception of D. H. Hill’s and Mchaws’ divisions, 
which remained to watch McClellan, the whole army 
followed. 

On the 15th Lee met his generalsincouncil. The map 
drawn by Captain Hotchkiss was produced, and the 
manceuvre which had suggested itself to Jackson was 
definitely ordered by the Commander-in-Chief. The Valley 
army, at dawn on the 18th, was to cross the Rapidan at 
Somerville Ford. Longstreet, preceded by Stuart, who 
was to cut the Federal communications in rear of Culpeper 
Court House, was to make the passage at Raccoon Ford. 
Jackson’s cavalry was to cover the left and front, and 
Anderson’s division was to form a general reserve. The 
movement was intended to be speedy. Only ambulances 
and ammunition waggons were to follow the troops. Bag- 
gage and supply trains were to be parked on the south side 
of the Rapidan, and the men were to carry three days’ 
cooked rations in their haversacks. 

On Clark’s Mountain, a high hill near Pisgah Church, 
Jackson had established a signal station. The view 
from the summit embraced an extensive landscape. The 
ravages of war had not yet effaced its tranquil beauty, nor 
had the names of its bright rivers and thriving villages 
become household words. It was still unknown to history, 
a peaceful and pastoral district, remote from the beaten 


112 . STONEWALL JACKSON 


tracks of trade and travel, and inhabited by a quiet and 
industrious people. To-day there are few regions which 
boast sterner or more heroic memories. ‘To the right, 
rolling away in light and shadow for a score of miles, is 
the great forest of Spotsylvania, within whose gloomy 
depths lie the fields of Chancellorsville; where the breast- 
works of the Wilderness can still be traced; and on the 
eastern verge of which stand the grass-grown batteries of 
Fredericksburg. Northward, beyond the woods which 
hide the Rapidan, the eye ranges over the wide and fertile 
plains of Culpeper, with the green crest of Slaughter 
Mountain overlooking Cedar Run, and the dim levels of 
Brandy Station, the scene of the great cavalry battle,! 
just visible beyond. Far away to the north-east the 
faint outline of a range of hills marks the source of 
Bull Run and the Manassas plateau, and to the west, 
the long rampart of the Blue Ridge, softened by distance, 
stands high above the Virginia plains. 

On the afternoon of August 17, Pope’s forces seemed 
doomed to inevitable destruction. The Confederate army, - 
ready to advance the next morning, was con- 
centrated behind Clark’s Mountain, ané Lee and 
Jackson, looking toward Culpeper, saw the promise of 
victory in the careless attitude of the enemy. ‘The day 
was hot and still. . Round the base of Slaughter Mountain, 
fifteen miles northward, clustered many thousands of tents, 
and the blue smoke of the camp-fires rose straight and thin 
in the sultry air. Regiments of infantry, just discernible 
through the glare, were marching and countermarching 
in various directions, and long waggon-trains were creeping 
slowly along the dusty roads. Near at hand, rising above 
the tree-tops, the Union colours showed that the outposts 
still held the river, and the flash of steel at the end of some 
woodland vista betrayed the presence of scouting party 
or vedette. But there were no symptoms of unusual 
excitement, no sign of working parties, of reinforcements 
for the advanced posts, of the construction of earthworks or 
abattis. Pope’s camps were scattered over a wide tract of 

1 June 9, 1863. 


Aug. 17. 


POPE IN DANGER 118 


country, his cavalry was idle, and it seemed absolutely 
certain that he was unconscious of the near neighbourhood 
of the Confederate army. 

The inference was correct. The march to Pisgah 
Church had escaped notice. The Federals were unaware 
that Lee had arrived at Gordonsville, and they had as yet 
no reason to believe that there was the smallest danger of 
attack. 

Between Raccoon and Locustdale fords, and stretching 
back to Culpeper Court House, 52,500 men—for Reno,with 
two divisions of Burnside’s army, 8,000 strong, had arrived 
from Fredericksburg—were in camp and bivouac. The front 
was protected by a river nearly a hundred yards wide, of 
which every crossing was held by a detachment, and Pope 
had reported that his position was so strong that it would 
be difficult to drive him from it. But he had not made 
sufficient allowance for the energy and ability of the Con- 
federate leaders. His situation, in reality, was one of 
extreme danger. In ordering Pope tothe Rapidan, and bid- 
ding him ‘ fight like the devil’ ! until McClellan should come 
up, Halleck made the same fatal error as Stanton, when 
he sent Shields up the Luray Valley in pursuit of Jackson. 
He had put an inferior force within reach of an enemy 
who held the interior lines, and bad ordered two armies, 
separated by several marches, to effect their concentration 
under the fire of the enemy’s guns. And if Pope’s strategical 
position was bad, his tactical position was even worse. His 
left, covering Raccoon and Somerville Fords, was very 
weak. The main body of his army was massed on the 
opposite flank, several miles distant, astride the direct road 
from Gordonsville to Culpeper Court House, and he re- 
mained without the least idea, so late as the morning of 
the 18th, that the whole Confederate army was concentrated 
behind Clark’s Mountain, within six miles of his most 
vulnerable point. Aware that Jackson was based on 
Gordonsville, he seems to have been convinced that if 
he advanced at all, he would advance directly on Culpeper 


1 O.R., vol. xii., part ii., p.57. ‘It may have been fortunate for the Con- 
federates,’ says Longstreet, ‘ that he was not instructed to fight luke Jackson.’ 


114 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Court House; and the move to Pisgah Church, which 
left Gordonsville unprotected, never entered into his calcu- 
lations. A sudden attack against his left was the last 
contingency that he anticipated; and had the Confede- 
rates moved as Lee intended, there can be no question 
but that the Federal army, deprived of all supplies, cut 
off from Washington, and forced to fight on ground where 
it was unprepared, would have been disastrously defeated. 

But it was not to be. The design was thwarted by one 
of those petty accidents which play so large a part in war. 
Stuart had been instructed to lead the advance. The only 
brigade at his disposal had not yet come up into line, but 
a message had been sent to appoint a rendezvous, and it 
was expected to reach Verdiersville, five miles from Raccoon 
Ford, on the night of the 17th. Stuart’s message, how- 
ever, was not sufficiently explicit. Nothing was said of 
the exigencies of the situation; and the brigadier, General 
Fitzhugh Lee, not realising the importance of reaching 
Verdiersville on the 17th, marched by a circuitous route 
in order to replenish his supplies. At nightfall he was 
still absent, and the omission of a few words in a simple 
order cost the Confederates dear. Moreover, Stuart him- 
self, who had ridden to Verdiersville with a small escort, 
narrowly escaped capture. His plumed hat, with which 
the whole army was familiar, as well as his adjutant- 
general and his dispatch-box, fell into the hands of a 
Federal reconnoitring party ; and among the papers brought 
to Pope was found a letter from General Lee, disclosing 
the fact that Jackson had been strongly reinforced. 

In consequence of the absence of Fitzhugh Lee’s 
brigade, the movement was postponed until the morning 
of the 20th. The Commander-in-Chief was of opinion 
that the horses, exhausted by their long march, would 
require some rest before they were fit for the hard work he 
proposed for them. Jackson, for once in opposition, urged 
that the movement should go forward. His signal officer 
on Clark’s Mountain reported that the enemy was quiet, 
and even extending his right up stream. The location of 
the Federal divisions had been already ascertained. The 


HIS ADVICE OVERRULED 115 


cavalry was not required to get information. There was 
no need, therefore, to wait till Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade was 
fit for movement. Jackson had, with his own command, a 
sufficient number of squadrons to protect the front and 
flanks of the whole army ; and the main object was not to 
cut the enemy’s communications, but to turn his left and 
annihilate him. Pope was still isolated, still unconscious 
of his danger, and the opportunity might never return. 

The suggestion, however, was overruled, and ‘it was 
fortunate,’ says one of Pope’s generals, ‘that Jackson 
was not in command of the Confederates on the night 
of August 17; for the superior force of the enemy must 
have overwhelmed us, if we could not have escaped, and 
escape on that night was impossible.’ ! 

It is probable, however, that other causes induced 
General Lee to hold his hand. There is good reason to 
believe that it was not only the cavalry that was unpre- 
pared. The movement from Richmond had been rapid, 
and both vehicles and supplies had been delayed. Nor 
were all the generals so avaricious of time as Jackson. 
It was impossible, it was urged, to move without some food 
in the waggons. Jackson replied that the enemy had a 
large magazine at Brandy Station, which might easily be . 
captured, and that the intervening district promised an 
abundance of ripening corn and green apples. It was 
decided, however, that such fare, on which, it may be 
said, the Confederates learned afterwards to subsist for 
many days in succession, was too meagre for the work in 
hand. Jackson, runs the story, groaned so audibly when 
Lee pronounced in favour of postponement, that Longstreet 
called the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to his 
apparent disrespect. 

Be this as it may, had it been possible to adopt Jack- 
son’s advice, the Federal army would have been caught 
Aug. 18 in the execution of a difficult maneuvre. Onthe 
‘morning of the 18th, about the very hour that 
the advance should have begun, Pope was informed by a 
spy that the Confederate army was assembled behind Clark’s 

1 General George H. Gordon. The Army of Virginia, p. 9. 


116 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Mountain and the neighbouring hills; that the artillery 
horses were harnessed, and that the troops were moment- 
arily expecting orders to cross the river and strike his rear. 
He at once made preparations for retreat. The trains 
moved off to seek shelter behind the Rappahannock, 
and the army followed, leaving the cavalry in position, and 
marching as follows :— 


Reno by Stevensburg to Kelly’s Ford. 

Banks and McDowell by Culpeper Court House and Brandy Station 
to the Rappahannock railway bridge. 

Sigel by Rixeyville to Sulphur Springs. 


The march was slow and halts were frequent. The 
long lines of waggons blocked every road, and on the 
Hirde morning of August 19 the troops were still at 

‘some distance from the Rappahannock, in neither 
condition nor formation to resist a resolute attack. 

The movement, however, was not discovered by the Con- 
federates untilit had been more than four-and-twenty hours 
in progress. General Lee, on August 19, had taken his stand - 
on Clark’s Mountain, but the weather was unfavourable for 
observation. Late in the afternoon the haze lifted, and 
almost at the same moment the remaining tents of the 
Federal army, fifteen miles away to the north-west, sud- 
denly vanished from the landscape, and great clouds of 
dust, rising high above the woods, left it no longer doubtful 
that Pope had taken the alarm. It was too late to inter- 
fere, and the sun set on an army baffled of its prey. In the 
Confederate councils there was some dismay, among the 
troops much heart-burning. Every hour that was wasted 
brought nearer the junction of Popeand McClellan, and the 
soldiers were well aware that a most promising opportunity, 
which it was worth while living on green corn and apples to 
secure, had been allowed toslip. Nevertheless, the pursuit 
was prompt. By the light of the rising moon the advanced- 
guards plunged thigh-deep into the clear waters of the 
hap. '20. Rapidan, and the whole army crossed by Raccoon 

and Somerville Fords. Stuart, with Robertson’s 
and Fitzhugh Lee’s brigades, pressed forward on the traces 


POPE ESCAPES 117 


of the retreating foe. Near Brandy Station the Federal 
cavalry made a stubborn stand. The Confederates, 
covering a wide front, had become separated. Robertson 
had marched through Stevensburg, Fitzhugh Lee on 
Kelly’s Ford, an interval of six miles dividing the two 
brigades; and when Robertson was met by Bayard’s 
squadrons, holding a skirt of woods with dismounted 
men, it was several hours before a sufficient force could 
be assembled to force the road. Towards evening two of 
Fitzhugh Lee’s regiments came up, and the Confederates 
were now concentrated in superior numbers. A series 
of vigorous charges, delivered by successive regiments 
on a front of fours, for the horsemen were confined 
to the road, hurried the retreating Federals across the 
Rappahannock; but the presence of infantry and guns 
near the railway bridge placed an effective barrier in 
the way of further pursuit. Before nightfall Jackson’s 
advanced-guard reached Brandy Station, after a march of 
twenty miles, and Longstreet bivouacked near Kelly’s Ford. 

The Rappahannock, a broad and rapid stream, with 
banks high and well-timbered, now rolled between the 
hostile armies. Pope, by his timely retreat, had gained a 
position where he could be readily reinforced, and although 
the river, in consequence of the long drought, had much 
dwindled from its usual volume, his front was perfectly 
secure. 

The situation with which the Confederate commander 
had now to deal was beset by difficulties. The delay from 
August 18 to August 20 had been most unfortunate. The 
Federals were actually nearer Richmond than the Army of 
Northern Virginia, and if McClellan, landing as Burnside had 
done at Aquia Creek, were to move due south through 
Fredericksburg, he would find the capital but feebly 
garrisoned, It was more probable, however, that he would 
reinforce Pope, and Lee held fast to his idea of crushing his 
enemies in detail. Aquia Creek was only thirty-five miles’ 
march from the Rappahannock, but the disembarkation 
with horses, trains, and artillery must needs be a lengthy 
process, and it might still be possible, by skilful and swift 


118 STONEWALL JACKSON 


manceuvres, to redeem the time which had been already lost. 
But the Federal position was very strong. Harly on the 
21st it was ascertained that Pope’s whole army was massed 
Ane. 91, 00 the left bank of the Rappahannock, extending 
° “from Kelly’s Ford to Hazel Run, and that a 
powerful artillery crowned the commanding bluffs. To 
turn the line of the river from the south was hardly 
practicable. The Federal cavalry was vigilant, and Pope 
would have quietly fallen back on Washington. A turn- 
ing movement from the north was more promising, and 
during the day Stuart, supported by Jackson, made 
vigorous efforts to find a passage across the river. Covered 
by a heavy fire of artillery, the squadrons drove in a 
regiment and a battery holding Beverley Ford, and 
spread their patrols over the country on the left bank. It 
was soon evident, however, that the ground was unsuitable 
for attack, and Stuart, menaced by a strong force of 
infantry, withdrew his troopers across the stream. Nothing 
further was attempted. Jackson went into bivouac near St. 
James’s Church, and Longstreet closed in upon his right. 

The next morning, in accordance with Lee’s orders to 
‘seek a more favourable place to cross higher up the river, 
Aue. gg, ond thus gain the enemy’s right,’ Jackson, still 

9 preceded by Stuart, and concealing his march 
as far as possible in the woods, moved towards the fords 
near Warrenton Springs. Longstreet, meanwhile, marched 
towards the bridge at Rappahannock Station, where the 
enemy had established a téte-de-pont, and bringing his guns 
into action at every opportunity, made brisk demonstrations 
along the river. 

Late in the afternoon, after an attack on his rear-guard 
at Welford’s Mill had been repulsed by Trimble, reinforced 
by Hood, Jackson, under a lowering sky, reached the ruined 
bridge at the Sulphur Springs. Only a few of the enemy’s 
cavalry had been descried, and he at once made preparations 
to effect the passage of the Rappahannock. ‘The 18th 
Georgia dashed through the ford, and occupied the 
cottages of the little watering-place. Harly’s brigade and 
two batteries crossed by an old mill-dam, a mile below, and 


ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK 119 


took post on the ridge beyond. But heavy rain had begun to 
fall; the night was closing in; and the river, swollen by 
the storms in the mountains, was already rising. The 
difficulties of the passage increased every moment, and the 
main body of the Valley army was ordered into bivouac on 
the western bank. It was not, however, the darkness of 
the ford or the precarious footing of the mill-dam that held 
Jackson back from reinforcing his advanced-guard, but the 
knowledge that these dangerous roadways would soon be 
submerged by a raging torrent. Early was, indeed, in 
peril, but it was better that one brigade should take its 
chance of escape than that one half the column should be 
cut off from the remainder. Next morning the 
pioneers were ordered to repair the bridge, 
while Longstreet, feinting strongly against the téte-de-pont, 
gave Pope occupation. Harly’s troops, under cover of the 
woods, moved northward to the protection of a creek named 
Great Run, and although the Federal cavalry kept close 
watch upon him, no attack was made till nightfall. This 
was easily beaten back; and Jackson, anxious to keep the 
attention of the enemy fixed on this point, sent over another 
hag om brigade. At dawn on the 24th, however, as the 
Federals were reported to be advancing in force, 
the detachment was brought back to the Confederate 
bank. The men had been for two days anda night without 
food or shelter. It was in vain that Karly, after the bridge 
had been restored, had requested to be withdrawn. Jackson 
sent Lawton to reinforce him with the curt message: ‘ Tell 
General Early to hold his position;’ and although the 
generals grumbled at their isolation, Pope was effectually 
deluded into the conviction that a serious attack had 
been repulsed, and that no further attempt to turn his right 
was to be immediately apprehended. The significance of 
Jackson’s action will be seen hereafter. 

While Jackson was thus mystifying the enemy, both 
Longstreet and Stuart had been hard at work. The former, 
after an artillery contest of several hours’ duration, had 
driven the enemy from his téte-de-pont on the railway, and 
had burnt the bridge. The latter, on the morning of the 


Aug. 23. 


120 STONEWALL JACKSON 


22nd, had moved northward with the whole of the cavalry, 
except two regiments, and had ridden round the Federal 
right. Crossing the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge 
and Hart’s Mills, he marched eastward without meeting 
a single hostile scout, and as evening fell the column of 
1,500 men and two pieces of artillery clattered into 
Warrenton. ‘The troopers dismounted in the streets. The 
horses were fed and watered, and while the officers amused 
themselves by registering their names, embellished with 
fantastic titles, at the hotel, Stuart’s staff, questioning the 
throng of women and old men, elicited important informa- 
tion. None of the enemy’s cavalry had been seen in the 
vicinity for some days, and Pope’s supply trains were 
parked at Catlett’s Station, on the Orange and Alexandria 
Railway, ten miles south-east. After an hour’s rest the 
force moved on, and passing through Auburn village was 
caught by the same storm that had cut off Early. The 
narrow roads became running streams, and the creeks 
which crossed the line of march soon rose to the horses’ 
withers. But this was the very condition of the ele- 
ments most favourable for the enterprise. The enemy’s 
vedettes and patrols, sheltering from the fury of the 
storm, were captured, one after another, by the advanced- 
euard, and the two brigades arrived at Catlett’s Station 
without the Federals receiving the least notice of their 
approach. 

A moment’s halt, a short consultation, a silent move- 
ment forward, and the astonished sentinels were over- 
powered. Beyond were the encampments and the trains, 
guarded by 1,500 infantry and 500 horsemen. The night 
was dark—the darkest, said Stuart, that he had ever 
known. Without a guide concerted action seemed impos- 
sible. The rain still fell in torrents, and the raiders, 
soaked to the skin, could only grope aimlessly in the 
gloom. But just at this moment a negro was captured 
who recognised Stuart, and who knew where Pope’s baggage 
and horses were to be found. He wastold to lead the way, 
and Colonel W. H. F. Lee, a son of the Commander-in- 
Chief, was ordered to follow with his regiment. The guide 


CAPTURE OF POPEH’S BAGGAGE 121 


led the column towards the headquarter tents. ‘Then 
there mingled with the noise of the rain upon the canvas 
and the roar of the wind in the forest the rushing sound of 
many horsemen, of loud voices, and clashing sabres.’ One 
of Pope’s staff officers, together with the uniform and 
horses of the Federal commander, his treasure chest, and 
his personal effects, fell into the hands of the Confederates, 
and the greater part of the enemy’s troops, suddenly 
alarmed in the deep darkness, dispersed into the woods. 
Another camp was quickly looted, and the 1st and 5th 
Virginia Cavalry were sent across the railway, riding 
without accident, notwithstanding the darkness, over 
a high embankment with deep ditches on either side. But 
the Federal guards had now rallied under cover, and the 
attack on the railway waggons had to be abandoned. 
Another party had taken in hand the main object of the 
expedition, the destruction of the railway bridge over 
Cedar Run. The force which should have defended it was 
surprised and scattered. The timbers, however, were by 
this time thoroughly saturated, and only a few axes had 
been discovered. Some Federal skirmishers maintained a 
heavy fire from the opposite bank, and it was impossible to 
complete the work. The telegraph was more easily dealt 
with; and shortly before daylight on the 28rd, carrying 
with him 3800 prisoners, including many officers, Stuart 
withdrew by the light of the blazing camp, and after a march 
of sixty miles in six-and-twenty hours, reached the Sulphur 
Springs before evening. 

The most important result of this raid was the 
capture of Pope’s dispatch book, containing most detailed 
information as to his strength, dispositions, and designs ; 
referring to the reinforcements he expected, and dis- 
closing his belief that the line of the Rappahannock was 
no longer tenable. But the enterprise had an indirect 
effect upon the enemy’s calculations, which was not without 
bearing on the campaign. Pope believed that Stuart’s 
advance on Catlett's Station had been made in connection 
with Jackson’s attempt to cross at Sulphur Springs; and the 
retreat of the cavalry, combined with that of Early, seemed 

vou. II. K 


122 STONEWALL JACKSON 


to indicate that the movement to turn his right had been 
definitely abandoned. 

The Federal commander was soon to be undeceived. 
Thrice had General Lee been baulked. The enemy, who 
should have been annihilated on August 19, had gained six 
days’ respite. On the 20th he had placed himself behind 
the Rappahannock. On the 22nd the rising waters forbade 
Jackson’s passage at the Sulphur Springs; and now, on the 
afternoon of the 24th, the situation was still unchanged. 
Disregarding Longstreet’s demonstrations, Popehad marched 
northward, keeping pace with Jackson, and his whole force 
was concentrated on the great road which runs from the 
Sulphur Springs through Warrenton and Gainesville to 
Washington and Alexandria. He had answered move by 
countermove. Hitherto, except in permitting Harly to re- 
cross the river, he had made no mistake, and he had 
gained time. He had marched over thirty miles, and 
executed complicated manceuvres, without offering the Con- 
federates an opening. His position near the Sulphur 
Springs was as strong as that which he had left on the 
lower reaches near the railway bridge. Moreover, the cor- 
respondence in his dispatch book disclosed the fact that a 
portion at least of McClellan’s army had landed at Aquia 
Creek, and was marching to Bealtown;! that a strong force, 
drawn from the Kanawha Valley and elsewhere, was as- 
sembling at Washington; and that 150,000 men might 
be concentrated within a few days on the Rappahannock. 
Lee, on learning McClellan’s destination, immediately 
asked that the troops which had been retained at Richmond 
should be sent to join him. Mr. Davis assented, but it was 
not till the request had been repeated and time lost that 
the divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws’, two brigades of 
infantry, under J. G. Walker, and Hampton’s cavalry 


1 Between August 21 and 25 Pope received the following reinforcements 
for the Army of the Potomac, raising his strength to over 80,000 men; 
Hooker’s Division 10.000 
Kearney’s ; } $ 
‘ Morell’s 3 
Fifth Corps. Porter . ; | Sykes? i | 10,000 
Pennsylvania Reserves. Reynolds : : . 8,000 


Third Corps. Heintzleman 4 


LEE’S PLAN 123 


brigade were ordered up. Yet these reinforcements only 
raised Lee’s numbers to 75,000 men, and they were from 
eighty to a hundred miles distant by an indifferent rail- 
road. 

Nor was it possible to await their arrival. Instant 
action was imperative. But what action was possible? A 
defensive attitude could only result in the Confederate army 
being forced back by superior strength; and retreat on 
Richmond would be difficult, for the Federals held the 
interior lines. The offensive seemed out of the question. 
Pope’s position was more favourable than before. His 
army was massed, and reinforcements were close at hand. 
His right flank was well secured. The ford at Sulphur 
Springs and the Waterloo Bridge were both in his posses- 
sion; north of the Springs rose the Bull Run Mountains, a 
range covered with thick forest, and crossed by few roads ; 
and his left was protected by the march of McClellan’s 
army corps from Aquia Creek. Even the genius of a 
Napoleon might well have been baffled by the difficulties in 
the way ofattack. But there were men in the Confederate 
army to whom overwhelming numbers and strong positions 
were merely obstacles to be overcome. 

On August 24 Lee removed his headquarters to Jefferson, 
where Jackson was already encamped, and on the same 
evening, with Pope’s captured correspondence before them, 
the two generals discussed the problem. What occurred 
at this council of war was never made public. To use 
Lee’s words: ‘A plan of operations was determined on; 
but by whom it was suggested there is none to tell us. 
‘ Jackson was so reticent,’ writes Dr. McGuire, ‘ that it was 
only by accident that we ever found out what he proposed to 
do, and there is no staff officer living (1897) who could throw 
any light on this matter. The day before we started to march 
round Pope’s army 1 saw Lee and Jackson conferring to- 
gether. Jackson—for him—was very much excited, drawing 
with the toe of his boot a map in the sand, and gesticulating 
in a much more earnest way than he was in the habit 
of doing. General Lee was simply listening, and after 
Jackson had got through, he nodded his head, as if acced- 


Kes 


124 STONEWALL JACKSON 


ing to some proposal. I believe, from what occurred 
afterwards, that Jackson suggested the movement as it 
was made, but I have no further proof than the incident I 
have just mentioned.’! It is only certain that we have 
record of few enterprises of greater daring than that 
which was then decided on; and no matter from whose 
brain it emanated, on Lee fell the burden of the responsibility ; 
on his shoulders, and on his alone, rested the honour of the 
Confederate arms, the fate of Richmond, the independence 
~ of the South; and if we may suppose, so consonant was the 
design proposed with the strategy which Jackson had 
already practised, that it was to him its inception was 
due, it is still to Lee that we must assign the higher 
merit. It is easy to conceive. It is less easy to execute. 
But to risk cause and country, name and reputa- 
tion, on a single throw, and to abide the issue with un- 
flinching heart, is the supreme exhibition of the soldier’s 
fortitude. 

Lee’s decision was to divide his army. Jackson, 
marching northwards, was to cross the Bull Run Mountains 
at Thoroughfare Gap, ten miles as the crow flies from the 
enemy’s right, and strike the railway which formed Pope’s 
line of supply. The Federal commander, who would mean- 
while be held in play by Longstreet, would be compelled to 
fall back in a north-easterly direction to save his com- 
munications, and thus be drawn away from McClellan. 
Longstreet would then follow Jackson, and it was hoped 
that the Federals, disconcerted by these movements, might 
be attacked in detail or forced to fight at a disadvantage. 
The risk, however, was very great. 

An army of 55,000 men was about to march into 
a region occupied by 100,000,? who might easily be re- 
inforced to 150,000; and it was to march in two wings, 


1 Letter to the author. 

2 Pope, 80,000; Washington and Aquia Creek, 20,000. Lee was well 
aware, from the correspondence which Stuart had captured, if indeed he 
had not already inferred it, that Pope had been strictly enjoined to cover 
Washington, and that he was dependent on the railway for supplies. There 
was not the slightest fear of his falling back towards Aquia Creek to join 
McClellan. 


THE GREAT MARCH 125 


separated from each other by two days’ march. If Pope 
were to receive early warning of Jackson’s march, he might 
hurl his whole force on one or the other. Moreover, defeat, 
with both Pope and McClellan between the Confederates 
and Richmond, spelt ruin and nothing less. But as Lee 
said after the war, referring to the criticism evoked by 
mancuvres, in this asin other of his campaigns, which were 
daring even to rashness, ‘Such criticism is obvious, but 
the disparity of force between the contending forces 
rendered the risks unavoidable.’! In the present case the 
only alternative was an immediate retreat; and retreat, so 
long as the enemy was not fully concentrated, and there was 
a chance of dealing with him in detail, was a measure which 
neither Lee nor Jackson was ever willing to advise. 

On the evening of the 24th Jackson began his pre- 
parations for the most famous of his marches. His troops 
were quietly withdrawn from before the Sulphur Springs, 
and Longstreet’s division, unobserved by the Federals, took 
their place. Captain Boswell was ordered to report on the 
most direct and hidden route to Manassas Junction, and 
the three divisions—Ewell’s, Hill’s, and the Stonewall, now 
commanded by Taliaferro—assembled near Jefferson. Three 
days’ cooked rations were to be carried in the haversacks, 
and a herd of cattle, together with the green corn standing 
in the fields, was relied upon for subsistence until requisition 
could be made on the Federal magazines. The troops 
marched light. Knapsacks were left behind. Tin cans and 
a few frying-pans formed the only camp equipment, and 
many an officer’s outfit consisted of a few badly baked 
biscuits and a handful of salt. 

Long before dawn the divisions were afoot. The men 
were hungry, and their rest had been short ; but they were 
old acquaintances of the morning star, and to march while 
Aug.95 the east was still grey had become a matter of 

routine. But as their guides led northward, and 
the sound of the guns, opening along the Rappahannock, 
erew fainter and fainter, a certain excitement began to 
pervade the column. Something mysterious was in the air. 
' The Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel Allan, p. 200. 


126 STONEWALL JACKSON 


What their movement portended not the shrewdest of the 
soldiers could divine ; but they recalled their marches in the 
Valley and their inevitable results, and they knew instinc- 
tively that a surprise on a still larger scale was in contem- 
plation. The thought was enough. Asking no questions, and 
full of enthusiasm, they followed with quick step the leader 
In whom their confidence had become so absolute. The flood 
had subsided on the Upper Rappahannock, and the divisions 
forded it at Hinson’s Mill, unmolested and apparently un- 
observed. Without halting it pressed on, Boswell with a 
small escort of cavalry leading the way. The march led first 
by Amissville, thence north to Orleans, beyond Hedgeman’s 
River, and thence to Salem, a village on the Manassas Gap 
Railroad. Where the roads diverged from the shortest line 
the troops took to the fields. Guides were stationed by the 
advanced-guard at each gap and gate which marked the 
route. Every precaution was taken to conceal the movement. 
The roads in the direction of the enemy were watched by 
cavalry, and so far as possible the column was directed 
through woods and valleys. The men, although they knew 
nothing of their destination, whether Winchester, or 
Harper’s Ferry, or even Washington itself, strode on mile 
after mile, through field and ford, in the fierce heat of the 
August noon, without question or complaint. ‘ Old Jack’ 
had asked them to do their best, and that was enough to 
command their most strenuous efforts. 

Near the end of the day Jackson rode to the head of 
the leading brigade, and complimented the officers on the 
fine condition of the troops and the regularity of the 
march. They had made more than twenty miles, and 
were still moving briskly, well closed up, and without 
stragglers. Then, standing by the wayside, he watched 
his army pass. The sun was setting, and the rays 
struck full on his familiar face, brown with exposure, 
and his dusty uniform. LTEwell’s division led the way, 
and when the men saw their general, they prepared 
to salute him with their usual greeting. But as they 
began to cheer he raised his hand to stop them, and the 
word passed down the column, ‘ Don’t shout, boys, the 


THE GREAT MARCH 127 


Yankees will hear us;’ and the soldiers contented them- 
selves with swinging their caps in mute acclamation. 
When the next division passed a deeper flush spread 
over Jackson’s face. Here were the men he had so often 
led to triumph, the men he had trained himself, the men 
of the Valley, of the First Manassas, of Kernstown, and 
M’Dowell. The Stonewall regiments were before him, 
and he was unable to restrain them; devotion such as 
theirs was not to be silenced at such a moment, and the 
wild battle-yell of his own brigade set his pulses tingling. 
For once a breach of discipline was condoned. ‘It is of 
no use,’ said Jackson, turning to his staff, ‘you see I 
can’t stop them ;’ and then, with a sudden access of intense 
pride in his gallant veterans, he added, half to himself, 
‘Who could fail to win battles with such men as these ?’ 
It was midnight before the column halted near Salem 
village, and the men, wearied outright with their march of 
six-and-twenty miles, threw themselves on the ground by 
the piles of muskets, without even troubling to unroll their 
blankets. So far the movement had been entirely suc- 
cessful. Nota Federal had been seen, and none appeared 
during the warm midsummer night. Yet the soldiers were 
permitted scant time for rest. Once more they were 
aroused while the stars were bright; and, half awake, 
snatching what food they could, they stumbled forward 
through the darkness. As the cool breath of the morning 
rose about them, the dark forests of the Bull Run Moun- 
Aug. 26. tains became gradually visible in the faint light of 
the eastern sky, and the men at last discovered 
whither their general was leading them. With the know- 
ledge, which spread quickly through the ranks, that they 
were making for the communications of the boaster Pope, 
the regiments stepped out with renewed energy. ‘There 
was no need for speech, no breath to spare if there had been 
—only the shuffling tramp of marching feet, the rumbling 
of wheels, the creak and clank of harness and accoutre- 
ments, with an occasional order, uttered under the breath, 
and always the same: “Close up, men! Close up!” ’! 
1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 533. 


128 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Through Thoroughfare Gap, a narrow gorge in the Bull 
Run range, with high cliffs, covered with creepers and crowned 
with pines on either hand, the column wound steadily 
upwards; and, gaining the higher level, the troops looked 
down on the open country to the eastward. Over a vast 
area of alternate field and forest, bounded by distant 
uplands, the shadows of the clouds were slowly sailing. 
Issuing from the mouth of the pass, and trending a little 
to the south-east, ran the broad high-road, passing through 
two tiny hamlets, Haymarket and Gainesville, and climbing 
by gentle gradients to a great bare plateau, familiar to 
the soldiers of Bull Run under the name of Manassas 
Plains. At Gainesville this road was crossed by another, 
which, lost in dense woods, appeared once more on the 
open heights to the far north-east, where the white buildings 
of Centreville glistened in the sunshine. The second 
road was the Warrenton and Alexandria highway, the 
direct line of communication between Pope’s army and 
Washington, and it is not difficult to divine the anxiety 
with which it was scrutinised by Jackson. If his march - 
had been detected, a far superior force might already 
be moving to intercept him. At any moment the news 
might come in that the Federal army was rapidly ap- 
proaching; and even were that not the case, it seemed 
hardly possible that the Confederate column, betrayed by 
the dust, could escape the observation of passing patrols or 
orderlies. But not a solitary scout was visible ; no move- 
ment was reported from the direction of Warrenton; and 
the troops pressed on, further and further round the 
Federal rear, further and further from Lee and Longstreet. 
The cooked rations which they carried had been consumed 
or thrown away ; there was no time for the slaughter and 
distribution of the cattle; but the men took tribute from 
the fields and orchards, and green corn and green apples 
were all the morning meal that many of them enjoyed. 
At Gainesville the column was joined by Stuart, who had 
maintained a fierce artillery fight at Waterloo Bridge the 
previous day; and then, slipping quietly away under cover 
of the darkness, had marched at two in the morning to cover 


THE JUNCTION CAPTURED 129 
Jackson’s flank. The sun was high in the heavens, and 
still the enemy made no sign. Munford’s horsemen, forming 
the advanced-guard, had long since reached the Alexandria 
turnpike, sweeping up all before them, and neither patrols 
nor orderlies had escaped to carry the news to Warrenton. 

So the point of danger was safely passed, and thirteen 
miles in rear of Pope’s headquarters, right across the com- 
munications he had told his troops to disregard, the long 
column swung swiftly forward in the noonday heat. Nota 
sound, save the muffled roll of many wheels, broke the still- 
ness of the tranquil valley; only the great dust cloud, 
rolling always eastward up the slopes of the Manassas 
plateau, betrayed the presence of war. 

Beyond Gainesville Jackson took the road which led 
to Bristoe Station, some seven miles south of Manassas 
Junction. Neither the success which had hitherto ac- 
companied his movement, nor the excitement incident 
on his situation, had overbalanced his judgment. From 
Gainesville the Junction might have been reached in 
little more than an hour’s march; and prudence would 
have recommended a swift dash at the supply depot, swift 
destruction, and swift escape. But it was always pos- 
sible that Pope might have been alarmed, and the railroad 
from Warrenton Junction supplied him with the means of 
throwing a strong force of infantry rapidly to his rear. 
In order to obstruct such a movement Jackson had 
determined to seize Bristoe Station. Here, breaking down . 
the railway bridge over Broad Run, and _ establishing 
his main body in an almost impregnable position behind 
the stream, he could proceed at his leisure with the 
destruction of the stores at Manassas Junction. The 
advantages promised by this mancuvre more than com- 
pensated for the increased length of the march. 

The sun had not yet set when the advanced-guard 
arrived within striking distance of Bristoe Station. Mun- 
ford’s squadrons, still leading the way, dashed upon the 
village. Hwell followed in hot haste, and a large 
portion of the guard, consisting of two companies, one of 
cavalry and one of infantry, was immediately captured. 


130 STONEWALL JACKSON 


A train returning empty from Warrenton Junction to 
Alexandria darted through the station under a heavy fire.! 
The line was then torn up, and two trains which followed 
in the same direction as the first were thrown down a 
high embankment. A fourth, scenting danger ahead, 
moved back before it reached the break in the road. The 
column had now closed up, and it was already dark. The 
escape of the two trains was most unfortunate. It would 
soon be known, both at Alexandria and Warrenton, that 
Manassas Junction was in danger. The troops had 
marched nearly five-and-twenty miles, but if the object of 
the expedition was to be accomplished, further exertions 
were absolutely necessary. Trimble, energetic as ever, 
volunteered with two regiments, the 21st Georgia and 21st 
North Carolina, to move on Manassas Junction. Stuart 
was placed in command, and without a moment’s delay 
the detachment moved northward through the woods. The 
night was hot and moonless. The infantry moved in order 
of battle, the skirmishers in advance; and pushing slowly 
forward over a broken country, it was nearly midnight . 
before they reached the Junction. Half a mile from the 
depot their advance was greeted by a salvo of shells. The 
Federal garrison, warned by the fugitives from Bristoe 
Station, were on the alert; but so harmless was their fire 
that Trimble’s men swept on without a check. The two 
regiments, one on either side of the railroad, halted within 
a hundred yards of the Federal guns. The countersign 
was passed down the ranks, and the bugles sounded the 
charge. The Northern gunners, without waiting for the 
onset, fled through the darkness, and two batteries, each 
with its full complement of guns and waggons, became the 
prize of the Confederate infantry. Stuart, coming up on 
the flank, rode down the fugitives. Over 800 prisoners 
were taken, and the remainder of the garrison streamed 
northward through the deserted camps. The results of 


1 The report received at Alexandria from Manassas Junction ran as 
follows: ‘No. 6 train, engine Secretary, was fired into at Bristoe by a party 
of cavalry, some 500 strong. They had piled ties on the track, but the 
engine threw them off. Secretary is completely riddled by bullets.’ 


HIS SITUATION 131 


this attack more than compensated for the exertions the 
troops had undergone. Only 15 Confederates had been 
wounded, and the supplies on which Pope’s army, whether 
it was intended to move against Longstreet or merely to 
hold the line of the Rappahannock, depended both for food 
and ammunition were in Jackson’s hands. 

_. The next morning Hill’s and Taliaferro’s divisions 
joined Trimble. Ewell remained at Bristoe; cavalry 
patrols were sent out in every direction, and Jackson, 
Aug.27, Yiding to Manassas, saw before him the reward 
of his splendid march. Streets of warehouses, 
stored to overflowing, had sprung up round the 
Junction. <A line of freight cars, two miles in length, 
stood upon the railway. Thousands of barrels, containing 
flour, pork, and biscuit, covered the neighbouring fields. 
Brand-new ambulances were packed in regular rows. 
Field-ovens, with the fires still smouldering, and all the 
paraphernalia of a large bakery, attracted the wondering 
gaze of the Confederate soldiery; while great pyramids of 
shot and shell, piled with the symmetry of an arsenal, 
testified to the profusion with which the enemy’s artillery 
was supplied. 

It was a strange commentary on war. Washington was 
but a long day’s march to the north; Warrenton, Pope’s 
headquarters, but twelve miles distant to the south-west ; 
and along the Rappahannock, between Jackson and Lee, 
stood the tents of a host which outnumbered the whole 
Confederate army. No thought of danger had entered the 
minds of those who selected Manassas Junction as the 
depot of the Federal forces. Pope had been content to 
leave a small guard as a protection against raiding cavalry. 
Halleck, concerned only with massing the whole army on 
the Rappahannock, had used every effort to fill the store- 
houses. If, he thought, there was one place in Virginia 
where the Stars and Stripes might be displayed in full secu- 
rity, that place was Manassas Junction; and here, as 
nowhere else, the wealth of the North had been poured out 
with a prodigality such as had never been seeninwar. To 
feed, clothe, and equip the Union armies no expenditure was 


132 STONEWALL JACKSON 


deemed extravagant. For the comfort and well-being of 
the individual soldier the purse-strings of the nation were 
freely loosed. No demand, however preposterous, was dis- 
regarded. The markets of Europe were called upon to 
supply the deficiencies of the States; and if money could 
have effected the re-establishment of the Union, the war 
would have already reached a triumphant issue. But the 
Northern Government had yet to learn that the accumula- 
tion of men, matériel, and supplies is not in itself sufficient 
for success. Money alone cannot provide good generals, a 
trained staff, or an efficient cavalry ; and so on this August 
morning 20,000 ragged Confederates, the soldiers of a 
country which ranked as the poorest of nations, had 
marched right round the rear of the Federal army, and 
were now halted in undisturbed possession of all that made 
that army an effective force. 

Few generals have occupied a position so command- 
ing as did Jackson on the morning of August 27. His 
enemies would henceforward have to dance while he 
piped. It was Jackson, and not Pope, who was to dictate 
the movements of the Federal army. It was impossible 
that the latter could now maintain its position on the 
Rappahannock, and Lee’s strategy had achieved its end. 
The capture of Manassas Junction, however, was only the 
first step in the campaign. Pope, to restore his com- 
munications with Alexandria, would be compelled to fall 
back ; but before he could be defeated the two Confederate 
wings must be united, and the harder part of the work 
would devolve on Jackson. The Federals, at Warrenton, 
were nearer by five miles to Thoroughfare Gap, his 
shortest line of communication with Lee and Longstreet, 
than he was himself. Washington held a large garrison, 
and the railway was available for the transit of the 
troops. The fugitives from Manassas must already have 
given the alarm, and at any moment the enemy might 
appear. 

If there were those in the Confederate ranks who con- 
sidered the manceuvres of their leader overbold, their mis- 
givings were soon justified. 


THE SPOILS OF WAR 133 


A train full of soldiers from Warrenton Junction 
put back on finding Ewell in possession of Bristoe Station ; 
but a more determined effort was made from the direction 
of Alexandria. So early as seven o’clock a brigade of 
infantry, accompanied by a battery, detrained on the north 
bank of Bull Run, and advanced in battle order against 
the Junction.! The Federals, unaware that the depot was 
held in strength, expected to drive before them a few squad- 
rons of cavalry. But when several batteries opened a heavy 
fire, and heavy columns advanced against their flanks, the 
men broke in flight towards the bridge. The Confederate 
infantry followed rapidly, and two Ohio regiments, which had 
just arrived from the Kanawha Valley, were defeated with 
heavy loss. Fitzhugh Lee, who had fallen back before 
the enemy’s advance, was then ordered in pursuit. The 
cars and railway bridge were destroyed; and during the 
day the brigade followed the fugitives as far as Burke’s 
Station, only twelve miles from Alexandria. 

This feeble attack appears to have convinced Jackson 
that his danger was not pressing. It was evident that the 
enemy had as yet no idea of his strength. Stuart’s cavalry 
watched every road; Ewell held a strong position on Broad 
Run, barring the direct approach from Warrenton Junction, 
and it was determined to give the wearied soldiers the 
remainder of the day for rest and pillage. It was impossible 
to carry away even a tithe of the stores, and when an issue 
of rations had been made, the bakery set working, and the 
liquor placed under guard, the regiments were let loose on 
the magazines. Such an opportunity occurs but seldom in 
the soldier’s service, and the hungry Confederates were not 
the men to let it pass. ‘Weak and haggard from their 
diet of green corn and apples, one can well imagine,’ says 
Gordon, ‘ with what surprise their eyes opened upon the 
contents of the sutlers’ stores, containing an amount and 


! These troops were sent forward, without cavalry, by order of General 
Halleck. O. R., vol. xii., part iii, p. 680. The Federal Commander-in- 
Chief expected that the opposition would be slight. He had evidently no 
suspicion of the length to which the daring of Lee and Jackson might have 
carried them. 


134 STONEWALL JACKSON 


variety of property such as they had never conceived. Then 
came a storming charge of men rushing in a tumultuous 
mob over each other’s heads, under each other’s feet, 
anywhere, everywhere, to satisfy a craving stronger 
than a yearning for fame. There were no laggards in 
that charge, and there was abundant evidence of the fruits of 
victory. Men ragged and famished clutched tenaciously 
at whatever came in their way, whether of clothing or 
food, of luxury or necessity. Here a long yellow-haired, 
barefooted son of the South claimed as prizes a tooth- 
brush, a box of candles, a barrel of coffee ; while another, 
whose butternut homespun hung round him in tatters, 
crammed himself with lobster salad, sardines, potted game 
and sweetmeats, and washed them down with Rhenish 
wine. Nor was the outer man neglected. From piles of 
new clothing the Southerners arrayed themselves in the 
blue uniforms of the Federals. The naked were clad, the 
barefooted were shod, and the sick provided with luxuries 
to which they had long been strangers.’ ! 

The history of war records many extraordinary scenes, 
but there are few more ludicrous than this wild revel at 
Manassas. Even the chagrin of Northern writers gives 
way before the spectacle; and Jackson must have smiled 
erimly when he thought of the maxim which Pope had 
promulgated with such splendid confidence: ‘ Let us study 
the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave 
our own to take care of themselves !’ 

It was no time, however, to indulge in reflections on 
the irony of fortune. All through the afternoon, while the 
sharp-set Confederates were sweeping away the profits 
which the Northern sutlers had wrung from Northern 
soldiers, Stuart’s vigilant patrols sent in report on report 
of the Federal movements. From Warrenton heavy 
columns were hurrying over the great highroad to Gaines- 
ville, and from Warrenton Junction a large force of all 
arms was marching direct on Bristoe. There was news, 
too, from Lee. Despite the distance to be covered, and the 


1 The Army of Virginia. General George H. Gordon. 


RETREAT 135 


proximity of the enemy, a trooper of the ‘ Black Horse,’ a 
regiment of young planters which now formed Jackson’s 
escort, discuised as a countryman, made his way back from 
headquarters, and Jackson learned that Longstreet, who had 
started the previous evening, was following his own track 
by Orleans, Salem, and Thoroughfare Gap.! It was evident, 
then, that the whole Federal army was in motion north- 
wards, and that Longstreet had crossed the Rappahannock. 
But Longstreet had many miles to march and Thorough- 
fare Gap to pass before he could lend assistance; and 
the movement of the enemy on Gainesville threatened 
to intervene between the widely separated wings of the 
Confederate army. 

It was no difficult matter for Jackson to decide on the 
course to be adopted. There was but one thing to do, to 
retreat at once ; and only one line of escape still open, the 
roads leading north and north-west from Manassas Junction. 
To remain at Manassas and await Lee’s arrival would have 
been to sacrifice hiscommand. 20,000 men, even with the 
protection of intrenchments, could hardly hope to hold the 
whole Federal army at bay for two days; and it was always 
possible that Pope, blocking Thoroughfare Gap with a portion 
of his force, might delay Lee for even longer than two days. 
Nor did it recommend itself to Jackson as sound strategy to 
move south, attack the Federal column approaching Bristoe, 
and driving it from his path to escape past the rear 
of the column moving to Gainesville. The exact position 
of the Federal troops was far from clear. Large forces might 
be encountered near the Rappahannock, and part of 
McClellan’s army was known to be marching westward from 
Aquia Creek. Moreover, such a movement would have ac- 
centuated the separation of the Confederate wings, and a local 
success over a portion of the hostile army would have been 
but a poor substitute for the decisive victory which Lee hoped 
to win when his whole force was once more concentrated. 


1 «Up to the night of August 28 we received,’ says Longstreet, ‘reports 
from General Jackson at regular intervals, assuring us of his successful 
operation, and of confidence in his ability to baffle all efforts of the enemy 
till we should reach him.’— Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 517. 


136 STONEWALL JACKSON 


About three in the afternoon the thunder of artillery 
was heard from the direction of Bristoe. Tiwell had sent 
a brigade along the railroad to support some cavalry on 
reconnaissance, and to destroy a bridge over Kettle Run. 
Hardly had the latter task been accomplished when a strong 
column of Federal infantry emerged from the forest and 
deployed for action. Hooker’s division of 5,500 men, belong- 
ing to McClellan’s army, had joined Pope on the same day 
that Jackson had crossed the Rappahannock, and had been 
dispatched northwards from Warrenton Junction as soon as 
the news came in that Manassas Junction had been cap- 
tured. Hooker had been instructed to ascertain the strength 
of the enemy at Manassas, for Pope was still under the 
impression that the attack on his rear was nothing more than 
a, repetition of the raid on Catlett’s Station. Striking the 
Confederate outposts at Kettle Run, he deployed his troops 
in three lines and pushed briskly forward. The batteries on 
both sides opened, and after a hot skirmish of an hour’s 
duration Ewell, who had orders not to risk an engagement 
with superior forces, found that his flanks were threatened.. 
In accordance with his instructions he directed his 
three brigades to retire in succession across Broad Run. 
This difficult manceuvre was accomplished with trifling 
loss, and Hooker, ascertaining that Jackson’s whole corps, 
estimated _at 80,000 men, was near at hand, advanced no 
further than the stream. LHvwell fell back slowly to the Junc- 
tion; and shortly after midnight the three Confederate 
divisions had disappeared into the darkness. The torch 
had already been set to the captured stores; warehouses, 
trains, camps, and hospitals were burning fiercely, and 
the dark figures of Stuart’s troopers, still urging on the 
work, passed to and fro amid the flames. Of the value of 
property destroyed it is difficult to arrive at an estimate. 
Jackson, in his official report, enumerates the various 
items with an unction which he must have inherited 
from some moss-trooping ancestor. Yet the actual quan- 
tity mattered little, for the stores could be readily replaced. 
But the effect of their destruction on the Federal operations 
was for the time being overwhelming. And of this de- 


POPE 137 


struction Pope himself was a witness. The fight with 
Ewell had just ceased, and the troops were going into 
bivouac, when the Commander-in-Chief, anxious to ascer- 
tain with his own eyes the extent of the danger to which 
he was exposed, reached Bristoe Station. There, while 
the explosion of the piles of shells resembled the noise of 
a great battle, from the ridge above Broad Run he saw the 
sky to the north-east lurid with the blaze of a vast confla- 
eration ; and there he learned for the first time that it was no 
mere raid of cavalry, but Stonewall Jackson, with his whole 
army corps, who stood between himself and Washington. 

_ For the best part of three days the Union general had 
been completely mystified. Jackson had left Jefferson on 
the 25th. But although his march had been seen by the 
Federal signallers on the hills near Waterloo Bridge,! and 
the exact strength of his force had been reported, his desti- 
nation had been unsuspected. When the column was last 
seen it was moving northward from Orleans, but the 
darkness had covered it, and the measure of prolonging 
the march to midnight bore good fruit. For the best 
part of two days Jackson had vanished from his enemy’s 
view, to be found by Pope himself at Manassas Junction.’ 
Nevertheless, although working in the dark, the Federal 
commander, up to the moment he reached Bristoe Station, 
had acted with sound judgment. He had inferred from the 
reports of his signalmen that Jackson was marching to 
Front Royal on the Shenandoah; but in order to clear up 
the situation, on the 26th Sigel and McDowell were ordered 
to force the passage of the Rappahannock at Waterloo 
Bridge and the Sulphur Springs, and obtain information of 
the enemy’s movements. Reno, at the same time, was to 


' Five messages were sent in between 8.45 a.m. and 11 a.m., but evidently 
reached headquarters much later. O.R., vol. xii., part iii., pp. 654-5. 

2 There is a curious undated report on page 671, O. R.., vol. xii., part iii., 
from Colonel Duffie, a French officer in the Federal service, which speaks of 
a column passing through Thoroughfare Gap; but, although the compilers 
of the Records have placed it under the date August 26, it seems evident, as 
this officer (see p. 670) was at Rappahannock Station on the 26th and 27th 
(O. B., vol. xii., part. iii., p. 688), that the report refers to Longstreet’s and 
not Jackson’s troops, and was written on August 28. 


VOR. IT. L 


138 STONEWALL JACKSON 


cross below the railway bridge and make for Culpeper. The 
manceuyres, however, were not carried out as contemplated. 
Only McDowell advanced; and as Lee had replaced Long- 
street, who marched to Orleans the same afternoon, by 
Anderson, but little was discovered. . 

It was evident, however, that the Confederates were 
trending steadily northwards, and on the night of the 26th 
Pope ordered his 80,000 Federals to concentrate in the 
neighbourhood of Warrenton. Reports had come in that 
hostile troops had passed through Salem, White Plains, and 
Thoroughfare Gap. But it seemed improbable, both to 
Pope and McDowell, the second in command, that more 
was meant by this than a flank attack on Warrenton. 
McDowell expressed his opinion that a movement round 
the right wing in the direction of Alexandria was far too 
hazardous for the enemy to attempt. Pope appears to 
have acquiesced, and a line of battle near Warrenton, with 
a strong reserve at Greenwich, to the right rear, was then 
decided on. Franklin’s army corps from the Peninsula, 
instead of proceeding to Aquia Creek, was disembarking at 
Alexandria, and Halleck had been requested to push these 
10,000 men forward with all speed to Gainesville. The 
Kanawha regiments had also reached Washington, and 
Pope was under the impression that these too would be sent 
to join him. He had therefore but little apprehension for 
his rear. The one error of judgment into which both Pope 
and McDowell had been betrayed was in not giving Lee 
’ due credit for audacity or Jackson for energy. That Lee 
’ would dare to divide his army they had never conceived ; 
that Jackson would march fifty miles in two days and 
‘place his single corps astride their communications was an 
/idea which had they thought of they would have instantly 
dismissed. Like the Austrian generals when they first 
confronted Napoleon, they might well have complained that 
their enemy broke every rule of the military art; and like 
all generals who believe that war is a mere matter of pre- 
cedent, they found themselves egregiously deceived. — 


10. R., vol. xii., part ili, p..672. Pope to Porter, p. 675. Pope to 
Halleck, p. 684. 


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POPE 139 


The capture of Manassas, to use Pope’s own words, 
rendered his position at Warrenton no longer tenable, and 
early on the 27th, the army, instead of concentrating on 
Warrenton, was ordered to move to Gainesville (from 
Gainesville it was easy to block Thoroughfare Gap) ; 
Buford’s cavalry brigade was thrown out towards White 
Plains to observe Longstreet, and Hooker was dispatched 
to clear up the situation at Manassas. This move, 
which was completed before nightfall, could hardly have 
been improved upon. The whole Federal army was now 
established on the direct line of communication between 
Jackson and Lee, and although Jackson might still escape, 
the Confederates had as yet gained no advantage be- 
yond the destruction of Pope’s supplies. It seemed im- 
possible that the two wings could combine east of the 
Bull Run Mountains. But on the evening of the 27th, 
after the conclusion of the engagement at Bristoe Station, 
Pope lost his head. The view he now took of the situa- 
tion was absolutely erroneous. Ewell’s retreat before 
Hooker he interpreted as an easy victory, which fully com- 
pensated for the loss of his magazines. He imagined that. 
Jackson had been surprised, and that no other course 
was open to him than to take refuge in the intrenchments 
of Manassas Junction and await Lee’s arrival. Orders 
were at once issued for a mancuvre which should ensure 
the defeat of the presumptuous foe. The Federal army 
corps, marching in three columns, were called up to Man- 
assas, a movement which would leave Thoroughfare Gap 
unguarded save by Buford’s cavalry. Some were to move 
at midnight, others ‘at the very earliest blush of dawn.’ 
‘We shall bag the whole crowd, if they are prompt and 
expeditious,’ ! said Pope, with a sad lapse from the poetical 
phraseology he had just employed. 

And so, on the morning of the 28th,a Federal army 
Aug.9g, Once more set out with the expectation of sur- 

rounding Jackson, to find once more that the task 
was beyond their powers. | 

The march was slow. Pope made no movement from 

1 QO. R. vol. xii., part ii., p. 72, 


140 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Bristoe Station until Hooker had been reinforced by 
Kearney and Reno; McDowell, before he turned east 
from Gainesville, was delayed by Sigel’s trains, which 
crossed his line of march, and it was not till noon that 
Hooker’s advanced-guard halted amid the still smouldering 
ruins on the Manassas plateau. The march had been 
undisturbed. The redoubts were untenanted. The woods 
to the north were silent. A few grey-coated vedettes 
watched the operations from far-distant ridges; a few 
stragglers, overcome perhaps by their Gargantuan meal of 
the previous evening, were picked up in the copses, but 
Jackson’s divisions had vanished from the earth. 

Then came order and counterorder. Pope was com- 
pletely bewildered. By four o’clock, however, the news 
arrived that the railway at Burke’s Station, within twelve 
miles of Alexandria, had been cut, and that the enemy was 
in force between that point and Centreville. On Centre- 
ville, therefore, the whole army was now directed ; Hooker, 
Kearney, and Reno, forming the right wing, marched by 
Blackburn’s Ford, and were to be followed by Porter and 
Banks; Sigel and Reynolds, forming the centre, took the 
road by New Market and the Stone Bridge; McDowell 
(King’s and Ricketts’ divisions), forming the left, was to 
pass through Gainesville and Groveton. But when the right 
wing reached Centreville, Pope was still at fault. There 
were traces of a marching column, but some small patrols 
of cavalry, who retreated leisurely before the Federal 
advance, were the sole evidence of the enemy’s existence. 
Night was at hand, and as the divisions he accompanied 
were directed to their bivouacs, Pope sought in vain for the 
enemy he had believed so easy a prey. 

Before his troops halted the knowledge came to him. 
Far away to the south-west, where the great Groveton valley, 
backed by the wooded mountains, lay green and beautiful, 
rose the dull booming of cannon, swelling to a continuous 
roar; and as the weary soldiers, climbing the slopes near 
Centreville, looked eagerly in the direction of the sound, the 
rolling smoke of a fierce battle was distinctly visible above the 
woods which bordered the Warrenton-Alexandria highway. 


HIS MANGUVRES 141 


Across Bull Run, in the neighbourhood of Groveton, and 
still further westward, where the cleft in the blue hills 
marked Thoroughfare Gap, was seen the flash of distant 
euns. McDowell, marching northwards through Gaines- 
ville, had evidently come into collision with the enemy. 
Jackson wasrun to earth at last; andit was now clear that 
while Pope had been moving northwards towards Centre- 
ville, the Confederates had been moving westward, and 
that they were once more within reach of Lee. But 
by what means, Pope might well have asked, had a 
whole army corps, with its batteries and waggons, passed 
through the cordon which he had planned to throw 
around it, and passed through as if gifted with the secret 
of invisibility ? 

The explanation was simple. While his enemies were 
watching the midnight glare above Manassas, Jackson was 
moving north by three roads; and before morning broke 
A. P. Hill was near Centreville, Ewell had crossed Bull Run 
by Blackburn’s Ford, and Taliaferro was north of Bald Hill, 
with a brigade at Groveton, while Stuart’s squadrons 
formed a screen to front and flank. Then, as the Federals 
slowly converged on Manassas, Hill and Ewell, marching 
unobserved along the north bank of Bull Run, crossed the 
Stone Bridge; Taliaferro joined them, and before Pope had 
found that his enemy had left the Junction, the Confederates 
were in bivouac north of Groveton, hidden in the woods, 
and recovering from the fatigue of their long night march.! 

Jackson’s arrangements for deceiving his enemy, for 
concealing his line of retreat, and for drawing Pope north- 
ward on Centreville, had been carefully thought out. 
The march from Manassas was no hasty movement to 
the rear. Taliaferro, as soon as darkness fell, had 
moved by New Market on Bald Hill. At 1 a.m. Ewell 
followed Hill to Blackburn’s Ford; but instead of con- 
tinuing the march on Centreville, had crossed Bull Run, 
and moving up stream, had joined Taliaferro by way of 
the Stone Bridge. Hill, leaving Centreville at 10 a.m., 


1 A. P. Hill had marched fourteen miles, Ewell fifteen, and Taliaferro, 
with whom were the trains, from eight to ten. 


142 STONEWALL JACKSON 


marched to the same rendezvous. Thus, while the atten- 
tion of the enemy was attracted to Centreville, Jackson’s 
divisions were concentrated in the woods beyond Bull 
Run, some five or six miles west. The position in 
which his troops were resting had been skilfully selected. 
South of Sudley Springs, and north of the Warrenton 
turnpike, it was within twelve miles of Thoroughfare 
Gap, and a line of retreat, in case of emergency, 
as well as a line by which Lee could join him, should 
Thoroughfare Gap be blocked, ran to Aldie Gap, the 
northern pass of the Bull Run Mountains. Established 
on his enemy’s fiank, he could avoid the full shock of his 
force should Lee be delayed, or he could strike effectively 
himself; and it was to retain the power of striking that 
he had not moved further northward, and secured his front 
by camping beyond Catharpen Run. It was essential that 
he should be prepared for offensive action. The object with 
which he had marched upon Manassas had only been half 
accomplished. Pope had been compelled to abandon the 
strong line of the Rappahannock, but he had not yet been 
defeated; and if he were not defeated, he would combine 
with McClellan, and advance in a few days in overwhelming 
force. Lee looked for a battle with Pope before he could 
be reinforced, and to achieve this end it was necessary that 
the Federal commander should be prevented from re- 
treating further; that Jackson should hold him by the 
throat until Lee should come up to administer the coup 
de grace. 

It was with this purpose in his mind that Jackson 
had taken post near Groveton, and he was now awaiting 
the information that should tell him the time had come to 
strike. But, as already related, the march of the Federals 
on Manassas was slow and toilsome. It was not till 
the morning was well on that the brigade of Taliaferro’s 
division near Groveton, commanded by Colonel Bradley 
Johnson, was warned by the cavalry that the enemy was 
moving through Gainesville in great strength. A skirmish 
took place a mile or two north of that village, and Johnson, 
finding himself menaced by far superior numbers, fell back 


THE CAPTURED ORDER 143 


to the wood near the Douglass House. He was not followed. 
The Union generals, Sigel and Reynolds, who had been 
ordered to Manassas to ‘ bag’ Jackson, had received no word 
of his departure from the Junction; and believing that 
Johnson’s small force was composed only of cavalry, they 
resumed the march which had been temporarily interrupted. 

The situation, however, was no clearer to the Confederates. 
The enemy had disappeared in the great woods south-west 
of Groveton, and heavy columns were still reported coming 
up from Gainesville. During the afternoon, however, the 
cavalry captured a Federal courier, carrying McDowell’s 
orders for the movement of the left and centre, which had 
been placed under his command, to Manassas Junction,! 
and this important document was immediately forwarded 
to Jackson. 

‘ Johnson’s messenger,’ says General Taliaferro, ‘ found 
the Confederate headquarters established on the shady side 
of an old-fashioned worm-fence, in the corner of which 
General Jackson and his division commanders were pro- 
foundly sleeping after the fatigues of the preceding night, 
notwithstanding the intense heat of the August day. 
There was not so much as an ambulance at headquarters. 
The headquarters’ train was back beyond the Rappahan- 
nock, at Jefferson, with remounts, camp equipage, and all 
the arrangements for cooking and serving food. All the 
property of the general, the staff, and the headquarters’ 
bureau was strapped to the pommels and cantels of the 
saddles, and these formed the pillows of their weary 
owners. The captured dispatch roused Jackson like an 
electric shock. He was essentially a man of action. He 
rarely, if ever, hesitated. He never asked advice. He 
called no council to discuss the situation disclosed by this 

! The order, dated 2 a.m., August 28, was to the following effect :— 

‘1. Sigel’s Corps to march from Gainesville to Manassas Junction, the 
right resting on the Manassas railroad. 

‘2. Reynolds to follow Sigel. 

‘3. King to follow Reynolds. 

‘4, Ricketts to follow King; but to halt at Thoroughfare Gap if the 
enemy threatened the pass.’ 


King was afterwards, while on the march, directed to Centreville by the 
Warrenton-Alexandria road. 


144 STONEWALL JACKSON 


communication, although his ranking officers were almost 
at his side. He asked no conference of opinion. He made 
no suggestion, but simply, without a word, except to repeat 
the language of the message, turned to me and said: 
‘“‘ Move your division and attack the enemy ;”’ and to Ewell, 
“Support the attack.”” The slumbering soldiers sprang 
from the earth at the first murmur. They were sleeping 
almost in ranks; and by the time the horses of their 
officers were saddled, the long lines of infantry were 
moving to the anticipated battle-field. 

‘The two divisions, after marching some distance to the 
north of the turnpike, were halted and rested, and the 
prospect of an engagement on that afternoon seemed to 
disappear with the lengthening shadows. The enemy did 
not come. The Warrenton turnpike, along which it was 
supposed he would march, was in view, but it was as free 
from Federal soldiery as it had been two days before, when 
Jackson’s men had streamed along its highway.’ ! 

Jackson, however, was better informed than his sub- 
ordinate. ‘Troops were still moving through Gainesville, 
and, instead of turning off to Manassas, were marching up 
the turnpike on which so many eyes were turned from the 
neighbouring woods. King’s division, while on the march 
to Manassas, had been instructed to countermarch and 
make for Centreville, by Groveton and the Stone Bridge. 
Ricketts, who had been ordered by McDowell to hold 
Thoroughfare Gap, was already engaged with Longstreet’s 
advanced-guard, and of this Jackson was aware; for 
Stuart, in position at Haymarket, three miles north of 
Gainesville, had been skirmishing all day with the enemy’s 
cavalry, and had been in full view of the conflict at the Gap.” 

Jackson, however, knew not that one division was all 
that was before him. The Federal movements had covered 

1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 507, 508. 

2 Longstreet had been unable to march with the same speed as Jackson. 
Leaving Jefferson on the afternoon of August 26, he did not reach Thorough- 
fare Gap until ‘ just before night’ on August 28. He had been delayed for 
an hour at White Plains by the Federal cavalry, and the trains of the army, 


such as they were, may also have retarded him. In two days he covered only 
thirty miles. 


To Aldie —. 


RENO 
F.LEE 


5 Centreville 
ON SStone KEARNEY 
JACK? bo f ee 
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Sst ART Kew Midrket Fairfax C.H. 
SIGEL 
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Sulphur 
Springs 


12 
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2 Catlett's St. 


Gane 


= 


Confederate ES 
Federal (_J 
Scale of Miles 


° " Io 


Situation Sunset August 28th. 1862. 


Walker & Boutall se. 


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HIS PLAN OF ACTION 145 


so wide an extent of country, and had been so well con- 
cealed by the forests, that it was hardly possible for 
Stuart’s patrols, enterprising as they were, to obtain 
accurate information. Unaccustomed to such disjointed 
marches as were now in progress across his front, Jackson 
believed that Kine’s column was the flank-guard of 
McDowell's army corps. But, although he had been com- 
pelled to leave Hill near the Stone Bridge, in order to 
protect his line of retreat on Aldie, he had still determined to 
attack. The main idea which absorbed his thoughts is clear 
enough. ‘The Federal army, instead of moving direct from 
Warrenton on Alexandria, as he had anticipated, had appa- 
rently taken the more circuitous route by Manassas, and if 
Pope was to be fought in the open field before he could be 
reinforced by McClellan, he must be induced to retrace his 
steps. Todo this, the surest means was a resolute attack on 
King’s division, despite the probability that it might be 
strongly reinforced ; and it is by no means unlikely that 
Jackson deferred his attack until near sunset in order that, 
if confronted by superior numbers, he might still be able 
to hold on till nightfall, and obtain time for Longstreet to 
come up. 

Within the wood due north of the Dogan House, through 
which ran an unfinished railroad, Ewell’s and Taliaferro’s 
divisions, awaiting the propitious moment for attack, were 
drawn up in order of battle. Hight brigades, and three 
small batteries, which had been brought across country with 
ereat difficulty, were present, and the remainder of the 
artillery was not far distant. Taliaferro, on the right, had 
two brigades (A. G. Taliaferro’s and the Stonewall) in first 
line; Starke was in second line, and Bradley Johnson near 
Groveton village. Ewell, on the left, had placed Lawton 
and Trimble in front, while Early and Forno formed a 
general reserve. This force numbered in all about 8,000 
men, and even the skirmishers, thrown out well to the front, 
were concealed by the undulations of the ground. 


1 Twenty pieces had been ordered to the front soon after the infantry 
moved forward. The dense woods, however, proved impenetrable to all but 
three horse-artillery guns, and one of these was unable to keep up. 


146 STONEWALL JACKSON 


The Federal division commanded by General King, 
although unprovided with cavalry and quite unsupported, 
was no unworthy enemy. It was composed of four brigades 
of infantry, led by excellent officers, and accompanied 
by four batteries. The total strength was 10,000 men. 
The absence of horsemen, however, placed the Northerners 
at a disadvantage from the outset. 

_The leading brigade was within a mile of Groveton, a 
hamlet of a few houses at the foot of a long descent, and the 
advanced-guard, deployed as skirmishers, was searching the 
woods in front. On the road in rear, with the batteries 
between the columns, came the three remaining brigades— 
Gibbon’s, Doubleday’s, and Patrick’s—in the order named. 

The wood in which the Confederates were drawn up 
was near a mile from the highway, on a commanding 
ridge, overlooking a broad expanse of open ground, which 
fell gently in successive undulations to the road. The 
Federals were marching in absolute unconsciousness 
that the enemy, whom the last reports had placed at 
Manassas, far away to the right, was close at hand. No. 
flank-guards had been thrown out. General King was at 
Gainesville, sick, and a regimental band had just struck 
up a merry quickstep. On the open fields to the left, 
bathed in sunshine, there was not a sign of life. The 
whitewashed cottages, surrounded by green orchards, 
which stood upon the slopes, were lonely and untenanted, 
and on the edge of the distant wood, still and drooping in 
the heat, was neither stir nor motion. The troops trudged 
steadily forward through the dust ; regiment after regiment 
disappeared in the deep copse which stands west of Grove- 
ton, and far to the rear the road was still crowded with 
men and guns. Jackson’s time had come. 

Two Confederate batteries, trotting forward from the 
wood, deployed upon the ridge. The range was soon 
found, and the effect was instantaneous. But the con- 
fusion in the Northern ranks was soon checked; the troops 
found cover inside the bank which lined the road, and 
two batteries, one with the advanced-guard and one from 
the centre of the column, wheeling into the fields to the 


THE FEDERALS SURPRISED 147 


left, came quickly into action. About the same moment 
Bradley Johnson became engaged with the skirmishers near 
Groveton. 

The Confederate infantry, still hidden by the rolling 
ground, was forming for attack, when a Federal brigade, 
led by General Gibbon, rapidly deploying on the slopes, 
moved forward against the guns. It was Stuart’s horse- 
artillery, so the Northerners believed, that had fired on the 
column, and a bold attack would soon drive back the 
cavalry. But as Gibbon’s regiments came forward the 
Southern skirmishers, lying in front of the batteries, sprang 
to their feet and opened with rapid volleys; and then the 
erey line of battle, rising suddenly into view, bore down upon 
the astonished foe. ‘Taliaferro, on the right, seized a small 
farmhouse near Gainesville, and occupied the orchard ; the 
Stonewall Brigade advanced upon his left, and Lawton and 
Trimble prolonged the front towards the Douglass House. 
But the Western farmers of Gibbon’s brigade were made of 
stubborn stuff. The Wisconsin regiments held their 
eround with unflinching courage. Both flanks were 
protected by artillery, and strong reinforcements were 
coming up. ‘The advanced-guard was gradually falling 
back from Groveton; the rear brigades were hurrying 
forward up the road. The two Confederate batteries, over- 
powered by superior metal, had been compelled to shift 
position; only a section of Stuart’s horse-artillery under 
Captain Pelham had come to their assistance, and the 
battle was confined to a frontal attack at the closest 
range. In many places the lines approached within a 
hundred yards, the men standing in the open and blazing 
fiercely in each other’s faces. Here and there, as fresh regi- 
ments came up on either side, the grey or the blue gave way 
for a few short paces; but the gaps were quickly filled, and 
the wave once more surged forward over the piles of dead. 
Men fell like leaves in autumn. Ewell was struck down, 
and Taliaferro, and many of their field officers, and still the 
Federals held their ground. Night was settling on the field, 
and although the gallant Pelham, the boy soldier, brought 
a gun into action within seventy paces of Gibbon’s line, yet 


148 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the front of fire, flashing redly through the gloom, neither 
receded nor advanced. A flank attack on either side would 
have turned the scale, but the fight was destined to end as 
it had begun. The Federal commander, ignorant of the 
enemy’s strength, and reaching the field when the fight 
was hottest, was reluctant to engage his last reserves. 
Jackson had ordered Early and Forno, moving through 
the wood west of the Douglass House, to turn the enemy’s 
right; but within the thickets ran the deep cuttings and 
high embankments of the unfinished railroad; and the 
regiments, bewildered in the darkness, were unable to 
advance. Meanwhile the fight to the front had gradually 
died away. The Federals, outflanked upon the left, and 
far outnumbered, had slowly retreated to the road. The 
Confederates had been too roughly handled to pursue. 

The reports of the engagement at Groveton are sin- 
sularly meagre. Preceded and followed by events of still 
sreater moment, it never attracted the attention it deserved. 
On the side of the Union 2,800 men were engaged, on the 
side of the Southerners 4,500, and for more than an hour 
and a half the lines of infantry were engaged at the 
very closest quarters. The rifled guns of the Federals un- 
doubiedly gave them a marked advantage. But the men > 
who faced each other that August evening fought with a 
gallantry that has seldom been surpassed. The Federals, 
surprised and unsupported, bore away the honours. The 
Western brigade, commanded by General Gibbon, displayed 
a coolness and a steadfastness worthy of the soldiers 
of Albuera. Out of 2,000 men the four Wisconsin and 
Indiana regiments lost 750, and were still unconquered. 
The three regiments which supported them, although it was 
their first battle, lost nearly half their number, and the 
casualties must have reached a total of 1,100. The Con- 
federate losses were even greater. Ewell, who was shot 
down in the first line, and lay long on the field, lost 725 
out of 8,000. The Stonewall Brigade, which had by this time 
dwindled to 600 muskets, lost over 200, including five field 
officers; the 2ist Georgia, of Trimble’s brigade, 178 
men out of 242; and it is probable that the Valley army on 


LOSSES 149 


this day was diminished by more than 1,200 stout soldiers. 
The fall of Ewell was a terrible disaster. Zealous and 
indefatigable, a stern fighter and beloved by his men, he 
was the most able and the most loyal of Jackson’s generals. 
Taliaferro, peculiarly acceptable to his Virginia regiments 
as a Virginian himself, had risen from the rank of colonel 
to the command of a division, and his spurs had been well 
won. The battle of Groveton left gaps in Jackson’s 
ranks which it was hard to fill, and although the men 
might well feel proud of their stubborn fight, they could 
hardly boast of a brilliant victory. 

Strategically, however, the engagement was decisive. 
Jackson had brought on the fight with the view of 
drawing the whole Federal army on himself, and he was 
completely successful. The centre, marching on the Stone 
Bridge from Manassas Junction, heard the thunder of 
the cannon and turned westward; and before nightfall 
A. P. Hill’s artillery became engaged with Sigel’s 
advanced-guard. Pope himself, who received the intelli- 
gence of the engagement at 9.20 p.m., immediately issued 
orders for an attack on Jackson the next morning, in which 
the troops who had already reached Centreville were to 
take part. ‘McDowell,’ ran the order, ‘has intercepted 
the retreat of the enemy, Sigel is immediately in his front, 
and I see no possibility of his escape.’ 

But Pope, full of the idea that Jackson had been stopped 
in attempting to retreat through Thoroughfare Gap, 
altogether misunderstood the situation. He was badly 
informed. He did not know even the position of his own 
troops. His divisions, scattered over a wide extent of 
country, harassed by Stuart’s cavalry, and ignorant of the 
topography, had lost all touch with the Commander-in-Chief. 
Important dispatches had been captured. Messages and 
orders were slow in arriving, if they arrived at all. Even 
the generals were at a loss to find either the Commander-in- 
Chief or the right road. McDowell had ridden from Gaines- 
ville to Manassas in order to consult with Pope, but Pope 
had gone to Centreville. McDowell thereupon set out to 
rejoin his troops, but lost his way in the forest and went 

VOL. II. M 


150 STONEWALL JACKSON 


back to Manassas. From Ricketts Pope received no 
information whatever.! He was not aware that after a 
long skirmish at Thoroughfare Gap, Longstreet had opened 
the pass by sending his brigades over the mountains 
on either hand, threatening both flanks of the Federals, 
and compelling them to retire. He was not aware that 
King’s division, so far from intercepting Jackson’s retreat, 
had abandoned the field of Groveton at 1 a.m., and, finding 
its position untenable in face of superior numbers, had 
fallen back on Manassas; or that Ricketts, who had by this 
time reached Gainesville, had in consequence continued his 
retreat in the same direction. 

Seldom have the baneful effects of dispersion been more 
strikingly illustrated, and the difficulty, under such 
circumstances, of keeping the troops in the hand of the 
Commander-in-Chief. On the morning of the 28th Pope had 
ordered his army to march in three columns on Manassas, 
one column starting from Warrenton Junction, one from 
Greenwich, and one from Buckland Mills, the roads which 
they were to follow being at their furthest point no more 
than seven miles apart. And yet at dawn on the 29th 
he was absolutely ignorant of the whereabouts of McDowell’s 
army corps; he was but vaguely informed of what had 
happened during the day ; and while part of his army was 
at Bald Hill, another part was at Centreville, seven miles 
north-east, and a third at Manassas and at Bristoe, from 
seven to twelve miles south-east. Nor could the staff be held 
to blame for the absence of communication between the 
columns. In peace it is an easy matter to assume that a 
message sent to a destination seven miles distant by a high- 
road or even country lanes arrives in good time. Seven 
miles in peace are very short. In war, in the neigh- 
bourhood of the enemy, they are very long. In peace, roads 
are easy to find. In war, it is the exception that they are 
found, even when messengers are provided with good maps 


1 Ricketts’ report would have been transmitted through McDowell, under 
whose command he was, and as McDowell was not to be found, it naturally 
went astray. 


THE SITUATION 151 


and the country is thickly populated; and it is from war 
that the soldier’s trade is to be learned. 

Jackson’s army corps bivouacked in the position they 
had held when the fierce musketry of Groveton died away. 
It was not till long after daybreak on the 29th that his cavalry 
patrols discovered that King’s troops had disappeared, 
and that Longstreet’s advanced-guard was already through 
Thoroughfare Gap. Nor was it till the sun was high that 
Lee learned the events of the previous evening, and these 
threw only a faint light on the general situation. But had 
either the Commander-in-Chief or his lieutenant, on the 
night of the 28th, known the true state of affairs, they would 
have had reason to congratulate themselves on the success 
of the plan which had been hatched on the Rappahannock. 
They had anticipated that should Jackson’s movement on 
Manassas prove successful, Pope would not only fall back, but 
that he would fall back in all the confusion which arises from 
a hastily conceived plan and hastily executed manoeuvres. 
They had expected that in his hurried retreat his army 
corps would lose touch and cohesion; that divisions would 
become isolated; that the care of his umpedimenta, suddenly 
turned in a new direction, would embarrass every movement ; 
and that the general himself would become demoralised. 

The orders and counterorders, the marches and counter- 
marches of August 28, and the consequent dispersion of 
the Federal army, are sufficient in themselves to prove the 
deep insight into war possessed by the Confederate leaders. 

Nevertheless, the risk bred of separation which, in order 
to achieve great results, they had deliberately accepted had 
not yet passed away. Longstreet had indeed cleared the 
pass, and the Federals who guarded it had retreated ; but 
the main body of the Confederate army had still twelve 
miles to march before it could reach Jackson, and Jackson 
was confronted by superior numbers. On the plateau of 
Bull Run, little more than two miles from the field of 
Groveton, were encamped over 20,000 Federals, with the 
same number at Manassas. At Centreville, a seven miles’ 
march, were 18,000; and at Bristoe Station, about the 
same distance, 11,000. 

M 2 


152 STONEWALL JACKSON 


It was thus possible for Pope to hurl a superior force 
against Jackson before Lee could intervene ; and although it 
would have been sounder strategy, on the part of the Federal 
commander, to have concentrated towards Centreville, and 
have there awaited reinforcements, now fast coming up, he 
had some reason for believing that he might still, unaided, 
deal with the enemy in detail. The high virtue of patience 
was not his. Ambition, anxiety to retrieve his reputation, 
already blemished by his enforced retreat, the thought that 
he might be superseded by McClellan, whose operations in 
the Peninsula he had contemptuously criticised, all urged 
him forward. An unsuccessful general who feels instinc- 
tively that his command is slipping from him, and who sees 
in victory the only hope of retaining it, seldom listens to the 
voice of prudence. 

So on the morning of the 29th Jackson had to do 
with an enemy who had resolved to overwhelm him by 
Ane 20. weight of numbers. Nor could he expect immediate 

help. The Federal cavalry still stood between 
Stuart and Thoroughfare Gap, and not only was Jackson 
unaware that Longstreet had broken through, but he was 
unaware whether he could break through. In any case, it 
would be several hours before he could receive support, and 
for that space of time his three divisions, worn with long 
marching and the fierce fight of the previous evening, would 
have to hold their own unaided. The outlook, to all 
appearance, was anything but bright. But on the opposite 
hills, where the Federals were now forming in line of battle, 
the Valley soldiers had already given proof of their stubborn 
qualities on the defensive. The sight of their baptismal 
battle-field and the memories of Bull Run must have gone 
far to nerve the hearts of the Stonewall regiments, and 
in preparing once more to justify their proud title the 
troops were aided by their leader’s quick eye for a position. 
While it was still dark the divisions which had been 
engaged at Groveton took ground to their left, and passing 
north of the hamlet, took post on the right of A. P, Hill. 
The long, flat-topped ridge, covered with scattered copses 
and rough undergrowth, which stands north of the War- 


HIS POSITION FOR BATTLE 153 


renton-Centreville road, commands the approaches from 
the south and east, and some five hundred yards below the 
crest ran the unfinished railroad. 

Behind the deep cuttings and high embankments the 
Confederate fighting-line was strongly placed. The left, 
slightly thrown back, rested on a rocky spur near Bull Run, 
commanding Sudley Springs Ford and the road to Aldie 
Gap. The front extended for a mile and three-quarters 
south-west. Harly, with two brigades and a battery, 
occupied a wooded knoll where the unfinished railroad 
crosses the highroad, protecting the right rear, and stretch- 
ing a hand to Longstreet. 

The infantry and artillery were thus disposed :— 


Infantry. 


Left.—A. P. Hill’s Division. Firstand Second line: Three brigades. 
(Field, Thomas, Gregg.) Third line: Three brigades. (Branch, Pender, 
Archer.) 

Centre.—Two brigades of Hwell’s Division (now commanded by 
Lawton). (Trimble’s and Lawton’s.) 

Right.—Taliaferro’s Division (now commanded by Starke). First 
and Second line: Two brigades. Third line: Two brigades. 

Force detached on the right: Two brigades of Hwell’s Division 
(Early and Forno), and one battery. 


Artillery. 


16 guns behind the left, ee the ridge, five hundred yards 
24 guns behind the right centre, in rear of the fighting-line. 


The flanks were secured by Stuart. A portion of the 
cavalry was placed at Haymarket to communicate as soon as 
possible with Longstreet. A regiment was pushed out to- 
wards Manassas, and on the left bank of Bull Run Fitzhugh 
Lee’s brigade watched the approaches from Centreville and 
the north. Jackson’s strength, deducting the losses of the 
previous day, and the numerous stragglers left behind during 
his forced marches, can hardly have exceeded 18,000 
muskets, supported by 40 guns, all that there was room 
for, and some 2,500 cavalry. These numbers, however, 
were ample for the defence of the position which had been 
selected. Excluding the detached force on the extreme 


154 STONEWALL JACKSON 


right, the line occupied was three thousand yards in length, 
and to every yard of this line there were more than five 
muskets, so that half the force could be retained in third 
line or reserve. The position was thus strongly held and 
strong by nature. The embankments formed stout parapets, 
the cuttings deep ditches. 

Before the right and the right centre the green pastures, 
shorn for thirteen hundred yards of all obstacles save a 
few solitary cottages, sloped almost imperceptibly to the 
brook which is called Young’s Branch. The left centre and 
left, however, were shut in by a belt of timber, from four 
hundred to six hundred yards in width, which we may call 
the Groveton wood. This belt closed in upon, and at one 
point crossed, the railroad, and, as regards the field of fire, 
it was the weakest point. In another respect, however, it 
was the strongest, for the defenders were screened by the 
trees from the enemy’s artillery. The rocky hill on the 
left, facing north-east, was a point of vantage, for an open 
corn-field lay between it and Bull Run. Within the position, 
behind the copses and undulations, there was ample cover 
for all troops not employed on the fighting-line; and from 
the ridge in rear the general could view the field from com- 
manding ground. 

Shortly after 5 a.m., while the Confederates were still 
taking up their positions, the Federal columns were seen 
515am, moving down the heights near the Henry House. 

Jackson had ridden round his lines, and ordering 
Karly to throw forward two regiments east of the turnpike, 
had then moved to the great battery forming in rear 
of his right centre. Huis orders had already been issued. 
The troops were merely to hold their ground, no general 
counterstroke was intended, and the divisional com- 
manders were to confine themselves to repulsing the 
attack. The time for a strong offensive return had not 
yet come. 

The enemy advanced slowly in imposing masses. 
Shortly after seven o’clock, hidden to some extent by the 
woods, four divisions of infantry deployed in several lines 
at the foot of the Henry Hill, and their skirmishers became 


SIGEL’S CORPS 155 


engaged with the Confederate pickets. At the same moment 
three batteries came into action on a rise north-east of 
Groveton, opposite the Confederate centre, and Sigel, sup- 
ported by Reynolds, prepared to carry out his instructions, 
and hold Jackson until the remainder of Pope’s army should 
arrive upon the field. At the end of July, Sigel’s army corps 
had numbered 13,000 men. Allowing for stragglers and 
for casualties on the Rappahannock, where it had been 
several times engaged, it must still have mustered 11,000. 
It was accompanied by ten batteries, and Reynolds’ 
division was composed of 8,000 infantry and four bat- 
teries. The attack was thus no stronger than the defence, 
and as the Federal artillery positions were restricted 
by the woods, there could be little doubt of the result. 
In other respects, moreover, the combatants were not 
evenly matched. Reynolds’ Pennsylvanians were fine 
troops, already seasoned in the battles on the Penin- 
sula, and commanded by such officers as Meade and 
Seymour. But Sigel, who had been an officer in the 
Baden army, had succeeded Frémont, and his corps was 
composed of those same Germans whom Ewell had used so 
hardly at Cross Keys. Many of them were old soldiers, 
who had borne arms in Europe; but the stern discipline 
and trained officers of conscript armies were lacking in 
America, and the Confederate volunteers had little respect 
for these foreign levies. Nor were Sigel’s dispositions a 
brilliant example of offensive tactics. His three divisions, 
Schurz’, Schenck’s, and Steinwehr’s, supported by Milroy’s 
independent brigade, advanced to the attack along a wide 
front. Schurz, with two brigades, moving into the Grove- 
ton wood, assailed the Confederate left, while Milroy 
and Schenck advanced over the open meadows which 
lay in front of the right. Steinwehr was in reserve, and 
Reynolds, somewhat to the rear, moved forward on the 
extreme left. The line was more than two miles long; 
the artillery, hampered by the ground, could render but 
small assistance ; and at no single point were the troops 
disposed in sufficient depth to break through the front of 
the defence. The attack, too, was piecemeal. Advancing 


156 STONEWALL JACKSON 


through the wood, Schurz’ division was at once met 
by a sharp counterstroke, delivered by the left brigade 
(Gregg’s South Carolina) of A. P. Hill’s division, which 
drove the two Federal brigades apart. Reinforcements 
were sent in by Milroy, who had been checked on the open 
ground by the heavy fire of Jackson’s guns, and the 
Germans rallied; but, after some hard fighting, a fresh 
counterstroke, in which Thomas’ brigade took part, drove 
them in disorder from the wood; and the South 
Carolinians, following to the edge, poured heavy volleys into 
their retreating masses. Schenck, meanwhile, deterred by 
the batteries on Jackson’s right, had remained inactive; the 
Federal artillery, such as had been brought into action, 
had produced no effect; Reynolds, who had a difficult 
march, had not yet come into action; and in order to 
support the broken troops Schenck was now ordered to 
close in upon the right. But the opportunity had already 
passed. 

It was now 10.80 a.m., and Jackson had long since 
learned that Lee was near at hand. Longstreet’s advanced- 
guard had passed through Gainesville, and the main body 
10.15 au, Was closing up. Not only had time been gained, 

but two brigades alone had proved sufficient to 
hold the enemy at arm’s length, and the rough counter- 
strokes had disconcerted the order of attack. A fresh 
Federal force, however, was already approaching. The 
troops from Centreville, comprising the divisions of Hooker, 
Kearney, and Reno, 17,000 or 18,000 men, were hurrying 
over the Stone Bridge; and a second and more vigorous 
attack was now to be withstood. Sigel, too, was still capable 
of further effort. Bringing up Steinwehr’s division, and 
demanding reinforcements from Reno, he threw his whole 
force against the Confederate front. Schenck, however, 
still exposed to the fire of the massed artillery, was unable 
to advance, and Milroy in the centre was hurled back. 
But through the wood the attack was vigorously pressed, 
and the fight raged fiercely at close quarters along the 
railway. Between Gregg’s and Thomas’ brigades a gap 
of over a hundred yards, as the men closed in upon the 


LONGSTREET AT LAST 157 


centre, had gradually opened. Opposite the gap was a 
deep cutting, and the Federals, covered by the wood, massed 
here unobserved in heavy force. Attack from this quarter 
was unexpected, and for a moment Hill’s first line was in 
jeopardy. Gregg, however, had still a regiment in second 
line, and throwing it quickly forward he drove the enemy 
across the railroad. Then Hill, bringing up Branch 
from the third line, sent this fresh brigade to Gregg’s 
support, and cleared the front. 

The Germans had now been finally disposed of. But 
although Longstreet had arrived upon the ground, and was 
deploying in the woods on Jackson’s right, thus relieving 
Early,who at once marched to support the centre, Jackson’s 
men had not yet finished with the enemy. Pope had now 
taken over command ; and besides the troops from Centre- 
ville, who had already reached the field, McDowell and 
Porter, with 27,000 men, were coming up from Manassas, 
and Reynolds had not yet been engaged. But it is one 
thing to assemble large numbers on the battle-field, another 
to give them the right direction. 

In the direction of Gainesville high woods and rolling 
ridges had concealed Longstreet’s approach, and the 
Federal patrols had been everywhere held in check by 
Stuart’s squadrons. In ignorance, therefore, that the 
whole Confederate army was concentrated before him, 
Pope, anticipating an easy victory, determined to sweep 
Jackson from the field. But it was first necessary to 
relieve Sigel. Kearney’s division had already deployed 
on the extreme right of the Federal line, resting on 
Bull Run. Hooker was on the left of Kearney and 
a brigade of Reno’s on the left of Hooker. While 
Sigel assembled his shattered forces, these 10,000 fresh 
troops, led by some of the best officers of the Army 
of the Potomac, were ordered to advance against A. P. Hill. 
Tieynolds, under the impression that he was fighting 
Jackson, was already in collision with Longstreet’s advanced- 
guard; and McDowell and Porter, marching along the rail- 
way from Manassas, might be expected to strike the Con- 
federate right rear at any moment. It was then with good 


158 STONEWALL JACKSON 


hope of victory that Pope rode along his line and explained 
the situation to his generals. 

But the fresh attack was made with no better concert 
than those which preceded it. Kearney, on the right, near 
Bull Run, was held at bay by Jackson’s guns, 
and Hooker and Reno advanced alone. 

As the Federals moved forward the grey skirmishers fell 
back through the Groveton wood, and scarcely had they 
reached the railroad before the long blue lines came crashing 
through the undergrowth. Hill’s riflemen, lying down to 
load, and rising only to fire, poured in their deadly volleys at 
point-blank range. The storm of bullets, shredding leaves 
and twigs, stripped the trees of their verdure, and the long 
dry grass, ignited by the powder sparks, burst into flames 
between the opposing lines. But neither flames nor musketry 
availed to stop Hooker’s onset. Bayonets flashed through 
the smoke, and a gallant rush placed the stormers on the 
embankment. The Confederates reeled back in confusion, 
and men crowded round the colours to protect them. But 
assistance was at hand. A fierce yell and a heavy volley, 
and the regiments of the second line surged forward, driving 
back the intruders, and closing the breach. Yet the Federal 
ranks reformed; the wood rang with cheers, and a fresh 
brigade advanced to the assault. Again the parapet was 
carried ; again the Southern bayonets cleared the front. 
Hooker’s leading brigade, abandoning the edge of the wood, 
had already given ground. Reno’s regiments, suffering fear- 
ful slaughter, with difficulty maintained their place; and 
Hill, calling once more upon his reserves, sent in Pender to 
the counterstroke. Passing by the right of Thomas, who, 
with Field, had borne the brunt of the last attack, Pender 
crossed the railroad, and charged into the wood. Many of 
the men in the fighting-line joined in the onward movement. 
The Federals were borne back; the brigades in rear were 
swept away by the tide of fugitives; the wood was cleared, 
and a battery near by was deserted by the gunners. 

Then Pender, received with a heavy artillery fire from 
the opposite heights, moved boldly forward across the open. 
But the counterstroke had been pushed too far. The line 


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GROVER’ ATTACK 159 


faltered ; hostile infantry appeared on either flank, and as 
the Confederates fell back to the railroad, the enemy came 
forward in pursuit. Grover’s brigade of Hooker’s division 
had hitherto been held in reserve, sheltered by a roll of the 
land opposite that portion of the front which was held by 
ars Thomas. It was now directed to attack. ‘ Move 

slowly forward,’ were the orders which Grover 
gave to his command, ‘ until the enemy opens fire. Then 
advance rapidly, give them one volley, and then the bayonet.’ 
The five regiments moved steadily through the wood in a 
single line. When they reached the edge they saw immedi- 
ately before them the red earth of the embankment, at this 
point ten feet high and lined with riflemen. There was a 
crash of fire, a swift rush through the rolling smoke, and the 
Federals, crossing the parapet, swept all before them. Hill’s 
second line received them with a scattered fire, turnedin con- 
fusion, and fled back upon the guns. Then beckoned victory 
to him who had held his reserves in hand. Jackson had 
seen the charge, and Forno’s Louisianians, with a regiment 
of Lawton’s, had already been sent forward with the bayonet. 

In close order the counterstroke cameon. The thinned 
ranks of the Federals could oppose no resolute resistance. 
Fighting they fell back, first to the embankment, where 
for a few moments they held their own, and then to the 
wood. But without supports it was impossible to rally. 
Johnson’s and Starke’s brigades swept down upon their 
flank, the Louisianians, supported by Field and Archer, 
against their front, and in twenty minutes, with a loss of 
one-fourth his numbers, Grover in his turn was driven 
beyond the Warrenton turnpike. 

Four divisions, Schurz’, Steinwehr’s, Hooker’s, and 
Reno’s, had been hurled in succession against Jackson’s 
front. Their losses had been enormous. Grover, in twenty 
minutes, had lost 461 out of 2,000, of which one regiment, 
283 strong, accounted for 6 officers and 106 men; three 
regiments of Reno’s lost 530; and it is probable that 
more than 4,000 men had fallen in the wood which lay in 
front of Hill’s brigades. 

The fighting, however, had not been without effect on 


160 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the Confederates. The charges to which they had been 
exposed, impetuous as they were, were doubtless less trying 
than a sustained attack, pressed on by continuous waves of 
fresh troops, and allowing the defence no breathing space. 
Such steady pressure, always increasing in strength, saps 
the moral more rapidly than a series of fierce assaults, 
delivered at wide intervals of time. But such pressure 
implies on the part of the assailant an accumulation of 
superior force, and this accumulation the enemy’s generals 
had not attempted to provide. In noneof the four attacks 
which had shivered against Hill’s front had the strength of 
the assailants been greater than that of his own division ; 
and to the tremendous weight of such a stroke as had won 
the battles of Gaines’ Mill or Cedar Run, to the closely 
combined advance of overwhelming numbers, Jackson’s men 
had not yet been subjected. 

The battle, nevertheless, had been fiercely contested, and 
the strain of constant vigilance and close-range fighting 
had told on the Light Division. The Federal skirmishers, 
boldly advancing as Pender’s men fell back, had once more ' 
filled the wood, and their venomous fire allowed the defenders 
no leisure for repose.| Ammunition had already given out ; 
many of the men had but two or three cartridges remaining, 
_and the volunteers who ran the gauntlet to procure fresh 
supplies were many of them shot down. Moreover, nine 
hours’ fighting, much of it at close range, had piled the 
corpses thick upon the railroad, and the ranks of Hill’s 
brigades were terribly attenuated. The second line had 
already been brought up to fill the gaps, and every brigade 
had been heavily engaged. 

It was about four o’clock, and for a short space the 
pressure on the Confederate lines relaxed. The continuous 


! «The Federal sharpshooters at this time,’ says Colonel McCrady, of the 
Light Division, ‘ held possession of the wood, and kept up a deadly fire of 
single shots whenever any one of us was exposed. Every lieutenant who 
had to change position did so at the risk of his life. What was my 
horror, during an interval in the attack, to see General Jackson himself 
walking quickly down the railroad cut, examining our position, and calmly 
looking into the wood that concealed the enemy! Strange to say, he was 
not molested.’— Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. xiii., p. 27. 


THE LAST ATTACK 161 


roar of the artillery dwindled to a fitful cannonade; and 
along the edge of the wood, drooping under the 
heat, where the foliage was white with the dust of 
battle, the skirmishers let their rifles cool. But the Valley 
soldiers knew that their respite would be short. The Federal 
masses were still marching and countermarching on the 
opposite hills; from the forest beyond long columns 
streamed steadily to the front, and near the Warrenton 
turnpike fresh batteries were coming into action. 

Pope had ordered Kearney and Reno to make a fresh 
attack. The former, one of the most dashing officers in 
the Federal army, disposed his division in two lines. Reno, 
in the same formation, deployed upon Kearney’s right, and 
with their flank resting on Bull Run the five brigades went 
forward to the charge. The Confederate batteries, posted 
on the ridge in rear, swept the open ground along the 
stream; but, regardless of their fire, the Federals came 
rapidly to close quarters, and seized the railroad. When 
Hill saw this formidable storm bursting on his 
lines he felt that the supreme moment had arrived. 
Would Gregg, on whose front the division of Reno was bear- 
ing down, be able to hold his own? That gallant soldier, 
although more than one half of his command lay dead or 
wounded, replied, in answer to his chief’s enquiry, that 
his ammunition was almost expended, but that he had still 
the bayonet. Nevertheless, the pressure was too heavy for 
his wearied troops. Foot by foot they were forced back, and, 
at the same moment, Thomas, Field, and Branch, still fight- 
ing desperately, were compelled to yield their ground. Hill, 
anxiously looking for succour, had already called on Karly. 
The enemy, swarming across the railroad, had penetrated 
to a point three hundred yards within the Confederate posi- 
tion. Butthe grey line was not yet shattered. The men of 
the Light Division, though borne backwards by the rush, 
still faced towards the foe; and Karly’s brigade, supported 
by two regiments of Lawton’s division, advanced with 
levelled bayonets, drove through the tumult, and opposed 
a solid line to the crowd of Federals. 

Once more the fresh reserve, thrown in at the propitious 


4 P.M. 


4.30 p.m. 


162 STONEWALL JACKSON 


moment, swept back numbers far superior to itself. Once 
more order prevailed over disorder, and the cold steel 
asserted its supremacy. The strength of the assailants was 
already spent. The wave receded more swiftly than it 
had risen, and through the copses and across the railroad 
the Confederates drove their exhausted foe. General Hill 
had instructed Early that he was not to pass beyond the 
original front; but it was impossible to restrain the 
troops, and not till they had advanced several hundred 
yards was the brigade halted and brought back. The 
515 pu, counterstroke was as completely successful as those 
~~ that had preceded it. THarly’s losses were com- 
paratively slight, those inflicted on the enemy very heavy, 
and Hill’s brigades were finally relieved. Pope abandoned 
all further efforts to crush Jackson. Five assaults had 
failed. 80,000 infantry had charged in vain through the 
fatal wood; and of the 8,000 Federal casualties reported 
on this day, by far the larger proportion was due to the 
deadly fire and dashing counterstrokes of Jackson’s 
infantry. 

While Pope was hurling division after division agains 
the Confederate left, Lee, with Longstreet at his side, 
observed the conflict from Stuart’s Hill, the wooded 
eminence which stands south-west of Groveton. On this 
wing, though a mile distant from Jackson’s battle, both 
Federals and Confederates were in force. At least one half 
of Pope’s army had gradually assembled on this flank. 
Here were Reynolds and McDowell, and on the Manassas 
road stood two divisions under Porter. 

Within the woods on Stuart’s Hill, with the cavalry on 
his flank, Longstreet had deployed his whole force, with the 
exception of Anderson, who had not yet passed Thoroughfare 
Gap. But although both Pope and Lee were anxious to 
engage, neither could bring their subordinates to the point. 
Pope had sent vague instructions to Porter and McDowell, 
and when at length he had substituted a definite order it 
was not only late in arriving, but the generals found that it 
was based on an absolutely incorrect view of the situation. 
The Federal commander had no knowledge that Longstreet, 


STUART'S HILL 163 


with 25,000 men, was already in position beyond his left. 
So close lay the Confederates that under the impression that 
Stuart’s Hill was still untenanted, he desired Porter to move 
across it and envelop Jackson’s right. Porter, suspecting 
that the main body of the Southern army way before him, 
declined to risk his 10,000 men until he had reported the 
true state of affairs. A peremptory reply to attack at once 
was received at 6.30, but it was then too late to intervene. 

Nor had Lee been more successful in developing a 
counterstroke. Longstreet, with a complacency it is difficult 
to understand, has related how he opposed the wishes of the 
Commander-in-Chief. Three times Lee urged him forward. 
The first time he rode to the front to reconnoitre, and 
found that the position, in his own words, was not inviting. 
Again Lee insisted that the enemy’s left might be turned. 
While the question was under discussion, a heavy force 
(Porter and McDowell) was reported advancing from Man- 
assas Junction. No attack followed, however, and Lee re- 
peated his instructions. Longstreet was still unwilling. A 
large portion of the Federal force on the Manassas road 
now marched northward to join Pope, and Lee, for the last 
time, bade Longstreet attack towards Groveton. ‘I sug- 
gested,’ says the latter, ‘that the day being far spent, 
it might’ be as well to advance before night on a forced 
reconnaissance, get our troops into the most favourable 
positions, and have all things ready for battle the next 
morning. To this General Lee reluctantly gave consent, 
and orders were given for an advance to be pursued under 
cover of night, until the main position could be carefully 
examined. It so happened that an order to advance was 
issued on the other side at the same time, so that the 
encounter was something of a surprise on both sides.’ ! 
Hood, with his two Texan brigades, led the Confederates, 
and King’s division, now commanded by Hatch, met him 
on the slopes of Stuart’s Hill. Although the Federals, 
since 1 a.m. the same morning, had marched to Manassas 
and back again, the fight was spirited. Hood, however, 
was strongly supported, and the Texans pushed forward 


1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 519. 
VOL. II. N 


164 STONEWALL JACKSON 


a mile and a half in front of the position they had held 
since noon. Longstreet had now full leisure to make 
his reconnaissance. The ground to which the enemy 
had retreated was very strong. He believed it strongly 
manned, and an hour after midnight Hood’s brigades 
were ordered to withdraw. 

The firing, even of the skirmishers, had long since 
died away on the opposite flank. The battle was over, 
and the Valley army had been once more victorious. 
But when Jackson’s staff gathered round him in the 
bivouac, ‘their triumph,’ says Dabney, ‘bore a solemn 
hue.’ Their great task had been accomplished, and Pope’s 
army, harassed, starving, and bewildered, had been brought 
to bay. Buttheir energies were worn down. ‘The incessant 
marching, by day and night, the suspense of the past week, 
the fierce strife of the day that had just closed, pressed 
heavily on the whole force. Many of the bravest were gone. 
Trimble, that stout soldier, was severely wounded, Field 
and Forno had fallen, and in Grege’s brigade alone 40 
officers were dead or wounded. Doctor McGuire, fresh 
from the ghastly spectacle of the silent battle-field, said, 
‘General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and 
stern fighting.’ ‘No,’ replied Jackson, very quietly, ‘it 
has been won by nothing but the blessing and _ protec- 
tion of Providence.’ And in this attitude of acknowledg- 
ment general and soldiers were as one. When the pickets 
had been posted, and night had fallen on the forest, officers 
and men, gathered together round their chaplains, made 
such preparations for the morrow’s battle as did the host of 
King Harry on the eve of Agincourt. 


165 


NOTH 


Students of war will note with interest the tactical details of the 
passage of the Rappahannock by the Army of Northern Virginia. 


August 21.—FEDERALS. 


In position behind the river from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford. 
Téte de pont covering the railway bridge, occupied by a brigade. 


CONFEDERATES. 


Longstreet to Kelly’s Ford. 
Jackson to Beverley Ford. 
Stuart to above Beverley Ford. 
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire. 


August 22.—FEDERALS. 


In position from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford. 
Bayard’s cavalry brigade on right flank. 
Buford’s cavalry brigade at Rappahannock Station. 


CONFEDERATES. 


Jackson to Sulphur Springs. Early crosses the river. 
Longstreet to Beverley Ford and railway. 
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire. 


August 23.—FEDERALS. 


Pope abandons téte de pont and burns railway bridge. 

Sigel moves against Early, but his advance is repulsed. 

Army to a position about Warrenton, with detachments along the 
river, and a strong force at Kelly’s Ford. 


CONFEDERATES. 


Karly moves north to Great Run, and is reinforced by Lawton. 
Stuart to Catlett’s Station. 
Longstreet demonstrates against railway bridge. 

N 2 


166 STONEWALL JACKSON 


August 24.—FEDERALS. 


Buford’s and Bayard’s cavalry to Waterloo. 
Army to Waterloo and Sulphur Springs. 


CONFEDERATES. 


Jackson in the evening retires to Jefferson, and is relieved after 
dark opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo by Longstreet. 
Anderson relieves Longstreet on the railway. 
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire all along the line. 


August 25.—FEDERALS. 


Pope extends his left down the river to Kelly’s Ford, determining 
to receive attack at Warrenton should the Confederates cross. 


CONFEDERATES. 


Jackson moves north and crosses the river at Hinson’s Mills. 
Longstreet demonstrates at Waterloo, and Anderson at the Sulphur 
Springs. 
August 26.—FEDERALS. 


A reconnaissance in force, owing to bad staff arrangements, comes 
to nothing. At nightfall the whole army is ordered to con-: 
centrate at Warrenton. 


CONFEDERATES. 


2 a.m. Stuart follows Jackson. 
Late in the afternoon, Longstreet, having been relieved by 
Anderson, marches to Hinson’s Mills. 
Jackson captures Manassas Junction. 
Skirmishing all day along the Rappahannock. 


August 27.—FEDERALS. 


7 aM. Hooker’s division from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe 
Station. 

8.30 a.m. Army ordered to concentrate at Gainesville, Buckland 
Mills, and Greenwich. Porter and Banks at Warrenton 
Junction. 

3 p.m. Action at Bristoe Station. 

6.30 p.m. Pope arrives at Bristoe Station. 

Army ordered to march to Manassas Junction at dawn. 


CONFEDERATES. 


Jackson at Manassas Junction. 
Longstreet to White Plains. 


167 


~ 


CHAPTER XVII 


THE SECOND MANASSAS (continued) 


Durine the night of August 80 the long line of camp-fires 
on the heights above Bull Run, and the frequent skirmishes 
along the picket line, told General Lee that his enemy had 
no intention of falling back behind the stream. And 
when morning broke the Federal troops were observed upon 
every ridge. 

The Confederate leader, eager as he had been to force 
the battle to an issue on the previous afternoon, had now 
Petre abandoned all idea of attack. The respite which 

us" the enemy had gained might have altogether 
changed the situation. It was possible that the Federals 
had been largely reinforced. Pope and McClellan had 
been given time, and the hours of the night might have 
been utilised to bring up the remainder of the Army of 
the Potomac. lee resolved, therefore, to await events. 
The Federal position was strong; their masses were 
well concentrated; there was ample space, on the ridges 
beyond Young’s Branch, for the deployment of their 
numerous artillery, and it would be difficult to outflank 
them. Moreover, a contingent of fresh troops from 
Richmond, the divisions of D. H. Hill, McLaws, and Walker, 
together with Hampton’s brigade of cavalry, and part of the 
reserve artillery, 20,350 men in all, had crossed the 
Rappahannock.'! Until this force should join him he deter- 


OW) Ss ; : ‘ - : 7,000 


McLaws . ; s : : 4 6,850 
Walker. ‘ : ) : F 4,000 
Hampton . ‘ ; ; : ; 1,500 
Artillery . : ‘ ea ; ; 1,000 


20,350 


168 STONEWALL JACKSON 


mined to postpone further manceuvres, and to rest his 
army. But he was not without hope that Pope might 
assume the initiative and move down from the heights 
on which his columns were already forming. Aware of 
the sanguine and impatient temper of his adversary, 
confident in the moral of his troops, and in the strength 
of his position, he foresaw that an opportunity might 
offer for an overwhelming counterstroke. 

Meanwhile, the Confederate divisions, still hidden in the 
woods, lay quietly on their arms. Few changes were made 
in the dispositions of the previous day. Jackson, despite 
his losses, had made no demand for reinforcements ; and the 
only direct support afforded him was a battery of eighteen 
suns, drawn from the battalion of Colonel 8. D. Lee, 
and established on the high ground west of the Douglass 
House, at right angles to his line of battle. These guns, 
pointing north-east, overlooked the wide tract of undulating 
meadow which lay in front of the Stonewall and Lawton’s 
divisions, and they commanded a field of fire over a mile 
long. ‘The left of the battery was not far distant from the 
guns on Jackson’s right, and the whole of the open space 
was thus exposed to the cross-fire of a formidable artillery. 

To the right of the batteries, Stuart’s Hill was strongly 
occupied by Longstreet, with Anderson’s division as general 
reserve; and this wing of the Confederate army was 
gradually wheeled up, but always under cover, until it was 
almost perpendicular to the line of the unfinished railroad. 
The strength of Lee’s army at the battle of Manassas was 
hardly more than 50,000 of all arms. Jackson’s command 
had been reduced by battle and forced marches to 17,000 
men. Longstreet mustered 30,000, and the cavalry 2,500. 

But numbers are of less importance than the confidence 
of the men in their ability to conquer,! and the spirit of the 
Confederates had been raised to the highest pitch. The keen 


* Hood’s Texans had a hymn which graphically expressed this truism : 
‘The race is not to him that’s got | 
The longest legs to run, 
Nor the battle to those people 
That shoot the biggest gun.’ 


GROVETON & SECOND MANASSAS 


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POPE 169 


critics in Longstreet’s ranks, although they had taken 
no part in the Manassas raid, or in the battles of August 28 
and 29, fully appreciated the daring strategy which had 
brought them within two short marches of Washington. The 
junction of the two wings, in the very presence of the 
enemy, after many days of separation, was a manceuvre 
after their own hearts. The passage of Thoroughfare 
Gap revealed the difficulties which had attended the 
operations, and the manner in which the enemy had been 
outwitted appealed with peculiar force to their quick intel- 
ligence. Their trust in Lee was higher than ever; and 
the story of Jackson’s march, of the capture of Manassas, 
of the repulse of Pope’s army, if it increased their con- 
tempt for the enemy, inspired them with an enthusiastic 
determination to emulate the achievements of their com- 
rades. ‘The soldiers of the Valley army, who, unaided 
by a single bayonet, had withstood the five successive 
assaults which had been launched against their position, 
were supremely indifferent, now Longstreet was in line, 
to whatever the enemy might attempt. It was noticed 
that notwithstanding the heavy losses they had experi- 
enced Jackson’s troops were never more light-hearted 
than on the morning of August 80. Cartridge-boxes 
had been replenished, rations had been issued, and for 
several hours the men had been called on neither to march 
nor fight. As they lay in the woods, and the pickets, 
firing on the enemy’s patrols, kept up a constant skirmish 
to the front, the laugh and jest ran down the ranks, and 
the unfortunate Pope, who had only seen ‘ the backs of his 
enemies,’ served as whetstone for their wit. 

By the troops who had revelled in the spoils of Win- 
chester Banks had been dubbed ‘ Old Jack’s Commissary 
General.’ By universal acclamation, after the Manassas 
foray, Pope was promoted to the same distinction ; and had 
it been possible to penetrate to the Federal headquarters, the 
mirth of those ragged privates would hardly have dimin- 
ished. Pope was in an excellent humour, conversing 
affably with his staff, and viewing with pride the martial 
aspect of his massed divisions. Nearly his whole force 


170 STONEWALL JACKSON 


was concentrated on the hills around him, and Porter, who 
had been called up from the Manassas road, was already 
marching northwards through the woods. Banks still was 
absent at Bristoe Station, in charge of the trains and stores 
which had been removed from Warrenton; but, shortly 
after ten o’clock, 65,000 men, with eight-and- 
twenty batteries, were at Pope’s disposal. He had 
determined to give battle, although Franklin and Sumner, 
who had already reached Alexandria, had not yet joined 
him; and heanticipated an easy triumph. He was labouring, 
however, under an extraordinary delusion. The retreat of 
Hood’s brigades the preceding night, after their recon- 
naissance, had induced him to believe that Jackson had ~ 
been defeated, and he had reported to Halleck at day- 
break: ‘We fought a terrific battle here yesterday with 
the combined forces of the enemy, which lasted with 
continuous fury from daylight until dark, by which time 
the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy. 
The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We 
lost not less than 8,000 men killed and wounded, but from 
the appearance of the field the enemy lost at least two to 
one. The news has just reached me from the front that 
the enemy is retreating towards the mountains.’ 

If, in these days of long-range weapons, Napoleon’s 
dictum still stands good, that the general who is ignorant 
of his enemy’s strength and dispositions is ignorant of his 
trade, then of all generals Pope was surely the most 
incompetent. At teno’clock on the morning of August 80, 
and for many months afterwards, despite his statement that 
he had fought ‘the combined forces of the enemy ’ on the 
previous day, he was still under the impression, so skilfully 
were the Confederate troops concealed, that Longstreet had 
not yet joined Jackson, and that the latter was gradually 
falling back on Thoroughfare Gap. His patrols had reported 
that the enemy’s cavalry had been withdrawn from the left 
bank of Bull Run. A small reconnaissance in force, sent 
to test Jackson’s strength, had ascertained that the extreme 
left was not so far forward as it had been yesterday ; while 
two of the Federal generals, reconnoitring beyond the turn- 


10.15 a.m. 


POPE 171 


pike, observed only a few skirmishers. On these negative 
reports Pope based his decision to seize the ridge 
which was held by Jackson. Yet the woods along the 
unfinished railroad had not been examined, and the in- 
formation from other sources was of a different colour 
and more positive. Buford’s cavalry had reported on 
the evening of the 29th that a large force had passed 
through Thoroughfare Gap. Porter declared that the 
enemy was in great strength on the Manassas road. 
Reynolds, who had been in close contact with Longstreet 
since the previous afternoon, reported that Stuart’s Hull 
was strongly occupied. Ricketts, moreover, who had fought 
Longstreet for many hours at Thoroughfare Gap, was 
actually present on the field. But Pope, who had made up 
his mind that the enemy ought to retreat, and that therefore 
he must retreat, refused credence to any report whatever 
which ran counter to these preconceived ideas. Without 
making the slightest attempt to verify, by personal obser- 
vation, the conclusions at which his subordinates had 
arrived, at midday, to the dismay of his best 
officers, his army being now in position, he issued 
orders for his troops to be ‘immediately thrown forward in 
pursuit of the enemy, and to press him vigorously.’ 

Porter and Reynolds formed the left of the Federal 
army. ‘These generals, alive to the necessity of examining 
the woods, deployed a strong skirmish line before them as 
they formed for action. Further evidence of Pope’s hal- 
lucination was at once forthcoming. The moment Reynolds 
moved forward against Stuart’s Hill he found his front 
overlapped by long lines of infantry, and, riding back, he 
informed Pope that in so doing he had had to run the 
gauntlet of skirmishers who threatened his rear. Porter, 
too, pushing his reconnaissance across the meadows west 
of Groveton, drew the fire of several batteries. But at this 
juncture, unfortunately for the Federals, a Union prisoner, 
recaptured from Jackson, declared that he had ‘heard the 
rebel officers say that their army was retiring to unite with 
Longstreet.’ So positively did the indications before him 
contradict this statement, that Porter, on sending the man 


12 noon. 


172 STONEWALL JACKSON 


to Pope, wrote: ‘In duty bound I send him, but I regard 
him as either a fool or designedly released to give a wrong 
impression. No faith should be put in what he says.’ If 
Jackson employed this man to delude his enemy, the ruse 
was eminently successful. Porter received the reply: 
‘General Pope believes that soldier, and directs you to 
attack ;’ Reynolds was dismissed with a message that cavalry 
would be sent to verify his report; and McDowell was 
ordered to put in the divisions of Hatch and Ricketts. on 
Porter’s right. 

During the whole morning the attention of the Con- 
federates had been directed to the Groveton wood. Beyond 
the timber rose the hill north-east, and on this hill three or 
four Federal batteries had come into action at an early 
hour, firing at intervals across the meadows. The Con- 
federate guns, save when the enemy’s skirmishers ap- 
proached too close, hardly deigned to reply, reserving their 
ammunition for warmer work. That such work was to 
come was hardly doubtful. Troops had been constantly in 
motion near the hostile batteries, and the thickets below 
12.15 pu, Were evidently full of men. Shortly after noon 

the enemy’s skirmishers became aggressive, 
swarming over the meadows, and into the wood which had 
seen such heavy slaughter in the fight of yesterday. As 
Jackson’s pickets, extended over a wide front, gave slowly 
back, his guns opened in earnest, and shell and shrapnel 
flew fast over the open space. ‘The strong force of 
skirmishers betrayed the presence of a line of battle not 
far in rear, and ignoring the fire of the artillery, the 
Confederate batteries concentrated on the covert behind 
which they knew the enemy’s masses were forming for 
attack. But, except the pickets, not a single man of 
either the Stonewall or Lawton’s division was permitted to 
expose himself. A few companies held the railroad, the 
remainder were carefully concealed. The storm was not 
long in breaking. Jackson had just ridden along his 
lines, examining with his own eyes the stir in the Grove- 
ton wood, when, in rear of the skirmishers, advancing 
over the highroad, appeared the serried ranks of the line 


THE FEDERALS ADVANCE 173 


of battle. 20,000 bayonets, on a front which extended 
from Groveton to near Bull Run, swept forward against 
his front ; 40,000, formed in dense masses on the slopes in 
rear, stood in readiness to support them; and numerous 
batteries, coming into action on every rising ground, 
covered the advance with a heavy fire. 

Pope, standing on a knoll near the Stone House, saw 
victory within his grasp. The Confederate guns had 
been pointed out to his troops as the objective of the 
attack. Unsupported, as he believed, save by the scattered 
groups of skirmishers who were already retreating to the 
railroad, and assailed in front and flank, these batteries, 
he expected, would soon be flying to the rear, and the Federal 
army, in possession of the high ground, would then sweep 
down in heavy columns towards Thoroughfare Gap. Sud- 
denly his hopes fell. Porter’s masses, stretching far to right 
and left, had already passed the Dogan House; Hatch was 
entering the Groveton wood ; Ricketts was moving forward 
along Bull Run, and the way seemed clear before them ; 
when loud and clear above the roar of the artillery rang 
out the Confederate bugles, and along the whole length 
of the ridge beyond the railroad long lines of infantry, 
streaming forward from the woods, ran down to the embank- 
ment. ‘The effect,’ said an officer who witnessed this un- 
expected apparition, ‘was not unlike flushing a covey of 
quails.’ 

Instead of the small rear-guard which Pope had thought 
to crush by sheer force of overwhelming numbers, the whole 
of the Stonewall division, with Lawton on the left, stood 
across Porter’s path. 

Reynolds, south of the turnpike, and confronting 
Longstreet, was immediately ordered to fall back and 
support the attack, and two small brigades, Warren’s 
and Alexander’s, were left alone on the Federal left. Pope 
had committed his last and his worst blunder. Sigel with 
two divisions was in rear of Porter, and for Sigel’s assist- 
ance Porter had already asked. But Pope, still under the 
delusion that Longstreet was not yet up, preferred rather 
to weaken his left than grant the request of a subordinate. 


174 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Under such a leader the courage of the troops, how- 
ever vehement, was of no avail, and in Porter’s attack 
the soldiers displayed a courage to which the Con- 
federates paid a willing tribute. Mborell’s division, with 
the two brigades abreast, arrayed in three lines, advanced 
across the meadows. Hatch’s division, in still deeper for- 
mation, pushed through the wood on Morell’s right. Nearer 
Bull Run were two brigades of Ricketts; and to Morell’s 
left rear the division of regulars moved forward under 
Sykes. 

Morell’s attack was directed against Jackson’s right. In 
the centre of the Federal line a mounted officer, whose 
gallant bearing lived long in the memories of the Stonewall 
division, rode out in front of the column, and, drawing 
his sabre, led the advance over the rolling grass-land. ‘The 
Confederate batteries, with a terrible cross-fire, swept the 
Northern ranks from end to end. The volleys of the 
infantry, lying behind their parapet, struck them full in 
face. But the horse and his rider lived through it all. 
The men followed close, charging swiftly up the slope, and 
then the leader, putting his horse straight at the embank- 
ment, stood for a moment on the top. The daring feat 
was seen by the whole Confederate line, and a yell went up 
from the men along the railroad, ‘ Don’t kill him! don’t 
kill him!’ But while the cry went up horse and rider 
fell in one limp mass across the earthwork, and the gallant 
Northerner was dragged under shelter by his generous foes. 

With such men as this to show the way what soldiers 
would be backward? As the Russians followed Skobelefi’s 
grey up the bloody slopes of Plevna, so the Federals followed 
the bright chestnut of this unknown hero, and not till the 
colours waved within thirty paces of the parapet did the 
charge falter. But, despite the supports that came 
thronging up, Jackson’s soldiers, covered by the earthwork, 
opposed a resistance which no mere frontal attack could 
break. Three times, as the lines in rear merged with the 
first, the Federal officers brought their men forward to the 
assault, and three times were they hurled back, leaving 
hundreds of their number dead and wounded on the blood- 


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MORELL’S ATTACK 175 


soaked turf. One regiment of the Stonewall division, posted 
in a copse beyond the railroad, was driven in; but others, 
when cartridges failed them, had recourse, like the Guards at 
Inkermann, to the stones which lay along the railway-bed ; 
and with these strange weapons, backed up by the bayonet, 
more than one desperate effort was repulsed. In arresting 
Garnett after Kernstown, because when his ammunition 
was exhausted he had abandoned his position, Jackson had 
lost a good general, but he had taught his soldiers a useful 
lesson. Solongas the cold steel was left to them, and their 
flanks were safe, they knew that their indomitable leader 
expected them to hold their ground, and right gallantly they 
responded. For over thirty minutes the battle raged along 
the front at the closest range. Opposite a deep cutting the 
colours of a Federal regiment, for nearly half an hour, rose 
and fell, as bearer after bearer was shot down, within ten 
yards of the muzzles of the Confederate rifles, and after the 
fight a hundred dead Northerners were found where the flag 
had been so gallantly upheld. 

Hill, meanwhile, was heavily engaged with Hatch. Every 
brigade, with the exception of Gregg’s, had been thrown into 
the fighting-line; and so hardly were they pressed, that Jack- 
son, turning to his signallers, demanded reinforcements from 
his colleague. Longstreet, in response to the call, ordered 
two more batteries to join Colonel Stephen Lee ; and Morell’s 
division, penned in that deadly cockpit between Stuart’s 
Hill and the Groveton wood, shattered by musketry in front 
and by artillery at short range in flank, fell back across the 
meadows. Hatch soon followed suit, and Jackson’s artil- 
lery, which during the fight at close quarters had turned its 
fire on the supports, launched a storm of shell on the 
defeated Federals. Some batteries were ordered to change 
position so as to rake their lines; and the Stonewall 
division, reinforced by a brigade of Hill’s, was sent forward to 
the counter-attack. At every step the losses of the Federals 
increased, and the shattered divisions, passing through 
two regiments of regulars, which had been sent forward to 
support them, sought shelter in the woods. Then Porter 
and Hatch, under cover of their artillery, withdrew their 

VOL. II. ) 


176 STONEWALL JACKSON 


infantry. Ricketts had fallen back before his troops 
arrived within decisive range. Under the impression 
that he was about to pursue a retreating enemy, he 
had found on advancing, instead of a thin screen of 
skirmishers, a line of battle, strongly established, and 
backed by batteries to which he was unable to reply. 
Against such odds attack would only have increased the 
slaughter. 

It was after four o’clock. Three hours of daylight yet 
remained, time enough still to secure a victory. But the 
Federal army was in no condition to renew the 
attack. Worn with long marches, deprived of 
their supplies, and oppressed by the consciousness that they 
were ill-led, both officers and men had lost all confidence. 
Every single division on the field had been engaged, and 
every single division had been beaten back. For four 
days, according to General Pope, they had been following 
a flying foe. ‘We were sent forward,’ reported a regi- 
mental commander with quiet sarcasm, ‘to pursue the 
enemy, who was said to be retreating ; we found the enemy, 
but did not see them retreat.’ 

Nor, had there been a larger reserve in hand, would 
a further advance have been permitted. The Stone- 
wall division, although Porter’s regiments were breaking 
up before its onset, had been ordered to fall back before it 
became exposed to the full sweep of the Federal guns. But 
the woods to the south, where Longstreet’s divisions had 
been lying for so many hours, were already alive with 
bayonets. The grey skirmishers, extending far beyond 
Pope’s left, were moving rapidly down the slopes of Stuart’s 
Hill, and the fire of the artillery, massed on the ridge in 
rear, was increasing every moment in intensity. The 
Federals, just now advancing in pursuit, were suddenly 
thrown on the defensive ; and the hand of a great captain 
snatched control of the battle from the grasp of Pope. 

As Porter reeled back from Jackson’s front, Lee had 
seen his opportunity. The whole army was ordered to 
advance to the attack. Longstreet, prepared since dawn 
for the counterstroke, had moved before the message 


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LEE'S COUNTERSTROKE 177 


reached him, and the exulting yells of his soldiers were 
now resounding through the forest. Jackson was desired 
to cover Longstreet’s left; and sending Starke and 
Lawton across the meadows, strewn with the bloody débris 
of Porter’s onslaught, he instructed Hill to advance en 
échelon with his left ‘refused.’ Anticipating the order, 
the commander of the Light Division was already sweeping 
through the Groveton wood. 

The Federal gunners, striving valiantly to cover the 
retreat of their shattered infantry, met the advance of the 
Southerners with a rapid fire. Pope and McDowell exerted 
themselves to throw a strong force on to the heights above 
Bull Run; and the two brigades upon the left, Warren’s 
and Alexander’s, already overlapped, made a gallant effort 
to gain time for the occupation of the new position. 

But the counterstroke of Lee was not to be withstood 
by a few regiments of infantry. The field of Bull Run 
had seen many examples of the attack as executed by 
indifferent tacticians. At the first battle isolated brigades 
had advanced at wide intervals of time. At the second 
battle the Federals had assaulted by successive divisions. 
Out of 50,000 infantry, no more than 20,000 had been 
simultaneously engaged, and when a partial success had 
been achieved there were no supports at hand to com- 
plete the victory. When the Confederates came forward it 
was in other fashion; and those who had the wit to under- 
stand were now to learn the difference between mediocrity 
and genius, between the half-measures of the one and 
the resolution of the other. Lee’s order for the advance em- 
braced his whole army. Every regiment, every battery, and 
every squadron was employed. No reserves save the artil- 
lery were retained upon the ridge, but wave after wave of 
bayonets followed closely on the fighting-line. To drive 
the attack forward by a quick succession of reinforce- 
ments, to push it home by weight of numbers, to pile 
blow on blow, to keep the defender occupied along his 
whole front, and to provide for retreat, should retreat be 
necessary, not by throwing in fresh troops, but by leav- 
ing the enemy so crippled that he would be powerless 


178 STONEWALL JACKSON 


to pursue—such were the tactics of the Confederate 
leader. 

The field was still covered with Porter’s and Hatch’s 
disordered masses when Lee’s strongarray advanced, and the 
sight was magnificent. As far as the eye could reach the 
long grey lines of infantry, with the crimson of the colours 
gleaming like blood in the evening sun, swept with ordered 
ranks across the Groveton valley. Batteries galloped furi- 
ously to the front; far away to the right fluttered the 
guidons of Stuart’s squadrons, and over all the massed 
artillery maintained a tremendous fire. The men drew 
fresh vigour from this powerful combination. The en- 
thusiasm of the troops was as intense as their excitement. 
With great difficulty, it is related, were the gunners re- 
strained from joining in the charge, and the officers of the 
staff could scarcely resist the impulse to throw themselves 
with their victorious comrades upon the retreating foe. 

The advance was made in the following order : 

Wilcox’ division, north of the turnpike, connected 
with Jackson’s right. Then came Evans, facing the two 
brigades which formed the Federal left, and extending 
across the turnpike. Behind Evans came Anderson 
on the left and Kemper on the right. Then, in prolonga- 
tion of Kemper’s line, but at some interval, marched the 
division of D. R. Jones, flanked by Stuart’s cavalry, and 
on the further wing, extending towards Bull Run, were 
Starke, Lawton, and A. P. Hill. 50,000 men, including 
the cavalry, were thus deployed over a front of four miles ; 
each division was formed in at least two lines; and in the 
centre, where Anderson and Kemper supported Hivans, were 
no less than eight brigades one in rear of the other. 

The Federal advanced line, behind which the troops 
which had been engaged in the last attack were slowly 
rallying, extended from the Groveton wood to a low hill, 
south of the turnpike and east of the village. This hill 
was quickly carried by Hood’s brigade of Evans’s division. 
The two regiments which defended it, rapidly outflanked, 
and assailed by overwhelming numbers, were routed with 
the loss of nearly half their muster. Jackson’s attack 


THE CHARGE OF THE VALLEY SOLDIERS 179 


through the Groveton wood was equally successful, but on 
the ridge in rear were posted the regulars under Sykes ; 
and, further east, on Buck Hill, had assembled the rem- 
nants of four divisions. 

Outflanked by the capture of the hill upon their left, and 
fiercely assailed in front, Sykes’s well-disciplined regiments, 
formed in lines of columns and covered by a rear-guard of 
skirmishers, retired steadily under the tremendous fire, pre- 
serving their formation, and falling back slowly across 
Young’s Branch. Then Jackson, reforming his troops 
along the Sudley road, and swinging round to the left, 
moved swiftly against Buck Hill. Here, in addition to the 
infantry, were posted three Union batteries, and the artil- 
lery made a desperate endeavour to stay the counterstroke. 

But nothing could withstand the vehement charge of 
the Valley soldiers. ‘They came on,’ says the corre- 
spondent of a Northern journal, ‘like demons emerging 
from the earth.’ The crests of the ridges blazed with 
musketry, and Hill’s infantry, advancing in the very teeth 
of the canister, captured six guns at the bayonet’s point. 
Once more Jackson reformed his lines; and, as twilight 
came down upon the battle-field, from position after 
position, in the direction of the Stone Bridge, the divisions 
of Stevens, Ricketts, Kearney, and Hooker, were gradually 
pushed back. 

On the Henry Hill, the key of the Federal position, 
a fierce conflict was meanwhile raging. From the high 
ground to the south Longstreet had driven back several 
brigades which, in support of the artillery, Sigel and 
McDowell had massed upon Bald Hill. But this position 
had not been occupied without a protracted struggle. 
Longstreet’s first line, advancing with over-impetuosity, 
had outstripped the second; and before it could be sup- 
ported was compelled to give ground under the enemy’s 
fire, one of the brigades losing 62 officers and 560 
men. Anderson and Kemper were then brought up; 
the flank of the defenders was turned; a counterstroke 
was beaten back, ridge after ridge was mastered, the 
edge of every wood was stormed; and as the sun set 


180 STONEWALL JACKSON 


behind the mountains Bald Hill was carried. During 
this fierce action the division of D. R. Jones, leaving 
the Chinn House to the left, had advanced against the 
Henry Hill. On the very ground which Jackson had 
held in his first battle the best troops of the Federal 
army were rapidly assembling. Here were 
Sykes’ regulars and Reynolds’ Pennsylvanians ; 
where the woods permitted batteries had been established ; 
and Porter’s Fifth Army Corps, who at Gaines’ Mill and 
Malvern Hill had proved such stubborn fighters, opposed 
a strong front once more to their persistent foes. 

Despite the rapid fire of the artillery the Southerners 
swept forward with unabated vigour. Butas the attack was 
pressed the resistance of the Federals grew more stubborn, 
and before long the Confederate formation lost its strength. 
The linesin rear had been called up. The assistance of the 
strong centre had been required to rout the defenders of Bald 
Hill; and although Anderson and Wilcox pressed forward 
on his left, Jones had not sufficient strength to storm the 
enemy’s last position. Moreover, the Confederate artillery 
had been unable to follow the infantry over the broken 
ground; the cavalry, confronted by Buford’s squadrons 
and embarrassed by the woods, could lend no active aid, 
and the Federals, defeated as they were, had not yet lost all 
heart. Whatever their guns could do, in so close a country, 
to relieve the infantry had been accomplished ; and the 
infantry, though continually outflanked, held together 
with unflinching courage. Stragglers there were, and 
stragglers in such large numbers that Bayard’s cavalry 
brigade had been ordered to the rear to drive them back; 
but the majority of the men, hardened by months of dis- 
cipline and constant battle, remained staunch to the 
colours. The conviction that the battle was lost was no longer 
a signal for ‘ the thinking bayonets ’ to make certain of their 
individual safety ; and the regulars, for the second time on 
the same field, provided a strong nucleus of resistance. 

Thrown into the woods along the Sudley-Manassas 
road, five battalions of the United States army held the ex- 
treme left, the most critical point of the Federal line, until 


6 P.M. 


THE FEDERALS STAND FAST 181 


a second brigade relieved them. ‘To their right Meade and 
his Pennsylvanians held fast against Anderson and Wilcox; 
and although six guns fell into the hands of the Confede- 
rate infantry, and four of Longstreet’s batteries, which 
had accompanied the cavalry, were now raking their 
left, Pope’s soldiers, as twilight descended upon the 
field, redeemed as far as soldiers could the errors of 
their general. Stuart, on the right flank of the Con- 
federate line, charged down the opposing cavalry! and 
crossed Bull Run at Lewis’ Ford; but the dark masses. 
on the Henry Hill, increased every moment by troops as- 
cending from the valley, still held fast, with no hope indeed 
of victory, but with a stern determination to maintain 
their ground. Had the hill been lost, nothing could have 
saved Pope’s army. The crest commanded the crossings 
of Bull Run. The Stone Bridge, the main point of passage, 
was not more than a mile northward, within the range of 
artillery, and Jackson was already in possession of the 
Matthew Hill, not fourteen hundred yards from the road 
by which the troops must pass in their retreat. 

The night, however, put an end to the battle. Hven the 
Valley soldiers were constrained to halt. It was impossible 
in the obscurity to distinguish friend from foe. The 
Confederate lines presented a broken front, here 
pushed forward, and here drawn back; divisions, brigades, 
and regiments had intermingled ; and the thick woods, inter- 
vening at frequent intervals, rendered combination impractic- 
able. During the darkness, which was accompanied by heavy 
rain, the Federals quietly withdrew, leaving thousands of 


7.30 P.M. 


1 This was one of the most brilliant cavalry fights of the war. Colonel 
Munford, of the 2nd Virginia, finding the enemy advancing, formed line 
and charged, the impetuosity of the attack carrying his regiment through 
the enemy’s first line, with whom his men were thoroughly intermingled in 
hand-to-hand conflict. The Federals, however, who had advanced at a trot, 
in four successive lines, were far superior in numbers; but the 7th and 12th 
Virginia rapidly came up, and the charge of the 12th, constituting as it 
were a last reserve, drove the enemy from the field. The Confederates lost 
5 killed and 40 wounded. Munford himself, and the commander of the 
First Michigan (Union) cavalry were both wounded by sabre-cuts, the latter 
mortally. 3800 Federals were taken prisoners, 19 killed, and 80 wounded. 
Sabre, carbine, and revolver were freely used. 


182 STONEWALL JACKSON 


wounded on the field, and morning found them in position. 
on the heights of Centreville, four miles beyond Bull Run. 

Pope, with an audacity which disaster was powerless to 
tame, reported to Halleck that, on the whole, the results of 
the battle were favourable to the Federal army. ‘The 
enemy,’ he wrote, ‘largely reinforced, assailed our position 
early to-day. We held our ground firmly until 6 o’clock 
P.M., when the enemy, massing very heavy forces on our 
left, forced that wing back about half a mile. At dark we 
held that position. Under all the circumstances, with 
horses and men having been two days without food, and 
the enemy greatly outnumbering us, I thought it best to 
move back to this place at dark. The movement has been 
made in perfect order and without loss. The battle was 
most furious for hours without cessation, and the losses on 
both sides very heavy. The enemy is badly whipped, and 
we shall do well enough. Do not be uneasy. We will hold 
our own here.’ 

Pope’s actions, however, were invariably at variance . 
with Pope’s words. At 6 p.m. he had ordered Franklin, 
who was approaching Bull Run from Alexandria with 
10,000 fresh troops, to occupy with his own command and 
whatever other troops he could collect, the fortifications 
round Centreville, and hold them ‘ to the last extremity.’ 
Banks, still at Bristoe Station, was told to destroy all the 
supplies of which he was in charge, as well as the railway, 
and to march on Centreville; while 80 guns and more 
than 2,000 wounded were left upon the field. Nor were 
Pope’s anticipations as to the future to be fulfilled. The 
position at Centreville was strong. The intrenchments 
constructed by the Confederates during the winter of 1861 
were still standing. Halleck had forwarded supplies; there 
was ammunition in abundance, and 20,000 infantry under 
Franklin and Sumner—for the latter also had come up from 
Washington—more than compensated for the casualties of 
the battle. But formidable earthworks, against generals 
who dare manceuvre, are often a mere trap for the un- 
wary. 

Before daylight Stuart and his troopers were in the saddle; 


POPE'S RETREAT 183 


and, picking up many stragglers as they marched, came 
Aug. 31, Within range of the guns at Centreville. Lee, accom- 

panied by Jackson, having reconnoitred the posi- 
tion, determined to move once more upon the Federal rear. 
Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage the 
attention of the enemy and cover the removal of the 
wounded ; while Jackson, crossing not by the Stone Bridge, 
but by Sudley Ford, was entrusted with the work of 
forcing Pope from his strong position. 

The weather was inclement, the roads were quagmires, 
and the men were in no condition to make forced marches. 
Yet before nightfall Jackson had pushed ten miles through 
the mud, halting near Pleasant Valley, on the Little River 
turnpike, five miles north-west of Centreville. During the 
afternoon Longstreet, throwing a brigade across Bull Run to 
keep the enemy on the qui vive, followed the same route. Of 
these movements Pope received no warning, and Jackson’s 
proclivity for flank manceuvres had evidently made no 
impression on him, for, in blissful unconsciousness that 
his line of retreat was already threatened, he ordered all 
waggons to be unloaded at Centreville, and to return to 
Fairfax Station for forage and rations. 

But on the morning of September 1, although his 
whole army, including Banks, was closely concentrated 
Sept. 1. behind strong intrenchments, Pope had conceived 
a suspicion thathe would find it difficult to fulfil his 
promise to Halleck that ‘he would hold on.’ The previous 
night Stuart had been active towards his right and rear, 
capturing his reconnoitring parties, and shelling his 
trains. Before noon suspicion became certainty. Hither 
stragglers or the country people reported that Jackson was 
moving down the Little River turnpike, and Centreville 
was at once evacuated, the troops marching to a new position 
round Fairfax Court House. 

Jackson, meanwhile, covered by the cavalry, was ad- 
vancing to Chantilly—a fine old mansion which the Federals 
had gutted—with the intention of seizing a position whence 
he could command the road. The day was sombre, and 
a tempest was gathering in the mountains. Late in the 


184 STONEWALL JACKSON 


afternoon, Stuart’s patrols near Ox Hill were driven in by 
hostile infantry, the thick woods preventing the scouts from 
ascertaining the strength or dispositions of the Federal force. 
Jackson at once ordered two brigades of Hill’s to feel the 
enemy. The remainder of the Light Division took ground 
to the right, followed by Lawton; Starke’s division held 
the turnpike, and Stuart was sent towards Fairfax Court 
House to ascertain whether the Federal main body was 
retreating or advancing. 

Reno, who had been ordered to protect Pope’s flank, came 
briskly forward, and Hill’s advanced-guard was soon brought 
to astandstill. Three fresh brigades were rapidly deployed ; 
as the enemy pressed the attack a fourth was sent in, and 
the Northerners fell back with the loss of a general and 
many men. Lawton’s first line became engaged at the same 
time, and Reno, now reinforced by Kearney, made a vigorous 
effort to hold the Confederates in check. Hays’ brigade of 
Lawton’s division, commanded by an inexperienced officer, 
was caught while ‘clubbed’ during a change of forma- 
tion, and driven back in disorder ; and Trimble’s brigade, 
now reduced to a handful, became involved in the con- 
fusion. Buta vigorous charge of the second line restored. 
the battle. The Federals were beginning to give way. 
General Kearney, riding through the murky twilight into 
the Confederate lines, was shot by a skirmisher. The 
hostile lines were within short range, and the advent 
of a reserve on either side would have probably ended 
the engagement. But the rain was now falling in 
torrents; heavy peals of thunder, crashing through the 
forest, drowned the discharges of the two guns which 
Jackson had brought up through the woods, and the red 
flash of musketry paled before the vivid lightning. Much 
of the ammunition was rendered useless, the men were 
unable to discharge their pieces, and the fierce wind 
lashed the rain in the faces of the Confederates. The 
night grew darker and the tempest fiercer ; and as if by 
mutual consent the opposing lines drew gradually apart.! 


1 Tt was at this time, probably, that Jackson received a message from a 
brigade commander, reporting that his cartridges were so wet that he 


POPE DISAPPEARS 185 


On the side of the Confederates only half the force had 
been engaged. Starke’s division never came into action, 
and of Hill’s and Lawton’s there were still brigades in 
reserve. 500 men were killed or wounded; but although 
the three Federal divisions are reported to have lost 1,000, 
they had held their ground, and Jackson was thwarted in 
his design. Pope’s trains and his whole army reached 
Fairfax Court House without further disaster. But the 
persistent attacks of his indefatigable foe had broken down 
his resolution. He had intended, he told Halleck, when 
Jackson’s march down the Little River turnpike was first 
announced, to attack the Confederates the next day, or 
Belted. certainly the day after.’ The action at Chantilly, 

however, induced a more prudent mood; and, on 
the morning of the 2nd, he reported that ‘ there was an in- 
tense idea among the troops that they must get behind 
the intrenchments [of Alexandria]; that there was an 
undoubted purpose, on the part of the enemy, to keep 
on slowly turning his position so as to come in on the 
right, and that the forces under his command were unable 
to prevent him doing so in the open field. Halleck must 
decide what was to be done.’ The reply was prompt, 
Pope was to bring his forces, ‘as best he could,’ under the 
shelter of the heavy guns. 

Whatever might be the truth as regards the troops, 
there could be no question but that the general was 
demoralised ; and, preceded by thousands of stragglers, 
the army fell back without further delay to the Potomac. 
It was not followed except by Stuart. ‘It was found,’ 
says Lee, in his official dispatch, ‘that the enemy had 
conducted his retreat so rapidly that the attempt to inter- 
fere with him was abandoned. The proximity of the fortifi- 
cations around Alexandria and Washington rendered further 
pursuit useless.’ 

On the same day General McClellan was entrusted 
with the defence of Washington, and Pope, permitted to 
resign, was soon afterwards relegated to an obscure 


feared he could not maintain his position. ‘Tell him,’ was the quick reply, 
* to hold his ground if his guns will not go off, neither will the enemy’s.’ 


186 STONEWALL JACKSON 


command against the Indians of the North-west. His 
errors had been flagrant. He can hardly be charged with 
want of energy, but his energy was spasmodic; on the 
field of battle he was strangely indolent, and yet he distrusted 
the reports of others. But more fatal than his neglect 
of personal reconnaissance was his power of self-deception. 
He was absolutely incapable of putting himself in his 
enemy’s place, and time after time he acted on the sup- 
position that Lee and Jackson would do exactly what he 
most wished them to do. When his supplies were de- 
stroyed, he concentrated at Manassas Junction, convinced 
that Jackson would remain to be overwhelmed. When he 
found Jackson near Sudley Springs, and Thoroughfare Gap 
open, he rushed forward to attack him, convinced that Long- 
street could not be up for eight-and- forty hours. When he 
sought shelter at Centreville, he told Halleck not to be un- 
easy, convinced that Lee would knock his head against his 
fortified position. Before the engagement at Chantilly he 
had made up his mind to attack the enemy the next 
morning. A few hours later he reported that his troops 
were utterly untrustworthy, although 20,000 of them, 
under Franklin and Sumner, had not yet seen the enemy. 
In other respects his want of prudence had thwarted 
his best endeavours. His cavalry at the beginning of the 
campaign was effectively employed. But so extravagant 
were his demands on the mounted arm, that before the battle 
of Manassas half his regiments were dismounted. It is true 
that the troopers were still indifferent horsemen and bad 
horse-masters, but it was the fault of the commander that 
the unfortunate animals had no rest, that brigades were 
sent to do the work of patrols, and that little heed was paid 
to the physical wants of man and beast. As a tactician 
Pope was incapable. Asa strategist he lacked imagination, 
except in his dispatches. His horizon was limited, and 
he measured the capacity of his adversaries by his own. 
He was familiar with the campaign in the Valley, with the 
operations in the Peninsula, and Cedar Run should have 
enlightened him as to Jackson’s daring. But he had no 
conception that his adversaries would cheerfully accept 


LEE 187 


ereat risks to achieve great ends; he had never dreamt of 
a general who would deliberately divide his army, or of one 
who would make fifty-six miles in two marches. 

Lee, with his extraordinary insight into character, had 
played on Pope as he had played on McClellan, and his 
strategy was justified by success. In the space of three 
weeks he had carried the war from the James to the 
Potomac. With an army that at no time exceeded 
55,000 men he had driven 80,000 into the fortifica- 
tions of Washington.! He had captured 80 guns, 7,000 
prisoners, 20,000 rifles, and many stand of colours; he 
had killed or wounded 18,500 Federals, destroyed sup- 
plies and material of enormous value; and all this with 
a loss to the Confederates of 10,000 officers and men. 

So much had he done for the South ; for his own repu- 
tation hehad done more. If, as Moltkeavers, the junction 
of two armies on the field of battle is the highest 
achievement of military genius,? the campaign against 
Pope has seldom been surpassed ; and the great counter- 
stroke at Manassas is sufficient in itself to make Lee’s 
reputation as a tactician. Salamanca was perhaps a more 
brilliant example of the same manceuvye, for at Salamanca 
Wellington had no reason to anticipate that Marmont 
would blunder, and the mighty stroke which beat 40,000 
French in forty minutes was conceived in a few moments. 
Nor does Manassas equal Austerlitz. No such subtle 
manceuvres were employed as those by which Napoleon in- 
duced the Allies to lay bare their centre, and drew them 
blindly to their doom. It was not due to the skill of Lee 
that Pope weakened his left at the crisis of the battle.® 


1 Sumner and Franklin had become involved in Pope’s retreat. 

* Tried by this test alone Lee stands out as one of the greatest 
soldiers of all times. Not only against Pope, but against McClellan at 
Gaines’ Mill, against Burnside at Fredericksburg, and against Hooker at 
Chancellorsville, he succeeded in carrying out the operations of which Moltke 
speaks; and in each case with the same result of surprising his adversary. 
None knew better how to apply that great principle of strategy, ‘to march 
divided but to fight concentrated.’ 

8 It may be noticed, however, that the care with which Longstreet’s troops 
were kept concealed for more than four-and-twenty hours had much to do 
with Pope’s false manceuvres. 


188 STONEWALL JACKSON 


But in the rapidity with which the opportunity was seized, 
in the combination of the three arms, and in the vigour 
of the blow, Manassas is in no way inferior to Austerlitz 
or Salamanca. That the result was less decisive was due 
to the greater difficulties of the battle-field, to the stub- 
born resistance of the enemy, to the obstacles in the way 
of rapid and connected movement, and to the inexperience 
of the troops. Manassas was not, like Austerlitz and 
Salamanca, won by veteran soldiers, commanded by trained 
officers, perfect in drill and inured to discipline. 

Lee’s strategic manceuvres were undoubtedly hazardous. 
But that an antagonist of different calibre would have met 
them with condign punishment is short-sighted criticism. 
Against an antagonist of different calibre, against such 
generals as he was afterwards to encounter, they would 
never have been attempted. ‘ He studied his adversary,’ 
says his Military Secretary, ‘knew his peculiarities, and 
adapted himself to them. His own methods no one could 
foresee—he varied them with every change in the com- 
manders opposed to him. He had one method with © 
McClellan, another with Pope, another with Hooker, 
another with Meade, and yet another with Grant.’ Nor 
was the dangerous period of the Manassas campaign so pro- 
tracted as might be thought. Jackson marched north from 
Jefferson on August 25. On the 26th he reached Bristoe 
Station. Pope, during these two days, might have thrown 
himself either on Longstreet or on Jackson. He did neither, 
and on the morning of the 27th, when Jackson reached Sud- 
ley Springs, the crisis had passed. Had the Federals blocked 
Thoroughfare Gap that day, and prevented Longstreet’s 
passage, Lee was still able to concentrate without incurring 
defeat. Jackson, retreating by Aldie Gap, would have 
joined Longstreet west of the mountains; Pope would 
have escaped defeat, but the Confederates would have lost 
nothing. 

Moreover, it is well to remember that the Confederate 
cavalry was in every single respect, in leading, horse- 
manship, training, and knowledge of the country, superior 
to the Federal. The whole population, too, was staunchly 


STUART 189 


Southern. It was always probable, therefore, that informa- 
tion would be scarce in the Federal camps, and that if some 
items did get through the cavalry screen, they would be 
so late in reaching Pope’s headquarters as to be prac- 
tically useless. There can be no question that Lee, in these 
operations, relied much on the skill of Stuart. Stuart 
was given a free hand. Unlike Pope, Lee issued few 
orders as to the disposition of hishorsemen. He merely 
explained the mancuvres he was about to undertake, 
pointed out where he wished the main body of the cavalry 
should be found, and left all else to their commander. He 
had no need to tell Stuart that he required information of 
the enemy, or to lay down the method by which it was to 
be obtained. That was Stuart’s normal duty, and right 
well was it performed. How admirably the young cavalry 
general co-operated with Jackson has already been de- 
scribed. The latter suggested, the former executed, and 
the combination of the three arms, during the whole of 
Jackson’s operations against Pope, was as close as when 
Ashby led his squadrons in the Valley. 

Yet it was not on Stuart that fell, next to Lee, the 
honours of the campaign. Brilliant as was the handling 
of the cavalry, impenetrable the screen it formed, and 
ample the information it procured, the breakdown of the 
Federal horse made the task comparatively simple. Against 
adversaries whose chargers were so leg-weary that they could 
hardly raise a trot it was easy to be bold. One of Stuart’s 
brigadiers would have probably done the work as well 
as Stuart himself. But the handling of the Valley 
army, from the time it left Jefferson on the 25th until 
Longstreet reached Gainesville on the 29th, demanded 
higher qualities than vigilance and activity. Through- 
out the operations Jackson’s endurance was the wonder 
of his staff. He hardly slept. He was untiring in re- 
connaissance, in examination of the country and in obser- 
vation of the enemy, and no detail of the march escaped 
his personal scrutiny. Yet his muscles were much less 
hardly used than his brain. The intellectual problem 
was more dificult than the physical. To march his 

VOL. II. P 


190 STONEWALL JACKSON 


army fifty-six miles in two days was far simpler than 
to maintain it on Pope’s flank until Longstreet came 
into line. The direction of his marches, the position of 
his bivouacs, the distribution of his three divisions, were 
the outcome of long premeditation. On the night of the 
25th he disappeared into the darkness on the road to 
Salem, leaving the Federals under the conviction that 
he was making for the Valley. On the 26th he moved 
on Bristoe Station, rather than on Manassas Junction, 
foreseeing that he might be interrupted from the south- 
west in his destruction of the stores. On the 27th he 
postponed his departure till night had fallen, moving in 
three columns, of which the column marching on Centre- 
ville, whither he desired that the enemy should follow, 
was the last to move. Concentrating at Sudley Springs 
on the 28th, he placed himself in the best position to 
hold Pope fast, to combine with Longstreet, or to escape 
by Aldie Gap; and on the 29th the ground he had selected 
for battle enabled him to hold out against superior numbers. 

Neither strategically nor tactically did he make a single: 
mistake. His attack on King’s division at Groveton, on 
the evening of the 28th, was purely frontal, and his troops 
lost heavily. But he believed King to be the flank-guard of 
a larger force, and under such circumstances turning move- 
ments were over-hazardous. The woods, too, prevented 
the deployment of his artillery; and the attack, in its 
wider aspect, was eminently successful, for the aim was 
not to defeat King, but to bring Pope back to a position 
where Lee could crush him. On the 29th his dispositions 
were admirable. The battle is a fine example of defensive 
tactics. The position, to use a familiar illustration, ‘ fitted 
the troops likea glove.’ It was of such strength that, while 
the front was adequately manned, ample reserves remained 
in rear. The left, the most dangerous flank, was secured 
by Bull Run, and massed batteries gave protection to the 
right. The distribution of the troops, the orders, and the 
amount of latitude accorded to subordinate leaders, followed 
the best models. The front was so apportioned that each 
brigadier on the fighting-line had hig own reserve, and 


HIS TACTICS 191 


each divisional general half his force in third line. The 
orders indicated that counterstrokes were not to be pushed 
so far as to involve the troops in an engagement with 
the enemy’s reserves, and the subordinate generals were 
encouraged, without waiting for orders, and thus losing the 
occasion, to seize allfavourable opportunities for counter- 
stroke. The methods employed by Jackson were singu- 
larly like those of Wellington. A position was selected which 
gave cover and concealment to the troops, and against which 
the powerful artillery of a more numerous enemy was prac- 
tically useless. These were the characteristics of Vimierz, 
Busaco, Talavera, and Waterloo. Nor did Jackson’s orders 
differ from those of the great Englishman. 

The Duke’s subordinates, when placed in position, acted 
on a well-established rule. Within that position they had 
unlimited power. They could defend the first line, or they 
could meet the enemy with a counter-attack from a position 
in rear, and in both cases they could pursue. But the 
pursuit was never to be carried beyond certain defined 
limits. Moreover, Wellington’s views as to the efficacy of 
the counterstroke were identical with those of Jackson, and 
he had the same predilection for cold steel. ‘If they 
attempt this point again, Hill,’ were his orders to that 
general at Busaco, ‘give them a volley and charge 
bayonets ; but don’t let your people follow them too far.’ 

But it was neither wise strategy nor sound tactics 
which was the main element in Pope’s defeat; neither the 
strong effort of a powerful brain, nor the judicious devo- 
lution of responsibility. A brilliant military historian, 
more conversant perhaps with the War of Secession than 
the wars of France, concludes his review of this cam- 
paign with a reference to Jackson as ‘the Ney of the 
Confederate army.’! The allusion is obvious. So long 
as the victories of Napoleon are remembered, the name of 
his lieutenant will always be a synonym for heroic valour. 
But the valour of Ney was of a different type from that of 
Jackson. Ney’s valour was animal, Jackson’s was moral, 
and between the two there isa vast distinction. Before the 

1 Swinton. Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. 
be: 


192 STONEWALL JACKSON 


enemy, when his danger was tangible, Ney had few rivals. 
But when the enemy was unseen and his designs were 
doubtful, his resolution vanished. He was without confid- 
ence in hisown resources. Hecould not act without direct 
orders, and he dreaded responsibility. At Bautzen his 
timidity ruined Napoleon’s combinations ; in the campaign 
of Leipsic he showed himself incapable of independent com- 
mand ; and he cannot be acquitted of hesitation at Quatre 
Bras. 

It was in the same circumstances that Ney’s courage 
invariably gave way that Jackson’s courage shone with 
the brightest lustre. It might appear that he had little 
cause for fear in the campaign of the Second Manassas, 
that he had only to follow his instructions, and that if he 
had failed his failure would have been visited upon Lee. The 
instructions which he received, however, were not positive, 
but contingent on events. If possible, he was to cut 
the railway, in order to delay the reinforcements which 
Pope was expecting from Alexandria; and then, should 
the enemy permit, he was to hold fast east of the Bull 
Run Mountains until Lee came up. But he was to 
be guided in everything by his own discretion. He was 
free to accept battle or refuse it, to attack or to defend, to 
select his own line of retreat, to move to any quarter of 
the compass that he pleased. For three days, from the 
morning of August 26 to the morning of August 29, he had 
complete control of the strategic situation ; on his movements 
were dependent the movements of the main army; the 
bringing the enemy to bay and the choice of the field of 
battle were both in his hands. And during those three 
days he was cut off from Lee and Longstreet. The 
mountains, with their narrow passes, lay between; and, sur- 
rounded by three times his number, he was abandoned 
entirely to his own resources. 

Throughout the operations he had been in unusually 
high spirits. The peril and responsibility seemed to act as 
an elixir, and he threw off much of his constraint. But 
as the day broke on August 29 he looked long and 
earnestly in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, and 


HIS COURAGE 193 


when a messenger from Stuart brought the intelli- 
gence that Longstreet was through the pass, he drew 
a long breath and uttered a sigh of relief... The period of 
Suspense was over, but even on that unyielding heart the 
weight of anxiety had pressed with fearful force. For three 
days he had only received news of the main army at long 
and uncertain intervals. For two of these days his infor- 
mation of the enemy’s movements was very small. While 
he was marching to Bristoe Station, Pope, for all he 
knew, might have been marching against Longstreet with 
his whole force. When he attacked King on the 28th the 
Federals, in what strength he knew not, still held 
Thoroughfare Gap ; when he formed for action on the 29th 
he was still ignorant of what had happened to the main 
body, and it was on the bare chance that Longstreet 
would force the passage that he accepted battle with far 
superior numbers. 

It is not difficult to imagine how a general like Ney, 
placed in Jackson’s situation, would have trimmed and hesi- 
tated: howin his march to Manassas, when he had crossed 
the mountains and left the Gap behind him, he would have 
sent out reconnaissances in all directions, halting his troops 
until he learned the coast was clear ; how he would have 
dashed at the Junction by the shortest route; how he would 
have forced his weary troops northward when the enemy’s 
approach was reported ; how, had he reached Sudley Springs, 
he would have hugged the shelter of the woodsand let King’s 
division pass unmolested ; and, finally, when Pope’s columns 
converged on his position, have fallen back on Thoroughfare 
or Aldie. Nor would he have been greatly to blame. Unless 
gifted with that moral fortitude which Napoleon ranks 
higher than genius or experience, no general would have 
succeeded in carrying Lee’s design to a successful issue. 
In his unhesitating march to Manassas Junction, in his 
deliberate sojourn for four-and-twenty hours astride his 
enemy’s communications, in his daring challenge to Pope’s 
whole army at Groveton, Jackson displayed the indomit- 
able courage characteristic of the greatest soldiers. 

1 Letter from Dr. Hunter McGuire, 


194 STONEWALL JACKSON 


As suggested in the first volume, it is too often over- 
looked, by those who study the history of campaigns, 
that war is the province of uncertainty. The reader 
has the whole theatre of war displayed before him. He 
notes the exact disposition of the opposing forces at each 
hour of the campaign, and with this in his mind’s eye 
he condemns or approves the action of the commanders. 
In the action of the defeated general he usually often 
sees much to blame; in the action of the successful 
general but little to admire. But his judgment is not 
based on a true foundation. He has ignored the fact 
that the information at his disposal was not at the 
disposal of those he criticises; and until he realises that 
both generals, to a greater or less degree, must have 
been groping in the dark, he will neither make just allow- 
ance for the errors of the one, nor appreciate the genius 
of the other. | 

It is true that it is difficult in the extreme to ascertain 
how much or how little those generals whose campaigns. 
have become historical knew of their enemy at any particular 
moment. Tor instance, in the campaign before us, we are 
nowhere told whether Lee, when he sent Jackson to Man- 
assas Junction, was aware that a portion of McClellan’s 
army had been shipped to Alexandria in place of Aquia; or 
whether he knew, on the second day of the battle of Man- 
assas, that Pope had been reinforced by two army corps from 
the Peninsula. He had certainly captured Pope’s dispatch 
book, and no doubt it threw much light on the Federal 
plans, but we are not aware how far into the future this 
light projected. We do know, however, that, in addition to 
this correspondence, such knowledge as he had was derived 
from reports. But reports are never entirely to be relied 
on; they are seldom full, they are often false, and they are 
generally exaggerated. However active the cavalry, however 
patriotic the inhabitants, no general is ever possessed of 
accurate information of his enemy’s dispositions, unless the 
forces are very small, or the precautions to elude observa- 
tion very feeble. On August 28 Stuart’s patrols covered 
the whole country round Jackson’s army, and during the 


‘THE FOG OF WAR’ 195 


whole day the Federal columns were converging on 
Manassas. Sigel and Reynolds’ four divisions passed 
through Gainesville, not five miles from Sudley Springs, 
and for a time were actually in contact with Jackson’s 
outposts ; and yet Sigel and Reynolds mistook Jackson’s out- 
posts for reconnoitring cavalry. Again, when King’s single 
division, the rear-guard of Pope’s army, appeared upon the 
turnpike, Jackson attacked it with the idea that it was the 
flank-guard of a much larger force. Nor was this want of 
accurate intelligence due to lack of vigilance or to the 
dense woods. Asa matter of fact the Confederates were 
more amply provided with information than is usually the 
case in war, even in an open country and with experienced 
armies. 

But if, in the most favourable circumstances, a 
general is surrounded by an atmosphere which has been 
most aptly named ‘the fog of war,’ his embarrassments 
are intensified tenfold when he commands a portion of a 
divided army. Under ordinary conditions a general is at 
least fully informed of the dispositions of his own forces. 
But when between two widely separated columns a powerful 
enemy, capable of crushing each in turn, intervenes; when 
the movements of that enemy are veiled in obscurity ; when 
anxiety has taken possession of the troops, and the soldiers 
of either column, striving hopelessly to penetrate the gloom, 
reflect on the fate that may have overtaken their comrades, 
on the obstacles that may delay them, on the misunder- 
standings that may have occurred—it is at such a crisis 
that the courage of their leader is put to the severest test. 

His situation has been compared to a man entering 
a dark room full of assailants, never knowing when or 
whence a blow may be struck against him. The illustration 
is inadequate. Not only has he to contend with the 
promptings of his own instincts, but he has to contend 
with the instincts and to sustain the resolution of his 
whole army. Itis not from the enemy that he has. most 
to fear. A time comes in all protracted operations when 
the nervous energy of the best troops becomes exhausted, 
when the most daring shrink from further sacrifice, when 


196 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the desire of self-preservation infects the stoutest veterans, 
and the will of the mass opposes a tacit resistance to all 
further effort. ‘Then,’ says Clausewitz, ‘the spark in the 
breast of the commander must rekindle hope in the hearts 
of his men, and so long as he is equal to this he remains 
their master. When his influence ceases, and his own 
spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of 
others, the masses, drawing him with them, sink into that 
lower region of animal nature which recoils from danger 
and knows not shame. Such are the obstacles which the 
brain and courage of the military commander must over- 
come if he is to make his name illustrious.’ And the 
obstacles are never more formidable than when his troops 
see no sign of the support they have expected. Then, if 
he still moves forward, although his. peril increase at every 
step, to the point of junction ; if he declines the temptation, 
although overwhelming numbers threaten him, of a safe 
line of retreat; if, as did Jackson, he deliberately confronts 
and challenges the hostile masses, then indeed does the ~ 
soldier rise to the highest level of moral energy. 

Strongly does Napoleon inveigh against operations 
which entail the division of an army into two columns 
unable to communicate ; and especially does he reprobate 
the strategy which places the point of junction under the 
very beard ofa concentrated enemy. Both of these maxims 
Lee violated. The last because he-knew Pope, the first be- 
cause he knew Jackson. It is rare indeed that such strategy 
succeeds. When all has depended on aswift and unhesita- 
ting advance, generals renowned for their ardent courage 
have wavered and turned aside. Hasdrubal, divided from 
Hannibal by many miles and a Consular army, fell back to 
the Metaurus, and Rome was saved. Two thousand years 
later, Prince Frederick Charles, divided by a few marches 
and two Austrian army corps from the Crown Prince, 
lingered so long upon the Iser that the supremacy of 
Prussia trembled in the balance. But the character of 
the Virginian soldier was of loftier type. It has been 
remarked that after Jackson’s death Lee never again 
attempted those great turning movements which had 


TURNING MOVEMENTS 197 


achieved his most brilliant victories. Never again did he 
divide his army to unite it again on the field of battle. The 
reason is not far to seek. There was now no general in 
the Confederate army to whom he dared confide the charge 
of the detached wing, and in possessing one such general 
he had been more fortunate than Napoleon.! 


1 It is noteworthy that Moltke once, at Kéniggratz, carried out the 
operation referred to; Wellington twice, at Vittoria and Toulouse ; Napoleon, 
although he several times attempted it, and against inferior numbers, 
never, except at Ulm, with complete success. 


198 7 STONEWALL JACKSON 


CHAPTER XVIII 
HARPER S FERRY 


Tue Confederate operations in Virginia during the spring 
and summer of 1862 had been successful beyond expectation 
Sept. and almost beyond precedent. Within six months 
1862. two great armies had been defeated; McClellan 
had been driven from the Peninsula, and Pope from the 
Rappahannock. The villages of Virginia no longer swarmed 
with foreign bayonets. The hostile camps had vanished 
from her inland counties. Richmond was free from 
menace; and in the Valley of the Shenandoah the harvest — 
was gathered in without let or hindrance. Except at 
Winchester and Martinsburg, where the garrisons, alarmed 
by the news of Pope’s defeat, were already preparing to 
withdraw; in the vicinity of Norfolk, and at Fortress 
Monroe, the invaders had no foothold’ within the boun- 
daries of the State they had just now overrun; and 
their demoralised masses, lying exhausted behind the 
fortifications of Washington and Alexandria, were in no 
condition to resume the offensive. The North had 
opened the campaign in the early spring with the confident 
hope of capturing the rebel capital; before the summer 
was over it was questionable whether it would be able 
to save its own. Had the rival armies been equally 
matched in numbers and equipment this result would have 
hardly been remarkable. The Federals had had great dif- 
ficulties to contend with—an unknown country, bad roads, 
a hostile population, natural obstacles of formidable cha- 
racter, statesmen ignorant of war, and generals at logger- 
heads with the Administration. Yet so superior were their 
numbers, so ample their resources, that even these disad- 


THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSIVE 199 


vantages might have been overcome had the strategy of 
the Southern leaders been less admirable. Lee, Jackson, 
and Johnston had played the réle of the defender to 
perfection. No attempt had been made to hold the frontier. 
Mobility and not earthworks was the weapon on which they 
had relied. Richmond, the only fortress, had been used as 
a ‘pivot of operations,’ and not merely as a shelter for 
the army. The specious expedient of pushing forward 
advanced-guards to harass or delay the enemy had been 
avoided; and thus no opportunity had been offered to 
the invaders of dealing with the defence in detail, 
or of raising their own moral by victory over isolated 
detachments. The generals had declined battle until their 
forces were concentrated and the enemy was divided. Nor 
had they fought except on ground of their own choice. 
Johnston had refused to be drawn into decisive action 
until McClellan became involved in the swamps of the 
Chickahominy. Jackson, imitating like his superior the 
defensive strategy of Wellington and Napoleon, had 
fallen back to a‘ zone of manceuvre’ south of the Massa- 
nuttons. By retreating to the inaccessible fastness of 
Elk Bun Valley he had drawn Banks and Frémont 
up the Shenandoah, their lines of communication grow- 
ing longer and ‘more vulnerable at every march, and 
requiring daily more men to guard them. Then, rushing 
from his stronghold, he had dealt his blows, clearing the 
Valley from end to end, destroying the Federal magazines, 
and threatening Washington itself; and when the over- 
whelming masses he had drawn on himself sought to cut 
him off, he had selected his own battle-field, and crushed 
the converging columns which his skill had kept apart. 
The hapless Pope, too, had been handled in the same 
fashion as McClellan, Banks, Shields, and Frémont. Jack- 
son had lured him forward to the Rapidan; and although 
his retreat had been speedy, Lee had completed his defeat 
before he could be efficiently supported. But, notwith- 
standing all that had been done, much yet remained to do. 

It was doubtless within the bounds of probability that 
a second attempt to invade Virginia would succeed no 


200 STONEWALL JACKSON 


better than the first. But it was by no means certain that 
the resolution of the North was not sufficient to withstand a 
long series of disasters so long as the war was confined to 
Southern territory ; and, at the same time, it might well be 
questioned whether the South could sustain, without foreign 
aid, the protracted and exhausting process of a purely 
defensive warfare. If her tactics, as well as her strategy, 
could be confined to the defensive; that is, if her generals 
could await the invaders in selected and prepared positions, 
and if no task more difficult should devolve upon her 
troops than shooting down their foes as they moved across 
the open to the assault of strong intrenchments, then the 
hope might reasonably be entertained that she might tire 
out the North. But the campaign, so far as it had pro- 
gressed, had shown, if indeed history had not already made 
it sufficiently clear, that opportunities for such tactics were 
not likely to occur. The Federal generals had consistently 
refused to run their heads against earthworks. Their 
overwhelming numbers would enable them to turn any 
position, however formidable; and the only chance of 
success lay in keeping these numbers apart and in pre- 
venting them from combining. 

It was by strategic and tactical counterstrokes that the 
recent victories had been won. Although it had awaited 
attack within its own frontier, the Army of Northern 
Virginia had but small experience of defensive warfare. 
With the exception of the actions round Yorktown, of 
Cross Keys, and of the Second Manassas, the battles 
had been entirely aggressive. The idea that a small army, 
opposed to one vastly superior, cannot afford to attack 
because the attack is costly, and that it must trust 
for success to favourable ground, had been effectually dis- 
pelled. Lee and Jackson had taught the Southerners 
that the secret of success lies not in strong positions, but 
in the concentration, by means of skilful strategy, of 
superior numbers on the field of battle. Their tactics had 
been essentially offensive, and it is noteworthy that their 
victories had not been dearly purchased. If we compare 
them with those of the British in the Peninsula, we shall 


THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSIVE 201 


find that with no greater loss than Wellington incurred in 
the defensive engagements of three years, 1810, 1811, 
1812, the Confederates had attacked and routed armies 
far larger in proportion than those which Wellington had 
merely repulsed.! 

But if they had shown that the best defence lies in a 
vigorous offensive, their offensive had not yet been applied 
at the decisive point. To make victory complete it is the 
sounder policy to carry the war into hostile territory. A 
nation endures with comparative equanimity defeat beyond 
its own borders. Pride and prestige may suffer, but a 
high-spirited people will seldom be brought to the point of 
making terms unless its army is annihilated in the heart 
of its own country, unless the capital is occupied and the 
hideous sufferings of war are brought directly home to the 
mass of the population. A single victory on Northern soil, 
within easy reach of Washington, was far more likely to 
bring about the independence of the South than even a 
succession of victories in Virginia. It was time, then, 
for a strategic counterstroke on a larger scale than had 
hitherto been attempted. The opportunity was ripe. No 
sreat risk would be incurred by crossing the Potomac. 
There was no question of meeting a more powerful enemy. 
The Federals, recruited by fresh levies, would undoubtedly 
be numerically the stronger; and the Confederate equip- 
ment, despite the large captures of guns and rifles, was still 
deficient. But for deficiencies in numbers and in matériel 
the higher moral and the more skilful leading would make 
ample compensation. It might safely be inferred that the 
Northern soldiers would no longer display the cool confi- 
dence of Gaines’ Mill or even of Malvern Hill. The places 
of the brave and seasoned soldiers who had fallen would 

1 Wellington’s losses in the battles of these three years were 33,000. 
The Confederates lost 23,000 in the Valley and the Seven Days and 10,000 
in the campaign against Pope. Itis not to be understood, however, that the 
Duke’s strategy was less skilful or less audacious than Lee’s and Jackson’s. 
During these three years his army, largely composed of Portuguese and 
Spaniards, was incapable of offensive tactics against his veteran enemies, 
and he was biding his time. It was the inefficiency of his allies and the 


miserable support he received from the English Government that prevented 
him, until 1813, from adopting a bolder policy. 


202 STONEWALL JACKSON 


be filled by recruits; and generals who had been out- 
manceuvred on so many battle-fields might fairly be ex- 
pected, when confronted once more with their dreaded 
opponents, to commit even more egregious errors than 
those into which they had already fallen. 

Such were the ideas entertained by Lee and accepted by 
the President, and on the morning of September 2, as soon 
Sept.2. 48 it was found that the Federals had sought 

shelter under the forts of Alexandria, Jackson was 
instructed to cross the Potomac, and form the advanced- 
guard of the army of invasion. It may be imagined with 
what feelings he issued his orders for the march on 
Leesburg, above which lay an easy ford. For more than 
twelve months, since the very morrow of Bull Run, he 
had persistently advocated an aggressive policy.' The 
fierce battles round Richmond and Manassas he had 
looked upon as merely the prelude to more resolute efforts. 
After he had defeated Banks at Winchester he had urged 
his friend Colonel Boteler to inform the authorities that, if 
they would reinforce him, he would undertake to capture 
Washington. The message had been conveyed to Lee. 
‘Tell General Jackson,’ was the reply of the Commander- 
in-Chief, ‘ that he must first help me to drive these people 
away from Richmond.’ ‘This object had been now 
thoroughly accomplished, and General Lee’s decision to 
redeem his promise was by none more heartily approved 
than by the leader of the Valley army. And yet, though 
the risks of the venture were small, the prospects of com- 
plete success were dubious. The opportunity had come, 
but the means of seizing it were feeble. Lee himself was 
buoyed up by no certain expectation of great results. In 


1 In Mrs. Jackson’s Memoirs of her husband a letter is quoted from her 
brother-in-law, giving the substance of a conversation with General Jackson 
on the conduct of the war. This letter I have not felt justified in quoting. 
In the first place, it lacks corroboration; in the second place, it contains 
a very incomplete statement of a large strategical question; in the third 
place, the opinions put in Jackson’s mouth are not only contradictory, but 
altogether at variance with his practice; and lastly, it attributes certain 
ideas to the general—raising ‘ the black flag,’ &e.—which his confidential staff 
officers declare that he never for a moment entertained. 


CONDITION OF THE ARMY. 203 


advocating invasion he confessed to the President that his 
troops were hardly fit for service beyond the frontier. ‘The 
army,’ he wrote, ‘is not properly equipped for an invasion 
of the enemy’s territory. It lacks much of the material of 
war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much 
reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, 
and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes... . 
What concerns me most is the fear of getting out of 
ammunition.’ ! 

This description was by no means over-coloured. 
As a record of military activity the campaign of the 
Spring and summer of 1862 has few parallels. Jack- 
son’s division, since the evacuation of Winchester at 
the end of February, that is, in six months, had taken 
part in no less than eight battles and innumerable minor 
engagements; it had marched nearly a thousand miles, 
and it had long ago discarded tents. The remainder of the 
army had been hardly less severely tasked. The demands 
of the outpost service in front of Richmond had been almost 
as trying as the forced marches in the Valley, and the climate 
of the Peninsula had told heavily on the troops. From the 
very first the army had been indifferently equipped ; the ill 
effects of hasty organisation were still glaring; the regi- 
mental officers had not yet learned to study the wants and 
comfort of their men; the troops were harassed by the 
ignorance of a staff that was still half-trained, and the com- 
missariat officials were not abreast of their important duties. 
More than all, the operations against Pope, just brought 
to a successful issue, had been most arduous; and the 
strain on the endurance of the troops, not yet recovered 
from their exertions in the Peninsula, had been so great 
that a period of repose seemed absolutely necessary. It 
was not only that battle and sickness had thinned the ranks, 
but that those whose health had been proof against con- 
tinued hardships, and whose strength and spirit were still 
equal to further efforts, were so badly shod that a few long 
marches over indifferent roads were certain to be more 
productive of casualties than a pitched battle. The want of 

1 OQ. R., vol. xix., part ii., pp. 590, 591. 


204 STONEWALL JACKSON 


boots had already been severely felt.! It has been said ~ 
that the route of the Confederate army from the Rappa- 
hannock to Chantilly might have been traced by the stains 
of bloody feet along the highways; and if the statement 
is more graphic than exact, yet it does not fall far short 
of the truth. Many a stout soldier, who had hobbled 
along on his bare feet until Pope was encountered and de- 
feated, found himself utterly incapable of marching into 
Maryland. In rear of the army the roads were covered 
with stragglers. Squads of infantry, banding together for 
protection, toiled along painfully by easy stages, unable 
to keep pace with the colours, but hoping to be up in 
time for the next fight ; and amongst these were not a few 
officers. But this was not the worst. Lax discipline and 
the absence of soldierly habits asserted themselves with 
the same pernicious effect as in the Valley. Not all the 
stragglers had their faces turned towards the enemy, not all 
were incapacitated by physical suffering. Many, without 
going through the formality of asking leave, were making 
for their homes, and had no idea that their conduct was 
in any way peculiar. They had done their duty in more 
than one battle, they had been long absent from their 
farms, their equipment was worn out, the enemy had been 
driven from Virginia, and they considered that they 
were fully entitled to some short repose. And amongst 
these, whose only fault was an imperfect sense of their 
military obligations, was the residue of cowards and malin- 
gerers shed by every great army engaged in protracted 
operations. 

Lee had been joined by the divisions of D. H. Hill, 
McLaws, Walker, and by Hampton’s cavalry, and the 
strength of his force should have been 65,000 effectives.? 
But it was evident that these numbers could not be long 


1 1,000 pairs of shoes were obtained in Fredericktown, 250 pairs in 
Williamsport, and about 400 pairs in this city (Hagerstown). They will 
not be sufficient to cover the bare feet of the army.’ Lee to Davis, September 
12,1862. O.R., vol. xix., part ii., p. 605. 

* Calculated on the basis of the Field Returns dated July 20, 1862, 
with the addition of Jackson’s and Ewell’s divisions, and subtracting the 
losses (10,000) of the campaign against Pope. 


CONDITION OF THE ARMY 205 


maintained. The men were already accustomed to half- 
rations of green corn, and they would be no worse off in 
Maryland and Pennsylvania, untouched as yet by the ravages 
of war, than in the wasted fields of Virginia. The most ample 
commissariat, however, would not compensate for the want 
of boots and the want of rest, and a campaign of invasion 
was certain to entail an amount of hard marching to which 
the strength of the troops was hardly equal. Not only had 
the South to provide from her seven millions of white 
population an army larger than that of Imperial France, 
but from a nation of agriculturists she had to provide 
another army of craftsmen and mechanics to enable the 
soldiers to keep the field. For guns and gun-carriages, 
powder and ammunition, clothing and harness, gunboats 
and torpedoes, locomotives and railway plant, she was now 
dependent on the hands of her own people and the 
resources of her own soil; the organisation of those re- 
sources, scattered over a vast extent of territory, was not 
to be accomplished in the course of a few months, nor was 
the supply of skilled labour sufficient to fill the ranks of 
her industrialarmy. By the autumn of 1862, although the 
strenuous efforts of every Government department gave the 
lie to the idea, not uncommon in the North, that the 
Southern character was shiftless and the Southern in- 
tellect slow, so little real progress had been made that if 
the troops had not been supplied from other sources they 
could hardly have marched at all. The captures made 
in the Valley, in the Peninsula, and in the Second 
Manassas campaign proved of inestimable value. Old 
muskets were exchanged for new, smooth-bore cannon 
for rifled guns, tattered blankets for good overcoats. ‘Mr. 
Commissary Banks,’ his successor Pope, and McClellan 
himself, had furnished their enemies with the material of 
war, with tents, medicines, ambulances, and ammunition 
waggons. liven the vehicles at Confederate headquarters 
bore on their tilts the initials U.S.A.; many of Lee’s 
soldiers were partially clothed in Federal uniforms, and the 
bad quality of the boots supplied by the Northern con- 
tractors was a very general subject of complaint in the 
VOL. II. & 


206 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Southern ranks. Nor while the men were fighting were 
the women idle. The output of the Government factories 
was supplemented by private enterprise. Thousands of 
spinning-wheels, long silent in dusty lumber-rooms, hum- 
med busily in mansion and in farm; matrons and maids, 
from the wife and daughters of the Commander-in-Chief 
to the mother of the drummer-boy, became weavers and 
seamstresses ; and in every household of the Confederacy, 
although many of the necessities of life—salt, coffee and 
sugar—had become expensive luxuries, the needs of the 
army came before all else. 

But notwithstanding the energy of the Government 
and the patriotism of the women, the troops lacked every- 
thing but spirit. Nor, even with more ample resources, 
could their wants have been readily supplied. In 
any case this would have involved a long halt in a secure 
position, and in a few weeks the Federal strength would 
be increased by fresh levies, and the moral of their de- 
feated troops restored. But even had time been given — 
the Government would have been powerless to render sub- 
stantial aid. Contingents of recruits were being drilled 
into discipline at Richmond; yet they hardly exceeded 
20,000 muskets; and it was not on the Virginia frontier 
alone that the South was hard pressed. The Valley 
of the Mississippi was beset by great armies; Alabama 
was threatened, and Western Tennessee was strongly 
occupied ; it was already difficult to find a safe passage 
across the river for the supplies furnished by the prairies 
of Texas and Louisiana, and communication with Ar- 
kansas had become uncertain. If the Mississippi were 
lost, not only would three of the most fertile States, as 
prolific of hardy soldiers as of fat oxen, be cut off 
from the remainder, but the enemy, using the river as 
a base, would push his operations into the very heart of 
the Confederacy. ‘To regain possession of the great water- 
way seemed of more vital importance than the defence of 
the Potomac or the secession of Maryland, and now that 
Richmond had been relieved, the whole energy of the Govern- 
ment was expended on the operations in Kentucky and 


THE SITUATION 207 


Tennessee. It may well be questioned whether a vigorous 
endeavour, supported by all the means available, and even 
by troops drawn from the West, to defeat the Army of the 
Potomac and to capture Washington, would not have 
been a more efficacious means to the same end; but 
Davis and his Cabinet consistently preferred dispersion 
to concentration, and, indeed, the situation of the South 
was such as might well have disturbed the strongest 
brains. The sea-power of the Union was telling with 
deadly effect. Although the most important strategic 
points on the Mississippi were still held by Confederate 
garrisons, nearly every mile of the great river, from Cairo 
to New Orleans, was patrolled by the Federal gunboats ; and 
in deep water, from the ports of the Atlantic to the road- 
steads of the Gulf, the frigates maintained their vigilant 
blockade. 

Even on the northern border there was hardly a gleam 
of light across the sky. The Federal forces were still for- 
midable in numbers, and a portion of the Army of the 
Potomac had not been involved in Pope’s defeat. It was 
possible, therefore, that more skilful generalship than had 
yet been displayed by the Northern commanders might 
deprive the Confederates of all chance of winning a decisive 
victory. Yet, although the opportunity of meeting the 
enemy with a prospect of success might never offer, an 
inroad into Northern territory promised good results. 

1. Maryland, still strong in sympathy with the South, 
might be induced by the presence of a Southern army to 
rise against the Union. 

2. The Federal army would be drawn off westward 
from its present position ; and so long as it was detained on 
the northern frontier of Virginia nothing could be attempted 
against Richmond, while time would be secured for improv- 
ing the defences of the Confederate capital. 

3. The Shenandoah Valley would be most effectively 
protected, and its produce transported without risk of 
interruption both to Lee’s army and to Richmond. 

To obtain such advantages as these was worth an effort, 
and Lee, after careful consideration, determined to cross the 

Q 2 


208 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Potomac. The movement was made with the same speed 
which had characterised the operations against Pope. It 
was of the utmost importance that the passage of the river 
should be accomplished before the enemy had time to dis- 
cover the design and to bar the way. Stuart’s cavalry 
formed the screen. On the morning after the battle of 
Chantilly, Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade followed the retreating 
Federals in the direction of Alexandria. Hampton’s brigade 
was pushed forward to Dranesville by way of Hunter’s Mill. 
Robertson’s brigade made a strong demonstration towards 
Washington, and Munford, with the 2nd Virginia, cleared out 
a Federal detachment which occupied Leesburg. Behind 
the cavalry the army marched unmolested and unob- 
served.! D. H. Hill’s division was pushed forward as ad- 
vanced-guard ; Jackson’s troops, who had been granted a 
Sept. 6 day’s rest, brought up the rear, and on the morning 
of the 6th reached White’s Ford on the Potomac. 
Through the silver reaches of the great river the long 
columns of men and waggons, preceded by Fitzhugh Lee’s . 
brigade, splashed and stumbled, and passing through the 
groves of oaks which overhung the water, wound steadily 
northward over the green fields of Maryland. 
1 The Army of Northern Virginia was thus organised during the Mary- 
land campaign :— 


McLaws’ Division 

R. H. Anderson’s Division . 

D. R. Jones’ Division . ; } 2 ‘ 
Longstreet’s4 J. G. Walker’s Division  . ‘ ‘ . bs 35,600 

Evans’ Brigade . ; : i 

Washington Ar tillery . : 

S. D. Lee’s Artillery battalion 


Ewell’s (Lawton) Division . ‘ : : 

Jackson’s ; The Light (A. P. Hill) Division . ; . $= 16,800 
Jackson’s own (J. R. Jones) Division . : 

D. H. Hill’s Division . ; ‘ : : 7,000 

Pendleton’s Reserve Artillery, 4 battalions . ; p . 1,000 
Hampton’s Brigade . é ‘ : ; 

Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade = 4,000 

Stuart Sabeeean® ’s Brigade | 


3H. A. batteries, Captain Pelham 


Total 64,400 


No allowance has been made for straggling. It is doubtful if more than 
55,000 men entered Maryland. 


OCCUPATION OF FREDERICK CITY 209 


The next day Frederick was occupied by Jackson, 
Sept. 7. Who was once more in advance; the cavalry at 
Urbanna watched the roads to Washington, and 
every city in the North was roused by the tidings that the 
orey jackets had crossed the border. But although the 
army had entered Maryland without the slightest diffi- 
culty, the troops were not received with the enthusiasm they 
had anticipated. ‘The women, indeed, emulating their Vir- 
ginia sisters, gave a warm welcome to the heroes of so many 
victories. But the men, whether terrorised by the stern rule 
of the Federal Government, or mistrusting the power of 
the Confederates to secure them from further punishment, 
showed little disposition to join the ranks. It is possible 
that the appearance of the Southern soldiery was not with- 
out effect. Lee’s troops, after five months’ hard marching 
and hard fighting, were no delectable objects. With torn 
and brimless hats, strands of rope for belts, and raw-hide 
moccasins of their own manufacture in lieu of boots; 
covered with vermin, and carrying their whole kit in Federal 
haversacks, the ragged scarecrows who swarmed through 
the streets of Frederick presented a pitiful contrast to 
the trim battalions which had hitherto held the Potomac. 
Their conduct indeed was exemplary. They had been 
warned that pillage and depredations would be severely 
dealt with, and all requisitions, even of fence-rails, were 
paid for on the spot. Still recruits were few. The war- 
worn aspect and indifferent equipment of the ‘dirty dar- 
lings,’ as more than one fair Marylander spoke of Jackson’s 
finest soldiers, failed to inspire confidence, and it was soon 
evident that the western counties of Maryland had small 
sympathy with the South. 

There were certainly exceptions to the general absence 
of cordiality. The troops fared well during their sojourn 
in Fisdérick Supplies were plentiful ; food and clothing 
were gratuitously distributed, and Jackson was presented 
with a fine but unbroken charger. The gift was timely, 
for ‘Little Sorrel,’ the companion of so many marches, 
was lost for some days after the passage of the Potomac ; 
but the Confederacy was near paying a heavy price for 


210 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the ‘good grey mare.’ When Jackson first mounted 
her a band struck up close by, and as she reared the 
girth broke, throwing her rider to the ground. Fortu- 
nately, though stunned and severely bruised, the general 
was only temporarily disabled, and, if he appeared but 
little in public during his stay in Frederick, his inacces- 
sibility was not due to broken bones. ‘Lee, Longstreet, 
and Jackson, and for a time Jeb Stuart,’ writes a staff 
officer, ‘had their headquarters near one another in 
Best’s Grove. Hither in crowds came the good people 
of Frederick, especially the ladies, as to a fair. General 
Jackson, still suffering from his hurt,. kept to his tent, 
busying himself with maps and official papers, and de- 
clined to see visitors. Once, however, when he had been 
called to General Lee’s tent, two young girls waylaid him, 
paralysed him with smiles and questions, and then jumped 
into their carriage and drove off rapidly, leaving him there, 
cap in hand, bowing, blushing, speechless. But once safe 
in his tent, he was seen no more that day.’! The next 
evening (Sunday) he went with his staff to service in the ~ 
town, and slept soundly, as he admitted to his wife, 
through the sermon of a minister of the German Reformed 
Church.’ 

But it was not for long that the Confederates were 
permitted to repose in Frederick. ‘The enemy had made 
no further reply to the passage of the Potomac beyond 
concentrating to the west of Washington. McClellan, 
who had superseded Pope, was powerless, owing to the 
inefficiency of his cavalry, to penetrate the cordon of 
Stuart’s pickets, and to ascertain, even approximately, 
the dispositions of the invading force. He was still in 
doubt if the whole or only part of Lee’s army had crossed 


1 «Stonewall Jackson in Maryland.’ Colonel H. K. Douglas. Batiles 
and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 621. 

2 ‘The minister,’ says Colonel Douglas, ‘was credited with much loyalty 
and courage, because he had prayed for the President of the United States in 
the very presence of Stonewall Jackson. Well, the general didn’t hear the 
prayer, and if he had he would doubtless have felt like replying as General 
Ewell did, when asked at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, if he would permit the 
usual prayer for President Lincoln—“ Certainly ; I’m sure he needs it.”’’ 


THE SITUATION 211 


into Maryland; and whether his adversary intended to 
attack Washington by the left bank of the Potomac, 
to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were 
questions which he had no means of determining. This 
uncertainty compelled him to move cautiously, and on 
September 9 his advanced-guard was still twenty miles 
east of Frederick. 

Nevertheless, the situation of the Confederates had 
become suddenly complicated. When the march into 
Maryland was begun, three towns in the Valley were 
held by the Federals. 3,000 infantry and artillery occu- 
pied Winchester. 3,000 cavalry were at Martinsburg ; 
and Harper’s Ferry, in process of conversion into an 
intrenched camp, had a garrison of 8,000 men. Lee 
was well aware of the presence of these forces when he 
resolved to cross the Potomac, but he believed that imme- 
diately his advance threatened to separate them from 
the main army, and to leave them isolated, they would 
be ordered to insure their safety by a timely retreat. 
Had it depended upon McClellan this would have been 
done. Halleck, however, thought otherwise ; and the officer 
commanding at Harper’s Ferry was ordered to hold his 
works until McClellan should open communication with 
him. 

On arrival at Frederick, therefore, the Confederates, 
contrary to anticipation, found 14,000 Federals still esta- 
blished in their rear, and although Winchester had been 
evacuated,! it was clear that Harper’s Ferry was to be 
defended. The existence of the intrenched camp was 
a serious obstacle to the full development of Lee’s designs. 
His line of communication had hitherto run from Rapidan 
Station to Manassas Junction, and thence by Leesburg 
and Point of Rocks to Frederick. This line was within 
easy reach of Washington, and liable to be cut at any 
moment by the enemy’s cavalry. Arrangements had 
therefore been already made to transfer the line to the 
Valley. There, sheltered by the Blue Ridge, the convoys of 


1 On the night of September 2. Lee’s Report, O. R., vol. xix., part i, 
p. 139. 


212 STONEWALL JACKSON 


sick and wounded, of arms, clothing, and ammunition, 
could move in security from Staunton to Shepherdstown, 
and the recruits which were accumulating at Richmond 
be sent to join the army in Northern territory. But 
so long as Harper’s Ferry was strongly garrisoned 
this new line would be liable to constant disturbance, 
and it was necessary that the post should either be 
masked by a superior force, or carried by a coup de 
main. The first of these alternatives was at once re- 
jected, for the Confederate numbers were too small 
to permit any permanent detachment of a considerable 
force, and without hesitation Lee determined to adopt 
the bolder course. 25,000 men, he considered, would be 
no more than sufficient to effect his object. But 25,000 
men were practically half the army, and the plan, when 
laid before the generals, was not accepted without remon- 
strance. Longstreet, indeed, went so far as to refuse 
command of the detachment. ‘I objected,’ he writes, 
‘and urged that our troops were worn with marching 
and were on short rations, and that it would be a 
bad idea to divide our forces while we were in the 
enemy’s country, where he could get information, in six 
or eight hours, of any movement we might make. The 
Federal army, though beaten at the Second Manassas, 
was not disorganised, and it would certainly come out 
to look for us, and we should- guard against being 
caught in such a condition. Our army consisted of a 
superior quality of soldiers, but it was in no condition to 
divide in the enemy’s country. I urged that we should 
keep it in hand, recruit our strength, and get up supplies, 
and then we could do anything we pleased. General 
Lee made no reply to this, and I supposed the Harper’s 
Ferry scheme was abandoned.’ ! 

Jackson, too, would have preferred to fight McClellan 
first, and consider the question of communications after- 
wards ;? but he accepted with alacrity the duty which his 
colleague had declined. His own divisions, reinforced by 


' Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 662. ? Dabney, vol. ii., p. 302. 


LONGSTREET’S PROTEST 213 


those of McLaws, R. H. Anderson,! and Walker, were detailed 
for the expedition; Harper’s Ferry was to be invested on 
three sides, and the march was to begin at daybreak on 
September 10. Meanwhile, the remainder of the army was 
to move north-west to Hagerstown, five-and-twenty miles 
from Frederick, where it would alarm Lincoln for the safety 
of Pennsylvania, and be protected from McClellan by the 
parallel ranges of the Catoctin and South Mountains. 
Undoubtedly, in ordinary circumstances, General Long- 
street would have been fully justified in protesting 
against the dispersion of the army in the presence of the 
enemy. Hagerstown and Harper’s Ferry are five-and- 
twenty miles apart, and the Potomac was between them. 
McClellan’s advanced-guard, on the other hand, was thirty 
miles from Harper’s Ferry, and forty-five from Hagerstown. 
The Federals were advancing, slowly and cautiously it is 
true, but still pushing westward, and it was certainly 
possible, should they receive early intelligence of the Con- 
federate movements, that before Harper’s Ferry fell a 
rapid march might enable them to interpose between Lee 
and Jackson. But both Lee and Jackson calculated the 
chances with a wider grasp than Longstreet. Had the 
general in command of the Federal army been bold and 
enterprising, had the Federal cavalry been more efficient, or 
Stuart lessskilful, they would certainly have hesitated before 
running the risk of defeat in detail. But solong as McClellan 
controlled the movements of the enemy, rapid and decisive 
action was not to be apprehended; and it was exceedingly 
improbable that the scanty and unreliable information which 
he might obtain from civilian sources would induce him to 
throw off his customary caution. Moreover, only a fortnight 
previously the Federal army had been heavily defeated.” 
Lee had resolved to woo fortune while she was in the 


! Anderson was placed under McLaws’ command. 

2 ¢ Are you acquainted with McClellan ?’ said Lee to General Walker on 
September 8, 1862, ‘He is an able general but a very cautious one. His 
enemies among his own people think him too much so. His army is in a 
very demoralised and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offen- 
sive operations—or he will not think it so—for three or four weeks.’—Battles 
and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 605 and 606. 


214 STONEWALL JACKSON 


mood. The movement against Harper’s Ferry once 
determined, it was essential that it should be carried out 
Sept. 10. with the utmost speed, and Jackson marched with 

even more than ordinary haste, but without 
omitting his usual precautions. Before starting he asked 
for a map of the Pennsylvania frontier, and made many 
inquiries as to roads and localities to the north of 
Frederick, whereas his route lay in the opposite direction. 
‘The cavalry, which preceded the column,’ says Colonel 
Douglas, ‘had instructions to let no civilian go to the 
front, and we entered each village we passed before the 
inhabitants knew of our coming. In Middletown two very 
pretty girls, with ribbons of red, white, and blue floating 
from their hair, and small Union flags in their hands, 
rushed out of a house as we passed, came to the kerbstone, 
and with much laughter waved their flags defiantly in the 
face of the general. He bowed, raised his hat, and turning 
with his quiet smile to the staff, said, ‘‘ We evidently have 
no friends in this town.” Having crossed South Mountain 
Sept. 11. at Turner’s Gap, the command encamped for the 

night within a mile of Boonsboro’ (fourteen miles 
from Frederick). Here General Jackson must determine 
whether he would go to Williamsport or turn towards 
Shepherdstown. I at once rode into the village with a 
cavalryman to make some inquiries, but we ran into a 
Federal squadron, who without ceremony proceeded to make 
war upon us. We retraced our steps, and although we did 
not stand upon the order of our going, a squad of them 
escorted us out of the town with great rapidity. Reaching 
the top of the hill, we discovered, just over it, General 
Jackson, walking slowly towards us, leading his horse. 
There was but one thing to do. Fortunately the chase had 
become less vigorous, and with a cry of command to unseen 
troops, we turned and charged the enemy. ‘They, sus- 
pecting trouble, turned and fled, while the general quickly 
galloped to the rear. As I returned to camp I picked up 
the gloves which he had dropped in mounting, and took 
them to him. Although he had sent a regiment of 
infantry to the front as soon as he went back, the only 


THE MARCH TO HARPER’S FERRY 215 


allusion he made to the incident was to express the opinion 
that I had a very fast horse. 

‘The next morning, having learned that the Federal 
troops still occupied Martinsburg, General Jackson took 
the direct road to Williamsport. He then forded the 
Potomac, the troops singing, the bands playing ‘‘ Carry me 
back to ole Virginny!’ We marched on Martinsburg. 
General A. P. Hill took the direct turnpike, while Jackson, 
with the rest of his command, followed a side road, so as to 
approach Martinsburg from the west, and encamped four 
Sept. 1g, Mules from the town. His object was to drive 
General White, who occupied Martinsburg, to- 
wards Harper’s Ferry, and thus “corral’’ all the Federal 
troops in that military pen. As the Comte de Paris puts 
it, he ‘‘organised a grand hunting match through the 
lower Valley, driving all the Federal detachments before 
him and forcing them to crowd into the blind alley of 
Harper’s Ferry.” 

‘The next morning the Confederates entered Martins- 
burg. Here the general was welcomed with enthusiasm, and 
a great crowd hastened to the hotel to greet him. At first 
he shut himself up in a room to write dispatches, but the 
demonstration became so persistent that he ordered the 
door to be opened. The crowd, chiefly ladies, rushed in and 
embarrassed the general with every possible outburst of 
affection, to which he could only reply, ‘“‘ Thank you, you 
are very kind.’ He gave them his autograph in books 
and on scraps of paper, cut a button from his coat for a 
little girl, and then submitted patiently to an attack by the 
others, who soon stripped the coat of nearly all the remain- 
ing buttons. But when they looked beseechingly at his 
hair, which was thin, he drew the line, and managed to 
close the interview. These blandishments did not delay his 
movements, however, for in the afternoon he was off again, 
and his troops bivouacked on the banks of the Opequon.”' 


1 Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 622,623. Major Hotchkiss relates 
that the ladies of Martinsburg made such desperate assaults on the mane 
and tail of the general’s charger that he had at last to post a sentry over the 
stable. 


216 STONEWALL JACKSON 


On the 18th Jackson passed through Halltown and 
Sept. 13. halted a mile north of that village,! throwing out 

pickets to hold the roads which lead south and 
west from -Harper’s Ferry. Meanwhile, McLaws and 
Walker had taken possession of the heights to the north 
and east, and the intrenched camp of the Federals, which, in 
addition to the garrison, now held the troops who had fled 
from Martinsburg, was surrounded on every side. The 
Federal officer in command had left but one brigade and 
two batteries to hold the Maryland Heights, the long 
ridge, 1,000 feet high, on the north shore of the Potomac, 
which looks down on the streets of the little town. This 
detachment, although strongly posted, and covered by 
breastworks and abattis, was driven off by General 
McLaws; while the Loudoun Heights, a portion of the 
Blue Ridge, east of the Shenandoah, and almost equally 
commanding, were occupied without opposition by 
General Walker. Harper’s Ferry was now completely 
surrounded. kLee’s plans had been admirably laid and 
precisely executed, and the surrender of the place was 
merely a question of hours. 

Nor had matters progressed less favourably elsewhere. 
In exact accordance with the anticipations of Lee and 
Jackson, McClellan, up till noon on the 18th, had received 
no inkling whatever of the dangerous manceuvres which 
Stuart so effectively concealed, and his march was very 
slow. On the 12th, after a brisk skirmish with the 
Confederate cavalry, his advanced-guard had occupied 
Frederick, and discovered that the enemy had marched 
off in two columns, one towards Hagerstown, the other 
towards Harper’s Ferry, but he was uncertain whether 
Lee intended to recross the Potomac or to move northwards 
into Pennsylvania. On the morning of the 18th, although 
General Hooker, commanding the First Army Corps, took 
the liberty of reporting that, in his opinion, ‘ the rebels had 
no more intention of going to Pennsylvania than they had 


1 On September 10 he marched fourteen miles, on September 11 twenty, 
on September 12 sixteen, and on September 13 twelve, arriving at Halltown 
at 11 a.m, 


McCLELLAN’S CAUTION 217 


of going to heaven,’ the Federal Commander-in-Chief was 
still undecided, and on the Boonsboro’ road only his cavalry 
was pushed forward. In four days McClellan had marched 
no more than five-and-twenty miles; he had been unable 
to open communication with Harper’s Ferry, and he had 
moved with even more than his usual caution. But at 
noon on the 13th he was suddenly put into possession 
of the most ample information. A copy of Lee’s order for 
the investment of Harper’s Ferry, in which the exact posi- 
tion of each separate division of the Confederate army 
was laid down, was picked up in the streets of Frederick, 
and chance had presented McClellan with an opportunity 
unique in history.'_ He was within twenty miles of Harper’s 
Ferry. The Confederates were more than that distance 
apart. The intrenched camp still held out, for the sound 
of McLaws’ battle on the Maryland Heights was distinctly 
heard during the afternoon, and a resolute advance would 
have either compelled the Confederates to raise the siege, 
or have placed the Federal army between their widely 
separated wings. 

But, happily for the South, McClellan was not the 
man for the opportunity. He still hesitated, and during 
the afternoon of the 13th only one division was pushed 
forward. In front of him was the South Mountain, the 
name given to the continuation of the Blue Ridge north 
of the Potomac, and the two passes, Turner’s and 
Crampton’s Gaps, were held by Stuart. No Confederate 
infantry, as Lee’s order indicated, with the exception, 
perhaps, of a rear-guard, were nearer the passes than 


1 General Longstreet, in his From Manassas to Appomattox, declares 
that the lost order was sent by General Jackson to General D. H. Hill, 
‘but was not delivered. The order,’ he adds, ‘that was sent to General 
Hill from general headquarters was carefully preserved.’ General Hill, 
however, in Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 570 (note), says: ‘It was 
proper that I should receive that order through Jackson, and not through 
Lee. I have now before me (1888) the order received from Jackson. My 
adjutant-general swore affidavit, twenty years ago, that no order was received 
at our office from General Lee.’ Jackson was so careful that no one should 
learn the contents of the order that the copy he furnished to Hill was written 
by hisownhand. The copy found by the Federals was wrapped round three 
cigars, and was signed by Lee’s adjutant-general. 


218 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the Maryland Heights and Boonsboro’.! The roads 
were good and the weather fine, and a night march of 
twelve miles would have placed the Federal advanced- 
guards at the foot of the mountains, ready to force the 
Gaps at earliest dawn. McClellan, however, although his 
men had made no unusual exertions during the past few 
days, preferred to wait till daylight. 

Nevertheless, on the night of the 18th disaster 
threatened the Confederates. Harper’s Ferry had not 
yet fallen, and, in addition to the cavalry, D. H. Hill’s 
division was alone available to defend the passes. Lee, 
however, still relying on McClellan’s irresolution, deter- 
mined to hold South Mountain, thus gaining time for 
the reduction of Harper’s Ferry, and Longstreet was 
ordered back from Hagerstown, thirteen miles west of 
Boonsboro’, to Hill’s assistance. 

On the same night Jackson, at Halltown, opened com- 
munications with McLaws and Walker, and on the next 

Sept. 14. morning (Sunday) he made the necessary arrange- 
ments to ensure combination in the attack. The 
Federal lines, although commanded by the Maryland and 
Loudoun Heights to the north and east, opposed a strong 
front to the south and west. The Bolivar Heights, an open 
plateau, a mile and a quarter in length, which has the 
Potomac on the one flank and the Shenandoah on the other, 
was defended by several batteries and partially intrenched. 
Moreover, it was so far from the summits occupied by 
McLaws and Walker that their guns, although directed 
against the enemy’s rear, could hardly render effective aid ; 
only the extremities of the plateau were thoroughly ex- 
posed to fire from the heights. 

In order to facilitate communication across the two 
great rivers Jackson ordered a series of signal stations to 
be established,:and while his own batteries were taking up 
their ground to assail the Bolivar Heights he issued his” 
instructions to his colleagues. At ten o’clock the flags on 
the Loudoun Heights signalled that Walker had six rifled 
guns in position. He was ordered to wait until McLaws, 

! For the lost order, see Note at end of chapter. 


HIS ORDERS 219 


who was employed in cutting roads through the woods, 
should have done the same, and the following message 
explained the method of attack :— 

‘General McLaws,—If you can, establish batteries to 
drive the enemy from the hill west of Bolivar and on which 
Barbour’s House is, and from any other position where he 
may be damaged by your artillery. Let me know when you 
are ready to open your batteries, and give me any sugges- 
tions by which you can operate against the enemy. Cut 
the telegraph line down the Potomac if it is not already done. 
Keep a good look-out against a Federal advance from 
below. Similar instructions will be sent to General Walker. 
I do not desire any of the batteries to open until all are 
ready on both sides of the river, except you should find 
if necessary, of which you must judge for yourself. I will 
let you know when to open all the batteries. 

‘T. J. Jackson, 
‘ Major-General Commanding.’ ! 


About half-past two in the afternoon McLaws reported 
that his guns were up, and a message ‘to fire at such 
positions of the enemy as will be most effective,’ followed 
the formal orders for the co-operation of the whole force. 


‘Headquarters, Valley District, 
Sept. 14, 1862. 

‘1. To-day Major-General McLaws will attack so as to 
sweep with his artillery the ground occupied by the enemy, 
take his batteries in reverse, and otherwise operate against 
him as circumstances may justify. 

‘2. Brigadier-General Walker will take in reverse the 
battery on the turnpike, and sweep with his artillery the 
eround occupied by the enemy, and silence the batteries on 
the island of the Shenandoah should he find a battery 
(sic) there. 

‘3. Major-General A. P. Hill will move along the left 
bank of the Shenandoah, and thus turn the enemy’s left 
flank and enter Harper’s Ferry. 


1 Report of Signal Officer, O. R., vol. xix., part i., p. 958. 


220 STONEWALL JACKSON 


‘4. Brigadier-General Lawton will move along the 
turnpike for the purpose of supporting General Hill, and 
otherwise operating against the enemy to the left of 
General Hill. 

‘5. Brigadier-General Jones will, with one of his 
brigades and a battery of artillery, make a demonstration 
against the enemy’s right; the remaining part of his 
division will constitute the reserve and move along the 
turnpike. 

‘ By order of Major-General Jackson, 

‘Wm. L. Jackson, 
‘Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.’ ' 


Jackson, it appears, was at first inclined to send a 
flag of truce, for the purpose of giving the civilian popula- 
tion time to get away, should the garrison refuse to sur- 
render ; but during the morning heavy firing was heard to 
the northward, and McLaws reported that he had been 
obliged to detach troops to guard his rear against McClellan. 
The batteries were therefore ordered to open fire on the 
Federal works without further delay. 

According to General Walker, Jackson, although he 
was aware that McClellan had occupied Frederick, not 
over twenty miles distant, could not bring himself to believe 
that his old classmate had overcome his prudential in- 
stincts, and attributed the sounds of battle to a cavalry 
engagement. It is certain that he never for a single 
moment anticipated a resolute attempt to force the pas- 
sages of the South Mountain, for, in reply to McLaws, he 
merely instructed him to ask General D. H. Hill to protect 
his rear, and to communicate with Lee at Hagerstown. Had 
he entertained the slightest suspicion that McClellan was 
advancing with his whole force against the passages of the 
South Mountain, he would hardly have suggested that Hill 
should be asked to defend Crampton’s as well as Turner’s Gap. 

With full confidence, therefore, that he would have 
time to enforce the surrender of Harper’s Ferry and to 
join Lee on the further bank of the Potomac, the progress of 

1 Report of Signal Officer, O. R., vol xix., part i., p. 659. 


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THE ARTILLERY ATTACK 221 


his attack was cautious and methodical. ‘The position in 
front of me,’ he wrote to McLaws, ‘is a strong one, and I 
desire to remain quiet, and let you and Walker draw atten- 
tion from Furnace Hill (west of Bolivar Heights), so that I 
may have an opportunity of getting possession of the hill 
without much loss.’ It was not, then, till the artillery had 
been long in action, and the fire of the enemy’s guns had 
been in some degree subdued, that the infantry was per- 
mitted to advance. Although the Federal batteries opened 
vigorously on the lines of skirmishers, the casualties were 
exceedingly few. The troops found cover in woods and 
broken ground, and before nightfall Hill had driven in the 
enemy’s pickets, and had secured a knoll on their left flank 
which afforded an admirable position for artillery. Lawton, 
in the centre, occupied a ridge over which ran the Charles- 
town turnpike, brought his guns into action, and formed 
his regiments for battle in the woods. Jones’ division 
held the Shepherdstown road on Lawton’s left, seized 
Furnace Hill, and pushed two batteries forward. 

No attempt was made during this Sunday evening to 
storm the Bolivar Heights; and yet, although the Confede- 
rate infantry had been hardly engaged, the enemy had been 
terribly shaken. From every point of the compass, from 
the lofty crests which looked down upon the town, from 
the woods towards Charlestown, from the hill to west- 
ward, a ceaseless hail of shells had swept the narrow neck 
to which the garrison was confined. Several guns had been 
dismounted. More than one regiment of raw troops had 
dispersed in panic, and had been with difficulty rallied. The 
roads were furrowed with iron splinters. Many buildings 
had been demolished, and although the losses among the 
infantry, covered by their parapets, had been insignificant, 
the batteries had come almost to their last round. 

During the night Jackson made preparations for an 
early assault. Two of A. P. Hill’s brigades, working their 
way along the bank of the Shenandoah, over ground 
which the Federal commander had considered impassable, 
established themselves to the left rear of the Bolivar 
Heights. Guns were brought up to the knoll which Hill 

R 2 


222 STONEWALL JACKSON 


had seized during the afternoon ; and ten pieces, which Jack- 
son had ordered to be taken across the Shenandoah by 
Keyes’ Ford, were placed in a position whence they could 
enfilade the enemy’s works at effective range. Lawton and 
Jones pushed forward their lines until they could hear 
voices in the intrenchments; and a girdle of bayonets, 
closely supported by many batteries, encircled the hapless 
Federals. The assault was to be preceded by a heavy 
bombardment, and the advance was to be made as soon 
as Hill’s guns ceased fire. 

All night long the Confederates slept upon their arms, 
waiting for the dawn. When day broke, a soft silver mist, 
rising from the broad Potomac, threw its protecting folds 

Sept. 15. OVer Harper’s Ferry. But the Southern gunners 
knew the direction of their targets; the clouds 

were rent by the passage of screaming shells, and as the sun, 
rising over the Loudoun Heights, dispersed the vapours, 
the whole of Jackson’s artillery became engaged. The 
Federal batteries, worked with stubborn courage, and show- | 
ing a bold front to every fresh opponent, maintained the 
contest for an hour; but, even if ammunition had not failed 
them, they could not have long withstood the terrible fire 
which took them in front, in flank, and in reverse.! Then, 
perceiving that the enemy’s guns were silenced, Hill ordered 
his batteries to cease fire, and threw forward his brigades 
against the ridge. Staunch to the last, the Federal 
artillerymen ran their pieces forward, and opened on the 
Confederate infantry. Once more the long line of Jackson’s 
guns crashed out in answer, and two batteries, galloping 
up to within four hundred yards of the ridge, poured in a 
destructive fire over the heads of their own troops. Hill’s 
brigades, when the artillery duel recommenced, had halted 
at the foot of the slope. Beyond, over the bare fields, the 
way was obstructed by felled timber, the lopped branches of 
which were closely interlaced, and above the abattis rose 
the line of breastworks. But before the charge was sounded 


1 The ten guns which had been carried across the Shenandoah were 
specially effective. Report of Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson’s chief of artillery. 
O. R., vol. xix., part i., p. 962. 


SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY 223 


the Confederate gunners completed the work they had so 
well begun. At 7.30 a.m. the white flag was hoisted, 
and with the loss of no more than 100 men Jackson had 
captured Harper’s Ferry with his artillery alone. 

The general was near the church in the wood on the 
Charlestown road, and Colonel Douglas was sent forward 
to ascertain the enemy’s purpose. ‘ Near the top of the 
hill,’ he writes, ‘I met General White (commanding the 
Federals), and told him my mission. Just then General 
Hill came up from the direction of his line, and on his 
request I conducted them to General Jackson, whom I 
found sitting on his horse where I had left him. He 
was not, as the Comte de Paris says, leaning against a 
tree asleep, but exceedingly wide-awake. ... The sur- 
render was unconditional, and then General Jackson turned 
the matter over to General A. P. Hill, who allowed General 
White the same liberal terms that Grant afterwards gave 
Lee at Appomattox. The fruits of the surrender were 
12,520 prisoners, 13,000 small arms, 78 pieces of artillery, 
and several hundred waggons. 

‘General Jackson, after a brief dispatch to General 
Lee announcing the capitulation, rode up to Bolivar and 
down into Harper’s Ferry. The curiosity in the Union 
army to see him was so great that the soldiers lined the 
sides of the road. Many of them uncovered as he passed, 
and he invariably returned the salute. One man had an 
echo of response all about him when he said aloud: 
‘Boys, he’s not much for looks, but if we’d had him we 
wouldn’t have been caught in this trap.”’ ! 

The completeness of the victory was marred by the 
escape of the Federal cavalry. Under cover of the night 
1,200 horsemen, crossing the pontoon bridge, and passing 
swiftly up the towpath under the Maryland Heights, had 
ridden boldly beneath the muzzles of McLaws’ batteries, 
and, moving north-west, had struck out for Pennsylvania. 
Yet the capture of Harper’s Ferry was a notable exploit, 
although Jackson seems to have looked upon it as a mere 
matter of course. 

* Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 625-7. 


224 STONEWALL JACKSON 


‘Through God’s blessing,’ he reported to Lee at eight 
o'clock, ‘ Harper’s Ferry and its garrison are to be surren- 
dered. As Hill’s troops have borne the heaviest part of the 
engagement, he will be left in command until the prisoners 
and publie property shall be disposed of, unless you direct 
otherwise. The other forces can move off this evening so 
soon as they get their rations. To what point shall they 
move? I write at this time in order that you may be 
apprised of the condition of things. You may expect to 
hear from me again to-day, after I get more information 
respecting the number of prisoners, &c.’ ! 

Lee, with D. H. Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart, was 
already falling back from the South Mountain to Sharps- 
burg, a little village on the right bank of the Antietam 
Creek ; and late in the afternoon Jackson, Walker, and 
McLaws were ordered to rejoin without delay.” September 
14 had been an anxious day for the Confederate Com- 
mander-in-Chief. During the morning D. H. Hill, with 
no more than 5,000 men in his command, had seen the 
ereater part of McClellan’s army deploy for action in — 
the wide valley below and to the eastward of Turner’s Gap. 
Stuart held the woods below Crampton’s Gap, six miles 
south, with Robertson’s brigade, now commanded by the 
gallant Munford; and on the heights above McLaws had 
posted three brigades, for against this important pass, the 
shortest route by which the Federals could interpose between 
Lee and Jackson, McClellan’s left wing, consisting of 20,000 
men under General Franklin, was steadily advancing. 

The positions at both Turner’s and Crampton’s Gaps 
were very strong. ‘The passes, at their highest points, 
are at least 600 feet above the valley, and the slopes steep, 
rugged, and thickly wooded. The enemy’s artillery had 


10. R., vol. xix., parti, p. 951. General Longstreet (from Manassas to 
Appomattox, p. 233) suggests that Jackson, after the capitulation of Harper’s 
Ferry, should have moved east of South Mountain against McClellan’s rear. 
Jackson, however, was acquainted neither with McClellan’s position nor 
with Lee’s intentions, and nothing could have justified such a movement 
except the direct order of the Commander-in-Chief. 

2 «The Invasion of Maryland,’ General Longstreet, Battles and Leaders, 
vol. ii., p. 666. 


CRAMPTON'S GAP 225 


little chance. Stone walls, running parallel to the crest, 
gave much protection to the Southern infantry, and loose 
boulders and rocky scarps increased the difficulties of the 
ascent. But the numbers available for defence were very 
small; and had McClellan marched during the night he 
would probably have been master of the passes before mid- 
day. As it was, Crampton’s Gap was not attacked by 
Franklin until noon; and although at the same hour the 
advanced-guard of the Federal right wing had gained much 
ground, it was not till four in the evening that a general 
attack was made on Turner’s Gap. By this time Long- 
street, after a march of thirteen miles, had reached the 
battle-field ;! and despite the determination with which 
the attack was pressed, Turner’s Gap was still held when 
darkness fell. 

The fight at Crampton’s Gap had been less successful. 
Franklin had forced the pass before five o’clock, and driving 
McLaws’ three brigades before him, had firmly established 
himself astride the summit. The Confederate losses were 
larger than those which they had inflicted. McClellan 
reports 1,791 casualties on the right, Franklin 533 on 
the left. McLaws’ and Munford’s loss was over 800, of 
whom 400 were captured. The number of killed and 
wounded in Hill’s and Longstreet’s commands is unknown ; 
it probably reached a total of 1,500, and 1,100 of their men 
were marched to Frederick as prisoners. Thus the day’s 
fighting had cost the South 8,400 men. Moreover, Long- 
street’s ammunition column, together with an escort of 
600 men, had been cut up by the cavalry which had 
escaped from Harper’s Ferry, and which had struck the 
Hagerstown road as it marched northward into Pennsyl- 


' The order for the march had been given the night before (‘ The Invasion 
of Maryland,’ General Longstreet, Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 666), 
and there seems to have been no good reason, even admitting the heat and 
dust, that Longstreet’s command should not have joined Hillatnoon. The 
troops marched ‘ at daylight’ (5 a.m.), and took ten hours to march thirteen 
miles. As it was, only four of the brigades took part in the action, and 
did so, owing to their late arrival, in very disjointed fashion. Not all 
the Confederate generals appear to have possessed the same ‘ driving power’ 
as Jackson, 


226 STONEWALL JACKSON 


vania. Yet, on the whole, Lee had no reason to be cha- 
srined with the result of his operations. McClellan had 
acted with unexpected vigour. But neither in strategy nor 
in tactics had he displayed improvement on his Peninsular 
methods. He should have thrown the bulk of his army 
against Crampton’s Gap, thus intervening between Lee and 
Jackson; but instead of doing so he had directed 70,000 
men against Turner’s Gap. Nor had his attack on Hill 
and Longstreet been characterised by resolution. The 
advanced-guard was left unsupported until 2 p.m., and 
not more than 80,000 men were employed throughout 
the day. Against this number 8,000 Confederates had 
held the pass. Cobb, one of McLaws’ brigadiers, who 
commanded the defence at Crarapton’s Gap, though driven 
down the mountain, had offered a stout resistance to superior 
forces ; and twenty-four hours had been gained for Jackson. 
On the other hand, in face of superior numbers, the posi- 
tion at Turner’s Gap had become untenable; and during 
the night Hill and Longstreet marched to Sharpsburg. 
This enforced retreat was not without effect on the 
moral of either army. McClellan was as exultant as he was 
credulous. ‘Ihave just learned,’ he reported to Halleck at 
Sept. 15. 8 a.m. on the 15th, ‘from General Hooker, in ad- 
vance, that the enemy is making for Shepherds- 
town in a perfect panic; and that General Lee last night 
stated publicly that he must admit they had been shockingly 
whipped. I am hurrying forward to endeavour to press 
their retreat to the utmost.’ Then, two hours later : ‘ Infor- 
mation this moment received completely confirms the rout 
and demoralisation of the rebel army. It is stated that 
Lee gives his losses as 15,000. We are following as rapidly 
as the men can move.’! Nor can it be doubted that 
McClellan’s whole army, unaccustomed to see their anta- 
gonists give ground before them, shared the general’s 
mood.? Amongst the Confederates, on the other hand, 
there was some depression. It could not be disguised that 


1Q. R. vol. xix., pp. 294, 295. 
*¢*The moral of our men is now restored.’ McClellan to Halleck 
after South Mountain. O.R., vol. xix., part ii, p. 294. 


COMMENTS 997 


a portion of the troops had shown symptoms of demora- 
lisation. The retreat to the Antietam, although effectively 
screened by Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade of cavalry, was not 
effected in the best of order. Many of the regiments had 
been broken by the hard fighting on the mountain; men 
had become lost in the forest, or had sought safety to the 
rear; and the number of stragglers was very large. It 
was not, then, with its usual confidence that the army 
moved into position on the ridge above the Antietam Creek. 
General Longstreet, indeed, was of opinion that the army 
should have recrossed the Potomac at once. ‘The moral 
effect of our move into Maryland had been lost by our 
discomfiture at South Mountain, and it was evident we 
could not hope to concentrate in time to do more than 
make a respectable retreat, whereas by retiring before the 
battle [of Sharpsburg] we could have claimed a very suc- 
cessful campaign.’! So spake the voice of prudence. Lee, 
however, so soon as he was informed of the fall of Harper’s 
Ferry, had ordered Jackson to join him, resolving to hold 
his ground, and to bring McClellan to a decisive battle on 
the north bank of the Potomac. 

Although 45,000 men—for Lee at most could count on 
no more than this number, so great had been the strag- 
gling—were about to receive the attack of over 90,000, 
Jackson, when he reached Sharpsburg on the morning 
of the 16th, heartily approved the Commander-in-Chief’s 
decision, and it is worth while to consider the reasons 
which led them to disagree with Longstreet. 

1. Under ordinary conditions, to expect an army of 
45,000 to wrest decisive victory from one of 90,000 well- 
armed enemies would be to demand an impossibility. The 
defence, when two armies are equally matched, is physically 
stronger than the attack, although we have Napoleon’s 
word for it that the defence has the harder task. But that 
the inherent strength of the defence is so great as to 
enable the smaller force to annihilate its enemy is contrary 
to all the teaching of history. By making good use of 
favourable ground, or by constructing substantial works, 

' Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 666, 667. 


228 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the smaller force may indeed stave off defeat and gain 
time. But it can hope for nothing more. The records of 
warfare contain no instance, when two armies were of 
much the same quality, of the smaller army bringing the 
campaign to a decisive issue by defensive tactics. Welling- 
ton and Lee both fought many defensive battles with inferior 
forces. But neither of them, under such conditions, ever 
achieved the destruction of their enemy. They fought 
such battles to gain time, and their hopes soared no 
higher. At Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes d’Onor, where 
the French were superior to the allies, Wellington repulsed 
the attack, but he did not prevent the defeated armies 
taking the field again in a few days. At the Wilderness, 
Spotsylvania, the North Anna, and Cold Harbour, the great 
battles of 1864, Lee maintained his ground, but he did 
not prevent Grant moving round his flank in the direction 
of Richmond. At the Second Manassas, Jackson stood fast 
for the greater part of two days, but he would never have 
driven Pope across Bull Run without the aid of Longstreet. 
Porter at Gaines’ Mill held 55,000 men with 385,000 for 
more than seven hours, but even if he had maintained his 
position, the Confederate army would not have become a 
mob of fugitives. No; except on peculiarly favourable 
ground, or when defending an intrenched camp, an army 
matched with one of equal efficiency and numerically 
superior, can never hope for decisive success. So circum- 
stanced, a wise general will rather retreat than fight, and 
thus save his men for a more favourable opportunity.' 

But Lee and Jackson had not to deal with ordinary 
conditions. Whatever may have been the case in the 
Peninsula and in the Valley, there can be no question but 
that the armies in Maryland were by no means equal in 


1 Before Salamanca, for instance, because Marmont, whose strength was 
equal to his own, was about to be reinforced by 4,000 cavalry, Wellington 
had determined to retreat. It is true, however, that when weaker than Mas- 
séna, whom he had already worsted, by 8,000 infantry and 3,800 sabres, but 
somewhat stronger in artillery, he stood to receive attack at Fuentes 
d’Onor. Yet Napier declares that it was a very audaciousresolution. The 
knowledge and experience of the great historian told him that to pit 32,000 
infantry against 40,000 was to trust too much to fortune. 


THE ARMIES 229 


quality. The Federals were far more accustomed to 
retreat than advance. For several months, whether they 
were engaged on the Shenandoah, on the Chickahominy, 
on the Rappahannock, or on Bull Run, they had been 
invariably outmanceuvred. Their losses had been ex- 
ceedingly severe, not only in battle, but from sickness 
and straggling. Many of their bravest officers and men 
had fallen. With the exception of the Second and Sixth 
Army Corps, commanded by Sumner and by Franklin, 
by far the greater part of the troops had been involved 
in Pope’s defeat, and they had not that trust in their 
leaders which promises a strong offensive. While at 
Washington the army had been reinforced by twenty-four 
regiments of infantry, but the majority of these troops 
had been but lately raised; they knew little of drill; 
they were commanded by officers as ignorant as them- 
selves, and they had never fired a musket. Nor were 
the generals equal in capacity to those opposing them. 
‘If a student of history,’ says a Northern officer, ‘ familiar 
with the characters who figured in the War of Seces- 
sion, but happening to be ignorant of the battle of 
Antietam, should be told the names of the men who 
held high commands there, he would say that with any- 
thing like equality of forces the Confederates must have 
won, for their leaders were men who made great names 
in the war, while the Federal leaders were, with few 
exceptions, men who never became conspicuous, or 
became conspicuous only through failure.’! And the dif- 
ference in military capacity extended to the rank and file. 
When the two armies met on the Antietam, events had 
been such as to confer a marked superiority on the 
Southerners. They were the children of victory, and every 
man in the army had participated in the successes of Lee 
and Jackson. ‘They had much experience of battle. They 
were supremely confident in their own prowess, for the fall 
of Harper’s Ferry had made more than amends for the 
retreat from South Mountain, and they were supremely 
confident in their leaders. No new regiments weakened 
1 The Antietam and Fredericksburg, General Palfrey, p. 53. 


230 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the stability of their array. Every brigade and every 
regiment could be depended on. The artillery, which had 
been but lately reorganised in battalions, had, under the 
fostering care of General Pendleton, become peculiarly 
efficient, although the matériel was still indifferent ; and 
against Stuart’s horsemen the Federal cavalry was prac- 
tically useless. 

In every military attribute, then, the Army of Northern 
Virginia was so superior to the Army of the Potomac that 
Lee and Jackson believed that they might fight a defensive 
battle, outnumbered as they were, with the hope of annihi- 
lating their enemy. They were not especially favoured by 
the ground, and time and means for intrenching were 
both wanting; but they were assured that not only were 
their veterans capable of holding the position, but, if 
favoured by fortune, of delivering a counterstroke which 
should shiver the Army of the Potomac into a thousand 
fragments. 

2. By retreating across the Potomac, in accordance with 
General Longstreet’s suggestion, Lee would certainly have 
avoided all chances of disaster. But, at the same time, 
he would have abandoned a good hope of ending the war. 
The enemy would have been fully justified in assuming 
that the retrograde movement had been made under the 
compulsion of his advance, and the balance of moral have 
been sensibly affected in favour of-the Federals. If the 
Potomac had once been placed between the opposing forces, 
McClellan would have had it in his power to postpone an 
encounter until his army was strongly reinforced, his raw 
regiments trained, and his troops rested. The passage of the 
river, it is true, had been successfully forced by the Confede- 
rates on September 5. But it by no means followed that it 
could be forced for the second time in face ofa concentrated 
enemy, who would have had time to recover his moral and 
supply his losses. McClellan, so long as the Confederates 
remained in Maryland, had evidently made up his mind to 
attack. But if Maryland was evacuated he would probably 
content himself with holding the line of the Potomac ; and, in 
view of the relative strength of the two armies, it would be an 


COMMENTS 231 


extraordinary stroke of fortune which should lay him open to 
assault. Lee and Jackson were firmly convinced that it was 
the wiser policy to give the enemy no time to reorganise and 
recruit, but to coerce him to battle before he had recovered 
from the defeat which he had sustained on the heights above 
Bull Run. To recross the Potomac would be to slight the 
favours of fortune, to abandon the initiative, and to sub- 
mit, in face of the vast numbers of fresh troops which the 
North was already raising, to a defensive warfare, a war- 
fare which might protract the struggle, but which must 
end in the exhaustion of the Confederacy. McClellan’s 
own words are the strongest justification of the views held 
by the Southern leaders :— 

‘The Army of the Potomac was thoroughly exhausted 
and depleted by the desperate fighting and severe march- 
ing in the unhealthy regions of the Chickahominy and 
afterwards, during the second Bull Run campaign ; its 
trains, administrative services and supplies were dis- 
organised or lacking in consequence of the rapidity and 
manner of its removal from the Peninsula, as well as 
from the nature of its operations during the second Bull 
Run campaign. 

‘Had General Lee remained in front of Washington 
(south of the Potomac) it would have been the part of 
wisdom to hold our own army quiet until its pressing 
wants were fully supplied, its organisation was restored, 
and its ranks were filled with recruits—in brief, until it 
was prepared for a campaign. But as the enemy main- 
tained the offensive, and crossed the Upper Potomac to 
threaten or invade Pennsylvania, it became necessary to 
meet him at any cost, notwithstanding the condition of the 
troops, to put a stop to the invasion, to save Baltimore 
and Washington, and throw him back across the Potomac. 
Nothing but sheer necessity justified the advance of the 
Army of the Potomac to South Mountain and Antietam in 
its then condition. The purpose of advancing from 
Washington was simply to meet the necessities of the 
moment by frustrating Lee’s invasion of the Northern 
States, and when that was accomplished, to push with the 


232 STONEWALL JACKSON 


utmost rapidity the work of reorganisation and supply, so 
that a new campaign might be promptly inaugurated with 
the army in condition to prosecute it to a successful termi- 
nation without intermission.’ ! 

And in his official report, showing what the result of a 
Confederate success might well have been, he says: ‘One 
battle lost and almost all would have been lost. Lee’s army 
might have marched as it pleased on Washington, Balti- 
more, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied its 
supplies from a fertile and undevastated country, extorted 
tribute from wealthy and populous cities, and nowhere 
east of the Alleghanies was there another organised force 
to avert its march.’ ? 

3. The situation in the West was such that even a 
victory in Maryland was exceedingly desirable. Confederate 
movements in Tennessee and Kentucky had won a measure 
of success which bade fair to open up a brilliant opportu- 
nity. Should the Federals be defeated in both the theatres 
of war, the blow would be felt throughout the length 
and breadth of the Northern States; and, in any case, it 
was of the utmost importance that all McClellan’s troops 
should be retained in the East. 

So, when the tidings came of Jackson’s victory at 
Harper’s Ferry, both armies braced themselves for the 
coming battle, the Confederates in the hope that it would be 
decisive of the war, the Federals that it would save the 
capital. But the Confederates had still a most critical time 
before them, and Lee’s daring was never more amply illus- 
trated than when he made up his mind to fight on the 
Antietam. McClellan’s great army was streaming through 
the passes of the South Mountain. At Rohrersville, six miles 
east of the Confederate bivouacs, where he had halted as 
soon as the cannonade at Harper’s Ferry ceased, Franklin 
was still posted with 20,000 men. From their battle-field at 
Turner’s Gap, ten miles from Sharpsburg, came the 70,000 
which composed the right and centre; and on the banks of 
the Antietam but 15,000 Southerners were in position. Jack- 


' Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 554, 
7 O. R., vol. xix., part i., p. 65. 


THE SITUATION 233 


son had to get rid of his prisoners, to march seventeen 
miles, and to ford the Potomac before he could reach the 
sround. Walker was twenty miles distant, beyond the 
Shenandoah ; and McLaws, who would be compelled by 
Franklin’s presence near Rohrersville to cross at Harper’s 
Ferry and follow Jackson, over five-and-twenty. Would 
they be up before McClellan attacked ? Lee, relying on 
McClellan’s caution and Jackson’s energy, answered the 
question in the affirmative. 

The September day wore on. The country between the 
South Mountain and Sharpsburg, resembling in every 
characteristic the Valley of the Shenandoah, is open and 
gently undulating. No leagues of woodland, as in Kastern 
Virginia, block the view. The roads run through wide corn- 
fields and rolling pastures, and scattered copses are the only 
relics of the forest. It was not yet noon when the Federal 
scouts appeared among the trees which crown the left 
bank of the Antietam Creek. ‘The number increased, and 
larger and larger grew the field of blue until it seemed to 
stretch as far as the eye couldsee. It was an awe-inspiring 
spectacle,’ adds Longstreet, ‘ as this grand force settled down 
in sight of the Confederates, shattered by battles and 
scattered by long and tedious marches.’! But when night 
fell upon the field the only interchange of hostilities had 
been a brief engagement of artillery. McClellan’s advance, 
owing to the difficulty of passing his great army through 
the mountains, and to the scarcity of roads, had been slow 
and tedious; in some of the divisions there had been 
unnecessary delay ; and Lee had so disposed his force that 
the Federal commander, unenlightened as to the real 
strength of his adversary, believed that he was opposed by 
50,000 men. 

Nor was the next morning marked by any increase of 
activity. McClellan, although he should have been well aware 

Sept. 16. that a great part of the Confederate army was 

still west of the Potomac, made no attack. ‘It 

was discovered,’ he reports, ‘that the enemy had changed 

the position of some of his batteries. The masses of 
' Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 667. 


234 STONEWALL JACKSON 


his troops, however, were still concealed behind the oppo- 
site heights. It was afternoon before I could move the 
troops to their positions for attack, being compelled to 
spend the morning in reconnoitring the new position taken 
up by the enemy, examining the ground, and finding fords, 
clearing the approaches, and hurrying up the ammunition 
and supply trains.’ ! 

Considering that McClellan had been in possession of the 
left bank of the Antietam since the forenoon of the previous 
day, all these preliminaries might well have been completed 
before daylight on the 16th. That a change in the dispo- 
sitions of a few batteries, a change so unimportant as to 
pass unnoticed in the Confederate reports, should have 
imposed a delay, when every moment was precious, of 
many hours, proves that Lee’s and Jackson’s estimate of 
their opponent’s character was absolutely correct. While 
McClellan was reconnoitring, and the guns were thunder- 
ing across the Antietam, Jackson and Walker crossed 
the Potomac, and reported to Lee in Sharpsburg.’ 
Walker had expected to find the Commander-in-Chief 
anxious and careworn. ‘ Anxious no doubt he was; but 
there was nothing in his look or manner to indicate it. 
On the contrary, he was calm, dignified, and even cheer- 
ful. If he had had a well- equipped army of a hundred 
thousand veterans at his back, he could not have 
appeared more composed and confident. On shaking 
hands with us, he simply expressed his satisfaction with 
the result of our operations at Harper’s Ferry, and 
with our timely arrival at Sharpsburg; adding that with 
our reinforcements he felt confident of being able to hold 
his ground until the arrival of the divisions of R. H. 
Anderson, McLaws, and A. P. Hill, which were still behind, 
and which did not arrive till next day.’ * 

Yet the reinforcements which Jackson and Walker 
had brought up were no considerable addition to Lee’s 


0. R., vol. xix., part i., p. 55. 
2 According to Jackson’s staff officers he himself reported shortly after 
daylight. 
3 Batiles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 675. 


THE CONFEDERATE STRENGTH 235 


strength. Jones’ division consisted of no more than 1,600 
muskets, Lawton’s of less than 3,500. Including officers 
and artillery, therefore, the effectives of these divisions 
numbered about 5,500. A. P. Hill’s division appears to 
have mustered 5,000 officers and men, and we may add 
1,000 for men sick or on detached duties. The total 
should undoubtedly have been larger. After the battle of 
Cedar Run, Jackson had 22,450 effectives in his ranks. 
His losses in the operations against Pope, and the transfer 
of Robertson’s cavalry to Stuart, had brought his numbers 
down by 5,787; but on September 16, including 70 killed 
or wounded at Harper’s Ferry, they should have been 
not less than 16,800. In reality they were only 11,500. 
We have not far to look for the cause of this reduction. 
Many of the men had absented themselves before the army 
crossed into Maryland ; and if those who remained with the 
colours had seen little fighting since Pope’s defeat, they 
had had no reason to complain of inactivity. The opera- 
tions which resulted in the capture of Harper’s Ferry 
had been arduous in the extreme. Men who had taken 
part in the forced marches of the Valley campaign declared 
that the march from Frederick to Harper’s Ferry sur- 
passed all their former experiences. In three-and-a-half 
days they had covered over sixty miles, crossing two moun- 
tain ranges, and fording the Potomac. The weather had been 
intensely hot, and the dust was terrible. Nor had the invest- 
ment of Harper’s Ferry been a period of repose. They had 
been under arms during the night which preceded the sur- 
render, awaiting the signal to assault within a few hundred 
yards of the enemy’s sentries. As soon as the terms of 
capitulation were arranged they had been hurried back to 
the bivouac, had cooked two days’ rations, and shortly after 
midnight had marched to the Potomac, seventeen miles 
away. This night march, coming on the top of their 
previous exertions, had taxed the strength of many beyond 
endurance. The majority were badly shod. Many were 
not shod at all. They were ill-fed, and men ill-fed are on 
the highroad to hospital. There were stragglers, then, 
from every company in thecommand. Even the Stonewall 
VOL. II. 8 


936 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Brigade, though it had still preserved its five regiments, was 
reduced to 800 muskets; and the other brigades of Jack- 
son’s division were but little stronger. Walker’s division, 
too, although less hardly used in the campaign than the 
Valley troops, had diminished under the strain of the night 
march, and mustered no more than 8,500 officers and men 
at Sharpsburg. Thus the masses of troops which McClellan 
conceived were hidden in rear of D. H. Hill and Longstreet 
amounted in reality to some 10,000 effective soldiers. 

It was fortunate, indeed, that in their exhausted con- 
dition there was no immediate occasion for their services 
on September 16. The shadows grew longer, but yet the 
Federals made no move; even the fire of the artillery died 
away, and the men slept quietly in the woods to north and 
west of the little town. Meanwhile, in an old house, one of 
the few which had any pretensions to comfort in Sharpsburg, 
the generals met in council. Staff officers strolled to and 
fro over the broad brick pavement; the horses stood lazily 
under the trees which shaded the dusty road ; and within, 
Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet pored long and earnestly over 
the map of Maryland during the bright September after- 
noon. But before the glow of a lovely sunset had faded 
from the sky the artillery once more opened on the ridge 
above, and reports came in that the Federals were crossing 
the Antietam near Pry’s Mill. Lee at once ordered 
Longstreet to meet this threat-with Hood’s division, 
and Jackson was ordered into line on the left of Hood. 
No serious collision, however, took place during the 
evening. The Confederates made no attempt to oppose 
the passage of the Creek. Hood’s pickets were driven 
in, but a speedy reinforcement restored the line, and 
except that the batteries on both sides took part the 
fighting was little more than an affair of outposts. At 
eleven o’clock Hood’s brigades were withdrawn to cook 
and eat. Jackson’s division filled their place; and the 
night, although broken by constant alarms, passed away 
without further conflict. The Federal movements had 
clearly exposed their intention of attacking, and had 
even revealed the point which they would first assail. 


FEDERAL MOVEMENTS 237 


McClellan had thrown two army corps, the First under 
Hooker, and the Twelfth under Mansfield, across the 
Antietam ; and they were now posted, facing southward, a 
mile and a half north of Sharpsburg, concealed by the woods 
beyond Jackson’s left. 


8 2 


238 STONEWALL JACKSON 


NOTE 


The essential paragraphs of the lost order ran as follows :— 

‘The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown 
road. General Jackson’s command will form the advance, and after 
passing Middletown, with such portions as he may select, take the 
route towards Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient - 
point, and by Friday night (September 12) take possession of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be 
at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may-atiempt to escape from 
Harper’s Ferry. 

‘General Longstreet’s command will pursue the same road as far as 
Boonsboro’, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage 
trains of the army. 

‘General McLaws, with his own division and that of General 
Anderson, will follow General Longstreet; on reaching Middletown 
he will take the route to Harper’s Ferry, and by Friday morning 
(September 12) possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavour 
to capture the enemy at Harper’s Ferry and vicinity. 

‘General Walker with his division . . . will take possession of the 
Loudoun Heights, if practicable by Friday morning (September 12), 
... He will as far as practicable co-operate with General McLaws 
and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. 

‘General D. H. Hill’s division will form the rear-guard of the army, 
pursuing the road taken by the main body. 

‘General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the 
commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with 
the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army and 
bring up all stragglers. 

‘The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after 
accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join 
the main bodyat Boonsboro’ or Hagerstown.’ 

The second paragraph was afterwards modified by General Lee so 
as to place Longstreet ati Hagerstown. 


239 


CHAPTER XIX 


SHARPSBURG 


It is a curious coincidence that not only were the numbers 
of the opposing armies at the battle of Sharpsburg almost 
identical with those of the French and Germans at the 
i862. battle of Worth, but that there is no small resem- 
Sept. 17. blance between the natural features and surround- 
ing scenery of the two fields. Full in front of the Confede- 
rate position rises the Red Hill, a spur of the South Mountain, 
wooded, like the Vosges, to the very crest, and towering high 
above the fields of Maryland, as the Hochwald towers above 
the Rhineland. The Antietam, however, is amore difficult 
obstacle than the Sauerbach, the brook which meanders 
through the open meadows of the Alsatian valley. A 
deep channel of more than sixty feet in width is over- 
shadowed by forest trees; and the ground on either 
bank ascends at a sharp gradient to the crests above. 
Along the ridge to the west, which parts the Antietam from 
the Potomac, and about a mile distant from the former 
stream, runs the Hagerstown turnpike, and in front of this 
road there was a strong position. Sharpsburg, a village 
of a few hundred inhabitants, lies on the reverse slope 
of the ridge, extending in the direction of the Poto- 
mac, and only the church steeples were visible to the 
Federals. Above the hamlet was the Confederate centre. 
Here, near a limestone boulder, which stood in a plot 
which is now included in the soldiers’ cemetery, was Lee’s 
station during the long hours of September 17, and from 
this point he overlooked the whole extent of his line of 
battle. A mile northward, on the Hagerstown pike, his 
left centre was marked by a square white building, famous 


240 STONEWALL JACKSON 


under the name of the Dunkard Church, and backed by a 
long dark wood. To the right, a mile southward, a bold 
spur, covered with scattered trees, forces the Antietam west- 
ward, and on this spur, overlooking the stream, he had 
placed his right. 

Between the Hagerstown pike and the Antietam the open 
slopes, although not always uniform, but broken, like those 
on the French side of the Sauerbach, by long ravines, afforded 
an admirable field of fire. The lanes which cross them are 
sunk in many places below the surface: in front of Sharps- 
burg the fields were divided by low stone walls; and these 
natural intrenchments added much to the strength of the 
position. Nor were they the only advantages. The belt 
of oaks beyond the Dunkard Church, the West Wood, 
was peculiarly adapted for defence. Parallel ledges of 
outcropping limestone, both within the thickets and 
along the Hagerstown road, rising as high as a man’s 
waist, gave good cover from shot and shell; the trees 
were of old growth, and there was little underwood. To . 
the north-east, however, and about five hundred yards 
distant across the fields, lay the East Wood, covering 
the slopes to the Antietam, with Poffenberger’s Wood 
beyond; while further to the left, the North Wood, 
extending across the Hagerstown pike, approached the Con- 
federate flank. The enemy, if he advanced to the attack 
in this quarter of the field, would thus find ample protec- 
tion during his march and deployment; and in case of 
reverse he would find a rallying-point in the North and 
Poffenberger’s Woods, of which Hooker was already in 
possession. In the space between the woods were several 
small farms, surrounded by orchards and stone fences ; 
and on the slope east of the Dunkard Church stood a few 
cottages and barns. 

Access to the position was not easy. Only a single 
ford, near Snaveley’s house, exists across the Antietam, 
and this was commanded by the bluff on the Confederate 
right. The stone bridges, however, for want of time and 
means to destroy them, had been left standing. That 
nearest the confluence of the Antietam and the Potomac, 


Robrersville 


Walker & Boutali cc. 


(Maryland). 
Scale. 


Boteler's Fora 


SHARPSBURG. 


, ? me Pe We Pea pret OF 1 ee 


5 S ae ean é: re ber f° hy at hot Ree + 


ire es i ve ‘ 
° t 7 é i 
wy oct vii ww! be vye Bee pit * 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS 241 


at the Antietam Iron-works, by which A. P Hil! was 
expected, was defended by rifle-pits and enfiladed by artil- 
lery. The next, known as the Burnside Bridge, was com- 
pletely overlooked by the heights above. That opposite 
Lee’s centre could be raked throughout its length ; but the 
fourth, at Pry’s Mill, by which Hooker and Mansfield had 
already crossed, was covered both from view and _ fire. 
Roads within the position were numerous. The Hagerstown 
turnpike, concealed for some distance on either side of 
Sharpsburg by the crest of the ridge, was admirably 
adapted for the movement of reserves, and another broad 
highway ran through Sharpsburg to the Potomac. 

The position, then, in many respects, was well adapted 
to Lee’s purpose. The flanks were reasonably secure. 
The right rested on the Antietam. The left was more open ; 
but the West Wood formed a strong point d’appw, and 
beyond the wood a low ridge, rising above Nicodemus Run, 
gave room for several batteries ; while the Potomac was so 
close that the space available for attack on this flank 
was much restricted. The ground could thus be held 
by a comparatively small number of men, and a large 
reserve set free for the counterstroke. The great draw- 
back was that the ridge east of the Antietam, although 
commanded by the crest which the Confederates occupied, 
would permit McClellan to deploy the whole of his powerful 
artillery, and in no place did the range exceed two thousand 
yards. In case of retreat, moreover, the Potomac, two 
hundred yards from shore to shore, would have to be crossed 
by a few deep fords,’ of which only one was practicable 
for waggons. These disadvantages, however, it was im- 
possible to avoid; and if the counterstroke were decisive, 
they would not be felt. 

The left of the position was assigned to Jackson, with 
Hood in third line. Next in order came D. H. Hill. 
Longstreet held the centre and the right, with Walker 
in reserve behind the flank. Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee’s 


1 Two fords, behind the left and centre, were examined by Major Hotch- 
kiss during the battle by Jackson’s order, and were reported practicable for 
infantry. 


242 STONEWALL JACKSON 


brigade and his four guns, was between the West Wood 
and the Potomac. Munford’s two regiments of cavalry, 
reinforced by a battery, held the bridge at the Antietam 
Iron-works, and kept open the communication with 
Harper’s Ferry : ; and twenty-six rifled pieces of the reserve 
artillery were with D. H. Hill. From the Nicodemus 
Run to the bluff overhanging the Burnside Bridge is just 
three miles, and for the occupation of this front the follow- 
ing troops were at Lee’s disposal :— 


Men Guns 
Jones’ Division : 1 
Ewell’s Divi ision (General Lawton) ; 5,500 a 
‘D. R. Jones’ Division : |] 
Hood’s Division (detached to J ackson) . »8,000 50 


Longstreet< Evans’ Brigade 


Jackson 


D; Hi Hills Divisions®)\:)/p)!.) ok ee 
Walker’s Division . i ; 3 . 8,500 (12 
, J Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade . : : ; \ 
Stuart Munford’s Brigade . : : - : pa 500 ae 
Reserve Artillery . ; ‘ : tn OR zm, 000 26 
25,500 184 


On the fax side of the Potomac the Shepherdstown 
Ford was protected by the remainder of the reserve 
artillery, with an infantry escort; but so small was the 
force whose retreat was thus secured that nearly every 
man was required in the fighting-line. Except the divisions 
of Hood and Walker, 5,500 men all told, there was no 
immediate reserve. 

But at daybreak on the 17th the troops which had 
been left at Harper’s Ferry were rapidly coming up. 
McLaws and Anderson, who had started before midnight, 
were already nearing the Potomac; Hampton’s cavalry 
brigade was not far behind, and orders had been dis- 
patched to A. P. Hill. But could these 18,000 bayonets 
be up in time—before Hooker and Mansfield received strong 
support, or before the Burnside Bridge was _ heavily 
attacked? The question was indeed momentous. If the 
Federals were to put forth their whole strength without 


' The majority of Jackson’s guns appear to have been left behind, 
the teams having broken down, at Harper’s Ferry. 


THE NUMBERS ENGAGED 243 


delay, bring their numerous artillery into action, and 
press the battle at every point, it seemed hardly possible that 
defeat could be averted. McClellan, however, who had 
never yet ventured on a resolute offensive, was not likely, 
in Lee’s judgment, to assault so strong a position as that 
held by the Confederates with whole-hearted energy, and it 
was safe to calculate that his troops would be feebly 
handled. Yet the odds were great. Even after the arrival 
of the absent divisions! no more than 85,000 infantry, 
4,000 cavalry, and 194 guns would be in line, and the 
enemy’s numbers were far superior. McClellan had 
called in Franklin from Rohrersville, and his muster roll 
was imposing. 


Men Guns 
First Corps—Hooker . ; , ‘ . 14,856 40 
Second Corps—Sumner . ; : ‘ . 18,813 42, 
Fifth Corps—Porter : ; ‘ : - 12,930 70 
Sixth Corps—Franklin . ‘ : : . 12,300 36 
Ninth Corps—Burnside . ; : ; . 138,819 35 
Twelfth Corps—Mansfield . : , . 10,126 36 
Cavalry—Pleasanton . ; ‘ : » 4,320 16 

87,164 275 


In comparison with the masses arrayed between the 
Red Hill and the Antietam, the Confederate army was but 
a handful. 

Notwithstanding McClellan’s caution, the opening of the 
battle was not long delayed. Before sunrise the desultory 
firing of the pickets had deepened to the roar of 
battle. Hooker, who had been ordered to begin 
the attack, forming his troops behind the North Wood, 
directed them on the Dunkard Church, which, stand- 
ing on rising ground, appeared the key of the position. 
Jackson had already thrown back his two divisions at 
nearly a right angle to the Confederate front. His 


5 A.M. 


Men Guns 

1 A. P. Hill’s Division ‘ ' - 5,000 18 
McLaws’ Division . A x ‘ . 4,500 24 
R. H. Anderson’s Division . } . 3,500 18 


Hampton’s Cavalry Brigade . ; . 1,500 -— 
14,500 60 


244 STONEWALL JACKSON 


right, which connected with the left of D. H. Hill, and 
resting on the western edge of the Hast Wood ex- 
tended as far as the Miller House, was held by Lawton, 
with two brigades in front and one in second line. West of 
the Hagerstown turnpike, and covering the ground as far as 
the Nicodemus Farm, was Jones’ division ; the Stonewall 
and Jones’ brigades in front, Taliaferro’s and Starke’s 
along the edge of the wood in rear. Three guns stood 
upon the turnpike; the remainder of the artillery 
(thirteen) guns was with Stuart on the high ground north 
of Nicodemus Run. Hood, in third -line, stood near the 
Dunkard Church; and on Hood’s right were three of 
Longstreet’s batteries under Colonel Stephen Lee. 

The ground which Jackson had been ordered to occupy 
was not unfavourable for defence, although the troops had 
practically no cover except the rail-fences and the rocky 
ledges. There was a wide and open field of fire, and when 
the Federal skirmishers appeared north of the Miller House 
the Confederate batteries, opening with vigourat arangeof . 
eight hundred yards, struck down sixteen men at the first 
salvo. This fire, and the stubborn resistance of the 
pickets, held the enemy for some time in check ; but Hooker 
deployed six batteries in reply, and after a cannonade of 
nearly an hour his infantry advanced. From the cover of 
the woods, still veiled by the morning mist, the Federals 
came forward in strong force. Across the dry ploughed 
land in Lawton’s front the fight grew hot, and on the far 
side of the turnpike the meadows round the Nicodemus 
Farm became the scene of a desperate struggle. Hooker 
had sent in two divisions, Meade on the left and Doubleday 
on the right, while a third under Ricketts acted in close 
support of Meade.! The attack was waged with the dash 
and energy which had earned for Hooker the sobriquet of 
‘Fighting Joe,’ and the troops he commanded had already 
proved their mettle on many murderous fields. Meade’s 
Pennsylvanians, together with the Indiana and Wisconsin 


1 Doubleday’s Division consisted of Phelps’, Wainwright’s, Patrick’s, and 
Gibbon’s brigades; Rickett’s Division of Duryea’s, Lyle’s, and Hartsuff’s; 
and Meade’s Pennsylvania Division of Seymour’s, Magilton’s, and Anderson’s. 


ATTACK OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS 246 


regiments, which had wrought such havoc in Jackson’s 
ranks at Grovetown, were once more bearing down upon his 
line. Nor were the tactics of the leaders ill-calculated 
to second the valour of the troops. Hooker’s whole army 
corps of 12,500 men was manceuvred in close combination. 
The second line was so posted as to render quick support. 
No portion of the front was without an adequate reserve 
in rear. The artillery was used in mass, and the flanks 
were adequately guarded. 

The conflict between soldiers so well matched was not 
less fierce than when they had met on other fields. 
Hooker’s troops had won a large measure of success at 
South Mountain three days previously, and their blood 
was up. Meade, Gibbon, and Ricketts were there to lead 
them, and the battle opened with a resolution which, if it 
had infected McClellan, would have carried the Sharpsburg 
ridge ere set of sun. Stubborn was the resistance of 
Jackson’s regiments, unerring the aim of his seasoned 
riflemen; but the opposing infantry, constantly rein- 
forced, pressed irresistibly forward, and the heavy guns 
beyond the Antietam, finding an opening between the 
woods, swept the thin grey line from end to end. Jones’ 
division, after fighting for three-quarters of an hour on 
the meadows, fell back to the West Wood; General 
Jones was carried wounded from the field, and the guns 
on the turnpike were abandoned. So tremendous was 
the fire, that the corn, said Hooker, over thirty 
acres was cut as close by the bullets as if 
it had been reaped with the sickle, and the dead lay 
piled in regular ranks along the whole Confederate front. 
Never, he added, had been seen a more bloody or dismal 
battle-field. To the east of the turnpike Lawton’s division, 
strengthened at the critical moment by the brigade in 
second line, held Meade in check, and with a sharp counter- 
stroke drove the Pennsylvanians back upon their guns. 
But Gibbon, fighting fiercely in the centre by the Miller 
House, brought up a battery in close support of his first 
line, and pressed heavily on the West Wood until the 
Confederate skirmishers, creeping through the maize, shot 


6.30 A.M. 


246 STONEWALL JACKSON 


_ down the gunners and the teams;! and Starke, who had 
succeeded Jones, led the Valley regiments once more into 
the open field. The battle swayed backwards and forwards 
under the clouds of smoke; the crash of musketry, rever- 
berating in the woods, drowned the roar of the artillery ; 
and though hundreds were shot down at the shortest range 
neither Federal nor Confederate flinched from the dreadful 
fray. Hooker sent in a fresh brigade, and Patrick, re- 
inforcing Gibbon with four regiments, passed swiftly to 
the front, captured two colours, and made some headway. 
But again the Virginians rallied, and Starke, observing 
that the enemy’s right had become exposed, led his regi- 
ments forward to the charge. Doubleday’s division, struck 
fiercely in front and flank, reeled back in confusion past 
the Miller House, and although the gallant Starke fell dead, 
the Confederates recovered the ground which they had lost. 
Jackson’s men had not been left unaided. Colonel Lee’s guns 
had themselves to look to, for along the whole course of the 
Antietam McClellan’s batteries were now in action, sweeping 
the Sharpsburg ridge with a tremendous fire; but Stuart, 
west of the Nicodemus Farm, had done much to embarrass 
Hooker’s operations. Bringing his artillery into action, for 
the ground was unsuited to cavalry, he had distracted the 
aim of the Federal gunners, and, assailing their infantry 
in flank, had compelled Doubleday to detach a portion of 
his force against him. Jackson, with supreme confidence 
in the ability of his men to hold their ground, had not 
hesitated to reinforce Stuart with Harly’s brigade, the 
strongest in his command; but before Doubleday was 
beaten back, Karly had been recalled. 
It was now half-past seven. The battle had been in 
progress nearly three hours, and Hooker’s attack had 
7.30 aa, Deen repulsed. But fresh troops were coming into 
~~~“ action from the north and north-east, and Lawton’s 
and Jones’ divisions were in no condition to withstand a 
renewed assault. No less than three officers in succes- 
sion had led the latter. Not one single brigade in either 


1 This battery of regulars, ‘B’ 4th U. §. Artillery, lost 40 officers and 
men killed and wounded, besides 33 horses. O. R., vol. xix., part i., p. 229. 


THE FIRST CORPS REPULSED 247 


division was still commanded by the officer who brought it 
into action, and but few regiments. Of 4,200 infantry,! 
1,700 had already fallen. Never had Jackson’s soldiers dis- 
played a spirit more akin to that of their intrepid leader, and 
their fierce courage was not to be wasted. Reinforcements 
were close at hand. Harly’s brigade, 1,100 strong,’ was 
moving across from Nicodemus Run into the West Wood. 
Hood brought his Texans, 1,800 muskets, to the relief of 
Lawton ; and on Hood’s right, but facing eastward, for 
Ricketts was working round Jackson’s right, three of 
D. H. Hill’s brigades, hitherto hidden under cover, came 
rapidly into line. Lawton’s division, nearly half the com- 
mand being killed or wounded, was withdrawn to the 
Dunkard Church; but on the skirt of the West Wood the 
heroic remnant of the Valley regiments still held fast 
among the limestone ledges. 

The 8,500 infantry which McClellan had sent to 
Hooker’s assistance formed the Twelfth Army Corps, com- 
manded by Mansfield; and with these men, too, Jackson’s 
soldiers were well acquainted. They were the men who had 
followed Banks and Shields from Kernstown to Winchester, 
from Port Republic to Cedar Run ; and the Valley army had 
not yet encountered more determined foes. Their attack 
was delivered with their wonted vigour. Several regiments, 
moving west of the turnpike, bore down on the West 
Wood. But coming into action at considerable intervals, 
they were roughly handled by Jones’ division, now com- 
manded by Colonel Grigsby, and protected by the rocks ; 
and Stuart’s artillery taking them in flank they were 
rapidly dispersed. Hast of the highroad the battle 
raged with still greater violence. Hood and his Texans, as 
Lawton’s brigades passed to the rear, dashed across the 
corn-field against Meade and Ricketts, driving back 
the infantry on the batteries, and shooting down the 


1 Early’s brigade had not yet been engaged. 

2 One small regiment was left with Stuart. 

3 Mansfield’s corps consisted of two divisions, commanded by Crawford 
(two brigades) and Greene (three brigades). The brigadiers were Knipe, 
Gordon, Tynedale, Stainbrook, Goodrich. 


248 STONEWALL JACKSON 


gunners. But the Federal line remained unbroken, and 
Mansfield’s troops were already moving forward. Craw- 
ford’s brigade, and then Gordon’s, struck the Texans in 
front, while Greene, working round the East Wood, made 
a resolute onslaught on D. H. Hill. The struggle was 
long and bloody. The men stood like duellists, firing and 
receiving the fire at fifty or a hundred paces. Crawford 
lost 1,000 men without gaining a foot of ground; but 
Gordon turned the scale, and Hood’s brigades were 
gradually forced back through the corn-field to the 
Dunkard Church. A great gap had now opened in Jackson’s 
line. Jones’ division, its flank uncovered by* Hood’s 
retreat, found itself compelled to seek a new position. 
D. H. Hill’s brigades, in the same plight, gave ground 
towards Sharpsburg; and Greene, following in pursuit, 
actually crossed the turnpike, and penetrated the West 
Wood; but neither Hooker nor Mansfield were able to 
support him, and unassisted he could make no progress. 

At this moment, as if by common consent, the firing 
ceased on this flank of the battle; and as McClellan’s 
Second Army Corps, led by Sumner, advanced 
to sustain the First and Twelfth, we may stand 
by Jackson near the Dunkard Church, and survey the 
field after four hours’ fighting. 

Assailed in front by superior numbers, and enfiladed 
by the batteries beyond the Antietam, the Confederate 
left had everywhere given back. The East Wood was in 
- possession of the enemy. Their right occupied the Miller 
House ; their centre, supported by many batteries, stood 
across the corn-field; while the left, thrust forward, 
was actually established on the edge of the West Wood, 
some five hundred yards to northward of the church. 
But if Jackson had yielded ground, he had exacted a fearful 
price. The space between the woods was a veritable 
slaughter-pen, reeking under the hot September sun, where 
the blue uniforms lay thicker than the grey. The First 
Army Corps had been cut to pieces. It had been beaten 
in fair fight by Jackson’s two divisions, counting at the 
outset less than half its numbers, and aided only by 


9 A.M. 


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Approximate Positions of the Troops 
during the attacks of Hooker & Mansfield ae 


on the Confederate left, at the Battle of Sharpsburg. hureh 
2 © 100 200 3n0 400 soe Yards 
ee ay eel as Le 
Walker & Boutalise. 
Tt 


VOL. II. 


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THE ARTILLERY FIGHT 249 


the cavalry. It had lost in killed and wounded over 
100 officers and 2,400 men. Hooker himself had been 
struck down, and as far as the Antietam the field was 
covered with his stragglers. The Twelfth Corps had 
suffered hardly less severely; and Mansfield himself, 
an old man and a gallant soldier, was dying of his wounds. 
His batteries indeed remained in action, pouring shot 
and shell on the West Wood and the Dunkard Church ; but 
his infantry, reduced by more than 1,500 rifles, could do 
no more than hold their ground. 

Nor was the exhaustion of the enemy the only advantage 
which the Confederates had gained by the slaughter of 4,000 
men. The position to which Jackson had retired was more 
favourable than that from which he had been driven. The 
line, no longer presenting a weak angle, was almost straight, 
and no part of the front was open to enfilade. Stuart and his 
artillery, withdrawn to a more favourable position, secured 
the left. D.H. Hill on the right, though part of his force 
had given way, still held the Roulette House and the sunken 
road, and the troops in the West Wood were well protected 
from the Northern batteries. The one weak point was 
the gap occupied by Greene’s Federals, which lay between 
Grigsby’s regiments in the northern angle of the West 
Wood and Hood’s division at the Dunkard Church. The 
enemy, however, showed no signs of making good his 
opportunity ; Harly’s brigade was close at hand, and Lee 
had promised further reinforcements. 

A glance southward showed that there was no reason 
for despair. Over all the field lay the heavy smoke of a 
great artillery battle. From near the Dunkard Church to 
the bluff overhanging the Antietam, a distance of two miles, 
battery on battery was in line. Here were Longstreet’s artil- 
lery under Stephen Lee, together with the six-and-twenty 
guns of Cutts’ reserve battalion, forty-eight guns in all; the 
divisional batteries of D. H. Hill, and the Washington 
artillery of New Orleans,' and in addition to these eighty 
guns others were in action above the Burnside Bridge. 
An array even more formidable crowned the opposite 

1 Both D. H. Hill and the Washington artillery had sixteen guns each. 
T 2 


250 STONEWALL JACKSON 


crest ; but although the Confederate batteries, opposed by 
larger numbers and heavier metal, had suffered terribly, 
both in men and in matériel, yet the infantry, the 
main strength of the defence, was still intact.! The cliffs 
of the Red Hill, replying to the rolling thunder of near 
800 guns, gave back no echo to the sharper crack of 
musketry. Save a few skirmishers, who had crossed 
the Sharpsburg Bridge, not one company of McClellan’s 
infantry had been sent into action south of the Dunkard 
Church. Beyond the Antietam, covering the whole space 
between the river and the hills, the blue masses were 
plainly to be seen through the drifting smoke ; some so far 
in the distance that only the flash of steel in the bright 
sunshine distinguished them from the surrounding woods ; 
others moving in dense columns towards the battle: 


Standards on standards, men on men ; 
In slow succession still. 


But neither by the Sharpsburg nor yet by the Burnside 
Bridge had a single Federal regiment crossed the stream ; 
Lee’s centre and right were not even threatened, and it 
was evident his reserves might be concentrated without 
risk at whatever point he pleased. 

Walker’s division was therefore withdrawn from the right, 
and McLaws, who had reached Sharpsburg shortly after 
sunrise, was ordered to the front. G.T. Anderson’s brigade 
was detached from D. H. Hill; and the whole force was 
placed at Jackson’s disposal. These fresh troops, together 
with Early’s regiments, not yet engaged, gave 10,000 
muskets for the counterstroke, and had Hooker and Mans- 
field been alone upon the field the Federal right wing would 
have been annihilated. But as the Confederate reserves 
approached the Dunkard Church, Sumner, whom McClellan 


1 ‘Our artillery,’ says General D. H. Hill, ‘ could not cope with the superior 
weight, calibre, range, and number of the Yankee guns ; hence it ought only 
to have been used against masses of infantry. On the contrary, our guns 
were made to reply to the Yankee guns, and were smashed up or withdrawn 
before they could be effectually turned against massive columns of 
attack.’ After Sharpsburg Lee gave orders that there were to be no more 
‘artillery duels’ so long as the Confederates fought defensive battles. 


ee 


ATTACK OF THE SECOND ARMY CORPS 251 


had ordered to cross Pry’s Bridge with the Second Army 
Corps, threw three divisions against the West Wood and 
the Roulette House. In three lines, up the slope from the 
Antietam, at sixty yards distance and covering a wide front, 
came Sedgwick on the right, French on the left, and Richard- 
son to the left rear. So orderly was the advance of those 
18,000 Northerners, and so imposing their array, that even 
the Confederate officers watched their march with admira- 
tion, and terrible was the shock with which they renewed 
the conflict. 

Sedgwick, emerging from the Kast Wood, moved directly 
over the corn-field, crossed the turnpike, and entering the 
West Wood to northward of the point still held by Greene, 
swept through the timber, and with a portion of his advanced 
brigade reached the further edge. Greene, at the same 
moment, moved upon the Dunkard Church, and Early, 
who with the fragments of Jones’ division was alone 
within the wood, marched rapidly in the same direction. 
Attacked suddenly in flank from behind a ridge of rock 
Greene’s regiments were driven back; and then Early, 
observing Sedgwick’s third line pushing across the turn- 
pike, reformed his troops for further action. Greene, 
for the moment, had been disposed of, but a more formid- 
able attack was threatening. Sedgwick’s 6,000 muskets, 
confronted only by some 600! of the Valley soldiers 
under Grigsby, were thronging threugh the wood, and a 
change of front southward would have sent them sweeping 
down the Confederate line. Karly could hardly have with- 
stood their onset; Hood was incapable of further effort, 
and D. H. Hill was heavily pressed by French. But 
Jackson’s hand still held the reins of battle. During the 
fierce struggle of the morning he had remained on the edge 
of the West Wood, leaving, as was his wont, the conduct of 
the divisions to his subordinates, but watching his enemy 
with a glance that saw beyond the numbers arrayed against 
him. He had already demanded reinforcements from 
General Lee; and in anticipation of their speedy arrival 


1 Letter of Jackson’s Adjutant-General. Memoirs of W. N. Pendleton, 
D.D., p. 216. 


252  - STONEWALL JACKSON 


their orders had been already framed. They had not 
been called for to sustain his front, or to occupy a 
new position. Despite the thronging masses of the 
Federals, despite the fact that his line was already 
broken, attack, and attack only, was in Jackson’s mind, 
and the reserves and the opportunity arrived together. 
A staff officer was dispatched to direct Walker, on the 
left, to sustain the Texans, to clear the West Wood, and 
to place a detachment in the gap between the Dunkard 
Church and the batteries of Colonel Lee;! while Jack- 
son himself, riding to meet McLaws, ordered him ‘to 
drive the enemy back and turn his right.’ Anderson’s 
brigade was sent to support McLaws, and Semmes’ brigade 
of McLaws’ division was detached to strengthen Stuart. 

Forming into line as they advanced, McLaws and 
Walker, leaving the Dunkard Church on their right, and 
moving swiftly through the wood, fell suddenly on Sedgwick’s 
flank. arly joined in the mélée, and ‘the result,’ says 
Palfrey, a Northern general who was present on the field, 
‘was not long doubtful. Sedgwick’s fine division was at 
the mercy of theirenemy. Change of front was impossible. 
In less time than it takes to tell it the ground was strewn 
with the bodies of the dead and wounded, while the un- 
wounded were moving off rapidly to the north. Nearly 
2,000 men were disabled in a moment.’? And the impetus 
of the counterstroke was not yet spent. Gordon’s brigade 
of the Twelfth Corps had been dispatched to Sedgwick’s 
help, but McLaws had reformed his troops, and after a short 
struggle the Confederates drove all before them. 

Confusion reigned supreme in the Federal ranks. In 
vain their powerful artillery, firing case and canister with 
desperate energy, strove to arrest the rush of the pursuing 
infantry. Out from the West Wood and across the corn- 
field the grey lines of battle, preceded by clouds of 
skirmishers, pressed forward without a check, and the light 
batteries, plying whip and spur, galloped to the front in 


1 Sharpsburg. By Major-General J. G. Walker, C.S.A. Battles and 
Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 677, 678. 
® Memoirs, p. 572. The Antietam and Fredericksburg, p. 87. 


THE COUNTERSTROKE 253 


close support. Hope rose high. The Southern yell, peal- 
ing from ten thousand throats, rang with a wild note of 
anticipated triumph, and Jackson, riding with McLaws, 
followed with kindling gaze the progress of his counterstroke 
attack. ‘God,’ he said to his companion, as the shells fell 
round them and the masses of the enemy melted away like 
the morning mist, ‘has been very kind to us this day.’ 

But the end was not yet. Sedgwick’s brigades, fly- 
ing to the north-east, rallied under the fire of their 
batteries, and as the Confederates advanced upon the Kast 
Wood, they found it already occupied by a fresh brigade. 
Smith’s division of the Sixth Corps had been sent forward 
by McClellan to sustain the battle, and its arrival saved 
his army from defeat. Once more the corn-field became 
the scene of a furious struggle, the Southerners fighting 
for decisive victory, the Federals for existence. So im- 
petuous was McLaws’ attack that the regiments on his left, 
although checked by the fences, drove in a battery and dashed 
back the enemy’s first line; but the weight of the artillery 
in front of the North Wood, supported by a portion of 
Smith’s division, prevented further advance, and a Federal 
brigade, handled with rare judgment, rushed forward to 
meet the assailants in the open. Sharp was the conflict, 
for McLaws, a fine soldier, as daring as he was skilful, 
strove fiercely to complete the victory; but the fight 
within the woods and the swift pursuit had broken the 
order of his division. Brigade had mingled with brigade, 
regiment with regiment. There were no supports; and 
the broken ranks, scourged by the terrible cross-fire of 
many batteries, were unable to withstand the solid impact 
of the Federal reserve. Slowly and sullenly the troops 
fell back from the deadly strife. The enemy, no less 
exhausted, halted and lay down beyond the turnpike; 
and while the musketry once more died away to northward 
of the Dunkard Church, Jackson, rallying his brigades, 
re-established his line along the edge of the West Wood. 

Near the church was a portion of Walker’s division. 
Further north were two of McLaws’ brigades; then Armi- 
stead, who had been sent forward from Sharpsburg, and 


254 STONEWALL JACKSON 


then Karly. A brigade of McLaws’ division formed the 
second line, and Anderson was sent back to D. H. Hill. 
Hood also was withdrawn, and the survivors of Jones’ 
division, many of whom had shared in the counter- 
attack, were permitted to leave the front. Their rifles 
10.30 au, Were no longer needed, for from half-past ten 
onwards, so far as the defence of the Confede- 

rate left was concerned, the work was done. For many 
hours the West Wood was exposed to the concentrated fire 
of the Federal artillery ; but this fire, although the range 
was close, varying from six to fifteen hundred yards, had 
little effect. The shattered branches fell incessantly among 
the recumbent ranks, and the shells, exploding in the foliage, 
sent their hissing fragments far and wide; yet the losses, 
so more than one general reported, were surprisingly small. 
But although the enemy’s infantry had been repulsed, 

no immediate endeavour was made by the Confederates to 
initiate a fresh counterstroke. When Lee sent McLaws 
and Walker to Jackson’s aid, he sent in his last reserve, for | 
A. P. Hill had not yet reached the field, and R. H. Anderson’s 
division had already been taken to support the centre. 
Thus no fresh troops were available, and the Federal right 
was strong. At least fifteen batteries of artillery were in 
position along the edge of. the North Wood, and they were 
powerfully supported by the heavy guns beyond the stream. 
Yet the infantry so effectively protected was only 
formidable by reason of its numbers. The First Corps and 
the Twelfth no longer existed as organised bodies.! Sedg- 
wick’s division of the Second Corps was still more shattered. 
Only Smith’s division was effective, and General McClellan, 
acting on the advice of Sumner, forbade all further 
attack. Slocum’s division of the Sixth Corps, which 
reached the East Wood at twelve o’clock, was ordered 
to remain in rear as support to Smith. The Confederate 
left wing, then, had offered such strenuous resistance that 
eight divisions of infantry, more than half of McClellan’s 
army, lay paralysed before them for the remainder of 


‘ It was not until two o’clock that even Meade’s Pennsylvanians were 
reformed. 


HEAVY LOSSES 255 


the day. 30,500 infantry, at the lowest calculation,' 
and probably 100 guns, besides those across the Antie- 
tam, had been massed by the Federals in this quarter 
of the field. Jackson’s numbers, even after he had been 
reinforced by McLaws and Walker, at no time approached 
those arrayed against him, and 19,400 men, including Stuart 
and three brigades of Hill, and 40 guns, is a liberal esti- 
mate of his strength.” The losses on both sides had been 
exceedingly heavy. Nearly 18,000 men,’ including no less 
than fifteen generals and brigadiers, had fallen within six 
hours. But although the Confederate casualties were not 
greatly exceeded by those of the enemy, and were much 
larger in proportion to their strength, the Federals had lost 
more than mere numbers. The moral of the troops had 
suffered, and still more the moral of the leaders. Even 


1,Hooker:» . |. : ; , ‘ . . 11,000 
Mansfield ; , J : ; 4 . 8,500 
Sedgwick : : : } : ; . 6,000 
Smith . ; : : ; x - 5,000 

30,500 

2 Lawton ; : 4 p ‘ ! . 8,600 
Jones . : : : ‘ ‘ . 1,800 
Hood . F : : P : ; . 2,000 
Stuart . ' ; i . : . ft BOO 
G. T. Anderson . p A , . 1,000 
Walker. ‘ : : : : , . 3,500 
McLaws ; : j ‘ ‘ : . 4,500 
D. H. Hill (3 brigades) . A : . 1,500 

19,400 


’ The Federals engaged against Jackson lost in five and a half hours 
7,000 officers and men. MDuring the seven hours they were engaged at 
Gravelotte the Prussian Guard and the Saxon Army Corps lost 10,349; but 
50,000 infantry were in action. The percentage of loss (20) was about 
the same in both cases. The Confederate losses up to 10.30 a.m. were as 
follows : 


Jones F ‘ P ; . : : 5 700 
Lawton . : é ‘ “ ; , . Look 
Hood f ; : E : ! , . 1,002 
McLaws . " : . * : (119 
Walker . ; : ? ‘ : ; . 1,012 
Anderson : ¢ : F : : - 87 
D. H. Hill (estimate) ; ; : . 600 


5,754 (29 p.c.) 


256 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Sumner, bravest of men, had been staggered by the fierce 
assault which had driven Sedgwick’s troops like sheep across 
the corn-field, nor was McClellan disposed to push matters 
to extremity. 

Over in the West Wood, on the other hand, discourage- 
ment had no place. Jackson had not yet abanddned hope 
of sweeping the enemy from the field. He was disappointed 
with the partial success of McLaws’ counterstroke. It had 
come too late. The fortuitous advance of Smith’s division, 
at the very crisis of the struggle, had, in all human proba- 
bility, rescued the Federal right from a terrible defeat. 
Had McLaws been able to reach the East Wood he would 
have compelled the hostile batteries to retreat; the Federal 
infantry, already shattered and disorganised, could hardly 
have held on, and the line would have been broken through. 
But although one opportunity had been lost, and he was 
once more thrown on the defensive, Jackson’s determination 
to make the battle decisive of the war was still unshaken. 
His judgment was never clearer. Shortly before eleven 
o’clock his medical director, appalled by the number of © 
wounded men sent back from the front, and assured 
that the day was going badly, rode to the West Wood in 
order to discuss the advisability of transferring the field 
hospitals across the Potomac. Dr. McGuire found Jackson 
sitting quietly on ‘Little Sorrel’ behind the line of battle, 
and some peaches he had brought with him were gratefully 
accepted. He then made his report, and his apprehensions 
were not made less by the weakness of the line which held 
the wood. The men, in many places, were lying at in- 
tervals of several yards; for support there was but one 
small brigade, and over in the corn-fields the overwhelming 
strength of the Federal masses was terribly apparent. Yet 
his imperturbable commander, apparently paying more 
attention to the peaches than to his subordinate’s sugges- 
tions, replied by pointing to the enemy and saying quietly, 
‘Dr. McGuire, they have done their worst.’ 

Meanwhile, the tide of battle, leaving Jackson’s front 
and setting strongly southwards, threatened to submerge 
the Confederate centre. French’s division of Sumner’s 


THE ‘BLOODY LANE’ 257 


corps, two brigades of Franklin’s, and afterwards Richard- 
son’s division, made repeated efforts to seize the Dunkard 
Church, the Roulette Farm, and the Piper House. From 
before ten until one o’clock the battle raged fiercely about 
ipy, he sunken road which was held by D. H. Hill, and 
which witnessed on this day such pre-eminence 

of slaughter that it has since been known by the name 
of the ‘Bloody Lane.’ Here, inspired by the unyielding 
courage of their leaders, fought the five brigades of D. H. 
Hill, with BR. H. Anderson’s division and two of Walker’s 
regiments; and here Longstreet, confident as always, 
controlled the battle with his accustomed skill. The Con- 
federate artillery was by this time overpowered, for 
on each battery in turn the enemy’s heavy ordnance had 
concentrated an overwhelming fire, and the infantry 
were supported by no more than a dozen guns. The 
attack was strong, but the sunken road, fortified by piles 
of fence-rails, remained inviolable. Still the Confede- 
rate losses were enormous, and defeat appeared a mere 
question of time; at one moment, the enemy under 
French had actually seized the wood near the Dunkard 
Church, and was only dispossessed by a desperate counter- 
stroke. Richardson, who advanced on French’s right, and 
at an appreciable interval of time, was even more successful 
than his colleague. The‘ Bloody Lane,’ already piled with 
dead, and enfiladed from a height to the north-west, was 
carried by a brilliant charge; and when the Roulette Farm, 
a strong defensive post, was stormed, Longstreet fell back to 
the turnpike through the wreck of the artillery. But at this 
critical juncture the Federals halted. They had not been 
supported by their batteries. Richardson had received a 
mortal wound, and a succession of rough counterstrokes had 
thinned their ranks. Here, too, the musketry dwindled to 
a spattering fire, and the opposing forces, both reduced to 
the defensive, lay watching each other through the long 
hours of the afternoon. A threat of a Federal advance 
from the Sharpsburg Bridge came to nothing. Four bat- 
teries of regulars, preceded by a force of infantry, pushed 
across the stream and came into action on either side of 


258 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the Boonsboro’ road; but on the slopes above, strongly 
protected by the walls, Evans’ brigade stood fast ; Lee sent 
up a small support, and the enemy confined his movements 
to a demonstration. 

Still further to the south, however, the battle blazed out 
at one o’clock with unexpected fury. The Federal attack, 
recoiling first from Jackson and then from Longstreet, 
swung round to the Confederate right; and it seemed 
as if McClellan’s plan was to attempt each section of 
Lee’s line in succession. Burnside had been ordered 
to force the passage of the bridge at nine o'clock, but 
either the difficulty of the task, or his inexperience in 
handling troops on the offensive, delayed his movements ; 
and when the attack was made, it was fiercely met by four 
Confederate brigades. Atlength, well on in the afternoon, 
three Federal divisions crowned the spur, and, driving 
Longstreet’s right before them, made good their foot- 
ing on the ridge. Sharpsburg was below them ; the Southern 
infantry, outflanked and roughly handled, was falling back 
in confusion upon the town ; andalthough Lee had assembled 
a group of batteries in the centre, and regiments were 
hurrying from the left, disaster seemed imminent. But 
strong assistance was at hand. A. P. Hill, who had forded 
the Potomac and crossed the Antietam by the lower bridge, 
after a forced march of seventeen miles in eight hours from 
Harper’s Ferry,' attacked without waiting for orders, and 
struck the Federals in flank with 3,000 bayonets. By this 
brilliant counterstroke Burnside was repulsed and the 
position saved. 

Northern writers have laid much stress on this attack. 
Had Burnside displayed more, or A. P. Hill less, energy, 
the Confederates, they assert, could hardly have escaped 
defeat. It is certainly true that lLongstreet’s four 
brigades had been left to bear the brunt of Burnside’s 
assault without further support than could be rendered by 
the artillery. They were not so left, however, because it 
was impossible to aid them. Jackson’s and Longstreet’s 


1 Hill received his orders at 6.30 a.m. and marched an hour later, 
reaching the battle-field about 3.30 p.m. 


PLANS A FRESH COUNTERSTROKE 259 


troops, despite the fiery ordeal through which they had 
passed, were not yet powerless, and the Confederate leaders | 
were prepared for offensive tactics. A sufficient force to 
sustain the right might have been withdrawn from the left 
and centre ; but Hill’s approach was known, and it was con- 
sidered inadvisable to abandon all hold of the means for 
a decisive counterstroke on the opposite flank. arly in 
the afternoon Longstreet had given orders for an advance. 
Hood’s division, with full cartridge-boxes, had reappeared 
upon the field. Jones’ and Lawton’s divisions were close 
behind; the batteries had replenished their ammunition, and 
if Longstreet was hardly warranted in arranging a general 
counter-attack on his own responsibility, he had at least full 
confidence in the ability of the troops to execute it. ‘ It 
seemed probable,’ he says, ‘that by concealing our move- 
ments under cover of the (West) wood, we could draw our 
columns so near to the enemy to the front that we would have 
but a few rods to march to mingle our ranks with his; that 
our columns, massed in goodly numbers, and pressing 
heavily upon a single point, would give the enemy much 
trouble and might cut him in two, breaking up his battle 
arrangements at Burnside Bridge.’ ! 

The stroke against the centre was not, however, to 
be tried. Lee had other views, and Jackson had been 
already ordered to turn the Federal right. Stuart, rein- 
forced by a regiment of infantry and several light batteries, 
was instructed to reconnoitre the enemy’s position, and 
if favourable ground were found, he was to be supported 
by all the infantry available. ‘About half-past twelve,’ 
says General Walker, ‘I sought Jackson to report that 
from the front of my position in the wood I thought I had 
observed a movement of the enemy, as if to pass through 
the gap where I had posted Colonel Cooke’s two regiments. 
I found Jackson in rear of Barksdale’s brigade, under an 
apple tree, sitting on his horse, with one leg thrown 
carelessly over the pommel of his saddle, plucking and 
eating the fruit. Without making any reply to my 
report, he asked me abruptly: ‘‘Can you spare me a 

1 From Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 256, 257. 


260 STONEWALL JACKSON 


regiment and a battery?” . . . adding that he wished to 
make up, for the different commands on our left, a force 
of four or five thousand men, and give them to Stuart, 
with orders to turn the enemy’s right and attack him 
in the rear; that I must give orders to my division to 
advance to the front, and attack the enemy as soon as I 
should hear Stuart’s guns, and that our whole left wing 
would move to the attack at the same time. ‘Then, 
replacing his foot in the stirrup, he said with great 
emphasis, ‘“‘ We'll drive McClellan into the Potomac.” 

‘Returning to my command, I repeated General Jack- 
son’s order to my brigade commanders and directed them 
to listen to the sound of Stuart’s guns. We all confidently 
expected to hear the welcome sound by two o'clock at 
least, and as that hour approached every ear was on the 
alert. Napoleon at Waterloo did not listen more intently 
for the sound of Grouchy’s fire than did we for Stuart’s, 
Two o’clock came, but nothing was heard of Stuart. Half- 
past two, and then three, and still Stuart made no sign. 

‘About half-past three a staff officer of General Long- 
street’s brought me an order to advance and attack the 
enemy in my front. As the execution of this order would 
have materially interfered with Jackson’s plans, I thought 
it my duty before beginning the movement to communicate 
with General Longstreet personally. I found him in rear 
of the position in which I had posted Cooke in the morning, 
and upon informing him of Jackson’s intentions, he with- 
drew his order. 

‘While we were discussing this subject, Jackson him- 
self joined us with the information of Stuart’s failure to 
turn the Federal right, for the reason that he found it 
securely posted onthe Potomac. Upon my expressing sur- 
prise at this statement, Jackson replied that he also had 
been surprised, as he had supposed the Potomac much 
further away ; but he remarked that Stuart had an excellent 
eye for topography, and it must be as he represented. 
“It is a great pity,’’ he added; ‘we should have driven 
McClellan into the Potomac.” ’! 


' Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 679, 680. 


THE BATTLE CEASES 261 


That a counterstroke which would have combined a 
frontal and flank attack would have been the best chance 
of destroying the Federal army can hardly be questioned. 
The front so bristled with field artillery, and the ridge 
beyond the Antietam was so strong in heavier ordnance, 
that a purely frontal attack, such as Longstreet suggested, 
was hardly promising; but the dispositions which baffled 
Stuart were the work of a sound tactician. Thirty rifled 
guns had been assembled in a single battery a mile north 
of the West Wood, where the Hagerstown turnpike ascends 
a commanding ridge, and the broad channel of the Potomac 
is within nine hundred yards. Here had rallied such 
portions of Hooker’s army corps as had not dispersed, and 
here Mansfield’s two divisions had reformed ; and although 
the infantry could hardly have opposed a resolute resistance 
the guns were ready to repeat the lesson of Malvern Hill. 
Against the rifled pieces the light Confederate smooth- 
bores were practically useless. Stuart’s caution was fully 
justified, and the sun sank on an indecisive battle. 

‘The blessed night came, and brought with it sleep and 
forgetfulness and refreshment to many; but the murmur 
of the night wind, breathing over fields of wheat and 
clover, was mingled with the groans of the countless 
sufferers of both armies. Who can tell, who can even 
imagine, the horrors of such a night, while the unconscious 
stars shone above, and the unconscious river went rippling 
by?’! Out of 180,000 men upon the ground, 21,000 
had been killed or wounded, more than sixteen per cent. ; 
and 25,000 of the Federals can hardly be said to have 
been engaged. 

The losses of the Confederate left have already been 
enumerated. Those of the centre and the right, although 
A. P. Hill reported only 350 casualties, had hardly been 
less severe. In all 9,500 officers and men, one-fourth of 
the total strength, had fallen, and many of the regiments 
had almost disappeared.2 The 17th Virginia, for in- 


1 General Palirey. The Antietam and Fredericksburg. 
2*One does not look for humour in a stern story like this, but the 
Charleston Cowrier account of the battle contains the following statement: 


262 STONEWALL JACKSON 


stance, of Longstreet’s command, took into battle 9 
officers and 46 men; of these 7 officers and 24 men were 
killed or wounded, and 10 taken prisoners, leaving 2 
officers and 12 men to represent a regiment which was 
over 1,000 strong at Bull Run. Yet as the men sank down 
to rest on the line of battle, so exhausted that they could 
not be awakened to eat their rations; as the blood cooled 
and the tension on the nerves relaxed, and even the officers, 
faint with hunger and sickened with the awful slaughter, 
looked forward with apprehension to the morrow, from one 
indomitable heart the hope of victory had not yet vanished. 
In the deep silence of the night, more oppressive than the 
stunning roar of battle, Lee, still mounted, stood on the 
highroad to the Potomac, and as general after general 
rode in wearily from the front, he asked quietly of each, 
‘How is it on your part of the line?’ Each told the 
same tale: their men were worn out ; the enemy’s numbers 
were overwhelming ; there was nothing left but to retreat 
across the Potomac before daylight. Even Jackson had 
no other counsel to offer. His report was not the less im- : 
pressive for his quiet and respectful tone. He had had to 
contend, he said, against the heaviest odds he had ever met. 
Many of his divisional and brigade commanders were dead 
or wounded, and his loss had been severe. Hood, who 
came next, was quite unmanned. He exclaimed that he 
had no men left. ‘Great God!’ cried Lee, with an ex- 
citement he had not yet displayed, ‘ where is the splendid 
division you had this morning?’ ‘They are lying on 
the field, where you sent them,’ was the reply, ‘for 
few have straggled. My division has been almost wiped 
out.’ | 

After all had given their opinion, there was an appalling 
silence, which seemed to last for several minutes, and then 
General Lee, rising erect in his stirrups, said, ‘ Gentlemen, 
we will not cross the Potomac to-night. You will go to 
your respective commands, strengthen your lines; send 


‘“‘ They [the Confederates] fought until they were cut to pieces, and then re- 
treated only because they had fired their last round!”’ General Palfrey, 
The Antietam and Fredericksburg. 


LEE 263 


two officers from each brigade towards the ford to collect 
your stragglers and get them up. Many have comein. I 
have had the proper steps taken to collect all the men who 
are in therear. If McClellan wants to fight in the morn- 
ing, I will give him battle again. Go!’ Without a word 
of remonstrance the group broke up, leaving their great 
commander alone with his responsibility, and, says an eye- 
witness, ‘if I read their faces aright, there was not one but 
considered that General Lee was taking a fearful risk.’ ! 
So the soldiers’ sleep was undisturbed. Through the 
September night they lay beside their arms, and from the 
dark spaces beyond came the groans of the wounded and 
the nameless odours of the battle-field. Not often has the 
night looked down upon a scene more terrible. The moon, 
rising above the mountains, reveaied the long lines of men 
and guns, stretching far across hill and valley, waiting for 
the dawn to shoot each other down, and between the armies 
their dead lay in such numbers as civilised war has seldom 
seen. So fearful had been the carnage, and comprised 
within such narrow limits, that a Federal patrol, it is 
related, passing into the corn-field, where the fighting had 
been fiercest, believed that they had surprised a whole 
Confederate brigade. There, in the shadow of the woods, 
lay the skirmishers, their muskets beside them, and there, in 
regular ranks, lay the line of battle, sleeping, as it seemed, 
the profound sleep of utter exhaustion. But the first man 
that was touched was cold and lifeless, and the next, and 
the next; it was the bivouac of the dead. 

When the day dawned the Confederate divisions, rein- 
forced by some 5,000 or 6,000 stragglers, held the same 
position as the previous evening, and over 
against them, seen dimly through the mist, lay 
the Federal lines. The skirmishers, crouching behind the 
shattered fences, confronted each other at short range; the 
guns of both armies were unlimbered, and the masses of 
infantry, further to the rear, lay ready for instant conflict. 
But not a shot was fired. The sun rose higher in the 


Sept. 18. 


1 Communicated by General Stephen D. Lee, who was present at the 
conference. 
VOL. Il. U 


264 STONEWALL JACKSON 


heavens; the warm breath of the autumn morning rustled 
in the woods, but still the same strange silence prevailed. 
The men spoke in undertones, watching intently the move- 
ments of staff officers and orderlies ; but the ranks lay as 
still as the inanimate forms, half hidden by the trodden 
corn, which lay so thickly between the lines; and as the 
hours passed on without stir or shot, the Southern generals 
acknowledged that Lee’s daring in offering battle was fully 
justified. The enemy’s aggressive strength was evidently 
exhausted; and then arose the question, Could the Con- 
federates attack? It would seem that the possibility of a 
ereat counterstroke had already been the subject of debate, 
and that Lee, despite the failure of the previous evening, 
and Jackson’s adverse report, believed that the Federal 
right might be outflanked and overwhelmed. ‘ During the 
morning,’ writes General Stephen D. Lee, ‘a courier from 
headquarters came to my battalion of artillery witha message 
that the Commander-in-Chief wished to seeme. I followed 
the courier, and on meeting General Lee, he said, 
‘“‘ Colonel Lee, I wish you to go with this courier to General 
Jackson, and say that I sent you to report to him.”’ I replied, 
*‘ General, shall I take my batteries with me?” He said, 
** No, just say that I told you to report to him, and he will 
tell you what he wants.’”’ I soon reached General Jackson. 
He was dismounted, with but few persons round him. He 
said to me, “ Colonel Lee, I wish you to take a ride with 
me,’ and we rode to the left of our lines with but one 
courier, | think. We soon reached a considerable hill and 
dismounted. General Jackson then said, ‘‘ Let us go up 
this hill, and be careful not to expose yourself, for the 
Federal sharpshooters are not far off.” The hill bore evi- 
dence of fierce fight the day before.! A battery of artillery 
had been on it, and there were wrecked caissons, broken 
wheels, dead bodies, and dead horses around. General 
Jackson said: ‘‘ Colonel, I wish you to take your glasses 
and carefully examine the Federal line of battle.’’ I did so, 
and saw a remarkably strong line of battle, with more 
troops than I knew General Lee had. After locating the 
1 Evidently the ridge which had been held by Stuart on the 17th. 


JACKSON AND COLONIIL LEE 265 


different batteries, unlimbered and ready for action, and 
noting the strong skirmish line, in front of the dense 
masses of infantry, I said to him, ‘“‘General, that is a 
very strong position, and there is a large force there.’ 
He said, “ Yes. I wish you to take fifty pieces of artil- 
lery and crush that force, which is the Federal right. 
Can you do it?’’ I can scarcely describe my feelings as I 
again took my glasses, and made an even more careful 
examination. I at once saw such an attempt must fail. 
More than fifty guns were unlimbered and ready for action, 
strongly supported by dense lines of infantry and strong 
skirmish lines, advantageously posted. The ground was 
unfavourable for the location of artillery on the Confederate 
side, for, to be effective, the guns would have to move up 
close to the Federal lines, and that, too, under fire of both 
infantry and artillery. I could not bring myself to say all 
that I felt and knew. I said, ‘‘ Yes, General ; where will I 
vet the fifty guns?’”’ Hesaid, ‘‘ How many have you?” I 
replied, ‘‘ About twelve out of the thirty I carried into the 
action the day before.’’ (My losses had been very great in 
men, horses, and carriages.) He said, ‘I can furnish you 
some, and General Lee says he can furnish some.” I replied, 
“Shall I go for the guns?” “No, not yet,” he replied. 
‘‘Colonel Lee, can you crush the Federal right with fifty 
ouns?” Isaid, “ General, cantry. Ican doit if anyone 
can.’ He replied, ‘ That is not whatI asked you, sir. If 
I give you fifty guns, can you crush the Federal right ?”’ 
I evaded the question again and again, but he pressed it 
home. Finally I said, ‘“‘General, you seem to be more 
intent upon my giving you my technical opinion as an 
artillery officer, than upon my going after the guns and 
making the attempt.” ‘‘ Yes, sir,’’ he replied, ‘‘ and I want 
your positive opinion, yes or no.” I felt that a great crisis 
was upon me, and I could not evade it. I again took my 
glasses and made another examination. I waited a good 
while, with Jackson watching me intently. 

‘I said, ‘‘General, it cannot be done with fifty guns 
and the troops you have near here.’ In an instant he 
said, ‘“‘ Let us ride back, Colonel.” I felt that I had 

u 2 


266 STONEWALL JACKSON 


positively shown a lack of nerve, and with considerable 
emotion begged that I might be allowed to make the 
attempt, saying, “ General, you forced me to say what I 
did unwillingly. If you give the fifty guns to any other 
artillery officer, I am ruined for life. I promise you I will 
fight the guns to the last extremity, if you will only let me 
command them.” Jackson was quiet, seemed sorry for 
me, and said, “It is all right, Colonel. Everybody knows 
you are a brave officer and would fight the guns well,” or 
words to that effect. Wesoon reached the spot from which 
we started. He said, “Colonel, go to General Lee, and 
tell him what has occurred since you reported to me. 
Describe our ride to the hill, your examination of the 
Federal position, and my conversation about your crushing 
the Federal right with fifty guns, and my forcing you to 
give your opinion.” 

‘With feelings such as I never had before, nor ever 
expect to have again, I returned to General Lee, and gave 
a detailed account of my visit to General Jackson, closing. 
with the account of my being forced to give my opinion as 
to the possibility of success. I saw a shade come over 
General Lee’s face, and he said, “Colonel, go and join 
your command.” 

‘For many years I never fully understood my mission 
that day, or why I was sent to General Jackson. When 
Jackson’s report was published of the battle, I saw that 
he stated, that on the afternoon of September 17, General 
Lee had ordered him to move to the left with a view 
of turning the Federal right, but that he found the enemy’s 
numerous artillery so judiciously posted in their front, and 
so near the river, as to render such an attempt too hazard- 
ous to undertake. I afterwards saw General J. E. B. 
Stuart’s report, in which he says that it was determined, 
the enemy not attacking, to turn the enemy’s right on 
the 18th. It appears General Lee ordered General 
Jackson, on the evening of the 17th, to turn the enemy’s 
right, and Jackson said that it could not be done. It 
also appears from Stuart’s report, and from the incident I 
relate, that General Lee reiterated the order on the 18th, 


THE FEDERALS REINFORCED 267 


and told Jackson to take fifty guns, and crush the Federal 
right. Jackson having reported against such attempt 
on the 17th, no doubt said that if an artillerist, in whom 
General Lee had confidence, would say the Federal right 
could be crushed with fifty guns, he would make the attempt. 

‘I now have the satisfaction of knowing that the 
opinion which I was forced to give on September 18 had 
already been given by Jackson on the evening of September 
17, and that the same opinion was reiterated by him on 
September 18, and confirmed by General J. EK. B. Stuart 
on the same day. I still believe that Jackson, Stuart, and 
myself were right, and that the attempt to turn the Federal 
right either on the 17th or on the 18th would have been 
unwise. 

‘The incident shows General Lee’s decision and bold- 
ness in battle, and General Jackson’s delicate loyalty to his 
commanding general, in convincing him of the inadvisa- 
bility of a proposed movement, which he felt it would be 
hazardous to undertake.’ 

The Federal left, protected by the Antietam, was 
practically inaccessible ; and on receiving from the artillery 
officers’ lips the confirmation of Jackson’s report, Lee 
was fain to relinquish all hope of breaking McClellan’s 
line. The troops, however, remained in line of battle; 
but during the day information came in which made 
retreat imperative. The Federals were being reinforced. 
Humphreys’ division, hitherto held back at Frederick 
by orders from Washington, had marched over South 
Mountain; Couch’s division, which McClellan had left to 
observe Harper’s Ferry, had been called in; and a large 
force of militia was assembling on the Pennsylvania 
border. Before evening, therefore, Lee determined to 
evacuate his position, and during the night the Army 
of Northern Virginia, with all its trains and artillery, 
recrossed the Potomac at Boteler’s Ford. 


1 Communicated to the author. The difficulties in the way of the 
attack, of which Jackson was aware on the night of the 17th, probably led 
to his advising retreat when Lee asked his opinion at the conference (ante, 
pp- 259, 260). 


268 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Such was the respect which the hard fighting of the 
Confederates had imposed upon the enemy, that although 
the rumbling of heavy vehicles, and the tramp of the long 
columns, were so distinctly audible in the Federal lines that 
they seemed to wakeful ears like the steady flow of a river, 
not the slightest attempt was made to interfere. It was not 
till the morning of the 19th that a Federal battalion, re- 
connoitring towards Sharpsburg, found the ridge and the 
town deserted ; and although Jackson, who was one of the 
last, except the cavalry scouts, to cross the river, did not 
reach the Virginia shore till eight o’clock, not a shot was 
fired at him. 

Nor were the trophies gathered by the Federals con- 
siderable. Several hundred badly wounded men were 
found in Sharpsburg, and a number of stragglers were 
picked up, but neither gun nor waggon had been left 
upon the field. The retreat, despite many obstacles, was 
as successfully as skilfully executed. The night was very 
dark, and a fine rain, which had set in towards even- — 
ing, soon turned the heavy soil into tenacious mud; the 
ford was wide and beset with boulders, and the only 
approach was a narrow lane. But the energetic quarter- 
master of the Valley army, Major Harman, made light of all 
difficulties, and under the immediate supervision of Lee and 
Jackson, the crossing was effected without loss or misad- 

Sept. 19. venture. Just before nightfall, however, under 
cover of a heavy artillery fire, the Federals 
pushed a force of infantry across the ford, drove back the 
two brigades, which, with thirty pieces of artillery, formed 
the Confederate rear-guard, and captured four guns. Hm- 
boldened by this partial success, McClellan ordered Porter to 
put three brigades of the Fifth Army Corps across the river 
the next morning, and reconnoitre towards Winchester. 

The news of the disaster to his rear-guard was long in 
reaching Lee’s headquarters. His army had not yet re- 
covered from the confusion and fatigue of the retreat. The 
bivouaes of the divisions were several miles from the river, 
and were widely scattered. The generals were ignorant 
of each other’s dispositions. No arrangements had been 


THE REAR-GUARD OVERWHELMED 269 


made to support the rear-guard in case of emergency. The 
greater part of the cavalry had been sent off to Williams- 
port, fifteen miles up stream, with instructions to cross the 
Potomac and delay the enemy’s advance by demonstration. 
The brigadiers had no orders; many of the superior 
generals had not told their subordinates where they would 
be found; and the commander of the rear-guard, General 
Pendleton, had not been informed of. the strength of the 
infantry placed at his disposal. On the part of the staff, 
worn out by the toils and anxieties of the past few days, 
there appears to have been a general failure; and had 
McClellan, calculating on the chances invariably offered by 
an enforced retreat, pushed resolutely forward in strong 
force, success might possibly have followed. 
Lee, on receiving Pendleton’s report, long after mid- 
night, sent off orders for Jackson to drive the enemy back. 
Sept. 20. When the messenger arrived, Jackson had already 
ridden to the front. He, too, had received news of 
the capture of the guns ; and ordering A. P. Hilland Early,’ 
who were in camp near Martinsburg, to march at once to 
Shepherdstown, he had gone forward to reconnoitre the 
enemy’s movements. When lLee’s courier found him 
he was on the Shepherdstown road, awaiting the arrival 
of his divisions, and watching, unattended by a single 
aide-de-camp, the advance of Porter’s infantry. He had 
ati once grasped the situation. The Confederates were 
in no condition to resist an attack in force. The army 
was not concentrated. The cavalry was absent. No 
reconnaissance had been made either of lines of march 
or of positions. The roads were still blocked by the 
trains. The men were exhausted by their late exertions, 
and depressed by their retreat, and the straggling was 
terrible. The only chance of safety lay in driving back 
the enemy’s advanced-guard across the river before it could 
be reinforced; and the chance was seized without an 
instant’s hesitation. 
The Federals advanced leisurely, for the cavalry which 


1 Commanding Ewell’s division, vice Lawton, wounded at Sharps- 
burg. 


270 STONEWALL JACKSON 


should have led the way had received its orders too late to 
reach the rendezvous at the appointed hour, and the infantry, 
compelled to reconnoitre for itself, made slow progress. 
Porter’s leading brigade was consequently not more than a 
mile and a half from the river when the Light Division 
reported to Jackson. Hill was ordered to form his troops 
in two lines, and with Early in close support to move at 
once to the attack. The Federals, confronted by a large 
force, and with no further object than to ascertain the 
whereabouts of the Confederate army, made no attempt to 
hold their ground. Their left and centre, composed mainly 
of regulars, withdrew in good order. The right, hampered 
by broken country, was slow to move; and Hill’s soldiers, 
who had done much at Sharpsburg with but little loss, were 
confident of victory. The Federal artillery beyond the river 
included many of their heavy batteries, and when the long 
lines of the Southerners appeared in the open, they were 
met by a storm of shells. But without a check, even to 
close the gaps in the ranks, or to give time to the. 
batteries to reply to the enemy’s fire, the Light Division 
pressed forward to the charge. The conflict was short. 
The Northern regulars had already passed the ford, and 
only a brigade of volunteers was left on the southern bank. 
Bringing up his reserve regiment, the Federal general made 
a vain effort to prolong his front. Hill answered by calling 
up a brigade from his second line; and then, outnumbered 
and outflanked, the enemy was driven down the bluffs and 
across the river. The losses in this affair were comparatively 
small. The Federals reported 340 killed and wounded, and 
of these a raw regiment, armed with condemned Enfield 
rifles, accounted for no less than 240. Hiull’s casualties were 
271. Yet the engagement was not without importance. 
Jackson’s quick action and resolute advance convinced the 
enemy that the Confederates were still dangerous; and 
McClellan, disturbed by Stuart’s threat against his rear, 
abandoned all idea of crossing the Potomac in pursuit 
of Lee. 
The losses at Sharpsburg may be here recorded. 


LOSSES 


JONES’ Diviston—1,800. 


The Stonewall Brigade, 250 Sa 
Taliaferro’s Brigade . ; 
Starke’s Brigade ; 
Jones’ Brigade 3 : A 


Eweuu’s (Lawton) Diviston—38,600. 


Lawton’s Brigade, 1,150 strong 
Early’s Brigade, 1,200 strong . 
Trimble’s Brigade, 700 strong . ‘ 
Hays’ Brigade, 550 strong i ‘ : 


THE Ligut Drviston—3,000. 


Branch’s Brigade 

Gregg’s Brigade 

Archer’s Brigade 

Pender’s Brigade. 

Field’s Brigade (not engaged) . : 
Thomas’ Brigade (at Harper’s Ferry) 


Artillery (Estimated) 


D. H. Hitu’s Dtviston—32,500. 


Rodes’ Brigade ‘ 
Garland’s Brigade (estimated). 
Anderson’s Brigade . : 
Ripley’s Brigade (estimated) 
Colquitt’s Brigade (estimated) . 


McLaws’ Diviston—4,500. 


Kershaw’s Brigade . 

Cobb’s Brigade 

Semmes’ Brigade : ; ; ; 
Barksdale’s Brigade F : - : 


271 


88 
173 
287 
152 


—— 


700 (38 p.c.) 


567 
194 
237 
336 


a 


1,884 (47 p.c.) 


- 104 
165 
105 


404 


a : meet 
Total, 2,488 (209 officers). 


208 
300 
302 
300 
300 


—_——— 


1,405 


355 
156 
314! 
294 


1,119 


1 Semmes’ four regiments, engaged in Jackson’s counterstroke, reported 
the following percentage of loss. 53rd Georgia, 30 p.c.; 32nd Virginia, 


45 p.c.; 10th Georgia, 57 p.c; 15th Virginia, 58 p.c. 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


D. R. Jones’ Diviston—8,500. 


Toombs’ Brigade (estimated) . ; P » 125 

’ Drayton’s Brigade (estimated) . . ; . 400 
Anderson’s Brigade . E ; ; { er hatte 
Garnett’s Brigade . : : ‘ / we 
Jenkins’ Brigade. : , . 210 
Kemper’s Brigade (estimated) ; : . 120 
1,041 


WALKER’S Diviston—38,500. 
Walker’s Brigade . ) c n : . 825 


Ransom’s Brigade . : 187 
1,012 
Hoop’s Diviston—2,000. 

Laws’ Brigade : : i : ; . 454 
Hood’s Brigade : : : ; 548 
1,002 

Evans’ Brigade, 250 strong. ‘ . 200 

R. H. ANDERSon’s Divist1on—38,500. 
Featherston’s Brigade, , i : . 804 
Mahone’s Brigade . ‘ 3 ; : Atala 
Pryor’s Brigade : : : ‘ : 182 
Armistead’s Brigade ; : : ‘ ae 
Wright’s Brigade. d ; ‘ . . 208 
Wilcox’ Brigade. ‘ : «| eas 
1,021 
ARTILLERY. 

Colonel 8. D. Lee’s Battalion . ; : ook Ue 
Washington Artillery ‘ : : . . od4 
Cavalry, &c. &c. (estimated) . “ ; . 148 
262 


Grand total, 9,550. 
ARMY OF THE PoToMAC. 


First Corps—Hooker , : : ’ . 2,590 
Second Corps—Sumner . : . ; . 5,188 
Fifth Corps—Porter : i ; ; - 109 
Sixth Corps—Franklin . ; ; ‘ . 489 
Ninth Corps—Burnside . - ? 3 . 2,849 
Twelfth Corps—Mansfield é : : . 1,746 
Cavalry Division, &.  . : : ‘ «ae 


(2,108 killed) 12,4101 


1 For the losses in various great battles, see Note at end of volume. 


THE SITUATION 273 


With Porter’s repulse the summer campaign of 1862 
was closed. Begun on the Chickahominy, within thirty 
miles of Richmond, it ended on the Potomac, within seventy 
miles of Washington ; and six months of continuous fighting 
had brought both belligerents to the last stage of exhaustion. 
Sie apart like two great battle-ships of the older wars, 
wi 


The smoke of battle drifting slow a-lee, 


hulls rent by roundshot, and scuppers awash with blood, 
but with the colours still flying over shattered spars and 
tangled shrouds, the armies drew off from the tremen- 
dous struggle. Neither Confederates nor Federals were 
capable of further effort. Lee, gathering in his stragglers, 
left Stuart to cover his front, and fell back towards Win- 
chester. McClellan was content with seizing the Maryland 
Heights at Harper’s Ferry, and except the cavalry patrols, 
not a single Federal soldier was sent across the river. 
Reorganisation was absolutely imperative. The Army 
of the Potomac was in no condition to undertake the in- 
vasion of Virginia. Not only had the losses in battle 
been very large, but the supply train, hurriedly got 
together after Pope’s defeat, had broken down; in every 
arm there was great deficiency of horses; the troops, 
especially those who had been engaged in the Peninsula, 
were half-clad and badly shod; and, above all, the army 
was very far from sharing McClellan’s conviction that 
Sharpsburg was a brilliant victory. The men in the 
ranks were not so easily deceived as their commander. 
McClellan, relying on a return drawn up by General 
Banks, now in command at Washington, estimated the 
Confederate army at 97,000 men, and his official reports 
made frequent mention of Lee’s overwhelming strength.! 
1 Mr. Lincoln had long before this recognised the tendency of McClellan 
and others to exaggerate the enemy’s strength. As a deputation from New 
England was one day leaving the White House, a delegate turned round and 
said: ‘ Mr. President, I should much like to know what you reckon to be the 
number the rebels havein arms against us.’ Without amoment’s hesitation 


Mr. Lincoln replied: ‘ Sir, I have the best possible reason for knowing the 
number to be one million of men, for whenever one of our generals engages 


274 STONEWALL JACKSON 


The soldiers knew better. They had been close enough to 
the enemy’s lines to learn for themselves how thin was the 
force which manned them. They were perfectly well aware 
that they had been held in check by inferior numbers, and 
that the battle on the Antietam, tactically speaking, was no 
more of a victory for the North than Malvern Hill had been 
for the South. From dawn to dark on September 18 they 
had seen the tattered colours and bright bayonets of the 
Confederates still covering the Sharpsburg ridge ; they had 
seen the grey line, immovable and defiant, in undisputed 
possession of the battle-ground, while their own guns were 
silent and their own generals reluctant to renew the fight. 
Both the Government and the people expected McClellan to 
complete his success by attacking Lee in Virginia. The Con- 
federates, it was said—and men based their opinions on 
McClellan’s reports—had been heavily defeated, not only at 
Antietam, but also at South Mountain; and although the 
Army of the Potomac might be unfit for protracted opera- 
tions, the condition of the enemy must necessarily be far . 
worse. 

Such arguments, however, were entirely inapplicable to 
the situation. The Confederates had not been defeated at 
all, either at South Mountain or Sharpsburg ; and although 
they had eventually abandoned their positions they had 
suffered less than their opponents. The retreat, however, 
across the Potomac had undoubtedly shaken their moral. 
‘In a military point of view,’ wrote Lee to Davis on Sep- 
tember 25, ‘the best. move, in my opinion, the army could 
make would be to advance upon Hagerstown and endeavour 
to defeat the enemy at that point. I would not hesitate 
to make it even with our diminished numbers did the 
army exhibit its former temper and condition, but, as 
far as I am able to judge, the hazard would be great and 
reverse disastrous.’’ But McClellan was not more cheer- 
ful. ‘The army,’ he said on the 27th, ‘is not now in a 


a rebel army he reports that he has encountered a force twice his strength. 
Now I know we have half a million soldiers, so I am bound to believe that 
the rebels have twice that number.’ 

' O.R., vol. xix., part ii., p. 627. 


STRAGGLING 275 


condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on 
another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some 
mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render 
it necessary.’ So far from thinking of pursuit, he thought 
only of the defence of the Potomac, apprehending a renewed 
attempt to enter Maryland, and by no means over-confident 
that the two army corps which he had at last sent to Harper’s 
Ferry would be able to maintain their position if attacked.! 
Nor were the soldiers more eager than their commander to 
cross swords with their formidable enemy. ‘It would be 
useless,’ says General G. H. Gordon, who now commanded a 
Federal division, ‘ to deny that at this period there was a 
despondent feeling in the army,’ and the Special Corre- 
spondents of the New York newspapers, the ‘ World’ and 
‘Tribune,’ confirm the truth of this statement. But the 
clearest evidence as to the condition of the troops is fur- 
nished in the numerous reports which deal with straggling. 
The vice had reached a pitch which is almost inconceiv- 
able. Thousands and tens of thousands, Federals as well 
as Confederates, were absent from their commands. 

‘The States of the North,’ wrote McClellan, ‘are 
flooded with deserters and absentees. One corps of this 
army has 13,000 men present and 15,000 absent; of this 
15,000, 8,000 probably are at work at home.’? On Sep- 
tember 23, General Meade, who had succeeded to the com- 
mand of Hooker’s corps, reported that over 8,000 men, 
including 250 officers, had quitted the ranks either before or 
during the battle of Antietam; adding that ‘ this terrible 
and serious evil seems to pervade the whole body.’* The 
Confederates, although the privations of the troops during 
the forced marches, their indifferent equipment, and the 
deficiencies of the commissariat were contributory causes, 
had almost as much reason to complain. It is said that 
in the vicinity of Leesburg alone over 10,000 men were 
living on the citizens. Jackson’s own division, which took 
into action 1,600 effectives on September 17 and lost 700, 
had 8,900 present for duty on September 30; Lawton’s 


1 O. R., vol. xix., part i., p. 70. 
2 Tbid., part ii., p. 365. 3 Thid., p. 348. 


276 STONEWALL JACKSON 


division rose from 2,500 to 4,450 during the same period ; 
and the returns show that the strength of Longstreet’s and 
Jackson’s corps was only 87,992 0n September 22, but 52,019 
on October 1.! - Itis thus evident that in eight days the army 
was increased by more than 14,000 men, yet only a few con- 
scripts had been enrolled. Lee’s official reports and cor- 
respondence allude in the strongest terms to the indiscipline 
of hisarmy. ‘The absent,’ he wrote on September 23, ‘ are 
scattered broadcast over the land;’ and in the dispatches of 
his subordinates are to be found many references to the 
vagrant tendencies of their commands.? A strong provost 
guard was established at Winchester for the purpose of col- 
lecting stragglers. Parties of cavalry were sent out to protect 
the farms from pillage, and to bring in the marauders as 
prisoners. The most stringent regulations were issued as to 
the preservation of order on the march, the security of 
private property, and the proper performance of their duties 
by regimental and commissariat officers. On September 23, 
General Jones reported from Winchester that the country 
was full of stragglers, that he had already sent back 5,000 or 
6,000, and that the numbers of officers amongst them was 
astonishing.2 The most earnest representations were made 
to the President, suggesting trial of the offenders by 
drumhead court-martial, and ordinary police duties became 
the engrossing occupation of every general officer. 

It can hardly be said, then, that the Confederates had 
drawn much profit from the invasion of Maryland. The 
capture of Harper’s Ferry made but small amends for 

1 O.R., vol. xix., part ii., pp. 621, 639. 

* General orders, Sept. 4; Lee to Davis, Sept. 7; Lee to Davis, Sept. 13; 
special orders, Sept. 21; circular order, Sept. 22; Lee to Davis, Sept. 23; 
Lee to Secretary of War, Sept. 23; Lee to Pendleton, Sept. 24; Lee to 
Davis, Sept. 24; Lee to Davis, Sept. 28; Lee to Davis, Oct. 2; O.R., vol. 
xix., part ii. See also Report of D. H. Hill, O. R., vol. xix., part i., p. 1026. 
Stuart to Secretary of War, Oct. 13. On Sept. 21, Jackson’s adjutant- 
general wrote, ‘We should have gained a victory and routed them, had it 
not been for the straggling. We were twenty-five thousand short by this 
cause.’ Memoirsof W. N. Pendieton, D.D.,p. 217. It is but fair to say that 
on September 13 there was a camp of 900.barefooted men at Winchester, and 
‘a great many more with the army.’ Lee to Quarter-Master-General, O. R., 
vol. xix., part ii., p. 614. 

8 O. B., vol. xix., part ii., p. 629. 


COMMENTS 277 


the retreat into Virginia; and the stubborn endurance 
of Sharpsburg, however remarkable in the annals of 
war, had served no useful purpose beyond crippling for 
the time being the Federal army. The battle must be 
classed with Aspern and Talavera ; Lee’s soldiers saved their 
honour, but no more. The facts were not to be disguised. 
The Confederates had missed their mark. Only a few 
hundred recruits had been raised in Maryland, and there 
had been no popular outbreak against the Union Govern- 
ment. The Union army had escaped defeat; Lincoln had 
been able to announce to the Northern people that Lee’s 
victorious career had at length been checked; and 12,000 
veteran soldiers, the flower of the Southern army, had 
fallen in battle. Had General Longstreet’s advice been 
taken, and the troops withdrawn across the Potomac after 
the fall of Harper’s Ferry, this enormous loss, which the 
Confederacy could so ill afford, would certainly have been 
avoided. Yet Lee was not ill-satisfied with the results 
of the campaign, nor did Jackson doubt the wisdom of 
accepting battle on the Antietam. 

The hazard was great, but the stake was greater. To 
achieve decisive success in war somerisk must berun. ‘It 
is impossible,’ says Moltke, ‘to forecast the result of a 
pitched battle ;’ but this is no reason that pitched battles, 
if there is a fair prospect of success, should be shirked. 
And in the Sharpsburg campaign the Confederates had un- 
doubtedly fair prospects of success. If the lost order had 
not fallen into McClellan’s hands, Lee in all probability would 
have had ample time to select his battlefield and concentrate 
his army ; there would have been no need of forced marches, 
and consequently much less strageling. Both Lee and 
Jackson counted on the caution of their opponent. Both 
were surprised by the unwonted vigour he displayed, 
especially at South Mountain and in the march to Sharps- 
burg. Such resolution in action, they were aware, was 
foreign to his nature. ‘I cannot understand this move of 
McClellan’s,’ was Jackson’s remark, when it was reported 
that the Federal general had boldly advanced against 
the strong position on South Mountain. But neither Lee 


278 STONEWALL JACKSON 


nor Jackson was aware that McClellan had exact infor- 
mation of their dispositions, and that the carelessness 
of a Confederate staff officer had done more for the Union 
than all the Northern scouts and spies in Maryland. 
Jackson had been disposed to leave a larger margin 
for accidents than his commander. He would have 
left Harper’s Ferry alone, and have fought the Federals 
in the mountains;' and he was probably right, for in 
the Gettysburg campaign of the following year, when 
Lee again crossed the Potomac, Harper’s Ferry was 
ignored, although occupied by a strong garrison, and 
neither in advance nor retreat were the Confederate 
communications troubled. But as to the wisdom of giving 
battle on the Antietam, after the fall of Harper’s Ferry, 
there was no divergence of opinion between Lee and his 
lieutenant. They had no reason to respect the Union 
army as a weapon of offence, and very great reason to 
believe that McClellan was incapable of wieldingit. Their 
anticipations were well founded. The Federal attack was 
badly designed and badly executed. If it be compared with 
the German attack at Worth, the defects of McClellan, the 
defects of his subordinates, the want of sound training 
throughout the whole army, become at once apparent. On 
August 6, 1870, there was certainly, early in the day, much 
disjointed fighting, due in great part to the difficulties of 
the country, the absence of the Crown Prince, and the 
anxiety of the generals to render each other loyal sup- 
port. But when once the Commander-in-Chief appeared 
upon the field, and, assuming direction of the battle, infused 
harmony into the operations, the strength and unity of the 
attack could hardly have been surpassed. Almost at the 
same moment 30,000 men were launched against McMahon’s 
front, 25,000 against his right, and 10,000 against his left. 
Every battalion within sound of the cannon participated in 
the forward movement; and numerous batteries, crossing 
the stream which corresponds with the Antietam, supported 
the infantry at the closest range. No general hesitated 
to act on his own responsibility. Hverywhere there was 
1 Dabney, vol. ii., p. 302. 


THE FEDERAL TACTICS 279 


co-operation, between infantry and artillery, between division 
and division, between army corps and army corps; and 
such co-operation, due to a sound system of command, is 
the characteristic mark of a well-trained army and a wise 
leader. At Sharpsburg, on the other hand, there was no 
combination whatever, and even the army corps com- 
manders dared not act without specific orders. There was 
nothing like the close concert and the aggressive energy 
which had carried the Southerners to victory at Gaines’ 
Mill and the Second Manassas. The principle of mutual 
support was utterly ignored. The army corps attacked in 
succession and not simultaneously, and in succession they 
were defeated. McClellan fought three separate battles, from 
dawn to 10 a.m. against Lee’s left; from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. 
against his centre; from1 to 4 p.m. against hisright. The 
subordinate generals, although, with a few exceptions, they 
handled their commands skilfully, showed no initiative, 
and waited for orders instead of improving the opportunity. 
Only two-thirds of the army was engaged; 25,000 men 
hardly fired a shot, and from first to last there was not the 
slightest attempt at co-operation. McClellan was made 
aware by his signallers on the Red Hill of every move- 
ment that took place in his opponent’s lines, and yet he 
was unable to take advantage of Lee’s weakness. He had 
still to grasp the elementary rule that the combination of 
superior numbers and of all arms against a single point 
is necessary to win battles. 

The Northern infantry, indeed, had not fought like 
troops who own their opponents as the better men. 
Rather had they displayed an elasticity of spirit unsus- 
pected by their enemies; and the Confederate soldiers, 
who knew with what fierce courage the attack had been 
sustained, looked on the battle of Sharpsburg as the 
most splendid of their achievements. No small share of 
the glory fell to Jackson. Since the victory of Cedar Run, 
his fame, somewhat obscured by Frayser’s Farm and 
Malvern Hill, had increased by leaps and bounds, and the 
defence of the West Wood was classed with the march to 
Manassas Junction, the three days’ battle about Groveton, 

VOL. Il. X 


280 STONEWALL JACKSON 


and the swift seizure of Harper’s Ferry. On October 2, 
Lee proposed to the President that the Army of Northern 
Virginia should be organised in two army corps, for 
the command of which he recommended Longstreet and 
Jackson. ‘My opinion,’ wrote Lee, ‘of General Jackson 
has been greatly enhanced during this expedition. He is 
true, honest, and brave; has a single eye to the good of 
the service, and spares no exertion to accomplish his 
object.’! On October 11, Jackson received his promotion 
as Lieutenant-General, and was appointed to the Second 
Army Corps, consisting at that date of his own 
division, the Light Division, Ewell’s, and D. H. Hill’s, 
together with Colonel Brown’s battalion of artillery ; a force 
of 1,917 officers, 25,000 men, and 126 guns. 

Jackson does not appear to have been unduly elated 
by his promotion, for two days after his appointment he 
wrote to his wife that there was no position in the world 
equal to that of a minister of the Gospel, and his letter 
was principally concerned with the lessons he had learned 
from the sermon of the previous Sunday.? The soldiers of 


1 O. R., vol. xix., part ii., p. 643. 

2 About this time he made a successful appearance in a new 76le. In 
September, General Bradley T. Johnson was told off to accompany Colonel 
Garnet Wolseley, the Hon. Francis Lawley, Special Correspondent to 
the Times, and Mr. Vizetelly, Special Correspondent of the Illustrated 
London News, round the Confederate camps. ‘ By order of General Lee,’ 
he says, ‘I introduced the party to General Jackson. We were all seated 
in front of General Jackson’s tent, and he took up the conversation. He 
had been to England, and had been greatly impressed with the architecture 
of Durham Cathedral and with the history of the bishopric. The Bishops 
had been Palatines from the date of the Conquest, and exercised semi-royal 
authority over their bishopric. 

‘There is a fair history of the Palatinate of Durham in Blackstone and 
Coke, but I can hardly think that General Jackson derived his information 
from those two fountains of the law. Anyhow, he cross-examined the 
Englishmen in detail about the cathedral and the close and the rights 
of the bishops, &c. &c. He gave them no chance to talk, and kept them 
busy answering questions, for he knew more about Durham than they did. 

‘ As we rode away, I said: ‘“‘ Gentlemen, you have disclosed Jackson in a 
new character to me, and I’ve been carefully observing him for a year and 
a half. You have made him exhibit finesse, for he did all the talking to 
keep you from asking too curious or embarrassing questions. I never saw 
anything like it in him before.” We all laughed, and agreed that the 


general had been too much for the interViewers.’—Memoirs, pp. 530-1. 


CAMP STORIES 281 


the Second Army Corps, however, did not allow him to 
forget his greatness. In their bivouacs by the clear waters 
of the Opequon, with abundance of supplies and with ample 
leisure for recuperation, the troops rapidly regained their 
strength and spirit. The reaction found vent in the most 
extravagant gaiety. No circumstance that promised enter- 
tainment was permitted to pass without attention, and the 
jest started at the expense of some unfortunate wight, con- 
spicuous for peculiarity of dress or demeanour, was taken up 
by a hundred voices. None were spared. A trim staff officer 
was horrified at the irreverent reception of his nicely twisted 
moustache, as he heard from behind innumerable trees : 
‘Take them mice out o’ your mouth ! take ’em out—no use 
to say they ain’t there, see their tails hanging out!’ 
Another, sporting immense whiskers, was urged ‘to come 
outo’ that bunch of hair! I know you’re in there! I see 
your ears a-working!’ So thesoldiers chaffed the dandies, 
and the camp rang with laughter ; fun and frolic were always 
in the air, and the fierce fighters of Sharpsburg behaved 
like schoolboys on a holiday. But when the general rode 
by the men remembered the victories they had won 
and to whom they owed them, the hardships they had 
endured, and who had shared them; and the appear- 
ance of ‘Little Sorrel’ was the sure precursor of a 
scene of the wildest enthusiasm. The horse soon learned 
what the cheers implied, and directly they began he 
would break into a gallop, as if to carry his rider as 
quickly as possible through the embarrassing ordeal. 
But the soldiers were not to be deterred by their com- 
mander’s modesty, and whenever he was compelled to 
pass through the bivouacs the same tribute was so in- 
variably offered that the sound of a distant cheer, rolling 
down the lines of the Second Army Corps, always evoked 
the exclamation: ‘Boys, look out! here comes old Stone- 
wall or an old hare!’ ‘These being the only individuals,’ 
writes one of Jackson’s soldiers, ‘ who never failed to bring 
down the whole house.’ 

Nothing could express more clearly the loyalty of the 
soldiers to their general than this quaint estimate of his 

x 2 


282 STONEWALL JACKSON 


popularity. The Anglo-Saxon is averse to the unrestrained 
display of personal affection ; and when his natural reluc- 
tance is overborne by irrepressible emotion, he attempts 
to hide it by a jest. So Jackson’s veterans laughed 
at his peculiarities, at his dingy uniform, his battered cap, 
his respect for clergymen, his punctilious courtesy, and his 
blushes. They delighted in the phrase, when a distant yell 
was heard, ‘ Here’s “Old Jack’’ or a rabbit!’ They de- 
lighted more in his confusion when he galloped through the 
shouting camp. ‘Here he comes,’ they said, ‘we'll make 
him take his hat off.’ They invented strange fables of 
which he was the hero. ‘Stonewall died,’ ran one of the 
most popular, ‘and two angels came down from heaven to 
take him back with them. They went to his: tent. He 
was not there. They went to the hospital. He was not 
there. They went to the outposts. He was not there. 
They went to the prayer-meeting. He was not there. So 
they had to return without him; but when they reported 
that he had disappeared, they found that he had made a 
flank march and reached heaven before them.’ Another 
was to the effect that whereas Moses took forty years to 
get the children of Israel through the wilderness, ‘ ‘“ Old 
Jack ’’ would have double-quicked them through in three 
days on half rations !’ 

But, nevertheless, beneath this affectation of hilarity 
lay a deep and passionate devotion; and two incidents 
which occurred at this time show the extent of this 
feeling, and at least one reason for its existence. ‘On 
October 8th,’ writes Major Heros von Borcke, adjutant- 
general of the cavalry division, ‘I was honoured with 
the pleasing mission of presenting to Stonewall, as a slight 
token of Stuart’s high regard, a new uniform coat, which 
had just arrived from the hands of a Richmond tailor. 
Starting at once, I reached the simple tent of our great 
general just in time for dinner. I found him in his old 
weather-stained coat, from which all the buttons had been 
clipped by the fair hands of patriotic ladies, and which, 
from exposure to sun, rain, and powder-smoke, and by 
reason of many rents and patches, was in a very unseemly 


‘ JOHNNIE” 293 


condition. When I had despatched more important 
matters, I produced General Stuart’s present in all its 
magnificence of gilt buttons and sheeny facings and gold 
lace, and I was heartily amused at the modest confusion 
with which the hero of many battles regarded the fine 
uniform, scarcely daring to touch it, and at the quiet way 
in which at last he folded it up carefully and deposited it 
in his portmanteau, saying to me, ‘Give Stuart my best 
thanks, Major ; the coat is much too handsome for me, but 
I shall take the best care of it, and shall prize it highly 
asa souvenir. And now let us have some dinner.” But I 
protested emphatically against the summary disposition of 
the matter of the coat, deeming my mission indeed but half 
executed, and remarked that Stuart would certainly ask 
how the coat fitted, and that I should take it as a personal 
favour if he would putit on. To this with a smile he readily 
assented, and having donned the garment, he escorted me 
outside the tent to the table where dinner had been served 
in the open air. The whole of the staff were in a perfect 
ecstasy at their chief’s brilliant appearance, and the old 
negro servant, who was bearing the roast turkey to the 
board, stopped in mid career with a most bewildered 
expression, and gazed in such wonderment at his master 
as if he had been transfigured before him. Meanwhile, 
the rumour of the change ran like electricity through the 
neighbouring camps, the soldiers came running by hundreds 
to the spot, desirous of seeing their beloved Stonewall in 
his new attire; and the first wearing of a new robe by 
Louis XIV., at whose morning toilette all the world was 
accustomed to assemble, never created half the excitement 
at Versailles that was roused in the woods of Virginia by 
the investment of Jackson in the new regulation uniform.’ ! 
The second incident is less amusing, but was not less 
appreciated by the rank and file. Riding one morning 
near Front Royal, accompanied by his staff, Jackson was 
stopped by a countrywoman, with a chubby child on 
either side, who inquired anxiously for her son Johnnie, 
serving, she said, ‘in Captain Jackson’s company.’ The 
' Memoirs of the Confederate War, vol. i. 


284 STONEWALL JACKSON 


general, with the deferential courtesy he never laid 
aside, introduced himself as her son’s commanding officer, 
but begged for further information as to his regiment. 
The good dame, however, whose interest in the war 
centred on one individual, appeared astonished that 
‘Captain Jackson’ did not know her particular ‘ Johnnie,’ 
and repeated her inquiries with such tearful emphasis that 
the young staff officers began to smile. Unfortunately 
for themselves, Jackson heard a titter, and turning on them 
with a scathing rebuke for their want of manners, he sent 
them off in different directions to discover Johnnie, 
giving them no rest until mother and son were brought 
together. 

But if the soldiers loved Jackson for his simplicity, and 
respected him for his honesty, beyond and above was the 
sense of his strength and power, of his indomitable will, 
of the inflexibility of his justice, and of the unmeasured re- 
sources of his vigorous intellect. Itis curious even after 


the long lapse of years to hear his veterans speak of 


their commander. Laughter mingles with tears; each 
has some droll anecdote to relate, each some instance 
of thoughtful sympathy or kindly deed; but it is still 
plain to be seen how they feared his displeasure, how 
hard they found his discipline, how conscious they were of 
their own mental inferiority. The mighty phantom of 
their lost leader still dominates their thoughts ; just as in 
the battles of the Confederacy his earthly presentment 
dominated the will of the Second Army Corps. In the 
campaign which had driven the invaders from Virginia, 
and carried the Confederate colours to within sight of 
Washington, his men had found their master. They had 
forgotten how to criticise. His generals had learned to 
trust him. Success and adulation had not indeed made 
him more expansive. He was as reticent as ever, and 
his troops—‘ the foot-cavalry’ as they were now called— 
were still marched to and fro without knowing why or 
whither. But men and officers, instead of grumbling when 
they were roused at untimely hours, or when their marches 
were prolonged, without apparent necessity, obeyed with 


THE BRIGADE SONG 285 


alacrity, and amused themselves by wondering what new 
surprise the general was preparing. ‘Where are you 
going ?’ they were asked as they were turned out for an un- 
expected march: ‘ We don’t know, but ‘Old Jack”’ does,’ was 
the laughing reply. And they had learned something of 
his methods. They had discovered the value of time, of 
activity, of mystery, of resolution. They discussed his 
stratagems, gradually evolving, for they were by no means 
apparent at the time, the object and aim of his manoeuvres ; 
and the stirring verses, sung round every camp-fire, show 
that the soldiers not only grasped his principles of warfare, 
but that they knew right well to whom their victories were 
to be attributed. 


STONEWALL JACKSON’S WAY 


Come, stack arms, men, pile on the rails; 
Stir up the camp-fires bright ; 

No matter if the canteen fails, 
We'll make a roaring night. 

Here Shenandoah brawls along, 

There lofty Blue Ridge echoes strong, 

To swell the Brigade’s roaring song 
Of Stonewall Jackson’s way. 


We see him now—the old slouched hat, 
Cocked o’er his eye askew ; 
The shrewd dry smile—the speech so pat, 
So calm, so blunt, so true. 
The ‘ Blue-Light Elder’ knows them well: 
Says he, ‘ That’s Banks—he’s fond of shell ; 
Lord save his soul! we'll give him——’ well, 
That’s Stonewall Jackson’s way. 


Silence! ground arms! kneel all! caps off! 
Old Blue-Light’s going to pray ; 

Strangle the fool that dares to scoff ! 
Attention ! it’s his way ! 

Appealing from his native sod, 

In forma pauperis to God, 

‘ Lay bare thine arm—stretch forth thy rod, 
Amen!’ That’s Stonewall’s way. 


286 STONEWALL JACKSON 


He’s in the saddle now! Fall in! 
Steady, the whole Brigade! 

Hill’s at the Ford, cut off !—we’ll win 
His way out, ball and blade. 

What matter if our shoes are worn ? 

What matter if our feet are torn ? 

Quick step! we’re with him before morn ! 
That’s Stonewall Jackson’s way. 


The sun’s bright lances rout the mists 
Of morning—and, by George! 
There’s Longstreet struggling in the lists, 
Hemmed in an ugly gorge. 
Pope and his columns whipped before— 
‘Bayonets and grape!’ hear Stonewall roar ; 
‘Charge, Stuart! pay off Ashby’s score ! ’ 
That’s Stonewall Jackson’s way. 


Ah! maiden, wait and watch and yearn 
For news of Stonewall’s band ; 

Ah! widow, read with eyes that burn 
The ring upon thy hand. 

Ah! wife, sew on, pray on, hope on, 

Thy life shall not be all forlorn ; 

The foe had better ne’er been born 
That gets in Stonewall’s way. 


NOTE 


Jackson’s Strength and Losses, August-September 1862. 


Strength at Cedar Run, August 9: 


Winder’s (Jackson’s po Division Wasnt ty 8,000 
Eiwell’s Division } 5,350 
Lawton’s Brigade? . 2,200 
A. P. Hill’s (the Light) Division? : ‘ 12,000 
Robertson’s Cavalry Brigade* (estimate) . : ° 1,200 
23,750 
Losses at Cedar Run: 
Winder’s Division . , : ‘ : ’ 718 
Ewell’s Division : : P : : : 195 1.314 
The Light Division ; ‘ : : BSE tia 
Cavalry, &c. : ; : : : i : 20 
22,436 
Losses on the Rappahannock, August 20-24 . 100 
Losses at Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction, 
August 26, 27. : . 3800 
Losses at Groveton, August 28: 4.000 
Stonewall Division euete) 441 1.200 ; 
Ewell’s Division 159 f > 
Stragglers and sick (estimate) ; 1,200 
Cavalry transferred to Stuart . : : : . 1,200 
Strength at Second Manassas, August 29 and 380 . ; . 18,486 
Losses : 
Taliaferro’s Division . : a : Sie BW 
Ewell’s Division ; : ; ‘ 364; 2,387 
The Light Division : . 1,507 
Loss at Chantilly, September 1 : ; 500 
Should have marched into Maryland , 5 ‘ . 15,549 


' Report of July 31, O. R., vol. xii., part iii., p. 965. 


2 Report of August 20, O. R., vol. xii., part iii., p. 966. 


Cedar Run.) 

3 Report of July 20, O. R., vol. xi., part iii., 
been added.) 

4 Four regiments. 


p. 645. 


(Not engaged at 


(35 regiments had 


288 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


Strength at Sharpsburg: 


Jones’ 


Division 


Ewell’s Division . 
The Light Division . 


(1 Brigade left at Harper’s 8 Perry) 


Loss at Harper’ s Ferry . 


Losses at 
Jones’ 


Ewell’s 


Sharpsburg: 
Division 
Division 


The Light Division . 


Strength on September 19 


. 2,000 
4.000 
08 a 


800 
: 62 
700 


404 


1st! 9,438 


9,300 


The Report of September 22, O. R., vol. xiv., part ii., p. 621, gives : 


Jackson’s own Division 


Ewell’s Division . 
The Light Division 


ays? 
2 Oj 


2,558 
3,290 
4,777 


10,620 * 


866 sick and straggling since August 28=21 p.c. 
rer 1,300 stragglers had rejoined, 


289 


CHAPTER XX 
FREDERICKSBURG 


Waite the Army of Northern Virginia was resting in the 
Valley, McClellan was preparing for a winter campaign. 

1862, He was unable, however, to keep pace with the im- 
October. patience of the Northern people. Not only was 
he determined to postpone all movement until his army 
was properly equipped, his ranks recruited, his cavalry 
remounted, and his administrative services reorganised, 
but the military authorities at Washington were very 
slow in meeting his demands. Notwithstanding, then, 
the orders of the President, the remonstrances of Halleck, 
and the clamour of the press, for more than five weeks 
after the battle of Sharpsburg he remained inactive on the 
Potomac. It may be that in the interests of the army he 
was perfectly right in resisting the pressure brought to 
bear upon him. He was certainly the best judge of the 
temper of his troops, and could estimate more exactly than 
either Lincoln or Halleck the chances of success if he were 
to encounter Lee’s veterans on their native soil. How- 
ever this may be, his inaction was not in accordance with 
the demands of the political situation. The President, 
immediately the Confederates retired from Maryland, had 
taken a step which changed the character of the war. 
Hitherto the Northerners had fought for the restoration 
of the Union on the basis of the Constitution, as inter- 
preted by themselves. Now, after eighteen months of con- 
flict, the Constitution was deliberately violated. For the 
clause which forbade all interference with the domestic 
institutions of the several States, a declaration that 
slavery should no longer exist within the boundaries 


290 STONEWALL JACKSON 


of the Republic was substituted, and the armies of the 
Union were called upon to fight for the freedom of the 
negro. 

ie the condition of political parties this measure was 
daring. It was not approved by the Democrats, and many 
of the soldiers were Democrats; or by those—and they 
were not a few—who believed that compromise was the 
surest means of restoring peace; or by those—and they 
were numerous—who thought the dissolution of the Union 
a smaller evil than the continuance of the war. The opposi- 
tion was very strong, and there was but one means of 
reconciling it—vigorous action on the part of the army, 
the immediate invasion of Virginia, and a decisive victory. 
Delay would expose the framers of the measure to the 
imputation of having promised more than they could 
perform, of wantonly tampering with the Constitution, and 
of widening the breach between North and South beyond 
all hope of healing. 

In consequence, therefore, of McClellan’s refusal to move. 
forward, the friction between the Federal Government and 
their general-in-chief, which, so long as Lee remained in 
Maryland, had been allayed, once more asserted its baneful 
influence; and the aggressive attitude of the Confederates 
did not serve to make matters smoother. Although the 
greater part of October was for the Army of Northern 
Virginia a period of unusual leisure, the troops were not 
altogether idle. As soon as the stragelers had been 
brought in, and the ranks of the divisions once more 
presented a respectable appearance, various enterprises 
were undertaken. The Second Army Corps was en- 
trusted with the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railway, a duty carried out by Jackson with charac- 
teristic thoroughness. The line from MHarper’s Ferry 
to Winchester, as well as that from Manassas June- 
tion to Strasburg, were also torn up; and the spoils of the 
late campaign were sent south to Richmond and Staunton. 
These preparations for defensive warfare were not, however, 
so immediately embarrassing to the enemy as the action 
of the cavalry. Stuart’s three brigades, after the affair at 


STUART'S RIDE 291 


Boteler’s Ford, picketed the line of the Potomac from the 
North Mountain to the Shenandoah, a distance of forty 
miles: Hampton’s brigade at Hedgesville, Fitzhugh Lee’s 
at Shepherdstown, Munford’s at Charlestown, and head- 
quarters near Leetown. 

On October 8 General Lee, suspecting that McClellan 
was meditating some movement, ordered the cavalry to 
cross the Potomac and reconnoitre. Selecting 600 men 
from each of his brigades, with General Hampton, Coloneis 
W. H. F. Lee and W. E. Jones in command, and 
accompanied by four horse-artillery guns, Stuart ren- 

Oct.9, dezvoused on the night of the 9th at Darkes- 
ville. As the day dawned he crossed the Potomac 

at McCoy’s Ford, drove in the Federal pickets, and broke 
up a signal station near Fairview. Marching due north, 
he reached Mercersburg at noon, and Chambersburg, forty- 
six miles from Darkesville, at 7 p.m. on October 10. Cham- 
bersburg, although a Federal supply depot of some impor- 
tance, was without a garrison, and here 275 sick and 
Oct, 19, Wounded were paroled, 500 horses requisitioned, 

’" the wires cut, and the railroad obstructed ; while 
the machine shops, several trains of loaded cars, and a large 
quantity of small arms, ammunition, and clothing was de- 

Oct. 11, Stroyed. At nine the next morning the force 
marched in the direction of Gettysburg, moving 

round the Federal rear. Then, crossing the mountains, it 
turned south through Emmittsburg, passed the Monocacy 
near Frederick, and after a march of ninety miles since leay- 
ing Chambersburg reached Hyattstown at daylight on the 
Arig 12th. Here, on the road which formed McClellan’s 
‘line of communication with Washington, a few 
waggons were captured, and information came to hand 
that 4,000 or 5,000 Federal troops were near Poolesville, 
suarding the fords across the Potomac. Moving at a trot 
through the woods, the column, leaving Poolesville two 
or three miles to the left, made for the mouth of the 
Monocacy. About a mile and a half from that river an 
advanced-guard of hostile cavalry, moving eastward, was 
encountered and driven in. Colonel Lee’s men were dis- 


292 STONEWALL JACKSON 


mounted, a gun was brought into action, and under cover of 
this screen, posted on a high crest, the main body made a 
dash for White’s Ford. The point of passage, although 
guarded by about 100 Federal riflemen, was quickly seized, 
and Stuart’s whole force, together with the captured horses, 
had completed the crossing before the enemy, advancing 
in large force from the Monocacy, was in a position to 
interfere. 

This brilliantly conducted expedition was as fruitful of 
results as the ride round McClellan’s army in the previous 
June. The information obtained was most important. 
Lee, besides being furnished with a sufficiently full report 
of the Federal dispositions, learned that no part of McClel- 
lan’s army had been detached to Washington, but that 
it was being reinforced from that quarter, and that there- 
fore no over-sea expedition against Richmond was to be 
apprehended. Several hundred fine horses from the farms 
of Pennsylvania furnished excellent remounts for the 
Confederate troopers. Prominent officials were brought . 
in as hostages for the safety of the Virginia citizens who 
had been thrown into Northern prisons. Only a few scouts 
were captured by the enemy, and not a man was killed. 
The distance marched by Stuart, from Darkesville to White’s 
Ford, was one hundred and twenty-six miles, of which the 
last eighty were covered without a halt. Crossing the 
Potomac at McCoy’s Ford about 6 a.m. on October 10, 
he had recrossed it at White’s Ford, between 1 and 2 P.M. on 
October 12 ; he was thus for fifty-six hours inside the enemy’s 
lines, and during the greater part of his march within thirty 
miles of McClellan’s headquarters near Harper’s Ferry. 

It is often the case in war that a well-planned and 
boldly executed enterprise has a far greater effect than 
could possibly have been anticipated. Neither Lee nor 
Stuart looked for larger results from this raid than a 
certain amount of plunder and a good deal of intelligence. 
But skill and daring were crowned with a more ample reward 
_ than the attainment of the immediate object. 

In the first place, the expedition, although there was 
little fighting, was most destructive to the Federal cavalry. 


STUART'S RIDE 293 


McClellan had done all in his power to arrest the raiders. 
Directly the news came in that they had crossed 
the Potomac, troops were sent in every direction to cut off 
their retreat. Yet so eminently judicious were Stuart’s 
precautions, so intelligent the Maryland soldiers who acted 
as his guides, and so rapid his movements, that although 
constant reports were received by the Federal generals as to 
the progress and direction of his column, the information 
came always too late to serve any practical purpose, and 
his pursuers were never in time to bar hismarch. General 
Pleasanton, with such cavalry as could be spared from the 
picket line, marched seventy-eight miles in four-and-twenty 
hours, and General Averell’s brigade, quartered on the Upper 
Potomac, two hundred miles in four days. The severity 
of the marches told heavily on these commands, already 
worn out by hard work on the outposts ; and so many of the 
horses broke down that a period of repose was absolutely 
necessary to refit them for the field. Until his cavalry 
should have recovered it was impossible for McClellan to 
invade Virginia. 

In the second place, neither the Northern Government 
nor the Northern people could forget that this was the 
second time that McClellan had allowed Stuart to ride at 
will round the Army of the Potomac. Public confidence in 
the general-in-chief was greatly shaken; and a handle was 
given to his opponents in the ranks of the abolitionists, 
who, because he was a Democrat, and had much influence 
with the army, were already clamouring for his removal. 

The respite which Stuart had gained for Virginia was 
not, however, of long duration. On October 26, McClellan, 
having ascertained by means of a strong reconnaissance 
in force that the Confederate army was still in the 
vicinity of Winchester, commenced the passage of the 
Potomac. ‘The principal point of crossing was 
near Berlin, and so soon as it became evident 
that the Federal line of operations lay east of the Blue 
Ridge, Lee ordered Longstreet to Culpeper Court House. 
Jackson, taking post on the road between Berryville and 
Charlestown, was to remain in the Valley. 


Oct. 26. 


294 STONEWALL JACKSON 


On November 7 the situation was as follows :— 


ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 


First Corps 
Second Corps 


Third Corps . 


Fifth Corps 
Ninth Corps . 
Eleventh Corps 


Cavalry Division 


Line of Supply 
Twelfth Corps 


Warrenton. 

Rectortown. 

( Between Manassas Junction and 
Warrenton. 

White Plains. 

Waterloo. 

New Baltimore. 

Rappahannock 

Sperryville. 


Station and 


f Orange and Alexandria and Man- 
’ \. assas Railways. 


Harper’s Ferry and Sharpsburg. 


Army oF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 


First Corps . 
Second Corps. 


Cavalry Division . : 


Lines of Supply 


Nov. 7. 


Culpeper Court House. 
Headquarters, Millwood. 


if Hampton’s and Fitzhugh Lee’s 


Brigades on the Rappahannock. 
Munford’s Brigade with Jackson. 


Staunton—Culpeper Court House. 
Richmond—Gordonsville. 


{ Staunton—Strasburg. 


On this date the six corps of the Army of the 
Potomac which were assembled between the Bull 


Run Mountains and the Blue Ridge numbered 125,000 
officers and men present for duty, together with 320 guns. 
The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia give the 


following strength :— 


First Army Corps . 
Second Army Corps 


31,939 
31,794 


Cavalry Division . 7,176 
Reserve Artillery . ‘ 900 
71,809 


Guns 
112 (54 short-range smooth-bores) 
128 (58) | ,, i 
4 
36 (20 i ¥ ) 


275 


The Confederates were not only heavily outnumbered 
by the force immediately before them, but along the 
Potomac, from Washington westward, was a second hostile 
army, not indeed so large as that commanded by McClellan, 
but larger by several thousands than that commanded by 


LINCOLN’S STRATEGY 295 


Lee. The Northern capital held a garrison of 80,000; at 
Harper’s Ferry were 10,000; in the neighbourhood of 
Sharpsburg over 4,000; along the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad 8,000. Thus the total strength of the Federals 
exceeded 225,000 men. Yet in face of this enormous 
host, and with Richmond only weakly garrisoned behind 
him, Lee had actually separated his two wings by an interval 
of sixty miles. He was evidently playing his old game, 
dividing his army with a view to a junction on the field 
of batile. 

Lincoln, in a letter of advice with which he had 
favoured McClellan a few days previously, had urged 
the importance of making Lee’s line of supply the first 
objective of the invading army. ‘An advance east 
of the Blue Ridge,’ he said, ‘would at once menace 
the enemy’s line of communications, and compel him to 
keep his forces together; and if Lee, disregarding this 
menace, were to cut in between the Army of the Potomac 
and Washington, McClellan would have nothing to do but 
to attack him in rear.’ He suggested, moreover, that by 
hard marching it might be possible for McClellan to reach 
Richmond first. 

The Confederate line of communications, so the Presi- 
dent believed, ran from Richmond to Culpeper Court 
House, and McClellan’s advanced-guards, on November 7, 
were within twenty miles of that point. Lee, however, had 
altogether failed to respond to Mr. Lincoln’s strategical 
pronouncements. Instead of concentrating his forces he 
had dispersed them ; and instead of fearing for his own 
‘communications, he had placed Jackson in a position to 
interfere very seriously with those of his enemy. 

Mr. Lincoln’s letter to McClellan shows that the lessons 
of the war had not been altogether lost upon him. 
Generals Banks and Pope, with some stimulus from Stone- 
wall Jackson, had taught him what an important part is 
played by lines of supply. He had mastered the strate- 
gical truism that an enemy’s communications are his 
weakest point. But there were other considerations which 
had not come home to him. He had overlooked the possi- 

vou. II, ¥ 


296 STONEWALL JACKSON 


bility that Lee might threaten McClellan’s communications 
before McClellan could threaten his; and he had yet to 
learn that an army operating in its own country, if proper 
forethought be exercised, can establish an alternative line 
of supply, and provide itself with a double base, thus 
gaining a freedom of action of which an invader, bound, 
unless he has command of the sea, to a single line, is generally 
deprived. 

The President appears to have thought that, if Lee 
were cut off from Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia 
would be reduced to starvation, and become absolutely power- 
less. Itnever entered his head that the astute commander 
of that army had already, in anticipation of the very move- 
ment which McClellan was now making, established a second 
base at Staunton, and that his line of supply, in case of 
necessity, would not run over the open country between 
Richmond and Gordonsville, but from Staunton to Culpeper, 
behind the ramparts of the Blue Ridge. 

Lee, in fact, accepted with equanimity the possibility of 
the Federals intervening between himself and Richmond. 
He had already, in the campaign against Pope, extricated 
himself from such a situation by a bold stroke against his 
enemy’s communications; and the natural fastness of the 
Valley, amply provided with food and forage, afforded 
facilities for such a mancuvre which had been altogether 
absent before the Second Manassas. Nor was he of Mr. 
Lincoln’s opinion, that if the Army of Northern Virginia 
cut in between Washington and McClellan it would be a 
simple operation for the latter to about face and attack the 
Confederates in rear. He knew, and Mr. Lincoln, if he 
had studied Pope’s campaign, should have known it too, 
that the operation of countermarching, if the line of com- 
munication has been cut, is not only apt to produce 
great confusion and great suffering, but has the very 
worst effect on the moral of the troops. But Lee had 
that practical experience which Mr. Lincoln lacked, and 
without which it is but waste of words to dogmatise on 
strategy. He was well aware that a large army is a cum- 
brous machine, not readily deflected from the original 


CONCENTRATION DEFERRED 297 


direction of the line of march;! and, more than all, he had 
that intimate acquaintance with the soldier in the ranks, 
that knowledge of the human factor, without which no 
military problem, whether of strategy, tactics, or organisa- 
tion, can be satisfactorily solved. McClellan’s task, there- 
fore, so long as he had to depend for his supplies on a 
single line of railway, was not quite so simple as Mr. 
Lincoln imagined. 

Nevertheless, on November 7 Lee decided to unite 
his army. As soon as the enemy advanced from Warren- 
ton, Jackson was to ascend the Valley, and crossing the 
Blue Ridge at Fisher’s Gap, join hands with Long- 
street, who would retire from Madison Court House to the 
vicinity of Gordonsville. The Confederates would then be 
concentrated on McClellan’s right flank should he march on 
Richmond, ready to take advantage of any opportunity for 
attack; or, if attack were considered too hazardous, to 
threaten his communications, and compel him to fall back 
to the Potomac. 

The proposed concentration, however, was not immedi- 
ately carried out. In the first place, the Federal advance 
came to a sudden standstill; and, in the second place, 
Jackson was unwilling to abandon his post of vantage behind 
the Blue Ridge. It need hardly be said that the policy of 
mancuvring instead of intrenching, of aiming at the 
enemy’s flank and rear instead of barring his advance 
directly, was in full agreement with his views of war; and 
it appears that about this date he had submitted proposals 
for a movement against the Federal communications. It 
would be interesting indeed to have the details of his design, 
but Jackson’s letter-book for this period has unfortunately 
disappeared, nor did he communicate his ideas to any of his 
staff. Letters from General Lee, however, indicate that 
the manceuvre proposed was of the same character as 


1 On November 1 the Army of the Potomac (not including the Third 
Corps) was accompanied by 4,818 waggons and ambulances, 8,500 transport 
horses, and 12,000 mules. O.R., vol. xix., part i., pp. 97-8. The train of 
each army corps and of the cavalry covered eight miles of road, or fifty 
miles for the whole. 


SG 


Ya 


298 STONEWALL JACKSON 


that which brought Pope in such hot haste from the 
Rappahannock to Bull Run, and that it was Jackson’s sug- 
gestion which caused the Commander-in-Chief to reconsider 
his determination of uniting his army. 

‘As long as General Jackson,’ wrote Lee to the Secretary 
of War on November 10, ‘can operate with safety, and 
secure his retirement west of the Massanutton Mountains, 
I think it advantageous that he should be in a position to 
threaten the enemy’s flank and rear, and thus prevent his 
advance southward on the east side of the Blue Ridge. 
General Jackson has been directed accordingly, and should 
the enemy descend into the Valley, General Longstreet will 
attack his rear, and cut off hiscommunications. The enemy 
apparently is so strong in numbers that I think it prefer- 
able to baffle his designs by manceuvring, rather than 
resist his advance by main force. To accomplish the latter 
without too great a risk and loss would require more than 
double our present numbers.’ ! 

His letter to Jackson, dated November 9, ran as_ 
follows: ‘The enemy seems to be massing his troops along 
the Manassas Railroad in the vicinity of Piedmont, which 
gives him great facilities for bringing up supplies from 
Alexandria. Jt has occurred to me that his object may be 
to seize upon Strasburg with his main force, to intercept 
your ascent of the Valley. . . . This would oblige you to 
cross into the Lost River Valley, or west of it, unless you 
could force a passage through the Blue Ridge; hence my 
anxiety for your safety. If you can prevent such a move- 
ment of the enemy, and operate strongly on his flank and 
rear through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, you would certainly 
in my opinion effect the object you propose. A demon- 
stration of crossing into Maryland would serve the same 
purpose, and might call him back to the Potomac. As my 
object is to retard and baffle his designs, if it can be accom- 
plished by manceuvring your corps as you propose, it will 
serve my purpose as well as if effected in any other way. 
With this understanding, you can use your discretion, which 
I know I can rely upon, in remaining or advancing up the 

tO. R., vol. xix., part ii., povit: 


McCLELLAN SUPERSEDED 299 


Valley. Keep me advised of your movements and inten- 
tions ; and you must keep always in view the probability of 
an attack upon Richmond from either north or south, when 
a concentration of force will become necessary.’ ! 

Jackson’s plan, however, was not destined to be tried. 
McClellan had issued orders for the concentration of his 
army at Warrenton. His troops had never been in better 
condition. They were in good spirits, well supplied 
and admirably equipped. Owing to the activity of 
his cavalry, coupled with the fact that the Con- 
federate horses were at this time attacked by a disease 
which affected both tongue and hoof, his information was 
more accurate than usual. He knew that Longstreet was 
at Culpeper, and Jackson in the Valley. He saw the 
possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy’s forces, 
and of either defeating Longstreet or forcing him to fall | 
back to Gordonsville, and he had determined to make the 
attempt. . 

On the night of November 7, however, at the very moment 
when his army was concentrating for an advance against 
Longstreet, McClellan was ordered to hand over his com- 
mand to General Burnside. Lincoln had yielded to the 
insistence of McClellan’s political opponents, to the 
rancour of Stanton, and the jealousy of Halleck. But in 
sacrificing the general who had saved the Union at 
Sharpsburg he sacrificed the lives of many thousands 
of his soldiers. A darker day than even the Second 
Manassas was in store for the Army of the Potomac. 
McClellan was not a general of the first order. But he was 
the only officer in the United States who had experience of 
handling large masses of troops, and he was improving every 
day. Stuart had taught him the use of cavalry, and Lee the 
value of the initiative. He was by no means deficient in 
resolution, as his march with an army of recently defeated 
men against Lee in Maryland conclusively proves; and 
although he had never won a decisive victory, he possessed, 
to a degree which was never attained by any of his successors, 
the confidence and affection of his troops. But deplorable 

1 O. R., vol. xix., part ii., p. 705. 


300 STONEWALL JACKSON 


as was the weakness which sanctioned his removal on the eve 
of a decisive manceuvre, the blunder which put Burnside in 
his place was even more so. The latter appears to have 
been the protégé of a small political faction. He had many 
good qualities. He was a firm friend, modest, generous, 
and energetic. But he was so far from being distinguished 
for military ability that in the Army of the Potomac it was 
very strongly questioned whether he was fit to command 
an army corps. His conduct at Sharpsburg, where he had 
been entrusted with the attack on the Confederate right, 
had been the subject of the severest criticism, and by not a 
few of his colleagues he was considered directly responsible 
for the want of combination which had marred McClellan’s 
plan of attack. More than once Mr. Lincoln infringed his 
own famous aphorism, ‘ Never swap horses when crossing a 
stream,’ but when he transferred the destinies of the Army 
of the Potomac from McClellan to Burnside he did more— 
he selected the weakest of his team of generals to bear 
the burden. . 

At the same time that McClellan was superseded, 
General FitzJohn Porter, the gallant soldier of Gaines’ 
Mill and Malvern Hill, probably the best officer in the Army 
of the Potomac, was ordered to resign command of the 
Fifth Army Corps, and to appear before a court-martial 
on charges of incompetency and neglect of duty at the 
Second Manassas. The fact that those charges were 
preferred by Pope, and that Porter had been allowed to 
retain his command through the campaign in Maryland, 
were hardly calculated to inspire the army with confidence in 
either the wisdom or the justice of its rulers; and it was 
the general opinion that his intimate friendship with 
McClellan had more to say to his trial than his alleged 
incompetency. 

Burnside commenced his career by renouncing the 
enterprise which McClellan had contemplated. Longstreet 
was left unmolested at Culpeper; and, in order to free the 
communications from Jackson, the Federal army was 
marched eastward along the Rappahannock to Falmouth, a 
new line of supply being established between that village 


RAPID MARCH OF THE FEDERALS | 301 


and Aquia Creek, the port on the Potomac, six hours’ 
sail from Washington. 

Lee had already foreseen that Jackson’s presence in the 
Valley might induce the Federals to change their line of 
operations. Fredericksburg, on the south side of the Rappa- 
hannock, and the terminus of the Richmond and Potomac 
Railroad, had consequently been garrisoned by an infantry 
regiment and a battery, while three regiments of cavalry 
patrolled the river. This force, however, was not posted 
on the Rappahannock with a view of retarding the enemy’s 
advance, but merely for observation. Lee, at this date, had 
no intention of concentrating at Fredericksburg. The 
Federals, if they acted with resolution, could readily fore- 
stall him, and the line of the North Anna, a small but 
difficult stream, thirty-six miles south, offered peculiar 
advantages to the defence. 

The Federal march was rapid. On November 15 the 
Army of the Potomac left Warrenton, and the advanced- 
guard reached Falmouth on the afternoon of the 
17th. General Sumner, in command, observing 
the weakness of the Confederate garrison, requested per- 
mission from Burnside to cross the Rappahannock and 
establish himself on the further bank. Although two army 
corps were at hand, and the remainder were rapidly closing 
up, Burnside refused, for the bridges had been broken, 
and he was unwilling to expose part of his forces on the 
right bank with no means of retreat except a difficult 
and uncertain ford. The same day, part of Longstreet’s 
corps and a brigade of cavalry were sent to Fredericksburg ; 
and on the 19th, Lee, finding that the Federals had left 
Warrenton, ordered Longstreet to concentrate his whole 
force at Fredericksburg, and summoned Jackson from the 
Valley to Orange Court House. 

Jackson, meanwhile, had moved to Winchester, pro- 
bably with the design of threatening the enemy’s garrisons 
on the Potomac, and this unexpected movement had 
caused much perturbation in the North. Pennsylvania 
and Maryland expected nothing less than instant invasion. 
The merchant feared for his strong-box, the farmer for 


Nov. 17. 


302 STONEWALL JACKSON 


his herds; plate was once more packed up; railway 
presidents demanded further protection for their lines ; 
generals begged for reinforcements, and, according to the 
‘Times’ Correspondent, it was ‘the universal belief that 
Stonewall Jackson was ready to pounce upon Washing- 
ton from the Shenandoah, and to capture President, 
Secretaries, and all.’ But before apprehension increased 
to panic, before Mr. Lincoln had become infected by the 
prevailing uneasiness, the departure of the Confederates 
from the Valley brought relief to the affrighted citizens. 

On November 22 Jackson bade farewell to Winchester. 
His headquarters were not more than a hundred yards 
from Dr. Graham’s manse, and he spent his last evening 
with his old friends. ‘He was in fine health and fine 
spirits,’ wrote the minister’s wife to Mrs. Jackson. ‘The 
children begged to be permitted to sit up to see ‘‘ General 
Jackson,” and he really seemed overjoyed to see them, 
played with them and fondled them, and they were 
equally pleased. I have no doubt it was a great recreation . 
to him. He seemed to be living over last winter again, 
and talked a great deal about the hope of getting back 
to spend this winter with us, in the old room, which I 
told him I was keeping for you and him. He certainly 
has had adulation enough to spoil him, but it seems not 
to affect or harm him at all. He is the same humble, 
dependent Christian, desiring to give God all the glory, 
looking to Him alone for a blessing, and not thinking of 
himself.’ 

So it was with no presage that this was the last time 
he would look upon the scenes he loved that Jackson 
moved southward by the Valley turnpike. Past Kernstown 
his columns swept, past Middletown and Strasburg, and all 
the well-remembered fields of former triumphs; until the 
peaks of the Massanuttons threw their shadows across the 
highway, and the mighty bulk of the noble mountains, 
draped in the gold and crimson of the autumn, once more re- 
echoed to the tramp of his swift-footed veterans. Turning 
east at New Market, he struck upwards by the familiar 
road; and then, descending the narrow pass, he forded the 


THE CONFEDERATE DISPOSITIONS 303 


Shenandoah, and crossing the Luray valley vanished in 
the forests of the Blue Ridge. Through the dark pines 
of Fisher’s Gap he led his soldiers down to the Virginia 
plains, and the rivers and the mountains knew him no 
more until their dead returned to them. 

On the 26th the Second Army Corps was at Madison 
Court House. The next day it was concentrated at Orange 
Court House, six-and-thirty miles from Fredericksburg. In 
eight days, two being given to rest, the troops had 
marched one hundred and twenty miles, and with 
scarce a straggler, for the stern measures which had been 
taken to put discipline on a firmer basis, and to make the 
regimental officers do their duty, had already produced a 
salutary effect. 

On Jackson’s arrival at Orange Court House he found 
the situation unchanged, Burnside, notwithstanding that 
heavy snow-storms and sharp frosts betokened the approach 
of winter, the season of impassable roads and swollen 
rivers, was still encamped near Falmouth. The difficulty 
of establishing a new base of supplies at Aquia Creek, 
and some delay on the part of the Washington authorities 
in furnishing him with a pontoon train, had kept him 
idle; but he had not relinquished his design of marching 
upon Richmond. His quiescence, however, together with 
the wishes of the President, had induced General Lee to 
change his plans. The Army of Northern Virginia, 78,500 
strong, although, in order to induce the Federals to attack, it 
was not yet closely concentrated, was ready to oppose in 
Noy.99, 1ull force the passage of the Rappahannock, and 

‘all thought of retiring to the North Anna had 
been abandoned. On November 29, therefore, Jackson was 
ordered forward, and while the First Army Corps occupied 
a strong position in rear of Fredericksburg, with an 
advanced detachment in the town, the Second was told off 
to protect the lower reaches of the Rappahannock. TEwell’s 
division, still commanded by Early, was posted at Skinker’s 
Neck, twelve miles south-east of Fredericksburg, a spot 
which afforded many facilities for crossing; D. H. Hill’s at 
Port Royal, already menaced by Federal gunboats, six 


Nov. 27. 


304 STONEWALL JACKSON 


miles further down stream; A. P. Hill’s and Taliaferro’s 
(Jackson’s own) at Yerby’s House and Guiney’s Station, five 
and nine miles respectively from Longstreet’s right; and 
Stuart, whose division was now increased to four brigades, 
watched both front and flanks. 

The Rappahannock was undoubtedly a formidable ob- 
stacle. Navigable for small vessels as far as Fredericks- 
burg, the head of the tide water, it is two hundred yards 
wide in the neighbourhood of the city, and it increases 
in width and depth as it flows seaward. But above Fal- 
mouth there are several easy fords; the river banks, 
except near Fredericksburg, are clad with forest, hiding 
the movements of troops; and from Falmouth downward, 
the left bank, under the name of the Stafford Heights, so 
completely commands the right that it was manifestly 
impossible for the Confederates to prevent the enemy, 
furnished with a far superior artillery, from making good 
the passage of the stream. A mile west of Fredericksburg, 
however, extending from Beck’s Island to the heights | 
beyond the Massaponax Creek, runs a long low ridge, 
broken by ravines and partially covered with timber, 
which with some slight aid from axe and spade could be 
rendered an exceedingly strong position. Longstreet, who 
occupied this ridge, had been ordered to intrench him- 
self; gun-pits had been dug on the bare crest, named 
Marye’s Hill, which immediately faces Fredericksburg; a 
few shelter-trenches had been thrown up, natural defences 
improved, and some slight breastworks and abattis con- 
structed along the outskirts of the woods. These works 
were at extreme range from the Stafford Heights; and the 
field of fire, extending as far as the river, a distance vary- 
ing from fifteen hundred to three thousand yards, needed 
no clearing. Over such ground a frontal attack, even if 
made by superior numbers, had little chance of success. 

But notwithstanding its manifest advantages the posi- 
tion found no favour in the eyes of Jackson. It could 
be easily turned by the fords above Falmouth—Banks’, 
United States, Ely’s, and Germanna. This, however, was 
a& minor disqualification compared with the restrictions in 


HIS ADVICE OVERRULED 505 


the way of offensive action. If the enemy should cross at 
Fredericksburg, both his flanks would be protected by the 
river, while his numerous batteries, arrayed on the Stafford 
Heights, and commanding the length and the breadth of 
the battle-field, would make counterstroke dificult and 
pursuit impossible. To await attack, moreover, was to 
allow the enemy to choose his own time and place, and 
to surrender the advantages of the initiative. Burn- 
side’s communications were protected by the Rappa- 
hannock, and it was thus impracticable to mancuvre 
against his most vulnerable point, to inflict on him a 
surprise, to compel him to change front, and, in case he 
were defeated, to cut him off from his base and deprive 
him of his supplies. The line of the North Anna, in Jack- 
son’s opinion, promised far greater results. The Federals, 
advancing from Fredericksburg, would expose their right 
flank and their communications for a distance of six-and- 
thirty miles; and if they were compelled to retreat, the 
destruction of their whole army was within the bounds of 
possibility. ‘Iam opposed,’ he said to General D. H. Hill, 
‘to fighting on the Rappahannock. We will whip the 
enemy, but gain no fruits of victory. I have advised the 
line of the North Anna, but have been overruled.’ ! 

So the days passed on. The country was white with 
snow. ‘The temperature was near zero, and the troops, 
with blankets as threadbare as their uniforms, without 
ereatcoats, and in many instances without boots, shivered 
beneath the rude shelters of their forest bivouacs. For- 
tunately there was plenty of work. Roads were cut through 
the woods, and existing tracks improved. The river banks 
were incessantly patrolled. Fortifications were constructed 
at Port Royal and Skinker’s Neck, and the movements 
of the Federals, demonstrating now here and now there, 
kept the whole army on the alert. Nor were Jackson’s 
men deprived of all excitement. He had the satisfaction 
of reporting to General Lee that D. H. Hill, with the aid of 
Stuart’s horse-artillery, had frustrated two attempts of 
the Federal gunboats to pass up the river at Port Royal ; 

1 Dabney, vol. ii., p. 355. From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 299. 


306 STONEWALL JACKSON 


and that the vigilance of Early at Skinker’s Neck had 
caused the enemy to abandon the design which he had 
apparently conceived of crossing at that point. 
But more vigorous operations were not long postponed. 
On December 10, General Burnside, urged by the impatience 
of the Northern press, determined to advance, and the next 
D morning, at 8 a.m., the signal guns of the Confede- 
ec. 11. ‘ 5 ° 
rates gave notice that the enemy was in motion. 
One hundred and forty Federal guns, many of large calibre, 
placed in epaulments on the Stafford Heights, frowned 
down upon Fredericksburg, and before the sun rose the 
Federal bridge builders were at work on the opposite 
shore. The little city, which had been deserted by the 
inhabitants, was held by Barksdale’s Mississippi brigade 
of McLaws’ division, about 1,600 strong, and the conduct 
of this advanced detachment must have done much 
to inspirit the troops who watched their prowess from the 
ridge inrear. A heavy fog hung upon the water, and not 
until the bridge was two-thirds completed, and shadowy . 
figures became visible in the mist, did the Mississippians 
open fire. Atsuch close quarters the effect was immediate, 
and the builders fled. Twice, at intervals of half an hour, 
they ventured again upon the deserted bridge, and twice were 
they driven back. Strong detachments were now moved 
forward by the Federals to cover the working parties, and 
artillery began to play upon the town. The Southerners, 
however, securely posted in rifle-pits and cellars, were not 
to be dislodged ; and at ten o’clock Burnside ordered the 
heavy batteries into action. Every gun which could be 
brought to bear on Fredericksburg discharged fiftyrounds of 
shot and shell. To this bmbardment, which lasted upwards 
of an hour, Longstreet’s artillery could make no reply. 
Yet though the effect on the buildings was appalling, and 
flames broke out in many places, the defenders not only 
suffered little loss, but at the very height of the cannonade 
repelled another attempt to complete the bridge. : 
After a delay of several hours General Hooker, com 
manding the advance, called for volunteers to cross the 
river in boats. Four regiments came forward. The pon- 


THE FEDERALS CROSS THE RIVER 307 


toons were manned, and though many lives were lost during 
the transit, the gallant Federals pushed quickly across ; 
others followed, and Barksdale, who had no orders to hold 
the place against superior strength, withdrew his men from 
the river bank. About 4.80 p.u., three bridges being at 
last established, the enemy pushed forward, and the Missis- 
sippians, retiring in good order, evacuated Fredericksburg. 
A mile below, near the mouth of Hazel Run, the Confederate 
outposts had been driven in, and three more bridges had 
been thrown across. Thus on the night of the 11th the 
Federals, who were now organised in three Grand Divisions, 
each of two army corps, had established their advanced- 
guards on the right bank of the Rappahannock, and, under 
cover of the batteries on the Stafford Heights, could rapidly 
and safely pass over their great host of 120,000 men.! 
Burnside had framed his plan of attack on the assump- 
tion that Lee’s army was dispersed along the Rappa- 
hannock. His balloon had reported large Confederate 
bivouacs below Skinker’s Neck, and he appears to have 
believed that Lee, alarmed by his demonstrations near 
Port Royal, had posted half his army in that neighbour- 
hood. Utterly unsuspicious that a trap had been laid 
for him, he had resolved to take advantage of this 
apparently vicious distribution, and, crossing rapidly at 
Fredericksburg, to defeat the Confederate left before the 
right could lend support. But Port Royal is but eighteen 
miles from Fredericksburg, and in prompt action, therefore, 
lay his only hope of success. Burnside, however, after the 
successful establishment of his six bridges, evinced the 
same want of resolution which had won him so unenviable 
a reputation at Sharpsburg. The long hours of darkness 
slipped peacefully away ; no unusual sound broke the silence 
of the night, and all was still along the Rappahannock. It 
was not till the next morning, December 12, that 
the army began to cross, and the movement, 
made difficult by a dense fog, was by no means energetic. 
Four of the six army corps were transferred during the 


Dec. 12. 


1 The three Grand Divisions were commanded by Sumner, Hooker, and 
Franklin. 


308 STONEWALL JACKSON 


day to the southern bank; but beyond a cavalry recon- 
‘naissance, which was checked by Stuart, there was no 
fighting, and to every man in the Federal ranks it was 
perfectly plain that the delay was fatal. 

Lee, meanwhile, with ample time at his disposal and 
full confidence in the wisdom of his dispositions, calmly 
awaited the development of his adversary’s plans. Jackson 
brought up A. P. Hill and Taliaferro at noon, and posted 
them on Longstreet’s right ; but it was not till that hour, 
when it had at last become certain that the whole Federal 
army was crossing, that couriers were dispatched to call 
in Early and D.H. Hill. Once more the Army of Northern 
Virginia was concentrated at exactly the right moment on 
the field of battle.? 

Like its predecessor, December 18 broke dull and calm, 
and the mist which shrouded river and plain hid from each 

Dee. 13, Other the rival hosts. Long before daybreak the 
‘Federal divisions still beyond the stream began 
to cross ; and as the morning wore on, and the troops near | 
Hazel Run moved forward from their bivouacs, the rum- 
bling of artillery on the frozen roads, the loud words of 
command, and the sound of martial music came, muffled 
by the fog, to the ears of the Confederates lying expectant 
on the ridge. Now and again the curtain lifted for a 
moment, and the Southern guns assailed the long dark 
columns of the foe. Very early had the Confederates taken 
up their position. The ravine of Deep Run, covered with 
tangled brushwood, was the line of demarcation between 
Jackson and Longstreet. On the extreme right of the 
Second Corps, and half a mile north of the marshy valley 
of the Massaponax, where a spur called Prospect Hill juts 
down from the wooded ridge, were fourteen guns under 
Colonel Walker. Supported by two regiments of Field’s 
brigade, these pieces were held back for the present within 
the forest which here clothed the ridge. Below Prospect 
Hill, and running thence along the front of the position, 
the embankment of the Richmond and Potomac Railroad 
formed a tempting breastwork. It was utilised, however, 

1 Lord Wolseley. North American Review, vol. 149, p. 282. 


THE CONFEDERATE POSITION 309 


only by the skirmishers of the defence. The edge of the 
forest, one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards in rear, 
looked down upon an open and gentle slope, and along the 
brow of this natural glacis, covered by the thick timber, 
Jackson posted his fighting-line. To this position it was 
easy to move up his supports and reserves without exposing 
them to the fire of artillery; and if the assailants should 
seize the embankment, he relied apon the deadly rifles of his 
infantry to bar their further advance up the ascent beyond. 
The Light Division supplied both the first and second 
lines of Jackson’s army corps. To the left of Walker’s 
guns, posted in a shelter-trench within the skirts of the wood, - 
was Archer’s brigade of seven regiments, including two of 
Field’s, the left resting on a coppice that projected beyond 
the general line of forest. On the further side of this 
coppice, but nearer the embankment, lay Lane’s brigade, 
an unoccupied space of six hundred yards intervening 
between his right and Archer’s left. Between Lane’s right 
and the edge of the coppice was an open tract two hundred 
yards in breadth. Both of these brigades had a strong skir- 
mish line pushed forward along and beyond the railroad. 
Five hundred yards in rear, along a road through the woods 
which had been cut by Longstreet’s troops, Gregg’s South 
Carolina brigade, in second line, covered the interval between 
Archer and Lane. To Lane’s left rear lay Pender’s 
brigade, supporting twelve guns posted in the open, on the 
far side of the embankment, and twenty-one massed in a 
field to the north of a small house named Bernard’s Cabin. 
Four hundred yards in rear of Lane’s left and Pender’s 
right was stationed Thomas’s brigade of four regiments.! 
It is necessary to notice particularly the shape, size, 
and position of the projecting tongue of woodland which 


1 The dispositions were as follows :— 
12 guns Lane Archer 


14 guns 

21 guns a 
Thomas 

Pender es 


— 


Gregg 


310 STONEWALL JACKSON 


broke the continuity of Hill’s line. A German officer 
on Stuart’s staff had the day previous, while riding 
along the position, remarked its existence, and suggested 
the propriety of razing it; but, although Jackson him- 
self predicted that there would be the scene of the 
severest fighting, the ground was so marshy within its 
depths, and the undergrowth so dense and tangled, that it 
was judged impenetrable and left unoccupied—an error of 
judgment which cost many lives. General Lane had also 
recognised the danger of leaving so wide a gap between 
Archer and himself, and had so reported, but without effect, 
to his divisional commander. 

The coppice was triangular in shape, and extended 
nearly six hundred yards beyond the embankment. The 
base, which faced the Federals, was five hundred yards long. 
Beyond the apex the ground was swampy and covered with 
scrub, and the ridge, depressed at this point to a level with 
the plain, afforded no position from which artillery could 
command the approach to or issue from this patch of. 
jungle. A space of seven hundred yards along the front 
was thus left undefended by direct fire. 

Early, who with D. H. Hill had marched in shortly 
after daybreak, formed the right of the third line, Taliaferro 
the left. The division of D. H. Hill, with several batteries, 
formed the general reserve, and a portion of Harly’s 
artillery was posted about half a mile in rear of his 
division, in readiness, if necessary, to relieve the guns on 
Prospect Hill. 

Jackson’s line was two thousand six hundred yards 
in length, and his infantry 30,000 strong, giving eleven 
rifles to the yard; but nearly three-fourths of the army 
corps, the divisions of Karly, Taliaferro, and D. H. Hill, 
were in third line and reserve. Of his one hundred and 
twenty-three guns only forty-seven were in position, but the 
wooded and broken character of the ground forbade a further 
deployment of his favourite arm. His left, near Deep Run, 
was in close touch with Hood’s division of Longstreet’s army 
corps ; and in advance of his right, already protected by the 
Massaponax, was Stuart with two brigades and his horse- 


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ON THE BATTLE-FIELD 311 


artillery. One Whitworth gun, a piece of great range and 
large calibre, was posted on the wooded heights beyond the 
Massaponax, north-east of Yerby’s House. 

Jackson’s dispositions were almost identical with those 
which he had adopted at the Second Manassas. His whole 
force was hidden in the woods; every gun that could find 
room was ready for action, and the batteries were deployed 
in two masses. Instead, however, of giving each division 
a definite section of the line, he had handed over the whole 
front to A. P. Hill. This arrangement, however, had been 
made before D. H. Hill and Karly came up, and with the 
battle imminent a change was hazardous. In many 
respects, moreover, the ground he now occupied resembled 
that which he had so successfully defended on August 29 
and 30. There was the wood opposite the centre, affording 
the enemy a covered line of approach; the open fields, 
pasture and stubble, on either hand; the stream, hidden 
by timber and difficult of passage, on the one flank, and 
Longstreet on the other. But the position at Fredericks- 
burg was less strong for defence than that at the Second Man- 
assas, for not only was Jackson’s line within three thousand 
yards—a long range but not ineffective—of the heavy guns 
on the Stafford Heights, but on the bare plain between the 
railway and the river there was ample room for the de- 
ployment of the Federal field-batteries. At the Second 
Manassas, on the other hand, the advantages of the artil- 
lery position had been on the side of the Confederates. 

Nevertheless, with the soldiers of Sharpsburg, ragged 
indeed and under-fed, but eager for battle and strong in 
numbers, there was no reason to dread the powerful artillery 
of the foe; and Jackson’s confidence was never higher than 
when, accompanied by his staff, he rode along his line of 
battle. He was not, however, received by his soldiers with 
their usual demonstrations of enthusiastic devotion. In 
honour of the day he had put on the uniform with which 
Stuart had presented him; the old cadet cap, which had so 
often waved his men to victory, was replaced by a head- 
dress resplendent with gold lace; ‘Little Sorrel’ had 
been deposed in favour of a more imposing charger; and 

Z 2 


312 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the veterans failed to recognise their commander until 
he had galloped past them. A Confederate artillery-man 
has given a graphic picture of his appearance when the 
fight was at its hottest :— 

‘A general officer, mounted upon a superb bay horse 
and followed by a single courier, rode up through our guns. 
Looking neither to the right nor the left, he rode straight to 
the front, halted, and seemed gazing intently on the enemy’s 
line of battle. The outfit before me, from top to toe, cap, 
coat, top-boots, horse and furniture, were all of the new — 
order of things. But there was something about the man 
that did not look so new after all. He appeared to be an 
old-time friend of all the turmoil around him. As he had 
done us the honour to make an afternoon call on the 
artillery, 1 thought it becoming in someone to say some- 
thing on the occasion. No one did, however, so, although 
a somewhat bashful and weak-kneed youngster, I plucked 
up courage enough to venture to remark that those big 
guns over the river had been knocking us about pretty 
considerably during the day. He quickly turned his head, 
and I knewin an instant who it was before me. The 
clear-cut, chiselled features; the thin, compressed and de- 
termined lips; the calm, steadfast eye; the countenance to 
command respect, and in time of war to give the soldier 
that confidence he so much craves from a superior officer, 
were all there. He turned his head quickly, and looking me 
all over, rode up the line and away as quickly and silently 
as he came, his little courier hard upon his heels; and 
this was my first sight of Stonewall Jackson.’ 

From his own lines Jackson passed along the front, 
drawing the fire of the Federal skirmishers, who were 
creeping forward, and proceeded to the centre of the 
position, where, on the eminence which has since borne 
the name of Lee’s Hill, the Commander-in-Chief, sur- 
rounded by his generals, was giving his last instructions. It 
was past nine o’clock. The sun, shining out with almost 
September warmth, was drawing up the mist which 
hid the opposing armies; and as the dense white folds 
dissolved and rolled away, the Confederates saw the broad 


THE POMP OF WAR 313 


plain beneath them dark with more than 80,000 foes. Of 
these the left wing, commanded by Franklin, and com- 
posed of 55,000 men and 116 guns, were moving against 
the Second Corps; 80,000, under Sumner, were form- 
ing for attack on Longstreet, and from the heights of 
Stafford, where the reserves were posted in dense masses, a 
great storm of shot and shell burst upon the Confederate 
lines. ‘For once,’ says Dabney, ‘war unmasked its 
terrible proportions with a distinctness hitherto unknown 
in the forest-clad landscapes of America, and the plain of 
Fredericksburg presented a panorama that was dreadful 
in its grandeur.’ It was then that Longstreet, to whose 
sturdy heart the approach of battle seemed always wel- 
come, said to Jackson, ‘ General, do not all those multi- 
tudes of Federals frighten you?’ ‘ We shall very soon 
see whether I shall not frighten them;’ and with this grim 
reply the commander of the Second Corps rode back to 
meet Franklin’s onset. 

The Federals were already advancing. From Deep 
Run southward, for more than a mile and a half, three 
great lines of battle, accompanied by numerous 
batteries, moved steadily forward, powerful enough, 
to all appearance, to bear down all opposition by sheer 
weight of numbers. ‘On they came,’ says an eye-witness, 
‘in beautiful order, as if on parade, their bayonets glisten- 
ing in the bright sunlight; on they came, waving their 
hundreds of regimental flags, which relieved with warm bits 
of colouring the dull blue of the columns and the russet 
tinge of the wintry landscape, while their artillery beyond 
the river continued the cannonade with unabated fury 
over their heads, and gave a background of white fleecy 
smoke, like midsummer clouds, to the animated picture.’ 

And yet that vast array, so formidable of aspect, lacked 
that moral force without which physical power, even in 
its most terrible form, is but an idle show. Not only were 
the strength of the Confederate position, the want of energy 
in the preliminary movements, the insecurity of their 
own situation, but too apparent to the intelligence of the 
regimental officers and men, but they mistrusted their 


9 A.M. 


314 STONEWALL JACKSON 


commander. Northern writers have recorded that the 
Army of the Potomac never went down to battle with less 
alacrity than on this day at Fredericksburg. 

Nor was the order of attack of such a character as to 
revive the confidence of the troops. Burnside, deluded by 
the skill with which Jackson had hidden his troops into the 
belief that the Second Army Corps was still at Port Royal, 
had instructed Franklin to seize the ridge with a single 
division, and Meade’s 4,500 Pennsylvanians were sent for- 
ward alone, while the remainder of the Grand Division, over 
50,000 strong, stood halted on the plain, awaiting the result 
of this hopeless manceuvre.! Meade advanced in three lines, 
each of a brigade, with skirmishers in front and on the 
flank, and his progress was soon checked. No sooner had 
his first line crossed the Richmond road than the left was 
assailed by a well-directed and raking artillery fire. 

Captain Pelham, commanding Stuart’s horse-artillery, 
had galloped forward by Jackson’s orders with his two 
rifled guns, and, escorted by a dismounted squadron, had 
come into action beyond a marshy stream which ran 
through a tangled ravine on the Federal flank. So telling 
was his fire that the leading brigade wavered and gave 
eround; and though Meade quickly brought up his guns 
and placed his third brigade en potence in support, he was 
unable to continue his forward movement until he had 
brushed away his audacious antagonist. The four Penn- 
sylvania batteries were reinforced by two others; but 
rapidly changing his position as often as the Federal 
gunners found his range, for more than half an hour Pel- 
ham defied their efforts, and for that space of time arrested 
the advance of Meade’s 4,500 infantry. One of his pieces 
was soon disabled ; but with the remaining gun, captured 
from the enemy six months before, he maintained the 
unequal fight until his limbers were empty, and he 
received peremptory orders from Stuart to withdraw. 

On Pelham’s retirement, Franklin, bringing several 
batteries forward to the Richmond road, for more than 


1 Franklin’s Grand Division consisted of the 42,800 men, and 12,000 of 
Hooker’s Grand Division had reinforced him. 


THE BOMBARDMENT 315 


half an hour subjected the woods before him to a heavy 
cannonade, in which the guns on the Stafford Heights 
played a conspicuous part. Hidden, however, by the thick 
timber, Jackson’s regiments lay secure, unharmed by the 
tempest that crashed above them through the leafless 
branches ; and, reserving their fire for the hostile infantry, 
his guns were silent. The general, meanwhile, according 
to his custom, had walked far out into the fields to recon- 
noitre for himself, and luck favoured the Confederacy 
on this day of battle. Lieutenant Smith was his only 
companion, and a Federal sharpshooter, suddenly rising 
from some tall weeds two hundred paces distant, levelled 
his rifle and fired. The bullet whistled between their 
heads, and Jackson, turning with a smile to his aide- 
de-camp, said cheerfully: ‘ Mr. Smith, had you not better 
go to the rear? ‘They may shoot you.’ Then, having 
deliberately noted the enemy’s arrangements, he returned 
to his station on Prospect Hill. It was past 
eleven before Meade resumed his advance. 
Covered by the fire of the artillery, his first line was within 
eight hundred yards of Jackson’s centre, when suddenly 
the silent woods awoke to life. The Confederate batteries, 
pushing forward from the covert, came rapidly into action, 
and the flash and thunder of more than fifty guns revealed 
to the astonished Federals the magnitude of the task they 
had undertaken. From front and flank came the scathing 
fire ; the skirmishers were quickly driven in, and on the closed 
ranks behind burst the full fury of the storm. Dismayed 
and decimated by this fierce and unexpected onslaught, 
Meade’s brigades broke in disorder and fell back to the 
Richmond road. 

For the next hour and a half an artillery duel, in which 
over 400 guns took part, raged over the whole field, and the 
Confederate batteries, their position at last revealed, engaged 
with spirit the more numerous and powerful ordnance 
of the enemy. Then Franklin brought up three divisions 
to Meade’s support; and from the smouldering ruins of 
Fredericksburg, three miles to the northward, beyond the 
high trees of Hazel Run, the deep columns of Sumner’s 


11.15 a.m. 


316 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Grand Division deployed under the fire of Longstreet’s 
guns. Sumner’s attack had been for some time in progress 
before Franklin was in readiness to co-operate. The 
battle was now fully developed, and the morning mists 
had been succeeded by dense clouds of smoke, shrouding 
hill and plain, through which the cannon flashed redly, and 
the defiant yells of Longstreet’s riflemen, mingled with their 
rattling volleys, stirred the pulses of Jackson’s veterans. 
As the familiar sounds were borne to their ears, it was seen 
that the dark lines beyond the Richmond road were moving 
forward, and the turn of the Second Corps had come. 

It was one o'clock, and Jackson’s guns had for the 
moment ceased their fire. Meade’s Pennsylvanians had 
rallied. Gibbon’s division had taken post on their right ; 
Birney and Newton were in support; and Doubleday, facing 
south, was engaged with Stuart’s dismounted 
troopers. Twenty-one guns on the right, and 
thirty on the left, stationed on the Richmond road, a 
thousand yards from the Confederate position, formed a 
second tier to the heavier pieces on the heights, and 
fired briskly on the woods. Preceded by clouds of skir- 
mishers, Meade and Gibbon advanced in column of brigades 
at three hundred paces distance, the whole covering 
a front of a thousand yards ; and the supporting divisions 
moved up to the Richmond road. 

When the Federals reached the scene of their former 
repulse, Jackson’s guns again opened; but without the 
same effect, for they were now exposed to the fire of the 
enemy’s batteries at close range. Hven Pelham could do 
but little; and the artillery beyond the railroad on Hill’s 
left was quickly driven in. 

Meade’s rear brigade was now brought up and deployed © 
on the left of the first, in the direction of the Massaponax, 
thus further extending the front. 

The leading brigade made straight for the tongue of 
woodland which interposed between Lane and Archer. As 
they neared the Confederate line, the Pennsylvanians, 
masked by the trees, found that they were no longer 
exposed to fire, and that the coppice was unoccupied. 


1 P.M. 


MEADE AND GIBBON ATTACK 317 


Quickly crossing the border, through swamp and under- 
growth they pushed their way, and, bursting from the 
covert to the right, fell on the exposed flank of Lane’s 
brigade. The fight was fierce, but the Southerners were 
compelled to give ground, for neither Archer nor Gregg 
was able to lend assistance. 

Meade’s second brigade, though following close upon 
the first, had, instead of conforming to the change of 
direction against Lane’s flank, rushed forward through the 
wood. ‘T'wo hundred paces from the embankment it came 
in contact with Archer’s left, which was resting on the very 
edge of the coppice. The Confederates were taken by sur- 
prise. ‘Their front was secured by a strong skirmish line; 
but on the flank, as the thickets appeared impenetrable, 
neither scouts nor pickets had been thrown out, and the 
men were lying with arms piled. Two regiments, leaping 
to their feet and attempting to form line to the left, were 
broken by a determined charge, and gave way in disorder. 
The remainder, however, stood firm, for the Federals, 
instead of following up their success in this direction, 
left Archer to be dealt with by the third brigade of 
the division, which had now reached the railroad, and 
swept on towards the military road, where Gregg’s brigade 
was drawn up within the forest. So thick was the cover, 
and so limited the view, that General Gregg, taking the 
advancing mass for part of Archer’s line retiring, re- 
strained the fire of his men. The Federals broke upon his 
right. He himself fell mortally wounded. His flank regi- 
ment, a battalion of conscripts, fled, except one company, 
without firing a shot. The two regiments on the opposite 
flank, however, were with great readiness turned about, and 
changing front inwards, arrested the movement of the 
enemy along the rear. 

The Federals had now been joined by a portion of the 
first brigade, inspirited by their victory over Lane, and the 
moment, to all appearance, seemed critical in the extreme 
for the Confederates. To the left rear of the attacking 
column, Meade’s third brigade was held in check by 
Walker’s batteries and the sturdy Archer, who, notwith- 


318 STONEWALL JACKSON 


standing that a strong force had passed beyond his flank, 

and had routed two of his regiments, still resolutely held his 

eround, and prevented his immediate opponents from joining 

the intruding column. To the right rear, opposite Pender, 

Gibbon’s division had been checked by the fire of the great 

battery near Bernard’s Cabin ; two of his brigades had been 

driven back, and the third had with difficulty gained the 

shelter of the embankment. So from neither left nor right 

was Immediate support to be expected by Meade’s victorious 

regiments. But on the Richmond road were the divisions 

of Birney and Newton, with Doubleday’s and Sickles’ not 

far in rear, and 20,000 bayonets might have been thrown 

rapidly into the gap which the Pennsylvanians had so vigor- 

ously forced. Yet Jackson’s equanimity was undisturbed. 

The clouds of smoke and the thick timber hid the fighting in 
the centre from his post of observation on Prospect Hill, and 
the first intimation of the enemy’s success was brought by 
an aide-de-camp, galloping wildly up the slope. ‘ General,’ 

he exclaimed in breathless haste, ‘the enemy have broken 
through Archer’s left, and General Gregg says he must 
have help, or he and General Archer will both lose their 
position.’ Jackson turned round quietly, and without the 
least trace of excitement in either voice or manner, sent 
orders to Early and Taliaferro, in third line, to advance 
with the bayonet and clear the front. Then, with rare self- 

restraint, for the fighting instinct was strong within him, 
and the danger was so threatening as to have justified his 
personal interference, he raised his field-glasses and resumed 
his scrutiny of the enemy’s reserves on the Richmond road. 
His confidence in his lieutenants was not misplaced. 
Early’s division, already deployed in line, came forward 
with a rush, and the Stonewall Brigade, responding with 
alacrity to Jackson’s summons, led the advance 
of Taliaferro. 

The counterstroke was vigorous. Meade’s brigades had 
penetrated to the heart of the Confederate position, but 
their numbers were reduced to less than 2,000 bayonets ; 
in the fierce fighting and dense thickets they had lost 
all semblance of cohesion, and not a single regiment had 


1.45 P.M. 


THE COUNTERSTROKE 319 


supported them. The men looked round in vain for help, 
and the forest around them resounded with the yells 
of the Confederate reinforcements. Assailed in front 
and flank by a destructive fire, the Pennsylvanians 
were rapidly borne back. MHill’s second line joined in 
HKarly’s advance. Gibbon was strongly attacked. Six 
brigades, sweeping forward from the forest, dashed down 
the slopes, and in a few moments the broken remnants 
of the Federal divisions were dispersing in panic across the 
plain. As the enemy fled the Confederate gunners, disre- 
garding the shells of Franklin’s batteries, poured a heavy 
fire into the receding mass; and although instructions 
had been given that the counterstroke was not to pass 
the railroad, Hoke’s and Atkinson’s brigades,' carried 
away by success and deaf to all orders, followed in swift 
pursuit. Some of Birney’s regiments, tardily coming 
forward to Meade’s support, were swept away, and the 
yelling line of grey infantry, shooting down the fugitives 
and taking many prisoners, pressed on towards the Rich- 
mond road. ‘There the remainder of Birney’s division was 
drawn up, protected by the breast-high bank, and flanked by 
artillery ; yet it seemed for a moment as if the two Con- 
federate brigades would carry all before them. 

The troops of Meade and Gibbon were streaming in 
confusion to the rear. Two batteries had been abandoned, 
and before Hoke’s onset the left of Birney’s infantry 
gave ground for fifty yards. But the rash advance 
had reached its climax. Unsupported, and with empty 
cartridge-boxes, the Southerners were unable to face the 
fire from the road; sixteen guns had opened on them with 
canister ; and after suffering heavy losses in killed, wounded, 
and prisoners, they withdrew in disorder but unpursued. 

The success of the Second Army Corps was greater than 
even Jackson realised. Meade and Gibbon had lost 4,000 
officers and men; and it was not till late in the after- 
noon that they were rallied on the river bank. The 
casualties in Birney’s division swelled the total to 
5,000, and the Confederate counterstroke had inflicted a 


1 Of Harly’s Division. 


320 STONEWALL JACKSON 


heavier blow than the tale of losses indicates. Not only 
the troops which had been engaged, but those who had 
witnessed their defeat, who had seen them enter the 
enemy’s position, and who knew they should have been 
supported, were much disheartened. At2.30p.m., 
soon after the repulse of Hoke and Atkinson, 
Burnside, having just witnessed the signal failure of afourth 
assault on Longstreet, sent an urgent order to Franklin to 
renew his attack. Franklin made no response. He had 
lost all confidence both in his superior and his men, and 
he took upon himself to disobey. 

On the Confederate:side Taliaferro and Karly, with part 
of the Light Division, now held the railway embankment 
and the skirt of the woods. D. H. Hill was brought up 
into third line, and the shattered brigades of A. P. Hill 
were withdrawn tothg rear. During the rest of the after- 
noon the skirmishers were actively engaged, but although 
Jackson’s victorious soldiery long and eagerly expected a 
renewal of the assault, the enemy refused to be again . 
tempted to close quarters. 

On the left, meanwhile, where the battle still raged, the 
Confederates were equally successful. Against an impreg- 
nable position 40,000 Northerners were madly hurled 
by the general of Mr. Lincoln’s choice. By those 
hapless and stout-hearted soldiers, sacrificed to incom- 
petency, a heroism was displayed which won the praise 
and the pity of their opponents. The attack was insuffi- 
ciently prepared, and feebly supported, by the artillery. 
The troops were formed on a narrow front. Marye’s Hill, 
the strongest portion of the position, where the Confederate 
infantry found shelter behind a stout stone wall, and 
numerous batteries occupied the commanding ground in 
rear, was selected for assault. Neither feint nor demon- 
stration, the ordinary expedients by which the attacker 
seeks to distract the attention and confuse the efforts of 
the defence, was made use of; and yet division after 
division, with no abatement of courage, marched in good 
order over the naked plain, dashed forward with ever- 
thinning ranks, and then, receding sullenly before the 


2.30 P.M. 


THE COUNTERSTROKE 321 


storm of fire, left, within a hundred yards of the stone 
wall, a long line of writhing forms to mark the limit of 
their advance. 

T'wo army corps had been repulsed by Longstreet with 
fearful slaughter when Meade and Gibbon gave way before 
Jackson’s counterstroke, and by three o’clock 
nearly one-half of the Federal army was broken 
and demoralised. The time appeared to have come for a 
general advance of the Confederates. Before Fredericks- 
burg, the wreck of Sumner’s Grand Division was still 
clinging to such cover as the ground afforded. On the 
Richmond road, in front of Jackson, Franklin had abandoned 
all idea of the offensive, and was bringing up his last 
reserves to defend his line. The Confederates, on the other 
hand, were in the highest spirits, and had lost but few. 

General Lee’s arrangements, however, had not included 
preparation for a great counterstroke, and such a move- 
ment is not easily improvised. The position had been 
occupied for defensive purposes alone. here was no 
general reserve, no large and intact force which could have 
moved to the attack immediately the opportunity offered. 
‘No skill,’ says Longstreet, ‘could have marshalled our 
troops for offensive operations in time to meet the emergency. 
My line was long and over broken country, so much so that 
the troops could not be promptly handled in offensive 
operations. Jackson’s corps was in mass, and could he 
have anticipated the result of my battle, he would have 
been justified in pressing Franklin to the river when the 
battle of the latter was lost. Otherwise, pursuit would have 
been as unwise as the attack he had just driven off. It is 
well known that after driving off attacking forces, if imme- 
diate pursuit can be made, so that the victors can go along 
with the retreating forces pell-mell, it is well enough to do 
so; but the attack should be immediate. To follow a 
success by counter-attack against the enemy in position is 
problematical.’ ! 

Moreover, so large was the battle-field, so limited the 
view by reason of the woods, and with such ease had the 

1 Battles and Leaders, vol. iii., pp. 82-3. 


3 P.M. 


322 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Federal attacks been repulsed, that General Lee was 
unaware of the extent of his success. Ignorant, too, as he 
necessarily was, of the mistrust and want of confidence in 
its leaders with which the Federal army was infected, he 
was far from suspecting what a strong ally he had in the 
hearts of his enemies; while, on the other hand, the 
inaccessible batteries on the Stafford Heights were an 
outward and visible token of unabated strength. 

Jackson, however, although the short winter day was 
already closing in, considered that the attempt was worth 
making. About 8 p.m. he had seen a feeble attack on the 
Confederate centre repulsed by Hood and Pender, and 
about the same time he received information of Long- 
street’s success. 

Franklin, meanwhile, was reforming his lines behind the 
high banks of the Richmond road, and the approach of his 
reserves, plainly visible from the Confederate position, 
seemed to presage a renewed attack. ‘I waited some time,’ 
says Jackson, ‘to receive it, but he making no forward | 
movement, I determined, if prudent, todo so myself. The 
artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make 
an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous ; 
yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully 
executed, as to induce me to make preparations for the 
attempt. In order to guard against disaster, the infantry 
was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement post- 
poned until late in the afternoon, so that if compelled 
to retire, it would be under cover of the night.’ ! 

Jackson’s decision was not a little influenced by Stuart, 
or rather by the reports which Stuart, who had sent out 
staff officers to keep the closest watch on the enemy's 
movements, had been able to furnish of the demoralised 
condition of a great part of Franklin’s force. The cavalry 
general, as soon as he verified the truth of these reports in 
person, galloped off to confer with Jackson on Prospect Hill, 
and a message was at once sent to Lee, requesting permis- 
sion for an advance. A single cannon shot was to be the 
signal for a general attack, which Stuart, striking the 

1 Jackson’s Reports, O. B., vol. xxi., p. 634. 


DISAPPOINTMENT 323 


enemy in flank, was to initiate with his two brigades and 
the lighter guns. | 

‘Returning to our position,’ to quote Starts chief of 
staff, ‘we awaited in anxious silence the desired signal; 
but minute after minute passed by, and the dark veil of the 
winter night began to envelop the valley, when Stuart, 
believing that the summons agreed upon had been given, 
issued the order to advance. Off we went into the gather- 
ing darkness, our sharpshooters driving their opponents 
easily before them, and Pelham with his guns, pushing ahead 
at a trot, giving them a few shots whenever the position 
seemed favourable, and then again pressing forward. This 
lasted about twenty minutes, when the fire of the enemy’s 
infantry began to be more and more destructive, and other 
fresh batteries opened upon us. Still all remained silent 
upon our main line. Our situation had become, indeed, a 
critical one, when a courier from General Jackson galloped 
up at full speed, bringing the order for Stuart to retreat as 
quickly as he could to his original position.’ . 

Under cover of the night this retrograde movement was 
effected without loss; and the cavalry, as they marched 
back, saw the camp-fires kindling on the skirts of the 
forest, and the infantry digging intrenchments by the fitful 
glare. 

The Second Corps had not come into action. Jackson 
had issued orders that every gun, of whatever calibre or 
range, which was not disabled should be brought to the 
front and open fire at sunset; and that as soon as the 
enemy showed signs of wavering, the infantry should charge 
with fixed bayonets, and sweep the invaders into the river. 
Hood’s division, which had been temporarily placed at his 
disposal, was instructed to co-operate.! It appears, how- 
ever, that it had not been easy, in the short space of daylight 
still available, to remedy the confusion into which the Con- 
federates had been thrown by Meade’s attack and their own 
counterstroke. The divisions were to some extent mixed 
up. Several regiments had been broken, and the ammuni- 
tion of both infantry and artillery needed replenishment. 

1 Advance and Retreat. - Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood, p. 50. 


324 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Moreover, it was difficult in the extreme to bring the 
batteries forward through the forest; and, when they 
eventually arrived, the strength of the Federal position was 
at once revealed. Franklin’s line was defended by a hun- 
dred and sixteen field pieces, generally of superior metal to 
those of the Confederates, and the guns on the Stafford 
Heights, of which at least thirty bore upon Jackson’s front, 
were still in action. As the first Confederate battery 
advanced, this great array of artillery, which had been 
for some time comparatively quiet, reopened with vigour, 
and, to use Jackson’s words, ‘so completely swept our front 
as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be 
abandoned.’ 

But he was not yet at the end of his resources. A 
strong position, which cannot be turned, is not always 
impregnable. If the ground be favourable, and few 
obstacles exist, a night attack with the bayonet, especially 
if the enemy be exhausted or half-beaten, has many 
chances of success; and during the evening Jackson 
made arrangements for such a movement. ‘ He asked 
me, says Dr. McGuire, ‘how many yards of bandaging 
I had, and when I replied that I did not know the exact 
number, but that I had enough for another fight, he 
seemed a little worried at my lack of information and 
showed his annoyance. Irepeated rather shortly, ‘‘I have 
enough for another battle,” meaning to imply that this was 
all that it was necessary for him to know. I then asked 
him: ‘‘Why do you want to know how much bandaging I 
have?” He said: ‘I want a yard of bandaging to put on 
the arm of every soldier in this night’s attack, so that 
the men may know each other from the enemy.” I told 
him I had not enough cotton cloth for any such purpose, 
and that he would have to take a piece of the shirt tail 
of each soldier to supply the cloth, but, unfortunately, 
half of them had no shirts! The expedient was never 
tried. General Lee decided that the attack would be too 
hazardous.’ ! , 

That night both armies lay on their arms. Burnside, 

’ Letter to the author. 


GENERAL GREGG’S CONDITION 325 


notwithstanding that he spent several hours amongst the 
troops before Fredericksburg, and found that both officers 
and men were opposed to further attack, decided to renew 
the battle the next day. His arrangements became 
known to Lee, an officer or orderly carrying dispatches 
having strayed within the Confederate outposts,! and the 
Southern generals looked forward, on the morning of 
the 14th, to a fresh attack, a more crushing repulse, and 
a general counterstroke. 

Such cheerful anticipations, however, so often enter- 
tained by generals holding a strong defensive position, are 
but seldom realised, and Fredericksburg was no exception. 
The Confederates spent the night in diligent preparation. 
Supplies of ammunition were brought up and_ distri- 
buted, the existing defences were repaired, abattis cut 
and laid, and fresh earthworks thrown up. Jackson, as 
usual on the eve of battle, was still working while others 
rested. Until near midnight he sat up writing and 
dispatching orders; then, throwing himself, booted and 
spurred, on his camp bed, he slept for two or three hours, 
when he again arose, lighted his candle, and resumed his 
writing. Before four o’clock he sent to his medical 
director to inquire as to the condition of General Grege. 
Dr. McGuire reported that his case was hopeless, and 
Jackson requested that he would go over and see that he 
had everything he wished. Somewhat against his will, 
for there were many wounded who required attention, 
the medical officer rode off, but scarcely had he entered 
the farmhouse where Gregg was lying, than he heard the 
tramp of horses, and Jackson himself dismounted on the 
threshold. The brigadier, it appears, had lately fallen 
under the ban of his displeasure; but from the moment his 
condition was reported, Jackson forgot everything but the 
splendid services he had rendered on so many hard-fought 
fields; and in his anxiety that every memory should be 
effaced which might embitter his last moments, he had 
followed Dr. McGuire to his bedside. 

The interview was brief, and the dying soldier was 

1 From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 316. 


VOL. Il. AA 


326 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the happier for it; but the scene in that lonely Virginian » 


homestead, where, in the dark hours of the chill December 
morning, the life of a strong man, of a gallant comrade, 
of an accomplished gentleman, and of an unselfish 
patriot—for Gregg was all these—was slowly ebbing, 
made a deeper impression on those who witnessed it than 
the accumulated horrors of the battle-field. Sadly and 
silently the general and his staff officer rode back through 
the forest, where the troops were already stirring round the 
smouldering camp-fires. Their thoughts were sombre. 
The Confederacy, with a relatively slender population, could 
ill spare such men as Gregg. And yet Jackson, though 
yielding to the depression of the moment, and deploring the 


awful sacrifices which the defence of her liberties imposed . 


upon the South, was in no melting mood. Dr. McGuire, 
when they reached headquarters, put a question as to the best 
means of coping with the overwhelming numbers of the 
enemy. ‘ Kill them, sir! kill every man!’ was the reply 


of the stern soldier who but just now, with words of tender 
sympathy and Christian hope, had bade farewell to his 


dying comrade. 

But on December 14, as on the morrow of Sharpsburg, 
the Confederates were doomed to disappointment. ‘ Dark- 
ness still prevailed,’ writes Stuart’s chief of the staff, 
‘when we mounted our horses and again hastened to 
Prospect Hill, the summit of which we reached just in time 

Dec, 14, $0 See the sun rising, and unveiling, as it dis- 
persed the haze, the long lines of the Federal army, 
‘which once more stood in full line of battle between our 
own position and the river. I could not withhold my 
admiration as I looked down upon the well-disciplined ranks 
of our antagonists, astonished that these troops now offering 
so bold a front should be the same whom not many hours 
since I had seen in complete flight and disorder. The 
skirmishers of the two armies were not much more than a 
hundred yards apart, concealed from each other’s view by 
the high grass in which they were lying, and above which, 
from time to time, rose a small cloud of blue smoke, telling 
that a shot had been fired. As the boom of artillery began 


<n ee “ss a - en 


THE FEDERALS RETREAT 327 


to sound from different parts of the line, and the attack 
might be expected every minute, each hastened to his post.’ 

But though the skirmishing at times grew hotter, and 
the fire of the artillery more rapid, long intervals of silence 
succeeded, until it at length became apparent to the 
Confederates that the enemy, though well prepared to 
resist attack, was determined not to fight outside his 
breastworks. Burnside, indeed, giving way to the remon- 
strances of his subordinates, had abandoned all idea of 
further aggressive action, and unless Lee should move 
forward, had determined to recross the Potomac. 

The next morning saw the armies in the same positions, 
and the Federal wounded, many of whom had _ been 
struck down nearly forty-eight hours before, 
still lying untended between the hostile lines. It 
was not till now that Burnside admitted his defeat by 
sending a flag of truce with a request that he might be 
allowed to bury his dead.1 

The same night a fierce storm swept the valley of the 
Rappahannock, and the Army of the Potomac repassed the 
bridges, evading, under cover of the elements, the observa- 
tion of the Confederate patrols. 

The retreat was effected with a skill which did much 
credit to the Federal staff. Within fourteen hours 100,000 
troops, with the whole of their guns, ambulances, and 
ammunition waggons, were conveyed across the Rappahan- 


Dee. 15. 


1 © When the flag of truce,’ says Major Hotchkiss, ‘was received by General 
Jackson, he asked me for paper and pencil, and began a letter to be sent in 
reply ; but after writing afew lines he handed the paper back, and sent a 
personal message by Captain Smith.’ 

Captain Smith writes: ‘The general said to me, before I went out to 
meet Colonel Sumner, representing the Federals: ‘If you are asked who is 
in command of your right, do not tell them I am, and be guarded in your 
remarks.”’ It so happened that Colonel Sumner was the brother-in-law of 
Colonel Long, an officer on General Lee’s staff. While we were together, 
another Federal officer named Junkin rode up, He was the brother or 
cousin of Jackson’s first wife, and I had known him before the war. After 
some conversation, Junkin asked me to give his regards to General Jack- 
son, and to deliver a message from the Rey. Dr. Junkin, the father of his 
first wife. I replied, “I will do so with pleasure when I meet General 
Jackson.”’ Junkin smiled and said: “It is not worth while for you to try 
to deceive us. We know that General Jackson is in front of us.” 


AVA 2 


328 STONEWALL JACKSON 


nock; but there remained on the south bank sufficient 
evidence to show that the Army of the Potomac had not 
escaped unscathed. When the morning broke the dead lay 
thick upon the field; arms and accoutrements, the débris 
of defeat, were strewed in profusion on every hand, and the 
ruined houses of Fredericksburg were filled with wounded. 
Burnside lost in the battle 12,647 men. 


Lert ATTACK—FRANKLIN, 


Meade’s Division . ; : ‘ « J,0585 
First Corps Gibbon’s Division . ; 1,267 
Doubleday’s Division : 214 
: Birney’s Division . : : ; . 950 
Third Corps Sickles’ Division . : ; ;  3h00 
Sixth Corps Newton’s Division . ‘ ‘ - : 63 


Total’. ° 7 eae 


CENTRE. 
Brook’s Division . . p ‘ : 197 
Howe’s Division . ; ; : ; 186 


Total . . 883 


Rieut AtTAcK—SuMNER AND HOOKER. 


Hancock’s Division ; ; : . 2,082 

Second Corps | Howan Division. : ; ; . _ 914 
French’s Division . : : : . 1,160 

Burns’ Division . Z ; : ; 27 

Ninth Corps 1 Store Division . : é ; - 1,007 
Getty’s Division . : : ; i 296 

Third Corps Whipple’s Division ; ; : A 129 
Griffin’s Division . ‘ , , . 926 

Fifth Corps { Sykes’ Division . ‘ ; ‘ sees 
Humphrey’s Division . : ‘ »/ 2019 

Engineers and Reserve Artillery, &. . : 79 
Total . Pee fe! f 

Grand Total (including 877 officers) . ; 12,647 


(589 prisoners). 


The Confederates showed 5,309 casualties out of less 
tuan 30,000 actually engaged. 


BURNSIDE’S ESCAPE 329 


Lert WING—LONGSTREET. 


Ransom’s Division : ; ; : 5385 
First Corps McLaws’ Division . : “ : 1 858 
Anderson’s Division ‘ : f : 159 
Artillery . : : j : ; : ; ; ; 37 
(1,224 on December 12.) Total . . 1,589 
CENTRE. 

: Pickett’s Division . : p i d 54. 
First Corps Hood’s Division , ; : : et Zoe 
Total . P 3805 

Rigut WINGc—JACKSON. 
Light Division . ‘ ; ‘ » 2,120 
Early’s Division . : ; ; he Oo 
D. H. Hill’s Division . : : ; 173 
Taliaferro’s Division . ; : ; 190 
Total (including 500 captured) . . 93,415 


No attempt was made by the Confederates to follow the 
enemy across the Rappahannock. The upper fords were 
open; but the river was rising fast, and the Army of the 
Potomac, closely concentrated and within a few miles of 
Aquia Creek, was too large to be attacked, and too close 
to its base to permit effective manceuvres, which might 
induce it to divide, against its line of communications. 
The exultation of the Southern soldiers in their easy 
victory was dashed by disappointment. Burnside’s escape 
had demonstrated the fallacy of one of the so-called rules of 
war. ‘The great river which lay behind him during the 
battle of Fredericksburg had proved his salvation instead 
of—as it theoretically should—his ruin. Over the six 
bridges his troops had more lines of retreat than is usually 
the case when roads only are available; and these lines of 
retreat were secure, protected from the Confederate cavalry 
by the river, and from the infantry and artillery by the 
batteries on the Stafford Heights. Had the battle been 
fought on the North Anna, thirty-six miles from Fredericks- 
burg, the result might have been very different. A direct 
counterstroke would possibly have been no more practicable 


330 STONEWALL JACKSON 


than on the Rappahannock, for the superior numbers of the 


enemy, and his powerful artillery, could not have been dis- 
regarded. Nor would a direct pursuit have been a certain 
means of making success decisive ; the rear of a retreating 
army, as the Confederates had found to their cost at Malvern 
Hill, is usually its strongest part. Buta pursuit directed 
against the flanks, striking the line of retreat, cutting off 
the supply and ammunition trains, and blocking the roads, 
a pursuit such as Jackson had organised when he drove 
Banks from the Valley, if conducted with vigour, seldom 
fails in its effect. And who would have conducted such an 
operation with greater skill and energy than Stuart, at the 
head of his 9,000 horsemen ? Who would have supported 
Stuart more expeditiously than the ‘foot-cavalry’ of the 
Second Army Corps ? 

Lee’s position at Fredericksburg, strong as it might 
appear, was exceedingly disadvantageous. A position which 


an army occupies with a view to decisive battle should 


fulfil four requirements :— 

1. It should not be too strong, or the enemy will not 
attack it. 

2. It should give cover to the troops both from view and 
fire from artillery, and have a good field of fire. 

3. It should afford facilities for counterstroke. 

4. It should afford facilities for pursuit. 

Of these Lee’s battle-field fulfilled but the first and 
second. It would have been an admirable selection if the 
sole object of the Confederates had been to gain time, or to 
prevent the enemy establishing himself south of the Rap- 
pahannock; but to encompass the destruction of the enemy’s 
whole army it was as ill adapted as Wellington’s position at 
Torres Vedras, at Busaco, or at Fuentes d’Onor. But while 
Wellington in taking up these positions had no further end 
in view than holding the French in check, the situation of 
the Confederacy was such that a decisive victory was emi- 
nently desirable. Nothing was to be gained by gaining time. 
The South could furnish Lee with no further reinforce- 
ments. Every able-bodied man was in the service of his 
country; and it was perfectly certain that the Western 


a 


COMMENTS 331 


armies, although they had been generally successful during 
the past year, would never be permitted by Mr. Davis to 
leave the valley of the Mississippi. 

The Army of Northern Virginia was not likely to be 
stronger or more efficient. Equipped with the spoils of many 
victories, it was more on a level with the enemy than had 
hitherto been the case. The ranks were full. The men were 
inured to hardships and swift marches; their health was 
proof against inclement weather, and they knew their work 
on the field of battle. The artillery had recently been reor- 
ganised. During the Peninsular campaign the batteries had 
been attached to the infantry brigades, and the indifferent 
service they had often rendered had been attributed to the 
difficulty of collecting the scattered units, and in handling 
them in combination. Formed into battalions of four or 
six batteries a large number of guns was now attached to 
each of the divisions, and each army corps had a strong 
reserve; so that the concentration of a heavy force of 
artillery on any part of a position became a feasible 
operation. The cavalry, so admirably commanded by 
Stuart, Hampton, and the younger Lees, was not less 
hardy or efficient than the infantry, and the moral of the 
soldiers of every arm, founded on confidence in themselves 
not less than on confidence in their leaders, was never higher. 

‘After the truce had been agreed upon,’ says Captain 
Smith, ‘litter-bearers to bring away the dead and wounded 
were selected from the command of General Rodes. When 
they had fallen in, General Rodes said to them: “ Now, 
boys, those Yankees are going to ask you questions, and you 
must not tell them anything. Be very careful about this.” 
At this juncture one of the men spoke up, and said, 
“General, can’t we tell them that we whipped them 
yesterday ?’’ Rodes replied, laughing: ‘‘ Yes, yes ! you can 
tell them that.” Immediately another man spoke up: 
** General, can’t we tell them that we can whip them to- 
morrow and the day after?’’ Rodes again laughed, and 
sent those incorrigible jokers off with: ‘‘ Yes, yes! go on, 
goon! ‘Tell them what you please.’’’ 

The Army of the Potomac, on the other hand, was not 


332 STONEWALL JACKSON 


likely to become weaker or less formidable if time were 
allowed it to recuperate. It had behind it enormous 
reserves. 60,000 men had been killed, wounded, or captured 
since the battle of Kernstown, and yet the ranks were as 
full as when McClellan first marched on Richmond. Many 
generals had disappeared; but those who remained were 
learning their trade; and the soldiers, although more familiar 
with defeat than victory, showed little diminution of martial 
ardour. Nor had the strain of the war sapped the resources 
ofthe North. Her trade, instead of dwindling, had actually 
increased; and the gaps made in the population by the 
Confederate bullets were more than made good by a 
constant influx of immigrants from Europe. 

It was not by partial triumphs, not by the slaughter of 
a few brigades, by defence without counterstroke, by 
victories without pursuit, that a Power of such strength and 
vitality could be compelled to confess her impotence. 
Whether some overwhelming disaster, a Jena or a Waterloo, 
followed by instant invasion, would have subdued her stub- | 
born spirit is problematical. Rome survived Canne, Scot- 
land Flodden, and France Sedan. But in some such ‘ crown- 
ing mercy’ lay the only hope of the Confederacy, and had 
the Army of the Potomace, ill-commanded as it was, been 
drawn forward to the North Anna, it might have been utterly 
destroyed. Half-hearted strategy, which aims only at re- 
pulsing the enemy’s attack, is not the path to ‘ king-making 
victory ;’ itis not by such feeble means that States secure 
or protect their independence. ‘To occupy a position where 
Stuart’s cavalry was powerless, where the qualities which 
made Lee’s infantry so formidable—the impetuosity of their 
attack, the swiftness of their marches—had no field for 
display, and where the enemy had free scope for the employ- 
ment of his artillery, his strongest arm, was but to posi po 
the evil day. It had been well for the Confederacy if } 
Stonewall Jackson, whose resolute strategy had but one aim, / 
and that aim the annihilation of the enemy, had been the ’ 
supreme director of her councils. To paraphrase Mahan : 
‘The strategic mistake (in occupying a position for which 
pursuit was impracticable) neutralised the tactical advantage 


» FALSE STRATEGY 333 


gained, thus confirming the military maxim that a strategic 
mistake is more serious and far-reaching in its effects than 
an error in tactics.’ 

Lee, however, was fettered by the orders of the Cabinet ; 
and Mr. Davis and his advisers, more concerned with 
the importance of retaining an area of country which 
still furnished supplies than of annihilating the Army of the 
Potomac, and relying on European intervention rather than 
on the valour of the Southern soldier, were responsible 
for the occupation of the Fredericksburg position. In 
extenuation of their mistake it may, however, be 
admitted that the advantages of concentration on the 
North Anna were not such as would impress themselves on 
the civilian mind, while the surrender of territory would 
undoubtedly have embarrassed both the Government and 
the supply department. Moreover, at the end of November, 
it might have been urged that if Burnside were permitted to 
possess himself of Fredericksburg, it was by no means cer- 
tain that he would advance on Richmond ; establishing him- 
self in winter quarters, he might wait until the weather 
improved, controlling, in the meantime, the resources and 
population of that portion of Virginia which lay within his 
reach. 

Nevertheless, as events went far to prove, Mr. Davis 
would have done wisely had he accepted the advice of the 
soldiers on the spot. His strategical glance was less com- 
prehensive than that of Lee and Jackson. In the first 
place, they knew that if Burnside proposed going into winter 
quarters, he would not deliberately place the Rappahan- 
nock between himself and his base, nor halt with the 
great forest of Spotsylvania on his flank. In the second 
place, there could be no question but that the Northern 
Government and the Northern people would impel him for- 
ward. The tone of the press was unmistakable ; and the very 
reason that Burnside had been appointed to command was 
because McClellan was so slow to move. In the third 
place, both Lee and Jackson saw the need of decisive victory. 
With them questions of strategic dispositions, offering chances 
of such victory, were of more importance than questions 


334 STONEWALL JACKSON 


of supply or internal politics. They knew with what rapidity 
the Federal soldiers recovered their moral; and they 
realised but too keenly the stern determination which 
inspired the North. They had seen the hosts of invasion 
retire in swift succession, stricken and exhausted, before 
their victorious bayonets. Thousands of prisoners had been 
marched to Richmond ; thousands of wounded, abandoned 
on the battle-field, had been paroled; guns, waggons and 
small arms, enough toequip a great army, had been captured ; 
and general after general had been reduced to the ignominy 
that awaits a defeated leader. Frémont and Shields had 
disappeared ; Banks was no longer in the field ; Porter was 
waiting trial; McDowell had gone; Pope had gone, and 
McClellan; and yet the Army of the Potomac still held its 
ground, the great fleets still kept their stations, the capture 
of Richmond was still the objective of the Union Govern- 
ment, and not for a single moment had Lincoln wavered 
from his purpose. 

It will not be asserted that either Lee or Jackson 
fathomed the source of this unconquerable tenacity. 
They had played with effect on the fears of Lincoln; 
they had recognised in him the motive power of the 
Federal hosts; but they had not yet learned, for the 
Northern people themselves had not yet learned it, that 
they were opposed by an adversary whose resolution was 
as unyielding as their own, who loved the Union even as 
they loved Virginia, and who ruled the nation with the 
same tact and skill that they ruled their soldiers. 

In these pages Mr. Lincoln has not been spared. He 
made mistakes, and he himself would have been the last to 
claim infallibility. He had entered the White House with a 
rich endowment of common-sense, a high sense of duty, and 
an extraordinary knowledge of the American character ; but 
his ignorance of ‘statesmanship directing arms’ was very 
great; and his errors were very numerous. Putting these 
aside, his tenure of office during the dark days of ’61 and ’62 
had been marked by the very highest political sagacity ; his 
courage and his patriotism had sustained the nation in its 
distress ; and in spite of every obstacle he was gradually 


THE EDICT OF EMANCIPATION 335 


bringing into being a unity of sympathy and of purpose, 
which in the early days of the war had seemed an impossible 
ideal. Not the least politic of his measures was the edict of 
emancipation, published after the battle of Sharpsburg. Ii 
was not a measure without flaw. It contained paragraphs 
which might fairly be interpreted, and were so interpreted 
by the Confederates, as inciting the negroes to rise against 
their masters, thus exposing to all the horrors of a servile in- 
surrection, with its accompaniments of murder and outrage, 
the farms and plantations where the women and children of 
the South lived lonely and unprotected. But if the edict 
served only to embitter the Southerners, to bind the whole 
country together in a still closer league of resistance, and to 
make peace except by conquest impossible, it was worth the 
price. The party in the North which fought for the re- 
establishment of the Union had carried on the war with 
but small success. The tale of reverses had told at last 
upon recruiting. Men were unwilling to come forward ; 
and those who were bribed by large bounties to join the 
armies were of a different character to the original 
volunteer. Enthusiasm in the cause was fast dimin- 
ishing when Lincoln, purely on his own initiative, pro- 
claimed emancipation, and, investing the war with the 
dignity of a crusade, inspired the soldier with a new 
incentive, and appealed to a feeling which had not yet 
been stirred. Many Northerners had not thought it worth 
while to fight for the re-establishment of the Union on the 
basis of the Constitution. If slavery was to be permitted 
to continue they preferred separation ; and these men were 
farmers and agriculturists, the class which furnished the best 
soldiers, men of American birth, for the most part abolition- 
ists, and ready to fight for the principle they had so much at 
heart. Itis true that the effect of the edict was not at 
once apparent. It was notreceived everywhere with accla- 
mation. The army had small sympathy with the coloured 
race, and the political opponents of the President accused 
him vehemently of unconstitutional action. Their denun- 
ciations, however, missed the mark. The letter of the Con- 
stitution, as Mr. Lincoln clearly saw, had ceased to be 


336 STONEWALL JACKSON 


regarded, at least by the great bulk of the people, with 
superstitious reverence. 

They had learned to think more of great principles 
than of political expedients; and if the defence of their 
hereditary rights had welded the South into a nation, the 
assertion of a still nobler principle, the liberty of man, 
placed the North on a higher plane, enlisted the sympathy 
of Kurope, and completed the isolation of the Confederacy. 

But although Lee and Jackson had not yet penetrated 
the political genius of their great antagonist, they rated 
at its true value the vigour displayed by his Administra- 
tion, and they saw that something more was wanting to 
wrest their freedom from the North than a mere passive 
resistance to the invader’s progress. Soon after the battle 
of Fredericksburg, Lee went to Richmond and laid pro- 
posals for an aggressive campaign before the President. 
‘He was assured, however,’ says General Longstreet, ‘ that 
the war was virtually over, and that we need not harass 
our troops by marches and other hardships. Gold had 
advanced in New York to two hundred premium, and we 
were told by those in the Confederate capital that in thirty 
or forty days we would be recognised (by the European 
Powers) and peace proclaimed. General Lee did not share 
this belief.’ ! 

So Jackson, who had hoped to return to Winchester, 
was doomed to the inaction of winter quarters on the 
Rappahannock, for with Burnside’s repulse operations 
practically ceased. The Confederate cavalry, however, did 

Dec. 1g, Mot at once abandon hostilities. On December 
‘“* 18, Hampton marched his brigade as far as the 
village of Occoquan, bringing off 150 prisoners and captur- 

Dec, 26, 14g a convoy; and on December 26 Stuart closed 
‘his record for 1862 by leading 1,800 troopers 
far to the Federal rear. After doing much damage in the 
district about Occoquan and Dumfries, twenty miles from 
Burnside’s headquarters, he marched northward in the | 
direction of Washington, and penetrated as far as Burke’s 
Station, fifteen miles from Alexandria. Sending a telegraphic 

1 Battles and Leaders, vol. iii., p. 84. 


‘THIS WAY TO RICHMOND’ 337 


message to General Meigs, Quartermaster-General at Wash- 
ington, to the effect that the mules furnished to Burnside’s 
army were of such bad quality that he was embarrassed in 
taking the waggons he had captured into the Con- 
federate lines, and requesting that a better class of animal 
might be supplied in future, he returned by long marches 
through Warrenton to Culpeper Court House, escaping 
pursuit, and bringing with him a large amount of plunder 
and many prisoners. From the afternoon of December 26 
to nightfall on December 81 he rode one hundred and fifty 
miles, losing 28 officers and men in skirmishes with detach- 
ments of the Federal cavalry. He had contrived to throw 
a great part of the troops sent to meet him into utter 
confusion by intercepting their telegrams, and answering 
them himself in a manner that scattered his pursuers and 
broke down their horses. 

Near the end of January, Burnside made a futile attempt 
to march his army round Lee’s flank by way of Ely’s and 
Germanna Fords. The weather, however, was inclement ; 
the roads were in a fearful condition, and the troops ex- 
perienced such difficulty in movement, that the operation, 
which goes by the name of the ‘ Mud Campaign,’ was soon 
abandoned. 

On January 26, Burnside, in consequence of ie strong 

1863. representations made by his lieutenants to the 
Jan. 26. President, was superseded. General Hooker, the 
dashing fighter of the Antietam, replaced him in command 
of the Army of the Potomac, and the Federal troops went 
into winter quarters about Falmouth, where, on the opposite 
shore of the Rappahannock, within full view of the sentries, 
stood a row of finger-posts, on which the Confederate 
soldiers had painted the taunting legend, ‘This way to 
Richmond |!’ 


338 STONEWALL JACKSON 


CHAPTER XXI 


THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA 


‘In war men are nothing ; it is the man who is everything. 
The general is the head, the whole of an army. It was 
not the Roman army that conquered Gaul, but Cesar ; it 
was not the Carthaginian army that made Rome tremble 
in her gates, but Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army — 
that reached the Indus, but Alexander; it was not the, 
French army that carried the war to the Weser and the Inn, 
but Turenne ; it was not the Prussian army which, for seven 
years, defended Prussia against the three greatest Powers of 
Europe, but Frederick the Great.’ So spoke Napoleon, 
reiterating a truth confirmed by the experience of suc- 
cessive ages, that a wise direction is of more avail than 
overwhelming numbers, sound strategy than the most per- 
- fect armament; a powerful will, invigorating all who come 
within its sphere, than the spasmodic efforts of ill-regulated 
valour. 

Even a professional army of long standing and old 
traditions is what its commander makes it; its cha- 
racter sooner or later becomes the reflex of his own; 
from him the officers take their tone; his energy 
or his inactivity, his firmness or vacillation, are rapidly 
communicated even to the lower ranks; and so far- 
reaching is the influence of the leader, that those who 
record his campaigns concern themselves but little as a 
rule with the men who followed him. The history of 
famous armies is the history of great generals, for no army 
has ever achieved great things unless it has been well com- 
manded. If the general be second-rate the army also 
will be second-rate. Mutual confidence is the basis of 


THE AMERICAN SOLDIER 339. 


success in war, and unless the troops have implicit trust in 
the resolution and resources of their chief, hesitation and 
half-heartedness are sure to mark their actions. They 
may fight with their accustomed courage; but the eager- 
ness for the conflict, the alacrity to support, the determina- 
tion to conquer, will not be there. The indefinable quality 
which is expressed by the word moral will to some degree 
be affected. The history of the Army of the Potomac is a 
case in point. 

Between the soldiers of the North and South there was 
little difference. Neither could claim a superiority of 
martial qualities. The Confederates, indeed, at the begin- 
ning of the war possessed a larger measure of technical skill ; 
they were better shots and finer riders. But they were 
neither braver nor more enduring, and while they probably 
derived some advantage from the fact that they were defend- 
ing their homes, the Federals, defending the integrity of 
their native land, were fighting in the noblest of all causes. 
Both Northerner and Southerner were of the same race, a 
race proud, resolute, independent; both were inspired by 
the same sentiments of self-respect; noblesse oblige—the 
noblesse of a free people—was the motto of the one as 
of the other. It has been asserted that the Federal 
armies were very largely composed of foreigners, whose 
motives for enlisting were purely mercenary. At no 
period of the war, however, did the proportion of native 
Americans sink below seventy per cent.,! and at the begin- 
ning of 1863 it was much greater. As a matter of fact, 
the Union army was composed of thoroughly reliable men.? 


1 See Note at end of chapter. 

2 «Throughout New England,’ wrote the Special Correspondent of an 
English newspaper, ‘ you can scarcely enter a door without being aware that 
you are in a house of mourning. Whatever may be said of Irish and German 
mercenaries, I must bear witness that the best classes of Americans have 
bravely come forth for their country. I know of scarcely a family more than 
one member of which has not been or is not in the ranks of the army. The 
youths maimed and crippled I meet on the highroad certainly do not for the 
most part belong to the immigrant rabble of which the Northern regiments 
are saidto consist; and even the present conscription is nowin many splendid 
instances most promptly and cheerfully complied with by the wealthy people 
who could easily purchase exemption, but who prefer to set a good example.’ 
Letter from Rhode Island, the Times, August 8, 1863. 


340 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Nor was the alien element at this time a source of weakness. 
Ireland and Germany supplied the greater number of those 
who have been called ‘ Lincoln’s hirelings;’ and, judg- 
ing from the official records, the Irish regiments at least were 
not a whit less trustworthy than those purely American. 
Moreover, even if the admixture of foreigners had been 
greater, the Army of the Potomac, for the reason that it was 
always superior in numbers, contained in its ranks many 
more men bred in the United States than the Army of 
Northern Virginia.! For the consistent ill-success of the 
Federals the superior marksmanship and finer horseman- 
ship of the Confederates cannot, therefore, be accepted as 
sufficient explanation. 

In defence the balance of endurance inclined neither to 
one side nor the other. Both Southerner and Northerner 
displayed that stubborn resolve to maintain their ground 
which is the peculiar attribute of the Anglo-Saxon. To 
claim for any one race a pre-eminence of valour is repugnant 
alike to good taste and to sound sense. Courage and 
endurance are widely distributed over the world’s surface, — 
and political institutions, the national conception of duty, 
the efficiency of the corps of officers, and love of country, 
are the foundation of vigour and staunchness in the field. 
Yet it is a fact which can hardly be ignored, that from Cre¢y 
to Inkermann there have been exceedingly few instances 
where an English army, large or small, has been driven from 
a position. In the great struggle with France, neither 
Napoleon nor his marshals, although the armies of every 
other Kuropean nation had fled before them, could boast of 
having broken the English infantry ; and no soldiers have 
ever received a prouder tribute than the admission of a 
generous enemy, ‘They never know when they are beaten.’ 
In America, the characteristics of the parent race were as 
prominent in the Civil War as they had been in the 
Revolution. In 1861-65, the side that stood on the 
defensive, unless hopelessly outnumbered, was almost 


é John Mitchell, the Irish Nationalist, said in a letter to the Dublin 
Nation that there were 40,000 Irishmen ig the Southern armies. The Times, 
February 7, 1863. 


NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SOLDIERS COMPARED 341 


invariably successful, just as it had been in 1776-82. 
‘My men,’ said Jackson, ‘sometimes fail to drive the 
enemy from his position, but to hold one, never!’ The 
Federal generals might have made the same assertion with 
almost equal truth. Porter had indeed been defeated at 
Gaines’ Mill, but he could only set 35,000 in line against 
55,000; Banks had been overwhelmed at Winchester, but 
6,500 men could hardly have hoped to resist more than 
twice their strength ; and Shields’ advanced-guard at Port 
Republic was much inferior to the force which Jackson 
brought against it; yet these were the only offensive victories 
of the ’*62 campaign. But if in defence the armies were 
well matched, it must be conceded that the Northern attack 
was not pressed with the same concentrated vigour as the 
Southern. McClellan at Sharpsburg had more than twice 
as many men as Lee; Pope, on the first day of the Second 
Manassas, twice as many as Jackson; yet on both occa- 
sions the smaller force was victorious. But, in the first 
place, the Federal tactics in attack were always feeble. 
Lincoln, in appointing Hooker to command the Army 
of the Potomac, warned him ‘to put in all his men.’ 
His sharp eye had detected the great fault which had 
characterised the operations of his generals. Their 
assaults had been piecemeal, like those of the Confederates 
at Malvern Hill, and they had been defeated in detail by 
the inferior numbers. The Northern soldiers were strangers 
to those general and combined attacks, pressed with un- 
yielding resolution, which had won Winchester, Gaines’ 
Mill, and the Second Manassas, and which had nearly 
won Kernstown. The Northern generals invariably kept 
large masses in reserve, and these masses were never used. 
They had not yet learned, as had Lee, Jackson, and Long- 
street, that superior numbers are of no avail unless they 
are brought into action, impelling the attack forward by 
sheer weight, at the decisive point. In the second place, none 
of the Federal leaders possessed the entire confidence either 
of their generals or their troops. With all its affection 
for McClellan, it may strongly be questioned whether his 
army gave him credit for dash or resolution. Pope was 
VOL. II. BB 


“ 
342 STONEWALL JACKSON 


defeated in his first action at Cedar Run. Banke at 
Winchester, Frémont west of Staunton, had both been out- 
manceuvred. Burnside had against him his feeble conduct 
at Sharpsburg. Hence the Federal soldiers fought most of 
their offensive battles under a terrible disadvantage. They 
were led by men who had known defeat, and who owed 
their defeat, in great measure, to the same fault—neglect to 
employ their whole force in combination. Brave and un- 
yielding as they were, the troops went into battle mistrustful 
of their leader’s skill, and fearful, from the very outset, that 
their efforts would be unsupported; and when men begin 
to look over their shoulders for reinforcements, demoralisa- 
tion is not far off. It would be untrue to say that a 
defeated general can never regain the confidence of 
his soldiers; but unless he has previous successes to 
set off against his failure, to permit him to retain 
his position is dangerous in the extreme. Such was 
the opinion of Jackson, always solicitous of the moral of his 
command. ‘To his mind nothing ever fully excused failure, 
and it was rarely that he gave an officer the opportunity of - 
failing twice. ‘‘The service,” he said, “ cannot afford to 
keep a man who does not succeed.’’ Nor was he ever 
restrained from a change by the fear of making matters 
worse. His motto was, get rid of the unsuccessful man at 
once, and trust to Providence for finding a better.’ 

Nor was the presence of discredited generais the only 
evil which went to neutralise the valour of the Federal 
soldiers. The system of command was as rotten in the © 
Army of the Potomac asin the Armies of Northern Virginia ~ 
and of the Valley it was sound; and the system of com- 
mand plays a most important part in war. The natural 
initiative of the American, the general fearlessness of re- 
sponsibility, were as conspicuous. among the soldiers as in 
the nation at large. To those familiar with the Official 
Records, where the doings of regiments and even companies 
are preserved, it is perfectly apparent that, so soon as the ~ 
officers gained experience, the smaller units were as boldly 
and efficiently handled asin the army of Germany under 
Moltke. But while Lee and Jackson, by every means in 


THE SYSTEM OF COMMAND 343 


their power, fostered the capacity for independent action, 
following therein the example of Napoleon,! of Washington, 
of Nelson, and of Wellington, and aware that their strength 
would thus be doubled, McClellan and Pope did their best 
to stifle it; and in the higher ranks they succeeded. In 
the one case the generals were taught to wait for orders, in 
the other to anticipate them. In the one case, whether 
troops were supported or not depended on the word of the 
commanding general ; in the other, every officer was taught 
that to sustain his colleagues was his first duty. It thus 
resulted that while the Confederate leaders were served by 
scores of zealous assistants, actively engaged in furthering 
the aim of their superiors, McClellan, Pope, and Frémont, 
jealous of power reduced their subordinates, with few ex- 
ceptions, to the position of machines, content to obey the 
letter of their orders, oblivious of opportunity, and incapable 
of co-operation. Lee and Jackson appear to have realised 
the requirements of battle far more fully than their 
opponents. They knew that the scope of the commander 
is limited; that once his troops are committed to close 
action it is impossible for him to exert further control, for 
his orders can no longer reach them; that he cannot keep 
the whole field under observation, much less observe every 
fleeting opportunity. Yet it is by utilising opportunities 
that the enemy’s strength is sapped. For these reasons 
the Confederate generals were exceedingly careful not to 
chill the spirit of enterprise. Errors of judgment were 
never considered in the light of crimes; while the officer 
who, in default of orders, remained inactive, or who, when 
his orders were manifestly inapplicable to a suddenly 
changed situation, and there was no time to have them 
altered, dared not act for himself, was not long retained in 
responsible command. In the Army of the Potomac, on 
the other hand, centralisation was the rule. McClellan 


1 In the opinion of the author, the charge of centralisation preferred 
against Napoleon can only be applied to his leading in his later campaigns. 
In his earlier operations he gave his generals every latitude, and he main- 
tained that loose but effective system of tactics, in which much was left to the 
individual, which the French soldiers had instinctively adopted in the Revolu- 
tionary Wars. 

BB 2 


344 STONEWALL JACKSON 


expected blind obedience from his corps commanders, and 
nothing more, and Pope brought Porter to trial for using his 
own judgment, on occasions when Pope himself was absent, 
during the campaign of the Second Manassas. Thus the 
Federal soldiers, through no fault of their own, laboured for 
the first two years of the war under a disadvantage from 
which the wisdom of Lee and Jackson had relieved the 
Confederates. The Army of the Potomac was an inert mass, 
the Army of Northern Virginia a living organism, endowed 
with irresistible vigour. 

It is to be noted, too, as tending to prove the equal 
courage of North and South, that on the Western theatre 
of war the Federals were the more successful. And yet the 
Western armies of the Confederacy were neither less brave, 
less hardy, nor less disciplined than those in Virginia. 
They were led, however, by inferior men, while, on the 
other hand, many of the Northern generals opposed to them 
possessed unquestionable ability, and understood the value 
of a good system of command. 

We may say, then, without detracting an iota from the 
high reputation of the Confederate soldiers, that it was 
not the Army of Northern Virginia that saved Richmond 
in 1862, but Lee; not the Army of the Valley which won 
the Valley campaign, but Jackson. 

It is related that a good priest, once a chaplain in 
Taylor’s Louisiana brigade, concluded his prayer at the 
unveiling of the Jackson monument in New Orleans with 
these remarkable words: ‘When in Thine inscrutable 
decree it was ordained that the Confederacy should fail, 
it became necessary for Thee to remove Thy servant . 
Stonewall Jackson.’! It is unnecessary, perhaps, to lay 
much forcible emphasis on the personal factor, but, at 
the same time, it is exceedingly essential that it should 
never be overlooked. | 

The Government which, either in peace or war, commits 
the charge of its armed forces to any other than the ablest 
and most experienced soldier the country can produce is 
but laying the foundation of national disaster. Had the 

1 Bright Skies and Dark Shadows, p. 294. H. M. Field, D.D. 


THE AMERICAN SOLDIER 345 


importance of a careful selection for the higher commands 
been understood in the North as it was understood in the 
South, Lee and Jackson would have been opposed by foes 
more formidable than Pope and Burnside, or Banks and 
Frémont. The Federal Administration, confident in the 
courage and intelligence of their great armies, considered 
that any ordinary general, trained to command, and 
supported by an efficient staff, should be able to win 
victories. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, himself a 
soldier, who, as United States Secretary of War, had 
enjoyed peculiar opportunities of estimating the character 
of the officers of the old army, made no such mistake. 
He was not always, indeed, either wise or consistent ; but, 
with few exceptions, his appointments were the best that 
could be made, and he was ready to accept the 
advice, as regarded selections for command, of his most 
experienced generals. 

But however far-reaching may be the influence of a 
great leader, in estimating his capacity the temper of 
the weapon that he wielded can hardly be overlooked. 
In the first place, that temper, to a greater or less degree, 
must have been of his own forging,—it is part of his fame. 
‘No man,’ says Napier, ‘can be justly called a great captain 
who does not know how to organise and form the character 
of an army, as well as to lead it when formed.’ In the 
second place, to do much with feeble means is greater 
than to do more with large resources. Difficulties are 
inherent in all military operations, and not the least. 
may be the constitution of the army. Nor would the story 
of Stonewall Jackson be more than half told without large 
reference to those tried soldiers, subalterns and private 
soldiers as they were, whom he looked upon as his comrades, 
whose patriotism and endurance he extolled so highly, and 
whose devotion to himself, next to the approval of his own 
conscience, was the reward that most he valued. 

He is blind indeed who fails to recognise the unselfish 
patriotism displayed by the citizen-soldiers of America, 
the stern resolution with which the war was waged; 
the tenacity of the Northerner, ill-commanded and con- 


346 STONEWALL JACKSON 


stantly defeated, fighting in a most difficult country and 
foiled on every line of invasion; the tenacity of the 
Southerner, confronting enormous odds, ill-fed, ill-armed, 
and ill-provided, knowing that if wounded his sufferings 
would be great—for drugs had been declared contraband of 
war, the hospitals contained no anesthetics to relieve the 
pain of amputation, and the surgical instruments, which 
were only replaced when others were captured, were worn 
out with constant usage; knowing too that his women-folk 
and children were in want, and yet never yielding to 
despair nor abandoning hope of ultimate victory. Neither 
Federal nor Confederate deemed his life the most precious 
of his earthly possessions. Neither New Englander nor Vir- 
ginian ever for one moment dreamt of surrendering, no matter 
what the struggle might cost, a single acre of the territory, 
a single item of the civil rights, which had been handed 
down to him. ‘I donot profess,’ said Jackson, ‘ any romantic 
sentiments as to the vanity of life. Certainly no man has 
more that should make life dear to him than I have, in the 
affection of my home; but I do not desire to survive the 
independence of my country.’ And Jackson’s attitude was 
that of his fellow-countrymen. The words of Naboth, 
‘ Jehovah forbid that I should give to thee the inheritance of 
my forefathers,’ were graven on the heart of both North and 
South ; and the unknown and forgotten heroes who fought 
in the ranks of either army, and who fought for a principle, 
not on compulsion or for glory, are worthy of the highest 
-honours that history can bestow. 

Nor can a soldier withhold his tribute of praise to the 
capacity for making war which distinguished the American 
citizen. ‘The intelligence of the rank and file played an 
important réle in every phase of a campaign. As skir- 
mishers,—and modern battles, to a very great extent, are 
fought out by lines of skirmishers—their work was ad- 
mirable ; and when the officers were struck down, or when 
command, by reason of the din and excitement, became im- 
possible, the self-dependence of the individual asserted itself 
with the best effect.!. The same quality which the German 

1 The historical student may profitably compare with the American 


THE SCOUTS 347 


training had sought to foster, and which, according to 
Moltke,! had much to do with the victories of 1870, was in- 
born in both Northerner and Southerner. On outpost and 
on patrol, in seeking information and in counteracting the 
ruses of the enemy, the keen intelligence of the educated 
volunteer was of the utmost value. History has hitherto 
overlooked the achievements of the ‘ scouts,’ whose names so 
seldom occur in the Official Records, but whose daring was 
unsurpassed, and whose services were of vast impor- 
tance. In the Army of Northern Virginia every command- 
ing general had his own party of scouts, whose business 
it was to penetrate the enemy’s lines, to see everything and 
to hear everything, to visit the base of operations, to inspect 
the line of communications, and to note the condition and 
the temper of the hostile troops. Attracted by a pure 
love of adventure, these private soldiers did exactly the same 
work as did the English Intelligence officers in the Penin- 
sula, and did it with the same thoroughness and acuteness. 
Wellington, deploring the capture of Captain Colquhoun 
Grant, declared that the gallant Highlander was worth as 
much tothearmy as a brigade of cavalry; Jackson had scouts 
who were more useful to him than many of his brigadiers. 
Again, in constructing hasty intrenchments, the soldiers 
needed neither assistance nor impulsion. ‘The rough cover 
thrown up by the men when circumstances demanded it, on 
their own volition, was always adapted to the ground, and 
generally fulfilled the main principles of fortification. For 
bridge-building, for road-making, for the destruction, the 
repair, and even the making, of railroads, skilled labour was 
always forthcoming from the ranks; and the soldiers 
stamped the impress of their individuality on the tactics 
of the infantry. Modern formations, to a very large ex- 
tent, had their origin on American battle-fields. The men 
realised very quickly the advantages of shelter ; the advance 
by rushes from one cover to another, and the gradually work- 
ing up, by this method, of the firing-line to effective range— 


soldier the Armies of Revolutionary France, in which education and intelli- 
gence were also conspicuous. 
1 Oficial Account of the Franco-German War, vol. ii., p. 168. 


348 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the method which all experience shows to be the true one 
—became the general rule. 

That the troops had faults, however, due in great 
part to the fact that their intelligence was not thoroughly 
trained, and to the inexperience of their officers, it is im- 
possible to deny. 

‘JT agree with you,’ wrote Lee in 1868, ‘ in believing that 
our army would be invincible if it could be properly organised 
and officered. There were never such men in an army 
before. They will go anywhere and do anything if properly 
led. Butthere is the difficulty—proper commanders. Where 
can they be obtained? But they are improving—constantly 
improving. Rome was not built in a day, nor can we expect 
miracles in our favour.’! Yet, taking them all in all, the 
American rank and file of 1868, with their native charac- 
teristics, supplemented by a great knowledge of war, were in 
advance of any soldiers of their time. 

In the actual composition of the Confederate forces no 
marked change had taken place since the beginning of the 
war. But the character of the army, in many essential 
respects, had become sensibly modified. The men encamped 
on the Rappahannock were no longer the raw recruits who 
had blundered into victory at the First Manassas ; nor were 
they the unmanageable divisions of the Peninsula. They 
were still, for the most part, volunteers, for conscripts in the 
Army of Northern Virginia were not numerous, but they were 
volunteers ofa very different type from those who had fought 
at Kernstown or at Gaines’ Mill. Despite their protracted 
absence from their homes, the wealthy and well-born privates 
still shouldered the musket. Though many had been pro- 
moted tocommissions, the majority were content to. set an ex- 
ample of self-sacrifice and sterling patriotism, and the regi- 
ments were thus still leavened with a large admixture of edu- 
cated and intelligent men. Itisa significant fact that during 
those months of 1863 which were spent in winter quarters 
Latin, Greek, mathematical, and even Hebrew classes were 
instituted by the soldiers. But all trace of social distinc- 
tion had long since vanished. Between the rich planter 

1 Lee to Hood, May 21, 1863; Advance and Retreat, p. 53. 


THE MEN OF 1863 349 


and the small farmer or mechanic there was no difference 
either in aspect or habiliments. Tanned by the hot 
Virginia. sun, thin-visaged and bright-eyed, gaunt of frame 
and spare of flesh, they were neither more nor less than 
the rank and file of the Confederate army; the product of 
discipline and hard service, moulded after the same pat- 
tern, with the same hopes and fears, the same needs, the 
same sympathies. They looked at life from a common 
standpoint, and that standpoint was not always elevated. 
Human nature claimed its rights. When his hunger was 
satisfied and, to use his own expression, ‘ he was full of hog 
and hominy,’ the Confederate soldier found time to discuss 
the operations in which he was engaged. Pipe in mouth, 
he could pass in review the strategy and tactics of both 
armies, the capacity of his generals, and the bearing of his 
enemies, and on each one of these questions, for he was the 
shrewdest of observers, his comments were always to the 
point. He had studied his profession in a practical school. 
The more delicate moves of the great game were topics of 
absorbing interest. He cast a comprehensive glance over 
the whole theatre; he would puzzle out the reasons for 
foreed marches and sudden changes of direction; his 
curiosity was great, but intelligent, and the groups round 
the camp-fires often forecast with surprising accuracy the 
mancuvres that the generals were planning. But far more 
often the subjects of conversation were of a more immediate 
and personal character. The capacity of the company 
cook, the quality of the last consignment of boots, the 
merits of different bivouacs, the prospect of the supply 
train coming up to time, the temper of the captain and 
subaltern—such were the topics which the Confederate 
privates spent their leisure in discussing. They had long 
since discovered that war is never romantic and seldom 
exciting, but a monotonous round of tiresome duties, 
enlivened at rare intervals by dangerous episodes. They 
had become familiar with its constant accompaniment of 
privations—bad weather, wet bivouacs, and wretched roads, 
wood that would not kindle, and rations that did not 
_satisfy. They had learned that a soldier’s worst enemy 


300 STONEWALL JACKSON 


may be his native soil, in the form of dust or mud; that 
it is possible to march for months without firing a shot 
or seeing a foe; that a battle is an interlude which breaks in 
at rare intervals on the long round of digging, marching, 
bridge-building, and road-making ; and that the time of 
the fiercest fire-eater is generally occupied in escorting mule- 
trains, in mounting guard, in dragging waggons through 
the mud, and in loading or unloading stores. Volunteering 
for perilous and onerous duties, for which hundreds had 
eagerly offered themselves in the early days, ere the 
elamour of the soldier’s life had vanished, had ceased 
to be popular. The men were now content to wait 
for orders; and as discipline crystallised into habit, they 
became resigned to the fact that they were no longer 
volunteers, masters of their own actions, but the paid 
servants of the State, compelled to obey and powerless to 
protest. 

To all outward appearance, then, in the spring of 1863 
the Army of Northern Virginia bore an exceedingly close - 
resemblance to an army of professional soldiers. It is true 
that military etiquette was not insisted on; that more 
license, both in quarters and on the march, was permitted 
than would be the case in a regular army; that officers 
were not treated with the same respect; and that tact, 
rather than the strict enforcement of the regulations, was 
the key-note of command. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, 
the Confederate soldiers were exceedingly well-conducted. 
The good elements in the ranks were too strong for those 
who were inclined to resist authority, and the amount of 
misbehaviour was wonderfully small. There was little 
neglect of duty. Whatever the intelligence of the men 
told them was necessary for success, for safety, or for 
efficiency, was done without reluctance. The outposts 
were seldom caught napping. Digging and tree-felling— 
for the men had learned the value of making fortifications 
and good roads—were taken as a matter of course. Nor 
was the Southern soldier a grumbler. He accepted half- 
rations and muddy camping-grounds without remonstrance ; 
if his boots wore out he made shift to march without 


THE CONFEDERATE SOLDIER 351 


them ; and when his uniform fell to pieces he waited for 
the next victory to supply himself with a new outfit. He 
was enough of a philosopher to know that it is better to 
meet misery with a smile than with a scowl. Mark Tapley 
had many prototypes in the Confederate ranks, and the men 
were never more facetious than when things were at their 
worst. ‘The very intensity of their sufferings became a 
source of merriment. Instead of growling and deserting, 
they laughed at their own bare feet, ragged clothes, and 
pinched faces ; and weak, hungry, cold, wet and dirty, with 
no hope of reward or rest, they marched cheerfully to meet 
the warmly clad and well-fed hosts of the enemy.’! In- 
domitable indeed were the hearts that beat beneath the 
grey jackets, and a spirit rising superior to all misfortune, 


That ever with a frolic welcome took 
The thunder and the sunshine, 


was a marked characteristic of the Confederate soldier. 
Nor was it only in camp or on the march that the 
temper of the troops betrayed itself in reckless gaiety.? 
The stress of battle might thin their ranks, but it was 
powerless to check their laughter. The dry humour of the 
American found a fine field in the incidents of a fierce 
engagement. Nothing escaped without remark: the 
excitement of a general, the accelerated movements of the 
non-combatants, the vagaries of the army mule, the bad 
practice of the artillery—all afforded entertainment. And 
when the fight became hotter and the Federals pressed 


1 Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia. 

2 General Longstreet relates an amusing story :—‘ One of the soldiers, 
during the investment of Suffolk (April 1863), carefully constructed 
and equipped a full-sized man, dressed in a new suit of improved 
“butternut” clothing; and christening him Julius Cesar, took him to a 
signal platform which overlooked the works, adjusted him to a graceful 
position, and made him secure to the framework by strong cords. A 
little after sunrise “ Julius Cesar’? was discovered by some of the Federal 
battery officers, who prepared for the target so inviting to skilful practice. 
The new soldier sat under the hot fire with irritating indifference until the 
Confederates, unable to restrain their hilarity, exposed the joke by calling 
for ‘‘ Three cheers for Julius Cesar!” The other side quickly recognised the 
situation, and good-naturedly added to ours their cheers for the old hero,”’— 
From Manassas to Appomattox. 


352 STONEWALL JACKSON 


resolutely to the attack, the flow of badinage took a 
orim and peculiar turn. It has already been related that 
the Confederate armies depended, to a large degree, for 
their clothing and equipments on what they captured. 
So abundant was this source of supply, that the soldier had 
come to look upon his enemy as a movable magazine of 
creature comforts ; and if he marched cheerfully to battle, 
it was not so much because he loved fighting, but that 
he hoped to renew his wardrobe. A victory was much, but 
the spoils of victory were more. No sooner, then, did the 
Federals arrive within close range, than the wild yells of 
the Southern infantry became mingled with fierce laughter 
and derisive shouts. ‘Take off them boots, Yank!’ ‘Come 
out of them clothes; we’re gwine to have them!’ ‘Comeon, 
blue-bellies, we want them blankets!’ ‘Bring them rations 
along! You’ve got to leave them !’—such were the cries, 
like the howls of half-famished wolves, that were heard along 
Jackson’s lines at Fredericksburg.' And they were not raised 
in mockery. The battle-field was the soldier’s harvest, and 
as the sheaves of writhing forms, under the muzzles of their 
deadly rifles, increased in length and depth, the men listened 
with straining ears for the word to charge. The counter- 
stroke was their opportunity. The rush with the bayonet 
was never so speedy but that deft fingers found time to rifle 
the haversacks of the fallen, and such was the eagerness for 
booty that it was with the greatest difficulty that the troops 
were dragged off from the pursuit. It is said that at Frede- 
ricksburg, some North Carolina regiments, which had re- 

1 ‘During the truce on the second day of Fredericksburg,’ says Captain 
Smith, ‘a tall, fine-looking Alabama soldier, who was one of the litter-bearers, 
picked up a new Enfield rifle on the neutral ground, examined it, tested the 
sights, shouldered it, and was walking back to the Confederate lines, when 
a young Federal officer, very handsomely dressed and mounted, peremptorily 
ordered him to throw it down, telling him he had no right to take it. The 
soldier, with the rifle on his shoulder, walked very deliberately round the officer, 


scanning him from head to foot, and then started again towards our lines. 
On this the Federal lieutenant, drawing his little sword, galloped after him, 


and ordered him with an oath to throw down the rifle. The soldier halted, 


then walked round the officer once again, very slowly, looking him up and 
down, and at last said, pointing to his fine boots: ‘I shall shoot you to- 
morrow, and get them boots;” then strode away to his command. The 
lieutenant made no attempt to follow.’ 


Ee 


THE CONFEDERATE SOLDIER 353 


pulsed and followed up a Federal brigade, were hardly to be 
restrained from dashing into the midst of the enemy’s 
reserves, and when at length they were turned back their 
complaints were bitter. The order to halt and retire 
seemed to them nothing less than rank injustice. Half- 
crying with disappointment, they accused their generals of 
favouritism! ‘They don’t want the North Car’linians to 
git anything,’ they whined. ‘They wouldn’t hev’ stopped 
Hood’s ‘‘ Texicans ’’—they’d hev’ let them go on!’ 

But if they relieved their own pressing wants at the 
expense of their enemies, if they stripped the dead, and ex- 
changed boots and clothing with their prisoners, seldom 
getting the worst of the bargain, no armies—to their lasting 
honour be it spoken, for no armies were so destitute—were 
ever less formidable to peaceful citizens, within the border 
or beyond it, than those of the Confederacy. It was 
exceedingly seldom that wanton damage was laid to the 
soldier’s charge. The rights of non-combatants were 
religiously respected, and the farmers of Pennsylvania 
were treated with the same courtesy and consideration as 
the planters of Virginia. A village was none the worse for 
the vicinity of a Confederate bivouac, and neither man nor 
woman had reason to dread the half-starved tatterdema- 
lions who followed Lee and Jackson. As the grey columns, 
in the march through Maryland, swung through the streets 
of those towns where the Unionist sentiment was strong, 
the women, standing in the porches, waved the Stars and 
Stripes defiantly in their faces. But the only retort of 
‘the dust brown ranks’ was a volley of jests, not always 
unmixed with impudence. The personal attributes of their 
fair enemies did not escape observation. The damsel 
whose locks were of conspicuous hue was addressed as 
‘bricktop’ until she screamed with rage, and threatened 
to fire into the ranks ; while the maiden of sour visage and 
uncertain years was saluted as ‘Ole Miss Vinegar’ by a 
whole division of infantry. But this was the limit of the 
soldier’s resentment. At the same time, when in the midst 
of plenty he was not impeccable. For highway robbery 
and housebreaking he had no inclination, but he was by 


354 STONEWALL JACKSON 


no means above petty larceny. Pigs and poultry, fruit, 
corn, vegetables and fence-rails, he looked upon as his 
lawful perquisites. 

He was the most cunning of foragers, and neither 
stringent orders nor armed guards availed to protect a field 
of maize or a patch of potatoes; the traditional negro was 
not more skilful in looting a fowl-house;'! he had an 
unerring scent for whisky or ‘apple-jack;’ and the 
address he displayed in compassing the destruction of the 
unsuspecting porker was only equalled, when he was caught 
flagrante delicto, by the ingenuity of his excuses. According 
to the Confederate private, the most inoffensive animals, in 
the districts through which the armies marched, developed 
a strange pugnacity, and if bullet and bayonet were used 
against them, it was solely in self-defence. 

But such venial faults, common to every army, and almost 
justified by the deficiencies of the Southern commissariat, 
were more than atoned for when the enemy was met. Of the 
prowess of Lee’s veterans sufficient has been said. Their 
deeds speak for themselves. But it was not the battle-field 
alone that bore witness to their fortitude. German soldiers 
have told us that in the war of 1870, when their armies, 
marching on Paris, found, to their astonishment, the great 
city strongly garrisoned, and hosts gathering inevery quarter 
for its relief, a singular apathy took possession of the troops. 
The explanation offered by a great military writer is that 
‘after a certain period even the victor becomes tired of war ;’ 
and ‘the more civilised,’ he adds, ‘a people is, the more 
quickly will this weakness become apparent.’ 7 Whether this 
explanation be adequate is not easy to decide. The fact 
remains, however, that the Confederate volunteer was able 
to overcome that longing for home which chilled the. 
enthusiasm of the German conscript. And this is the 
more remarkable, inasmuch as his career was not one of 
unchequered victory. In the spring of 1868, the Army of 
the Potomac, more numerous than ever, was still before 


1 Despite Lee’s proclamations against indiscriminate foraging, ‘ the hens,’ 
he said, ‘had to roost mighty high when the Texans were about.’ 
* The Conduct of War. Von der Goltz. 


THE CONFEDERATE SOLDIER 355 


him, firmly established on Virginian soil; hope of foreign 
intervention, despite the assurances of the politicians, was 
gradually fading, and it was but too evident that the war 
was far from over. Yet at no time during their two years 
of service had the soldiers shown the slightest sign of that 
discouragement which seized the Germans after two months. 
And who shall dare to say that the Southerner was less 
highly civilised than the Prussian or the Bavarian? 
Political liberty, freedom of speech and action, are the 
real elements’ of civilisation, and not merely education. 
But let the difference in the constitution of the two armies 
be borne in mind. ‘The Confederates, with few exceptions, 
were volunteers, who had become soldiers of their own 
choice, who had assumed arms deliberately and without 
compulsion, and who by their own votes were responsible 
that war had been declared. The Germans were con- 
scripts, a dumb, powerless, irresponsible multitude, ani- 
mated, no doubt, by hereditary hatred of the enemy, but 
without that sense of moral obligation which exists in the 
volunteer. We may be permitted, then, to believe that 
this sense of moral obligation was one reason why the 
spirit of the Southerners rose superior to human weak- 
ness, and that the old adage, which declares that ‘ one 
volunteer is better than three pressed men,’ is not yet 
out of date. Nor is it an unfair inference that the armies 
of the Confederacy, allied by the ‘crimson thread of 
kinship’ to those of Wellington, of Raglan, and of Clyde, 
owed much of their enduring fortitude to ‘ the rock whence 
they were hewn.’ 

And yet, with all their admirable qualities, the Southern 
soldiers had not yet got rid of their original defects. 
Temperate, obedient, and well-conducted, small as was 
the percentage of bad characters and habitual mis- 
doers, their discipline was still capable of improvement. 
The assertion, at first sight, seems a contradiction in terms. 
How could troops, it may be asked, who so seldom infringed 
the regulations be other than well-disciplined ? For the 
simple reason that discipline in quarters is an absolutely 
different quality from discipline in battle. No large body of 


356 STONEWALL JACKSON 


intelligent men, assembled in a just cause and of good 
character, is likely to break out into excesses, or, if obedience 
is manifestly necessary, to rebel against authority. Sub- 
ordination to the law is the distinguishing mark of all 
civilised society. But such subordination, however praise- 
worthy, is not the discipline of the soldier, though it is often 
confounded with it. A regiment of volunteers, billeted in 
some country town, would probably show a smaller list of 
misdemeanours than a regiment of regulars. Yet the latter 
might be exceedingly well-disciplined, and the former have 
no real discipline whatever. Self-respect—for that is the 
discipline of the volunteer—is not battle discipline, the 
discipline of the cloth, of habit, of tradition, of constant 
associations and of mutual confidence. Self-respect, excel- 
lent in itself, and by no means unknown amongst regular 
soldiers, does not carry with it a mechanical obedience to 
command, nor does it merge the individual in the mass, and 
give the tremendous power of unity to the efforts of large 
numbers. 
It will not be pretended that the discipline of regular 
troops always rises superior to privation and defeat. It 
is a notorious fact that the number of deserters from 
Wellington’s army in Spain and Portugal, men who 
wilfully absented themselves from the colours and wan- 
dered over the country, was by no means inconsiderable ; 
while the behaviour of the French regulars in 1870, and 
even of the Germans, when they rushed back in panic 
through the village of Gravelotte, deaf to the threats 
and entreaties of their aged sovereign, was hardly in 
accordance with military tradition. Nevertheless, it is not 
difficult to show that the Southerners fell somewhat short 
of the highest standard. They were certainly not incapable 
of keeping their ranks under a hot fire, or of holding 
their ground to the last extremity. Pickett’s charge at 
Gettysburg is one of the most splendid examples of dis- 
ciplined valour in the annals of war, and the endurance of 
Lee’s army at Sharpsburg has seldom been surpassed. Nor 
was the disorder into which the attacking lines were sooner 
or later thrown a proof of inferior training. Even in the 


THE CONFEDERATE DISCIPLINE 367 


days of flint-lock muskets, the admixture of not only 
companies and battalions, but even of brigades and divi- 
sions, was a constant feature of fierce assaults over broken 
ground. If, under such conditions, the troops still press 
forward, and if, when success has been achieved, order 
is rapidly restored, then discipline is good; and in neither 
respect did the Confederates fail. But to be proof against 
disorder is not everything in battle. It is not sufficient 
that the men should be capable of fighting fiercely ; to reap 
the full benefit of their weapons and their training they 
must be obedient to command. The rifle is a far less for- 
midable weapon when every man uses it at his own discre- 
tion than when the fire of a large body of troops is directed 
by a single will. Precision of movement, too, is necessary for 
the quick concentration of superior forces at the decisive 
point, for rapid support, and for effective combination. But 
neither was the fire of the Confederate infantry under the 
complete control of their officers, nor were their movements 
always characterised by order and regularity. It was 
seldom that the men could be induced to refrain from 
answering shot with shot ; there was an extraordinary waste 
of ammunition, there was much unnecessary noise, and the 
regiments were very apt to get out of hand. It is needless 
to bring forward specific proof; the admissions of superior 
officers are quite sufficient. General D. H. Hill, in an 
interesting description of the Southern soldier, speaks very 
frankly of his shortcomings. ‘Self-reliant always, obedient 
when he chose to be, impatient of drill and discipline, 
he was unsurpassed as a scout or on the skirmish line. 
Of the shoulder-to-shoulder courage, bred of drill and 
discipline, he knew nothing and cared less. Hence, on 
the battle-field, he was more of a free lance than a 
machine. Who ever saw a Confederate line advancing 
that was not crooked as a ram’s horn? Each ragged 
rebel yelling on his own hook and aligning on himself! 
But there is as much need of the machine-made soldier 
as of the self-reliant soldier, and the concentrated blow 
is always the most effective blow. The erratic effort 
of the Confederate, heroic though it was, yet failed to 
VoL. Il. co 


358 STONEWALL JACKSON 


achieve the maximum result just because it was erratic. 
Moreover, two serious evils attended that excessive egotism 
and individuality which came to the Confederate through 
his training, association, and habits. He knew when a 
movement was false and a position untenable, and he was 
too little of a machine to give in such cases the whole- 
hearted service which might have redeemed the blunder. 
The other evil was an ever-growing one. His disregard of 
discipline and independence of character made him often 
a straggler, and by straggling the fruit of many a victory 
was lost.’ ! 

General Lee was not less outspoken. A circular issued 
to his troops during the last months of the war is vir- 
tually a criticism on their conduct. ‘Many opportunities,’ 
he wrote, ‘ have been lost and hundreds of valuable lives 
uselessly sacrificed for want of a strict observance of 
discipline. Its object is to enable an army to bring 
promptly into action the largest possible number of men 
in good order, and under the control of their officers. 
Its effects are visible in all military history, which 
records the triumph of discipline and courage far more 
frequently than that of numbers and resources. The 
importance and utility of thorough discipline should be 
impressed on officers and men on all occasions by illus- 
trations taken from the experience of the instructor or 
from other sources of information. They should be made 
to understand that discipline contributes no less to their 
safety than to their efficiency. Disastrous surprises and 
those sudden panics which lead to defeat and the greatest 
loss of life are of rare occurrence among disciplined troops. 
it is well known that the greatest number of casualties 
occur when men become scattered, and especially when they 
retreat in confusion, as the fire of the enemy is then more 
deliberate and fatal. The experience of every officer shows 
that those troops suffer least who attack most vigorously, 
and that a few men, retaining their organisation and acting 
in concert, accomplish far more with smaller loss than a 
larger number scattered and disorganised. 

1 Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. xiii., p. 261. 


THE CONFEDERATE DISCIPLINE 359 


‘The appearance of a steady, unbroken line is more 
formidable to the enemy, and renders his aim less accurate 
and his fire less effective. Orders can be readily trans- 
mitted, advantage can be promptly taken of every opportu- 
nity, and all efforts being directed to a common end, the 
combat will be briefer and success more certain. 

‘Let officers and men be made to feel that they will 
most effectually secure their safety by remaining steadily 
at their posts, preserving order, and fighting with coolness 
and vigour. . . . Impress upon the officers that discipline 
cannot be attained without constant watchfulness on 
their part. They must attend to the smallest particulars 
of detail. Men must be habituated to obey or they cannot 
be controlled in battle, and the neglect of the least impor- 
tant order impairs the proper influence of the officer.’ } 

That such a circular was considered necessary after the 
troops had been nearly four years under arms establishes 
beyond all question that the discipline of the Confederate 
army was not that of the regular troops with whom General 
Lee had served under the Stars and Stripes; but it is not 
to be understood that he attributed the deficiencies of his 
soldiers to any spirit of resistance on their part to the 
demands of subordination. Elsewhere he says: ‘The 
greatest difficulty I find is in causing orders and regulations 
to be obeyed. This arises not from a spirit of disobedi- 
ence, but from ignorance.’? And here, with his usual 
perspicacity, he goes straight to the root of the evil. When 
the men in the ranks understand all that discipline involves, 
safety, health, efficiency, victory, it is easily maintained ; 
and it is because experience and tradition have taught them 
this that veteran armies are so amenable to control. 
‘Soldiers,’ says Sir Charles Napier, ‘must therefore obey 
in all things. They may and do laugh at foolish orders, 
but they nevertheless obey, not because they are blindly 
obedient, but because they know that to disobey is to break 
the backbone of their profession.’ 


1 Memoirs of General Robert E. Lee, By A. L. Long, Military Secretary 
and Brigadier-General, pp. 685-6. 
2 Memoirs, éc., p. 619. Letter dated March 21, 1863. 


cc} 


860 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Such knowledge, however, is long in coming, even to 
the regular, and it may be questioned whether it ever 
really came home to the Confederates. 

In fact, the Southern soldier, ignorant, at the outset, 
of what may be accomplished by discipline, never quite got 
rid of the belief that the enthusiasm of the individual, his 
goodwill and his native courage, was a more than sufficient 
substitute. ‘The spirit which animates our soldiers,’ wrote 
Lee, ‘and the natural courage with which they are so 
liberally endowed, have led to a reliance upon those good 
qualities, to the neglect of measures which would increase 
their efficiency and contribute to their safety.’’ Yet 
the soldier was hardly to blame. Neither he nor his 
regimental officers had any previous knowledge of war 
when they were suddenly launched against the enemy, 
and there was no time to instil into them the habits 
of discipline. There was no regular army to set them an 
example; no historic force whose traditions they would 
unconsciously have adopted; the exigencies of the service ° 
forbade the retention of the men in camps of instruction, 
and trained instructors could not be spared from more 
important duties. 

Such ignorance, however, as that which prevailed in 
the Southern ranks is not always excusable. It would be 
well if those who pose as the friends of the private soldier, 
as his protectors from injustice, realised the mischief they 
may do by injudicious sympathy. The process of being 
broken to discipline is undoubtedly galling to the instincts of 
free men, and it is beyond question that among a multitude 
of superiors, some will be found who are neither just nor 
considerate. Instances of hardship must inevitably occur. 
But men and officers—for discipline presses as hardly on the 
officers as on the men—must obey, no matter at what cost to 
their feelings, for obedience to orders, instant and unhesi- 
tating, is not only the life-blood of armies but the security 
of States; and the doctrine that under any conditions 
whatever deliberate disobedience can be justified is treason 
to the commonwealth. It is to be remembered that the 

1 Memoirs, éc., p. 684. By A. L. Long. 


THE ‘THINKING BAYONET’ 361 


end of the soldier’s existence is not merely to conduct him- 
self as a respectable citizen and earn his wages, but to face 
peril and privations, not of his own free will, but at the bid- 
ding of others ; and, in circumstances where his natural in- 
stincts assert themselves most strongly, to make a complete 
surrender of mind and body. If he has been in the habit 
of weighing the justice or the wisdom of orders before obey- 
ing them, if he has been taught that disobedience may be a 
pardonable crime, he will probably question the justice of 
the order that apparently sends him to certain death; if 
he once begins to think; if he once contemplates the 
possibility of disobedience ; if he permits a single idea to 
enter his head beyond the necessity of instant compliance, 
it is unlikely that he will rise superior to the promptings 
of his weaker nature. ‘Men must be habituated to obey or 
they cannot be controlled in battle ;’ and the slightest in- 
terference with the habit of subordination is fraught, 
therefore, with the very greatest danger to the efficiency 
of an army. 

It has been asserted, and it would appear that the idea 
is widespread, that patriotism and intelligence are of vastly 
more importance than the habit of obedience, and it was 
certainly a very general opinion in America before the war. 
This idea should have been effectually dissipated, at all 
events in the North, by the battle of Bull Run. Neverthe- 
less, throughout the conflict a predilection existed in favour 
of what was called the ‘thinking bayonet;’ and the very 
term ‘ machine-made soldier,’ employed by General D. H. 
Hill, proves that the strict discipline of regular armies 
was not held in high esteem. 

It is certainly true that the ‘ thinking bayonet’ is by 
no means to be decried. Aman can no more be a good 
soldier without intelligence and aptitude for his profes- 
sion than he can be a successful poacher or a skilful 
jockey. But it is possible, in considering the value of 
an armed force, to rate too highly the natural qualities 
of the individual in the ranks. In certain circum- 
stances, especially in irregular warfare, where each 
man fights for his own hand, they doubtless play a con- 


362 STONEWALL JACKSON 


spicuous part. A thousand skilled riflemen, familiar with 
the ‘ moving accidents by flood and field,’ even if they have 
no regular training and are incapable of precise manceuvres, 
may prove more than a match for the same number of 
professional soldiers. But when large numbers are in 
question, when the concentration of superior force at a 
single point, and the close co-operation of the three arms, 
infantry, artillery, and cavalry, decide the issue, then the 
force that can manceuvre, that moves like a machine at the 
mandate of a single will, has a marked advantage; and 
the power of manceuvring and of combination is conferred 
by discipline alone. ‘Two Mamelukes,’ said Napoleon, 
‘can defeat three French horsemen, because they are better 
armed, better mounted, and more skilful. A hundred 
French horse have nothing to fear from a hundred 
Mamelukes, three hundred would defeat a similar number, 
and a thousand French would defeat fifteen hundred 
Mamelukes. So great is the influence of tactics, order, 
and the power of manceuvring.’ 
It may be said, moreover, that whatever may have been 
the case in past times, the training of the regular soldier 
to-day neither aims at producing mere machines nor has it 
that effect. As much attention is given to the development 
of self-reliance in the rank and file as to making them sub- 
ordinate. It has long been recognised that there are many 
occasions in war when even the private must use his wits ; 
on outpost, or patrol, as a scout, an orderly, or when his 
immediate superiors have fallen, momentous issues may 
hang on his judgment and initiative; and in a good army 
these qualities are sedulously fostered by constant instruc- 
tion in field duties. Nor is the fear justified that the 
strict enforcement of exact obedience, whenever a supe- 
rior is present, impairs, under this system of training, the 
capacity for independent action when such action becomes 
necessary. In the old days, to drill and discipline the 
soldier into a machine was undoubtedly the end of all his 
training. To-day his officers have the more difficult task 
of stimulating his intelligence, while, at the same time, 
they instil the habits of subordination ; and that such task 


BATTLE DISCIPLINE 363 


may be successfully accomplished we have practical proof. 
The regiments of the Light Brigade, trained by Sir John 
Moore nearly a century ago on the system of to-day, 
proved their superiority in the field over all others. As 
skirmishers, on the outpost, and in independent fighting, 
they were exceedingly efficient ; and yet, when they marched 
shoulder to shoulder, no troops in Wellington’s army showed 
a more solid front, manceuvred with greater precision, or 
were more completely under the control of their officers. 
Mechanical obedience, then, is perfectly compatible with 
the freest exercise of the intelligence, provided that the 
men are so trained that they know instinctively when to 
sive the one and to use the other; and the Confederates, 
had their officers and non-commissioned officers been trained 
soldiers, might easily have acquired this highest form of 
discipline. As it was, and as it always will be with im- 
provised troops, the discipline of battle was to a great 
degree purely personal. The men followed those officers 
whom they knew, and in whom they had confidence; but 
they did not always obey simply because the officer had the 
right to command ; and they were not easily handled when 
the wisdom of an order or the necessity of a movement was 
not apparent. The only way, it was said by an Englishman 
in the Confederacy, in which an officer could acquire 
influence over the Southern soldiers was by his personal 
conduct under fire. ‘Every ounce of authority,’ was his 
expression, ‘had to be purchased by a drop of my blood.’! 
Such being the case, it is manifest that Jackson’s methods 
of discipline were well adapted to the peculiar constitution 
of the army in which he served. With the officers he was 
exceedingly strict. He looked to them to set an example 
of unhesitating obedience and the precise performance of 
duty. He demanded, too—and in this respect his own 
conduct was a model—that the rank and file should be 
treated with tact and consideration. He remembered that 
his citizen soldiers were utterly unfamiliar with the forms 
and customs of military life, that what to the regular would 


1 Three Months in the Southern States. General Sir Arthur Fremantle, 
C.B. 


364 STONEWALL JACKSON 


be a mere matter of course, might seem a gross outrage to 
the man who had never acknowledged a superior. In his 
selection of officers, therefore, for posts upon his staff, and 
in his recommendations for promotion, he considered 
personal characteristics rather than professional ability. 
He preferred men who would win the confidence of others— 
men not only strong, but possessing warm sympathies and 
broad minds—to mere martinets, ruling by regulation, and 
treating the soldier as a machine. But, at the same time, 
he was by no means disposed to condone misconduct in 
the volunteers. Never was there a more striking contrast 
than between Jackson the general and Jackson off duty. 
During his sojourn at Moss Neck, Mr. Corbin’s little 
daughter, a child of six years old, became a special favourite. 
‘Her pretty face and winsome ways were so charming that 
he requested her mother that she might visit him every 
afternoon, when the day’s labours were over. He had 
always some little treat in store for her—an orange or an 
apple—but one afternoon he found that his supply of good © 
things was exhausted. Glancing round the room his eye 
fell on a new uniform cap, ornamented with a gold band. 
Taking his knife, he ripped off the braid, and fastened it 
among the curls of his little playfellow.’ A little later the 
child was taken ill, and after his removal from Moss Neck 
he heard that she had died. ‘The general,’ writes his 
aide-de-camp, ‘wept freely when I brought him the sad 
news.’ Yet in the administration of discipline Jackson 
was far sterner than General Lee, or indeed than any 
other of the generals in Virginia. ‘Once on _ the 
march, fearing lest his men might stray from the ranks 
and commit acts of pillage, he had issued an order that 
the soldiers should not enter private dwellings. Dis- 
regarding the order, a soldier entered a house, and even 
used insulting language to the women of the family. This 
was reported to Jackson, who had the man arrested, tried 
by drum-head court-martial, and shot in twenty minutes.’ ! 
He never failed to confirm the sentences of death passed by 
courts-martial on deserters. It was in vain that his oldest 
1 Bright Skies and Dark Shadows. Rev. H. M. Field, D.D., p. 286. 


DISCIPLINE 565 


friends, or even the chaplains, appealed for a mitigation of 
the extreme penalty. ‘While he was in command at 
Winchester, in December 1861, a soldier who was charged 
with striking his captain was tried by court-martial and 
sentenced to be shot. Knowing that the breach of dis- 
cipline had been attended with many extenuating circum- 
stances, some of us endeavoured to secure his pardon. 
Possessing ourselves of all the facts, we waited upon the 
general, who evinced the deepest interest in the object of 
our visit, and listened with evident sympathy to our plea. 
There was moisture in his eyes when we repeated the poor 
fellow’s pitiful appeal that he be allowed to die for his 
country as a soldier on the field of battle, and not asa 
dog by the muskets of his own comrades. Such solicitude 
for the success of our efforts did he manifest that he even 
suggested some things to be done which we had not 
thought of. At the same time he warned us not to be too 
hopeful. He said: ‘‘It is unquestionably a case of great 
hardship, but a pardon at this juncture might work 
greater hardship. Resistance to lawful authority is a 
grave offence in a soldier. To pardon this man would be 
to encourage insubordination throughout the army, and so 
ruin our cause. Still,’’ he added, “I will review the whole 
case, and no man will be happier than myself if I can 
reach the same conclusions as you have done.” The 
soldier was shot.’ ! ; 

On another occasion four men were to be executed for 
desertion to the enemy. ‘The firing party had been ordered 
to parade at four o’clock in the afternoon, and shortly 
before the hour a chaplain, not noted for his tact, made 
his way to the general’s tent, and petitioned earnestly 
that the prisoners might even now be released. Jackson, 
whom he found pacing backwards and forwards, in evident 
agitation, watch in hand, listened courteously to his argu- 
ments, but made no reply, until at length the worthy 
minister, in hig most impressive manner, said, ‘ General, 
consider your responsibility before the Lord. You are 
sending these men’s souls to hell!’ With a look ofintense 

1 Communicated by the Rev. Dr. Graham. 


366 STONEWALL JACKSON 


disgust at such empty cant, Jackson made one stride 
forward, took the astonished divine by his shoulders, and 
saying, in his severest tones, ‘That, sir, is my business— 
do you do yours!’ thrust him forcibly from the tent. 

His severity as regards the more serious offences did 
not, however, alienate in the smallest degree the confidence 
and affection of his soldiers. They had full faith in his 
justice. They were well aware that to order the execution 
of some unfortunate wretch gave him intense pain. But they 
recognised, as clearly as he did himself, that it was some- 
times expedient that individuals should suffer. They knew 
that not all men, nor even the greater part, are heroes, 
and that if the worthless element had once reason to 
believe that they might escape the legitimate consequences 
of their crimes, desertion and insubordination would destroy 
the army. By some of the senior officers, however, his 
rigorous ideas of discipline were less favourably considered. 
They were by no means disposed to quarrel with the fact that 
the sentences of courts-martial in the Second Army Corps’ 
were almost invariably confirmed ; but they objected strongly 
to the same measure which they meted out to the men being 
consistently applied to themselves. They could not be 
brought to see that neglect of duty, however trivial, on the 
part of a colonel or brigadier was just as serious a fault as 
desertion or insubordination on the part of the men; and 
the conflict of opinion, in certain cases, had unfortunate 
results. 

To those whose conduct he approved he was more than 
considerate. General Lane, who was under him as a cadet 
at Lexington, writes as follows :— 

‘When in camp at Bunker Hill, after the battle of 
Sharpsburg, where the gallant Branch was killed, I, as 
colonel commanding the brigade, was directed by General 
A. P. Hill to hold my command in readiness, with three 
days’ rations, for detached service, and to report to General 
Jackson for further orders. That was all the information 
that Hill could give me. I had been in Jackson’s corps 
since the battles round Richmond, and had been very 
derelict in not paying my respects to my old professor. 


DISCIPLINE 567 


As I rode to his headquarters I wondered if he would 
recognise me. I certainly expected to receive his orders in 
a few terse sentences, and to be promptly dismissed with a 
military salute. He knew me as soon as I entered his tent, 
though we had not met for years. He rose quickly, with a 
smile on his face, took my hand in both of his in the 
warmest manner, expressed his pleasure at seeing me, 
chided me for not having been to see him, and bade me be 
seated. His kind words, the tones of his voice, his fami- 
liarly calling me Lane, whereas it had always been Mr. Lane 
at the Institute, put me completely at my ease. Then, for 
the first time, I began to love that reserved man whom I 
had always honoured and respected as my professor, and 
whom I greatly admired as my general. 

‘After a very pleasant and somewhat protracted conver- 
sation, he ordered me to move at once, and as rapidly as 
possible, to North Mountain Depot, tear up the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad, and put myself in communication with 
General Hampton (commanding cavalry brigade), who 
would cover my operations. While we were there General 
Jackson sent a member of his staff to see how we were 
progressing. That night I received orders to move at once 
and quickly to Martinsburg, as there had been heavy skir- 
mishing near Kerneysville. Next morning, when I reported 
to General Jackson, he received me in the same cordial, 
warm-hearted manner, complimented me on the thorough- 
ness of my work, told me that he had recommended me for 
promotion to take permanent charge of Branch’s brigade, 
and that as I was the only person recommended through 
military channels, I would be appointed in spite of the two 
aspirants who were trying to bring political influence to 
bear in Richmond in their behalf. When I rose to go he 
took my hand in both of his, looked me steadily in the face, 
and in the words and tones of friendly warmth, which can 
never be forgotten, again expressed his confidence in my 
promotion, and bade me good-bye, with a ‘‘ God bless you, 
Lane!”’! 

On the other hand, Jackson’s treatment of those who 

1 Memoirs, pp. 536-7. 


368 STONEWALL JACKSON 


failed to obey his orders was very different. No matter how 
high the rank of the offender, Jackson never sought to screen 
the crime.! No thought that the public rebuke of his principal 
subordinates might impair their authority or destroy their 
cordial relations with himself ever stayed his hand; and 
it may well be questioned whether his disregard of conse- 
quences was not too absolutely uncompromising. Men who 
live in constant dread of their chief’s anger are not likely 
to render loyal and efficient service, and the least friction in 
the higher ranks is felt throughout the whole command. 
When the troops begin taking sides and unanimity disap- 
pears, the power of energetic combination at once deterio- 
rates. That Jackson was perfectly just is not denied ; 
the misconduct of his subordinates was sometimes flagrant ; 
but it may well be questioned whether to keep officers under 
arrest for weeks, or even months, marching without their 
swords in rear of the column, was wholly wise. There is but 
one public punishment for a senior officer who is guilty of 
serious misbehaviour, and that is instant dismissal. If 
he is suffered to remain in the army his presence will 
always be a source of weakness. But the question will 
arise, Is it possible to replace him ? If he is trusted by his 
men they will resent his removal, and give but half- 
hearted support to his successor ; so in dealing with those in 
high places tact and consideration are essential. Hven Dr. 
Dabney admits that in this respect Jackson’s conduct is 
open to criticism. 

As already related, he looked on the blunders of his 
officers, if those blunders were honest, and due simply to 
misconception of the situation, with a tolerant eye. He 
knew too much of war and its difficulties to expect that 
their judgment would be unerring. He never made the 
mistake of reprehending the man who had done his best 
to succeed, and contented himself with pointing out, 
quietly and courteously, how failure might have been 
avoided. ‘But if he believed,’ says his chief of the 


1 The five regimental commanders of the Stonewall Brigade were once 
placed under arrest at the same time for permitting their men to burn 
fence-rails ; they were not released until they had compensated the farmer. 


DISCIPLINE 869 


staff, ‘that his subordinates were self-indulgent or con- 
tumacious, he became a stern and exacting master; .. . 
and during his career a causeless friction was produced 
in the working of his government over seyeral gallant 
and meritorious officers who served under him. This 
was almost the sole fault of his military character: 
that by this jealousy of intentional inefficiency he 
diminished the sympathy between himself and the 
general officers next his person by whom his orders were 
to be executed. Had he been able to exercise the same 
energetic authority, through the medium of a zealous 
personal affection, he would have been a more perfect 
leader of armies.’ ! 

This system of command was in all probability the out- 
come of deliberate calculation. No officer, placed in perma- 
nent charge of a considerable force, least of all a man who 
never acted except upon reflection, and who had a wise regard 
for human nature, could fail to lay down for himself certain 
principles of conduct towards both officersand men. It may 
be, then, that Jackson considered the course he pursued the 
best adapted to maintain discipline amongst a number of 
ambitious young generals, some of whom had been senior 
to himself in the old service, and all of whom had been 
raised suddenly, with probably some disturbance to their 
self-possession, to high rank. It is to be remembered, 
too, that during the campaigns of 1862 his pre-eminent 
ability was only by degrees made clear. It was not every- 
one who, like General Lee, discerned the great qualities of 
the silent and unassuming instructor of cadets, and other 
leaders, of more dashing exterior, with a well-deserved 
reputation for brilliant courage, may well have doubted 
whether his capacity was superior to their own. 

Such soaring spirits possibly needed a tight hand ; and, 
in any case, Jackson had much cause for irritation. With 
Wolfe and Sherman he shared the distinguished honour 
of being considered crazy by hundreds of self-sufficient 
mediocrities. It was impossible that he should have been 
ignorant, although not one word of complaint ever passed 

1 Dabney, vol. ii. pp. 519-20. 


370 STONEWALL JACKSON 


his lips, how grossly he was misrepresented, how he was 
caricatured in the press, and credited with the most ex- 
travagant and foolhardy ideas of war. Nor did his sub- 
ordinates, in very many instances, give him that loyal and 
ungrudging support which he conceived was the due of 
the commanding general. More than one of his enterprises 
fell short of the full measure of success owing to the short- 
comings of others; and these shortcomings, such as Loring’s 
insubordination at Romney, Steuart’s refusal to pursue 
Banks after Winchester, Garnett’s retreat at Kernstown, 
A. P. Hill’s tardiness at Cedar Run, might all be traced to 
the same cause—disdain of his capacity, and a misconception 
of their own position. In such circumstances it is hardly 
to be wondered at if his wrath blazed to a white heat. 
He was not of a forgiving nature. Once roused, resent- 
ment took possession of his whole being, and it may be 
questioned whether it was ever really appeased. At the 
same time, the fact that Jackson lacked the fascination 
which, allied to lofty intellect, wins the hearts of men. 
most readily, and is pre-eminently the characteristic of the 
very greatest warriors, can hardly be denied. His influence 
with men was a plant of slow growth. Yet the glamour of 
his great deeds, the gradual recognition of his unfailing 
sympathy, his modesty and his truth, produced in the end 
the same result as the personal charm of Napoleon, of 
Nelson, and of Lee. His hold on the devotion of his troops 
was very sure: ‘God knows,’ said his adjutant-general, 
weeping the tears of a brave man, ‘I would have died for 
him !’ and few commanders have been followed with more 
implicit confidence or have inspired a deeper and more 
abiding affection. Long years after the war a bronze statue, 
in his habit as he lived, was erected on his grave at Lex- 
ington. Thither, when the figure was unveiled, came the 
survivors of the Second Army Corps, the men of Manassas 
and of Sharpsburg, of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, 
and of many another hard-fought field; and the younger 
generation looked on the relics of an army whose peer the 
world has seldom seen. When the guns had fired a salute, 
the wild rebel yell, the music which the great Virginian had 


THE DEVOTION OF HIS SOLDIERS 371 


loved so well, rang loud above his grave, and as the last 
reverberations died away across the hill, the grey-haired 
ranks stood still and silent. ‘See how they loved him!’ 
sald one, and it was spoken with deepest reverence. Two 
well-known officers, who had served under Jackson, were 
sitting near each other on their horses. Hach remarked 
the silence of the other, and each saw that the other was 
in tears. ‘I’m not ashamed of it, Snowden!’ ‘Nor I, old 
boy,’ replied the other, as he tried to smile. 

When, after the unveiling, the columns marched past 
the monument, the old fellows looked up, and then bowed 
their uncovered heads and passed on. But one tall, gaunt 
soldier of the Stonewall Brigade, as he passed out of the 
cemetery, looked back for a moment at the life-like figure of 
his general, and waving his old grey hat towards it, cried 
out, ‘Good-bye, old man, good-bye; we’ve done all we 
could for you; good-bye !’ 

It is not always easy to discern why one general is 
worshipped, even by men who have never seen him, while 
another, of equal or even superior capacity, fails to awaken 
the least spark of affection, except in his chosen friends. 
Grant was undoubtedly a greater soldier than McClellan, 
and the genius of Wellington was not less than that of 
Nelson. And yet, while Nelson and McClellan won all 
hearts, not one single private had either for Welling- 
ton or Grant any warmer sentiment than respect. It 
would be as unfair, however, to attribute selfishness or 
want of sympathy to either Wellington or Grant, as to in- 
sinuate that Nelson and McClellan were deliberate bidders 
for popularity. It may be thatin the two former the very 
strength of their patriotism was at fault. To them the 
State was everything, the individual nothing. To fight 
for their country was merely a question of duty, into which 
the idea of glory or recompense hardly entered, and, 
indifferent themselves either to praise or blame, they 
considered that the victory of the national arms was a 
sufficient reward for the soldier’s toils. Both were gene- 
rous and open-handed, exerting themselves incessantly to 
provide for the comfort and well-being of their troops. 


B7b. 6 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Neither was insensible to suffering, and both were just as 
capable of self-sacrifice as either Nelson or McClellan. 
But the standpoint from which they looked at war was too 
exalted. Nelson and McClellan, on the other hand, recog- 
nised that they commanded men, not stoics. Sharing with 
Napoleon the rare quality of captivating others, a quality 
which comes by nature or comes not at all, they made 
allowance for human nature, and identified themselves 
with those beneath them in the closest camaraderie. And 
herein, to a great extent, lay the secret of the enthusiastic 
devotion which they inspired. 

If the pitiless dissectors of character are right we ought 
to see in Napoleon the most selfish of tyrants, the coldest 
and most crafty of charlatans. It is difficult, however, 
to believe that the hearts of a generation of hardy warriors 
were conquered merely by ringing phrases and skilful 
flattery. It should be remembered that from a mercenary 
force, degraded and despised, he transformed the Grand 
Army into the terror of Europe and the pride of France.: 
During the years of his glory, when the legions controlled 
the destinies of their country, none was more honoured than 
the soldier. His interests were always the first to be con- 
sidered. ‘The highest ranks in the peerage, the highest 
offices of State, were held by men who had carried the 
knapsack, and when thrones were going begging their 
claims were preferred before all others. The Emperor, 
with all his greatness, was always ‘the Little Corporal ’ 
to his grenadiers. His career was their own. As they 
shared his glory, so they shared hisreward. Every upward 
step he made towards supreme power he took them with 
him, and their relations were always of the most cordial 
and familiar character. He was never happier than when, 
on the eve of some great battle, he made his bivouae within 
a square of the Guard ; never more at.ease than when ex- 
changing rough compliments with the veterans of Rivoli or 
Jena. He was the representative of the army rather than 
of the nation. The men knew that no civilian would be 
preferred before them ; that their gallant deeds were certain 
of his recognition; that their claims to the cross, to 


NAPOLEON 378 


pension, and to promotion, would be as carefully considered 
as the claims of their generals. They loved Napoleon and 
they trusted him; and whatever may have been his faults, 
he was ‘the Little Corporal,’ the friend and comrade of his 
soldiers, to the end. 

It was by the same hooks of steel that Stonewall Jackson 
grappled the hearts of the Second Army Corps to his own. 
His men loved him, not merely because he was the 
bravest man they had ever known, the strongest, and the 
most resolute, not because he had given them glory, and 
had made them heroes whose fame was known beyond 
the confines of the South, but because he was one of 
themselves, with no interests apart from their interests ; 
because he raised them to his own level, respecting them 
not merely as soldiers, but as comrades, the tried comrades 
of many a hard fight and weary march. Although he 
ruled them with a rod of iron, he made no secret, either 
officially or privately, of his deep and abiding admiration for 
their self-sacrificing valour. His very dispatches showed that 
he regarded his own skill and courage as small indeed when 
compared with theirs. Like Napoleon’s, his congratulatory 
orders were conspicuous for the absence of all reference to 
himself ; it was always ‘ we,’ not ‘I,’ and he was among the 
first to recognise the worth of the rank and file. ‘One 
day, says Dr. McGuire, ‘ early in the war, when the Second 
Virginia Regiment marched by, I said to General Johnston, 
“Tf these men will not fight, you have no troops that will.”’ 
He expressed the prevalent opinion of the day in his reply, 
saying, ‘I would not give one company of regulars for 
the whole regiment.” When I returned to Jackson I 
had occasion to quote General Johnston’s opinion. “ Did 
he say that?” he asked, ‘‘and of those splendid men?” 
And then he added: “The patriot volunteer, fighting for 
his country and his rights, makes the most reliable soldier 
upon earth.” And his veterans knew more than that their 
general believed them to be heroes. They knew that this 
great, valiant man, beside whom all others, save Lee him- 
self, seemed small and feeble, this mighty captain, who held 
the hosts of the enemy in the hollow of his hand, was the 

VOL. II. DD 


374 STONEWALL JACKSON 


kindest and the most considerate of human beings. To them 
he was “‘ Old Jack”’ in the same affectionate sense as he had 
been ‘Old Jack” to his class-mates at West Point. They 
followed him willingly, for they knew that the path he trod 
was the way to victory; but they loved him as children 
do their parents, because they were his first thought and his 
last. 

In season and out of season he laboured for their welfare. 
To his transport and commissariat officers he was a hard 
master. The unfortunate wight who had neglected to bring 
up supplies, or who ventured to make difficulties, discovered, 
to his cost, that his quiet commander could be very 
terrible ; but those officers who did their duty, in whatever 
branch of the service they might be serving, found that 
their zeal was more than appreciated. For himself 
he asked nothing; on behalf of his subordinates he was a 
constant and persistent suitor. He was not only ready to 
support the claims to promotion of those who deserved 
it, but in the case of those who displayed special merit he 
took the initiative himself: and he was not content with 
one refusal. His only difference with General Lee, if differ- 
ence it can be called, was on a question of this nature. The 
Commander-in-Chief, it appears, soon after the battle of 
Fredericksburg, had proposed to appoint officers to the 
Second Army Corps who had served elsewhere. After 
some correspondence Jackson wrote as follows :—‘ My rule 
has been to recommend such as were, in my opinion, best 
qualified for filling vacancies. The application of this rule 
has prevented me from even recommending for the 
command of my old brigade one of its officers, because I 
did not regard any of them as competent as another of 
whose qualifications I had a higher opinion. This rule has 
led me to recommend Colonel Bradley T. Johnson for the 
command of Taliaferro’s brigade. . . . I desire the interest 
of the service, and no other interest, to determine who 
shall be selected to fill the vacancies. Guided by this 
principle, I cannot go outside of my command for persons 
to fill vacancies in it, unless by so doing a more competent 
officer is secured. ‘This same principle leads me to oppose 


SUPPORTS HIS OFFICERS AND MEN 375 


having officers who have never served with me, and of 
whose qualifications I have no knowledge, forced upon me 
by, promoting them to fill vacancies in my command, and 
advancing them over meritorious officers well qualified for 
the positions, and of whose qualifications I have had ample 
opportunities of judging from their having served with me. 

‘In my opinion, the interest of the service would be 
injured if I should quietly consent to see officers with whose 
qualifications I am not acquainted promoted into my 
command to fill vacancies, regardless of the merits of my 
own officers who are well qualified for the positions. The 
same principle leads me, when selections have to be made 
outside of my command, to recommend those (if there be 
such) whose former service with me proved them well 
qualified for filling the vacancies. This induced me to 
recommend Captain Chew, who does not belong to this 
army corps, but whose well-earned reputation when with 
me has not been forgotten.’ 

And as he studied the wishes of his officers, working 
quietly and persistently for their advancement, so he 
studied the wishes of the private soldiers. It is well known 
that artillerymen come, after a time, to feel a personal affec- 
tion for their guns, especially those which they have used 
in battle. When in camp near Fredericksburg Jackson was 
asked to transfer certain field-pieces, which had belonged 
to his old division, to another portion of the command. 
The men were exasperated, and the demand elicited the 
following letter :— 


‘General R. HE. Les, 
‘Commanding Army of Northern Virginia. 


‘ General,—Your letter of this date, recommending that I 
distribute the rifle and Napoleon guns “so as to give General 
D. H. Hill a fair proportion’ has been received. I respect- 
fully request, if any such distribution is to be made, that 
you will direct your chief of artillery or some other officer 
to do it; but I hope that none of the guns which belonged 
to the Army of the Valley before it became part of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, after the battle of Cedar Run, 


ppd 


‘December 8, 1862. 


376 STONEWALL JACKSON 


will be taken from it. If since that time any artillery has 
improperly come into my command, I trust that it will be 
' taken away, and the person in whose possession it may be 
found punished, if his condyct requires it. So careful was 
I to prevent an improper distribution of the artillery and 
other public property captured at Harper’s Ferry, that I 
issued a written order directing my staff officers to turn 
over to the proper chiefs of staff of the Army of Northern 
Virginia all captured stores. A copy of the order is here- 
with enclosed. 

‘General D. H. Hill’s artillery wants existed at the time 
he was assigned to my command, and it is hoped that the 
artillery which belonged to the Army of the Valley will not 
be taken to supply his wants. 

‘I am, General, your obedient servant, 
‘T. J. Jackson, Lieutenant-General.’ 


No further correspondence is to be found on the subject, 
so it may be presumed that the protest was successful. 

Jackson’s relations with the rank and file have already 
been referred to, and although he was now commander of an 
army corps, and universally acknowledged as one of the 
foremost generals of the Confederacy, his rise in rank and 
reputation had brought no increase of dignity. He still 
treated the humblest privates with the same courtesy that 
he treated the Commander-in-Chief. He never repelled 
their advances, nor refused, if he could, to satisfy their 
curiosity ; and although he seldom went out of his way to 
speak to them, if any soldier addressed him, especially if he 
belonged to a regiment recruited from the Valley, he seldom 
omitted to make some inquiry after those he had left at home. 
Never, it was said, was his tone more gentle or his smile 
more winning than when he was speaking to some ragged 
representative of his old brigade. How his heart went out 
to them may be inferred from the following. Writing toa 
friend at Richmond he said: ‘Though I have been relieved 
from command in the Valley, and may never again be 
assigned to that important trust, yet I feel deeply when I 
see the patriotic people of that region under the heel of a 


THE PEOPLE OF THE VALLEY 377 


hateful military despotism. There are all the hopes of 
those who have been with me from the commencement of 
the war in Virginia, who have repeatedly left their homes 
and families in the hands of the enemy, to brave the 
dangers of battle and disease; and there are those who 
have so devotedly laboured for the relief of our suffering 
sick and wounded.’ 


378 STONEWALL JACKSON 


NOTE 


Table showing the Nationality and Average Measurements of 346,744 
Federal Soldiers examined for Military Service after March 6, 
1863. 


Chest at 
Height. Inspiration. 
Number. £6; an, in. 
United States . . 237,391 5 7:40 35°61 
(69 per cent.) 
Germany : ‘ - 985,985 5 5°54 35°88 
Ireland . , ‘ . 982,478 5 5:54 35°24 
Canada . ; : . 15,507 5 5:51 35°42 
FEingland A : . 11,479 5 6°02 35°41 
France . ‘ ‘ : 2,630 5 581 85°29 
Scotland ‘ 2,127 5 6:13 35°97 


Other nationalities, in- 
cluding Wales and five 9,202 —— — 
British Colonies . 
346,744 


Report of the Provost Marshal General, 1866, p. 698. 

The Roll of the 35th Massachusetts, which may be taken as a 
typical Northern regiment, shows clearly enough at what period the 
great influx of foreigners took place. Of 104 officers the names of all 
but four—and these four joined in 1864—are pure English. Of the 964 
rank and file of which the regiment was originally composed, only 50 
bore foreign names. In 1864, however, 495 recruits were received, 
and of these over 400 were German immigrants.—History of the 35th 
Regiment, Mass. Volunteers, 1862-65. 


379 


CHAPTER XXII 


WINTER QUARTERS 


Durine the long interval which intervened between the 
battle of Fredericksburg and the next campaign, Jackson 
employed himself in preparing the reports of his 
battles, which had been called for by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief. ‘They were not compiled in their entirety 
by his own hand. He was no novice at literary composi- 
tion, and his pen, as his letter-book shows, was not 
that of an unready writer. He had a good command 
of language, and that power of clear and concise ex- 
pression which every officer in command of a large 
force, a position naturally entailing a large amount of 
confidential correspondence, must necessarily possess. But 
the task now set him was one of no ordinary magnitude. 
Since the battle of Kernstown, the report of which had 
been furnished in April 1862, the time had been too fully 
occupied to admit of the crowded events being placed on 
record, and more than one-half of the division, brigade, 
and regimental commanders who had been engaged in the 
operations of the period had been killed. Nor, even now, 
did his duties permit him the necessary leisure to complete 
the work without assistance. On his requisition, therefore, 
Colonel Charles Faulkner, who had been United States 
Minister to France before the war, was attached to his 
staff for the purpose of collecting the reports of the sub- 
ordinate commanders, and combining them in the proper 
form. The rough drafts were carefully gone over by the 
general. Hvery sentence was weighed ; and everything that 
might possibly convey & wrong impression was at once 
rejected ; evidence was called to clear up disputed points ; 


1863. 


380 STONEWALL JACKSON 


no inferences or suppositions were allowed to stand; truth 
was neyer permitted to be sacrificed to effect; super- 
latives were rigorously excluded,! and the narratives may 
be unquestionably accepted as an accurate relation of 
the facts. Many stirring passages were added by the 
general’s own pen; and the praise bestowed upon the 
troops, both officers and men, is couched in the warmest 
terms. Yet much was omitted. Jackson had a rooted 
objection to represent the motives of his actions, or to 
set forth the object of his movements. In reply to a 
remonstrance that those who came after him would 
be embarrassed by the absence of these explanations, 
and that his fame would suffer, he said: ‘The men 
who come after me must act for themselves; and as to 
the historians who speak of the movements of my com- 
mand, I do not concern myself greatly as to what they 
may say.’ To judge, then, from the reports, Jackson 
himself had very little to do with his success ; indeed, were 
they the only evidence available, it would be difficult to © 
ascertain whether the more brilliant mancuvres were 
ordered by himself or executed on the initiative of others. 
But in this he was perfectly consistent. When the 
publisher of an illustrated periodical wrote to him, asking 
him for his portrait and some notes of his battles as the 
basis of a sketch, he replied that he had no likeness of 
himself, and had done nothing worthy of mention. It is 
not without interest, in this connection, to note that the 
Old Testament supplied him with a pattern for his 
reports, just as it supplied him, as he often declared, 
with precepts and principles applicable to every military 
emergency. After he was wounded, enlarging one morning 
on his favourite topic of practical religion, he turned 
to the staff officer in attendance, Lieutenant Smith, and 
asked him with a smile: ‘Can you tell me where the 
Bible gives generals a model for their official reports of 
battles?’ The aide-de-camp answered, laughing, that it 
never entered his mind to think of looking for such a thing 


1 The report of Sharpsburg, which Jackson had not yet revised at the 
time of his death, is not altogether free from exaggeration. 


A MODEL REPORT 381 


in the Scriptures. ‘ Nevertheless,’ said the general, ‘ there 
are such ; and excellent models, too. Look, for instance, 
at the narrative of Joshua’s battles with the Amalekites ; 
there you have one. It has clearness, brevity, modesty ; 
and it traces the victory to its right source, the blessing 
of God.’ 

The early spring of 1863 was undoubtedly one of the 
happiest seasons of a singularly happy life. Jackson’s 
ambition, if the desire for such rank that would enable him 
to put the powers within him to the best use may be so 
termed, was fully gratified. The country lad who, one-and- 
twenty years ago, on his way to West Point, had looked on 
the green hills of Virginia from the Capitol at Washington, 
could hardly have anticipated a higher destiny than that 
which had befallen him. Over the hearts and wills of 
thirty thousand magnificent soldiers, the very flower of 
Southern manhood, his empire was absolute; and such 
dominion is neither the heritage of princes nor within the 
reach of wealth. The most trusted lieutenant of his great 
commander, the strong right arm with which he had 
executed his most brilliant enterprises, he shared with him 
the esteem and admiration not only of the army but of the 
whole people of the South. The name he had determined, 
in his lonely boyhood, to bring back to honour alréady 
ranked with those of the Revolutionary heroes. Even 
his enemies, for the brave men at the front left rancour 
to the politicians, were not proof against the attraction of 
his great achievements. A friendly intercourse, not always 
confined to a trade of coffee for tobacco, existed between 
the outposts; ‘Johnnies’ and ‘Yanks’ often exchanged 
greetings across the Rappahannock ; and it is related that 
one day when Jackson rode along the river, and the 
Confederate troops ran together, as was their custom, to 
greet him with a yell, the Federal pickets, roused by the 
sudden clamour, crowded to the bank, and shouted across 
to ask the cause. ‘ General Stonewall Jackson,’ was the 
proud reply of the grey-coated sentry. Immediately, to 
his astonishment, the cry, ‘ Hurrah for Stonewall Jackson !’ 
rang out from the Federal ranks, and the voices of North 


382 STONEWALL JACKSON 


and South, prophetic of a time to come, mingled in accla- 
mation of a great American. | 

The situation of the army, although the winter was un- 
usually severe, was not without its compensations. ‘The 
country was covered with snow, and storms were frequent ; 
rations were still scarce,! for the single line of badly laid 
rails, subjected to the strain of an abnormal traffic, formed 
a precarious means of transport; every spring and pond 
was frozen ; and the soldiers shivered beneath their scanty 
coverings.? Huts, however, were in process of erection, and 
the goodwill of the people did something to supply the de- 
ficiencies of the commissariat.2 The homes of Virginia 
were stripped, and many—like Jackson himself, whose 
blankets had already been sent from Lexington to his 
old brigade—ordered their carpets to be cut up into 
rugs and distributed amongst the men. But neither 
cold nor hunger could crush the: spirit of the troops. 
The bivouacs were never merrier than on the bare hills” 
and in the dark pine-woods which looked down on the 
ruins and the graves of Fredericksburg. Picket duty was 


1 On January 23 the daily ration was a quarter of a pound of beef, and 
one-fifth of a pound of sugar was ordered to be issued in addition, but there 
was no sugar! Lee to Davis, O. R., vol. xxi., p.1110. In the Valley, during 
the autumn, the ration had been one and one-eighth pound of flour, and one 
and a quarter pounds of beef. On March 27 the ration was eighteen ounces 
of flour, and four ounces of indifferent bacon, with occasional issues of rice, 
sugar, or molasses. Symptoms of scurvy were appearing, and to supply 
the place of vegetables each regiment was directed to send men daily to 
gather sassafras buds, wild onions, garlic, &., &c. Still ‘the men are 
cheerful,’ writes Lee, ‘and I receive no complaints.’ O. R., vol. xxv., 
part ii., p. 687. On April 17 the ration had been increased by ten pounds of 
rice to every 100 men about every third day, with a few peas and dried 
fruits occasionally. O. R., vol. xxv., part ii., p. 730. 

2 On January 19, 1,200 pairs of shoes and 400 or 500 pairs of blankets 
were forwarded for issue to men without either in D. H. Hill’s division. 
O. R., vol. xxi., p. 1097. In the Louisiana brigade on the same date, out 
of 1,500 men, 400 had no covering for their feet whatever. A large number 
had not a particle of underclothing, shirts, socks, or drawers; overcoats were 
so rare as to be a curiosity ; the 5th Regiment could not drill for want of 
shoes ; the 8th was almost unfit for duty from the same cause; the con- 
dition of the men’s feet, from long exposure, was horrible, and the troops 
were almost totally unprovided with cooking utensils. O. R., vol. xxi., 

. 1098. 
ni O. R., vol. xxi., p. 1098, 


MOSS NECK 383 


light, for the black waters of the great river formed a secure 
barrier against attack; and if the men’s stomachs were 
empty, they could still feast their eyes on a charming land- 
scape. ‘To the right and left the wooded range extended 
towards Fredericksburg on the one hand, and Port Royal 
on the other; in front, the far-stretching level gave full 
sweep to the eye; and at the foot of its forest-clad bluffs, 
or by the margin of undulating fields, the Rappahannock 
flowed calmly to the sea. Old mansions dotted this beautiful 
land—for beautiful it was in spite of the chill influences of 
winter, with its fertile meadows, its picturesque woodlands, 
and its old roads skirted by long lines of shadowy 
cedars.’ ' 

The headquarters of the Second Army Corps were esta- 
blished at Moss Neck, on the terrace above the Rappahan- 
nock, eleven miles below Fredericksburg. After the retreat 
of the Federals to Falmouth, the Confederate troops had re- 
occupied their former positions, and every point of passage 
between Fredericksburg and Port Royal* was strongly 
intrenched and closely watched. At Moss Neck Jackson 
was not only within easy reach of his divisions, but was 
more comfortably housed than had usually been the case. 
A hunting-lodge which stood on the lawn of an old and 
picturesque mansion-house, the property of a gentleman 
named Corbin, was placed at his disposal—he had declined 
the offer of rooms in the house itself lest he should trespass 
on the convenience of its inmates; and to show the peculiar 
constitution of the Confederate army, an anecdote re- 
corded by his biographers is worth quoting. After his first 
interview with Mrs. Corbin, he passed out to the gate, 
where a cavalry orderly who had accompanied him was 
holding his horse. ‘Do you approve of your accommodation, 
‘General ?’ asked the courier. ‘ Yes, sir, 1 have decided to 
make my quarters here.’ ‘Iam Mr. Corbin, sir,’ said the 
soldier, ‘and I am very pleased.’ 

The lower room of the lodge, hung with trophies of 
the chase, was both his bedroom and his office; while a 
large tent, pitched on the grass outside, served as a mess- 

1 Cooke, p. 289. 


384 STONEWALL JACKSON 


room for his military family; and here for three long 
months, until near the end of March, he rested from the 
labour of his campaigns. The Federal troops, on the 
snow-clad heights across the river, remained idle in their 
camps, slowly recovering from -the effects of their defeat 
on the fields of Fredericksburg; the pickets had ceased to 
bicker ; the gunboats had disappeared, and ‘all was quiet 
on the Rappahannock.’ Many of the senior officers in the 
Confederate army took advantage of the lull in operations 
to visit their homes; but, although his wife urged him to 
do the same, Jackson steadfastly refused to absent himself 
even for a few days from the front. In November, to his 
unbounded delight, a daughter had been born to him. ‘ To 
a man of his extreme domesticity, and love for children,’ 
says his wife, ‘ this was a crowning happiness; and yet, with 
his great modesty and shrinking from publicity, he re- 
quested that he should not receive the announcement by 
telegraph, and when it came to him by letter he kept the 
glad tidings to himself—leaving his staff and those around 
him in the camp to hear of it from others. This was to 
him “a joy with which a stranger could not intermeddle,”’ 
and from which even his own hand could not lift the veil 
of sanctity. His letters were full of longing to see his little 
Julia; for by this name, which had been his mother’s, he 
had desired her to be christened, saying, ‘‘ My mother was 
mindful of me when I was a helpless, fatherless child, and 
I wish to commemorate her now.’ 

‘How thankful I am,’ he wrote, ‘to our kind Heavenly 
Father for having spared my precious wife and given us a 
little daughter! I cannot tell how gratified I am, nor how 
much I wish I could be with you and see my two darlings. 
But while this pleasure is denied me, J am thankful it is 
accorded to you to have the little pet, and I hope it may be 
a great deal of company and comfort to its mother. Now, 
don’t exert yourself to write to me, for to know that you 
were exerting yourself to write would give me more pain 
than the letter would pleasure, so you must not do it. But 
you must love your esposo in the mean time. . . . I expect 
you are just now made up with that baby. Don’t you wish 


“DUTY IS OURS’ 385 


your husband wouldn’t claim any part of it, but let you 
have the sole ownership? Don’t you regard it as the most 
precious little creature in the world? Do not spoil it, and 
don’t let anybody tease it. Don’t permit it to have a bad 
temper. How I would love to see the darling little thing! 
Give her many kisses from her father. 

‘At present I am fifty miles from Richmond, and eight 
miles from Guiney’s Station, on the railroad from Richmond 
to Fredericksburg. Should I remain here, I do hope you 
and baby can come to see me before spring, as you can 
come on the railway. Wherever I go, God gives me kind 
friends. The people here show me great kindness. I 
receive invitation after invitation to dine out and spend 
the night, and a great many provisions are sent me, includ- 
ing cakes, tea, loaf-sugar, &c., and the socks and gloves 
and handkerchiefs still come! 

‘I am so thankful to our ever-kind Heavenly Father 
for having so improved my eyes as to enable me to write at 
night. He continually showers blessings upon me ; and that 
you should have been spared, and our darling little daughter 
given us, fills my heart with overflowing gratitude. If I 
know my unworthy self, my desire is to live entirely and 
unreservedly to God’s glory. Pray, my darling, that I may 
so live.’ 

Again to his sister-in-law: ‘I trust God will answer the 
prayers offered for peace. Not much comfort is to be 
— expected until this cruel war terminates. I haven’t seen 
~ my wife since last March, and never having seen my child, 
you can imagine with what interest I look to North Carolina.’ 

But the tender promptings of his deep natural affection 
were stilled by his profound faith that ‘ duty is ours, conse- 
quences are God’s.’ The Confederate army, at this time as 
at all others, suffered terribly from desertion ; and one of 
his own brigades reported 1,200 officers and men absent 
without leave. 

‘Last evening,’ he wrote to his wife on Christmas Day, 
‘T received a letter from Dr. Dabney, saying, ‘one of the 
highest gratifications both Mrs. Dabney and I could 
enjoy would be another visit from Mrs. Jackson,” and he 


386 STONEWALL JACKSON 


invites me to meet you there. He and Mrs. Dabney are 
very kind, but it appears to me that it is better for me to 
remain with my command so long as the war continues. 
. . . If all our troops, officers and men, were at their posts, 
we might, through God’s blessing, expect a more speedy 
termination of the war. The temporal affairs of some are 
so deranged as to make a strong plea for their returning 
home for a short time; but our God has greatly blessed 
me and mine during my absence, and whilst it would be a 
sreat comfort to see you and our darling little daughter, 
and others in whom I take a special interest, yet duty 
appears to require me to remain with my command. It is 
important that those at headquarters set an example by 
remaining at the post of duty.’ 

So business at headquarters went on in its accustomed 
course. There were inspections to be made, the deficiencies 
of equipment to be made good, correspondence to be con- 
ducted—and the control of 80,000 men demanded much 
office-work—the enemy to be watched, information to be . 
sifted, topographical data to be collected, and the reports of 
the battles to be written. Every morning, as was his 
invariable habit during a campaign, the general had an 
interview with the chiefs of the commissariat, transport, 
ordnance, and medical departments, and he spent many 
hours in consultation with his topographical engineer. 
The great purpose for which Virginia stood in arms was 
ever present to his mind, and despite his reticence, his 
staff knew that he was occupied, day and night, with the 
problems that the future might unfold. Existence at head- 
quarters to the young and high-spirited officers who formed 
the military family was not altogether lively. Outside 
there was abundance of gaiety. The Confederate army, 
even on those lonely hills, managed to extract enjoyment 
from its surroundings. The hospitality of the plantations 
was open to the officers, and wherever Stuart and his 
brigadiers pitched their tents, dances and music were the 
order of the day. Nor were the men behindhand. Even 
the heavy snow afforded them entertainment. Whenever 
a thaw took place they set themselves to making snow- 


STUART 387 


balls ; and great battles, in which one division was arrayed 
against another, and which were carried through with the 
pomp and circumstance of war, colours flying, bugles 
sounding, and long lines charging elaborately planned in- 
trenchments, were a constant source of amusement, except 
to unpopular officers. Theatrical and musical performances 
enlivened the tedium of the long evenings; and when, by 
the glare of the camp-fires, the band of the 5th Virginia 
broke into the rattling quick-step of ‘ Dixie’s Land,’ not the 
least stirring of national anthems, and the great concourse 
of grey-jackets took up the chorus, closing it with a yell 


That shivered to the tingling stars, 


the Confederate soldier would not have changed places with 
the President himself. 
; There was much social intercourse, too, between the dif- 
ferent headquarters. General Lee was no unfrequent 
visitor to Moss Neck, and on Christmas Day Jackson’s 
aides-de-camp provided a sumptuous entertainment, at 
which turkeys and oysters figured, for the Commander-in- 
Chief and the senior generals. Stuart, too, often invaded 
the quarters of his old comrade, and Jackson looked forward 
to the merriment that was certain to result just as much 
as the youngest of his staff. ‘Stuart’s exuberant cheerful- 
ness and humour,’ says Dabney, ‘ seemed to be the happy 
relief, as they were the opposites, to Jackson’s serious and 
diffident temper. While Stuart poured out his ‘“‘ quips and 
cranks,’ not seldom at Jackson’s expense, the latter sat by, 
sometimes unprepared with any repartee, sometimes blush- 
ing, but always enjoying the jest with a quiet and merry 
laugh. The ornaments on the wall of the general’s quarters 
gave Stuart many a topic of badinage. Affecting to believe 
that they were of General Jackson’s selection, he pointed now 
to the portrait of some famous race-horse, and now to the 
print of some celebrated rat-terrier, as queer revelations of 
his private tastes, indicating a great decline in his moral 
character, which would be a grief and disappointment to 
the pious old ladies of the South. Jackson, with a quiet 
smile, replied that perhaps he had had more to do with 


388 STONEWALL JACKSON 


race-horses than his friends suspected. It was in the 
midst of such a scene as this that dinner was announced, 
and the two generals passed to the mess-table. It so 
happened that Jackson had just received, as a present 
from a patriotic lady, some butter, upon the adornment of 
which the fair donor had exhausted her housewife’s skill. 
The servants, in honour of General Stuart’s presence, had 
chosen this to grace the centre of the board. As his eye 
fell upon it, he paused, and with mock gravity pointed to 
it, saying, “There, gentlemen! If that is not the 
crowning evidence of our host’s sporting tastes. He even 
has his favourite game-cock stamped on his butter!” The 
dinner, of course, began with great laughter, in which 
J ackson joined, with as much enjoyment as any.’ 

Visitors, too, from Europe, attracted by the fame of 
the army and its leaders, had made their way into the 
Confederate lines, and were received with all the hospi- 
tality that the camps afforded. An English officer has 
recorded his experiences at Moss Neck :-— 

‘TI brought from Nassau a box of goods (a present from 
England) for General Stonewall Jackson, and he asked me 
when I was at Richmond to come to his camp and see him. 
I left the city one morning about seven o’clock, and about 
ten landed at a station distant some eight or nine miles 
from Jackson’s (or, as his men called him, ‘‘ Old Jack’s’’) 
camp. A heavy fall of snow had covered the country for 
some time before to the depth of a foot, and formed a 
erust over the Virginian mud, which is quite as villainous 
as that of Balaclava. The day before had been mild and 
wet, and my journey was made in a drenching shower, 
which soon cleared away the white mantle of snow. You 
cannot imagine the slough of despond I had to pass 
through. Wet to the skin, I stumbled through mud, I 
waded through creeks, I passed through pine-woods, and at 
last got into camp about two o’clock. I then made my way to 
a small house occupied by the general as his headquarters. 
I wrote down my name, and gave it to the orderly, and I 
was immediately told to walk in. 

‘The general rose and greeted me warmly. I expected 


ENGLISH VISITORS | 389 


to see an old, untidy man, and was most agreeably sur- 
prised and pleased with his appearance. He is tall, 
handsome, and powerfully built, but thin. He has brown 
hair and a brown beard. His mouth expresses great 
determination. The lips are thin and compressed firmly 
together ; his eyes are blue and dark, with keen and 
searching expression. I was told that his age was thirty- 
eight, and he looks forty. The general, who is indescrib- 
ably simple and unaffected in all his ways, took off my wet 
overcoat with his own hands, made up the fire, brought 
wood for me to put my feet on to keep them warm while 
my boots were drying, and then began to ask me questions 
on various subjects. At the dinner hour we went out and 
joined the members of his staff. At this meal the general 
said grace in a fervent, quiet. manner, which struck me 
very much. After dinner I returned to his room, and he 
again talked for along time. The servant came in and 
took his mattress out of a cupboard and laid it on the 
floor. 

‘AsI rose to retire, the general said, “‘ Captain, there is 
plenty of room on my bed, I hope you will share it with 
me?” I thanked him very much for his courtesy, but 
said ‘‘Good-night,” and slept in a tent, sharing the 
blankets of one of his aides-de-camp. In the morning at 
breakfast-time I noticed that the general said grace before 
the meal with the same fervour I had remarked before. 
An hour or two afterwards it was time for me to return to 
the station ; on this occasion, however, I had a horse, and 
I returned to the general’s headquarters to bid him adieu. 
His little room was vacant, so I slipped in and stood before 
the fire. I then noticed my greatcoat stretched before it 
ona chair. Shortly afterwards the general entered the 
room. He said: “ Captain, I have been trying to dry 
your greatcoat, but Iam afraid I have not succeeded very 
well.” That little act illustrates the man’s character. 
With the care and responsibilities of a vast army on his 
shoulders he finds time to do little acts of kindness and 
thoughtfulness.’ 

With each of his staff officers he was on most friendly 

VOL. II. EE 


390 ! STONEWALL JACKSON 


terms; and the visitors to his camp, such as the Eng- 
lish officer quoted above, found him a most delightful 
host, discussing with the ease of an educated gentleman 
all manner of topics, and displaying not the slightest 
trace of that awkwardness and extreme diffidence which 
have been attributed to him. The range and accuracy of 
his information surprised them. ‘ Of military history,’ said 
another English soldier, ‘he knew more than any other 
man I met in America; and he was so far from display- 
ing the somewhat grim characteristics that have been 
associated with his name, that one would have thought 
his tastes lay in the direction of art and literature.’ 
‘His chief delight,’ wrote the Hon. Francis Lawley, who 
knew him well, ‘ was in the cathedrals of England, notably 
in York Minster and Westminster Abbey. He was never 
tired of talking about them, or listening to details about 
the chapels and cloisters of Oxford.’ ! 

‘General Jackson,’ writes Lord Wolseley, ‘had cer- 
tainly very little to say about military operations, although 
he was intensely proud of his soldiers, and enthusiastic 
in his devotion to General Lee; and it was impossible to 
make him talk of his own achievements. Nor can I say 
that his speech betrayed his intellectual powers. But his 
manner, which was modesty itself, was most attractive. 
He put you at your ease at once, listening with ss 
courtesy and attention to whatever you might say; an 
when the subject of conversation was congenial, he was a 
most interesting companion. I quite endorse the state- 
ment as to his love for beautiful things. He told me that 
in all his travels he had seen nothing so beautiful as the 
lancet windows in York Minster.’ 

In his daily intercourse with his staff, however, in his 
office or in the mess-room, he showed to less advantage 
than in the society of strangers. His gravity of demeanour 
seldom wholly disappeared, his intense earnestness was in 
itself oppressive, and he was often absent and preoccu- 
pied. ‘Life at headquarters,’ says one of his staff 
officers, ‘ was decidedly dull. Our meals were often very 

1 The Times, June 11, 1863, 


STRATEGY 391 


dreary. The general had no time for light or trivial con- 
versation, and he sometimes felt it his duty to rebuke our 
thoughtless and perhaps foolish remarks. Nor was it 
always quite safe to approach him. Sometimes he had a 
tired look in his eyes, and although he never breathed a 
word to one or another, we knew that he was dissatisfied 
with what was being done with the army.’ ! 

Intense concentration of thought and purpose, in 
itself an indication of a powerful will, had distinguished 
Jackson from his very boyhood. During his campaigns he 
would pace for hours outside his tent, his hands clasped 
behind his back, absorbed in meditation; and when the 
army was on the march, he would ride for hours without 
raising his eyes or opening his lips. It was unquestion- 
ably at such moments that he was working out his plans, 
step by step, forecasting the counter-movements of the 
enemy, and providing for every emergency that might 
occur. And here the habit of keeping his whole faculties 
fixed on a single object, and of imprinting on his memory 
the successive processes of complicated problems, fostered 
by the methods of study which, both at West Point and 
Lexington, the weakness of his eyes had made compulsory, 
must have been an inestimable advantage. Brilliant 
strategical manceuvres, it cannot be too often repeated, 
are not a matter of inspiration and of decision on the 
spur of the moment. The problems presented by a 
theatre of war, with their many factors, are not to be 
solved except by a vigorous and sustained intellectual 
effort. ‘If,’ said Napoleon, ‘I always appear prepared, 
it is because, before entering on an undertaking, I have 
meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It 
is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly 
what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others ; 
itis thought and meditation.’ 

The proper objective, speaking in general terms, of all 
military operations is the main army of the enemy, for a 
campaign can never be brought to a successful conclusion 
until the hostile forces in the field have become demoralised 


1 Letter from Dr. Hunter McGuire. 
EB 2 


392 STONEWALL JACKSON 


by defeat; but, to ensure success, preponderance of numbers 
is usually essential, and it may be said, therefore, that the 
proper objective is the enemy’s main army when it is in 
inferior strength. 

Under ordinary conditions, the first step, then, towards 
victory must be a movement, or a series of movements, 
which will compel the enemy to divide his forces, and 
put it out of his power to assemble even equal strength 
on the battle-field. ? 

This entails a consideration of the strategic points upon 
the theatre of war, for it is by occupying or threatening 
some point which the enemy cannot afford to lose that 
he will be induced to disperse his army, or to place 
himself in a position where he can be attacked at a disad- 
vantage. While his main army, therefore, is the ulti- 
mate objective, certain strategic points become the initial 
objectives, to be occupied or threatened either by the main 
body or detached forces. It is seldom, however, that these 
initial objectives are readily discovered; and it is very 
often the case that even the ultimate objective may be 
obscured. 

These principles are well illustrated by the operations 
in the Valley of Virginia during the month of May and the 
first fortnight of June, 1862. After the event it is easy to 
see that Banks’ army was Jackson’s proper objective—being 
the principal force in the secondary theatre of war. But at 
the time, before the event, Lee and Jackson alone realised the 
importance of overwhelming Banks and thus threatering 
Washington. It was not realised by Johnston, a most able 
soldier, for the whole of his correspondence goes to show 
that he thought a purely defensive attitude the best policy 
for the Valley Army. It was not realised by Jackson’s 
subordinates, for it was not till long after the battle of 
Winchester that the real purport of the operations in which 
they had been engaged began to dawn on them. It was 
not realised by Lincoln, by Stanton, or even by McClellan, 
for to each of them the sudden attack on Front Royal was 
as much of a surprise as to Banks himself; and we may be 
perfectly confident that none but a trained strategist, after 


DEFECTS OF THE FEDERAL STRATEGY 393 


a prolonged study of the map and the situation, would 
realise it now. 

It is to be noted, too, that Jackson’s initial objectives— 
the strategical points in the Valley—were invariably well 
selected. The Luray Gap, the single road which gives 
access across the Massanuttons from one side of the Valley 
to the other, was the most important. The flank position 
on Elk Run, the occupation of which so suddenly brought 
up Banks, prevented him interposing between Jackson and 
Hdward Johnson, and saved Staunton from capture, was 
a second; Front Royal, by seizing which he threatened 
Banks at Strasburg in flank and rear, compelling him to a 
hasty retreat, and bringing him to battle on ground which 
he had not prepared, a third; and the position at Port 
Republic, controlling the only bridge across the Shenan- 
doah, and separating Shields from Frémont,a fourth. The 
bearing of all these localities was overlooked by the Federals, 
and throughout the campaign we cannot fail to notice a 
great confusion on their part as regards objectives. They 
neither recognised what the aim of their enemy would be, 
nor at what they should aim themselves. It was long 
before they discovered that Lee’s army, and not Richmond, 
was the vital point of the Confederacy. Not a single 
attempt was made to seize strategic points, and if we may 
judge from the orders and dispatches in the Official 
Records, their existence was never recognised. To this 
oversight the successive defeats of the Northern forces were 
in great part due. From McClellan to Banks, each one of 
their generals appears to have been blind to the advantages 
that may be derived from a study of the theatre of war. 
Not one of them hit upon a line of operations which 
embarrassed the Confederates, and all possessed the un- 
happy knack of joining battle on the most unfavourable 
terms. Moreover, when it at last became clear that the 
surest means of conquering a country is to defeat its 
armies, the true objective was but vaguely realised. The 
annihilation of the enemy’s troops seems to have been the 
last thing dreamt of. Opportunities of crushing him in 
detail were neither sought for nor created. As General 


’ 


394 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Sheridan said afterwards: ‘The trouble with the com- 
manders of the Army of the Potomac was that they never 
marched out to “lick”? anybody; all they thought of was 
to escape being ‘‘ licked’”’ themselves.’ 

But it is not sufficient, in planning strategical combina- 
tions, to arrive at a correct conclusion as regards the objec- 
tive. Success demands a most careful calculation of ways 
and means: of the numbers at disposal ; of food, forage, and 
ammunition ; and of the forces to be detached for secondary 
purposes. The different factors of the problem—the 
strength and dispositions of the enemy, the roads, rail- 
ways, fortresses, weather, natural features, the moral of the 
opposing armies, the character of the opposing general, the 
facilities for supply —have each and all of them to be con- 
sidered, their relative prominence assigned to them, and 
their conflicting claims to be brought into adjustment. 

For such mental exertion Jackson was well equipped. 
He had made his own the experience of others. His 
knowledge of history made him familiar with the principles 
which had guided Washington and Napoleon in the selec- 
tion of objectives, and with the means by which they 
attained them. It is not always easy to determine the 
benefit, beyond a theoretical acquaintance with the pheno- 
mena of the battle-field, to be derived from studying the 
campaigns of the great masters of war. It is true that no 
successful general, whatever may have been his practical 
knowledge, has neglected such study ; but while many have 
borne witness to its efficacy, none have left a record of the 
manner in which their knowledge of former campaigns 
influenced their own conduct. 

In the case of Stonewall Jackson, however, we have 
much evidence, indirect, but unimpeachable, as to the 
value to a commander of the knowledge thus acquired. 
The Maxims of Napoleon, carried in his haversack, were 
constantly consulted throughout his campaigns, and this 
little volume contains a fairly complete exposition, in 
Napoleon’s own words, of the grand principles of war. 
Moreover, Jackson often quoted principles which are not 
to be found in the Maxims, but on which Napoleon 


MILITARY HISTORY * 895 


consistently acted. It is clear, therefore, that he had 
studied the campaigns of the great Corsican in order to 
discover the principles on which military success is based ; 
that having studied and reflected on those principles, and 
the effect their application produced, in numerous concrete 
cases, they became so firmly imbedded in his mind as to 
be ever present, guiding him into the right path, or warn- 
ing him against-the wrong, whenever he had to deal with 
a strategic or tactical situation. 

It may be noted, moreover, that these principles, espe- 
cially those which he was accustomed to quote, were con- 
cerned far more with the moral aspect of war than with 
the material. It is a fair inference, therefore, that it was 
to the study of human nature as affected by the conditions 
of war, by discipline, by fear, by the want of food, by want 
of information, by want of confidence, by the weight of 
responsibility, by political interests, and, above all, by sur- 
prise, that his attention was principally directed. He found 
in the campaigns of Jena and of Austerlitz not merely a 
record of marches and manceuvres, of the use of intrench- 
ments, or of the general rules for attack and defence; this 
is the mechanical and elementary part of the science of 
command. What Jackson learned was the truth of the 
famous maxim that the moral is to the physical—that is, 
to armament and numbers—as three to one. He learned, 
too, to put himself into his adversary’s place and to realise 
his weakness. He learned, in a word, that war is a struggle 
between two intellects rather than the conflict of masses ; 
and if was by reason of this knowledge that he played 
on the hearts of his enemies with such extraordinary skill. 

It is not to be asserted, however, that the study of mili- 
tary history is an infallible means of becoming a great or 
even a good general. The first qualification necessary for 
a leader of men is a strong character, the second, a strong 
intellect. With both Providence had endowed Jackson, and 
the strong intellect illuminates and explains the page that 
to others is obscure and meaningless. With its innate 
faculty for discerning what is essential and for discarding 
unimportant details, it discovers most valuable lessons 


396 STONEWALL JACKSON 


where ordinary men see neither light nor leading. Endowed 
with the power of analysis and assimilation, and accustomed 
to observe and to reflect upon the relations between cause 
and effect, it will undoubtedly penetrate far deeper into the 
actual significance and practical bearing of historical facts 
than the mental vision which is less acute. 

Jackson, by reason of his antecedent training, was 
eminently capable of the sustained intellectual efforts 
which strategical conceptions involve. Such was his self- 
command that under the most adverse conditions, the 
fatigues and anxieties of a campaign, the fierce excitement 
of battle, his brain, to use the words of a great Confederate 
general, ‘worked with the precision of the most perfect 
machinery.’! But it was not only in the field, when the 
necessity for action was pressing, that he was accustomed 
to seclude himself with his own thoughts. Nor was he 
content with considering his immediate responsibilities. 
His interest in the general conduct of the war was of a 
very thorough-going character. While in camp on the. 
Rappahannock, he followed with the closest attention the 
movements of the armies operating in the Valley of the 
Mississippi, and made himself acquainted, so far as was 
possible, not only with the local conditions of the war, but 
also with the character of the Federal leaders. It was said 
that, in the late spring of 1862, it was the intention of 
Mr. Davis to transfer him to the command of the Army of 
the Tennessee, and it is possible that some inkling of this 
determination induced him to study the Western theatre.? 
Be this as it may, the general situation, military and 
political, was always in his mind, and despite the victory 
of Fredericksburg, the future was dark and the indications 
ominous. 

According to the Official Records, the North, at the 
beginning of April, had more than 900,000 soldiers under 


* General G. B. Gordon. Introduction to Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson, 
Dp: xiv. 

? In April he wrote to his wife: ‘There is increasing probability that I 
may be elsewhere as the season advances.’ That he said no more is 
characteristic. 


THE SITUATION 397 


arms; the South, so far as can be ascertained, not more 
than 600,000. The Army of the Potomac was receiving con- 
stant reinforcements, and at the beginning of April, 130,000 — 
men were encamped on the Stafford Heights. In the West, 
the whole extent of the Mississippi, with the exception of the 
hundred miles between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, was 
held by the Federals, and those important fortresses were 
both threatened by large armies, acting in concert with a 
formidable fleet of gunboats. A third army, over 50,000 
strong, was posted at Murfreesboro’, in the heart of Ten- 
nessee, and large detached forces were operating in Louisiana 
and Arkansas. The inroads of the enemy in the West, 
greatly aided by the waterways, were in fact far more serious 
than in the Kast; but even in Virginia, although the Army 
of the Potomac had spent nearly two years in advancing fifty 
miles, the Federals had a strong foothold. Winchester had 
been reoccupied. Fortress Monroe was still garrisoned. 
Suffolk, on the south bank of the James, seventy miles from 
Richmond, was held by a force of 20,000 men; while 
another small army, of about the same strength, occupied 
New Berne, on the North Carolina coast. 

Slowly but surely, before the pressure of vastly superior 
numbers, the frontiers of the Confederacy were contracting ; 
and although in no single direction had a Federal army 
moved more than a few miles from the river which supplied 
it, yet the hostile occupation of these rivers, so essential to 
internal traffic, was making the question of subsistence more 
difficult every day. Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas, the 
cattle-raising States, were practically cut off from the re- 
mainder; and in a country where railways were few, distances 
long, and roads indifferent, it was impossible, in default of 
communication by water, to accumulate and distribute the 
produce of the farms. Moreover, the dark menace of the 
blockade had assumed more formidable proportions. The 
Federal navy, gradually increasing in numbers and activity, 
held the highway of the ocean in an iron grip ; and proudly 
though the Confederacy bore her isolation, men looked 
across the waters with dread foreboding, for the shadow of 
their doom was already rising from the pitiless sea. 


398 STONEWALL JACKSON 


If, then, his staff officers had some reason to complain 
of their chief’s silence and abstraction, it was by no means 
unfortunate for the South, so imminent was the danger, 
that the strong brain was incessantly occupied in fore- 
casting the emergencies that might occur. 

But not for a single moment did Jackson despair of 
ultimate success. His faith in the justice of the Southern 
cause was as profound as his trust in God’s good pro- 
vidence. He had long since realised that the overwhelming 
strength of the Federals was more apparent than real. He 
recognised their difficulties ; he knew that the size of an 
army is limited to the number that can be subeisted, 
and he relied much on the superior moral and the 
superior leading of the Confederate troops. After long 
and mature deliberation he had come to a conclusion as to 
the policy to be pursued. ‘We must make this campaign,’ 
he said, in a moment of unusual expansion, ‘an ex- 
ceedingly active one. Only thus can a weaker country 
cope with a stronger ; it must make up in activity what it: 
lacks in strength. A defensive campaign can only be 
made successful by taking the aggressive at the proper time. 
Napoleon never waited for his adversary to become fully 
prepared, but struck him the first blow.’ 

On these principles Jackson had good reason to believe 
General Lee had determined to act;' of their efficacy he 
was convinced, and when his wife came to visit him at 
the end of April, she found him in good heart and the 
highest spirits. He not only anticipated a decisive result 
from the forthcoming operations, but he had seen with 
peculiar satisfaction that a more manly tone was pervading 
the Confederate army. Taught by their leaders, by Lee, 
Jackson, Stuart, and many others, of whose worth and 
valour they had received convincing proof, the Southern 
soldiers had begun to practise the clean and wholesome 
virtue of self-control. They had discovered that purity 


1 «There is no better way of defending a long line than by moving into 
the enemy’s country.’ Lee to General Jones, March 21, 1863; O. R., 
vol. xxv., part ii., p. 680. 


THE CHAPLAINS’ ASSOCIATION 399 


and temperance are by no means incompatible with 
military prowess, and that a practical piety, faithful in 
small things as in great, detracts in no degree from skill 
and resolution in the field. The Stonewall Brigade 
set the example. As soon as their own huts were 
finished, the men, of their own volition, built a log 
church, where both officers and men, without distinction of 
rank, were accustomed. to assemble during the winter 
evenings ; and those rude walls, illuminated by pine torches 
cut from the neighbouring forest, witnessed such scenes 
as filled Jackson’s cup of content to overflowing. A chap- 
lain writes: ‘The devout listener, dressed in simple grey, 
ornamented only with three stars, which any Confederate 
colonel was entitled to wear, is our great commander, 
Robert Edward Lee. That dashing-looking cavalry-man, 
with “ fighting jacket,” plumed hat, jingling spurs, and gay 
decorations, but solemn, devout aspect during the service, 
is “Jeb” Stuart, the flower of cavaliers—and all through 
the vast crowd wreaths and stars of rank mingle with the 
bars of the subordinate officers and the rough garb of the 
private soldier. But perhaps the most supremely happy of 
the gathered thousands is Stonewall Jackson.’ ‘One could 
not,’ says another, ‘sit in that pulpit and meet the con- 
centrated gaze of those men without deep emotion. I 
remembered that they were the veterans of many a bloody 
field. The eyes which looked into mine, waiting for the 
Gospel of peace, had looked steadfastly upon whatever is 
terrible in war. Their earnestness of aspect constantly 
impressed me. . . . They looked as if they had come on 
business, and very important business, and the preacher 
could scarcely do otherwise than feel that he, too, had 
business of moment there!’ 

At this time, largely owing to Jackson’s exertions, 
chaplains were appointed to regiments and brigades, and 
ministers from all parts of the country were invited to 
visit the camps. The Chaplains’ Association, which did a 
good work in the army, was established at his suggestion, 
and although he steadfastly declined to attend its meetings, 


400 STONEWALL JACKSON 


deeming them outside his functions, nothing was neglected, 
so far as lay within his power, that might forward the 
moral welfare of the troops. 

But at the same time their military efficiency and 
material comforts received his constant attention. Dis- 
cipline was made stricter, indolent and careless officers 
were summarily dismissed, and the divisions were drilled 
at every favourable opportunity. Headquarters had been 
transferred to a tent near to Hamilton’s Crossing, the 
general remarking, ‘ It is rather a relief to get where there 
will be less comfort than in a room, asI hope thereby 
persons will be prevented from encroaching so much upon 
my time.’ On his wife’s arrival he moved to Mr. Yerby’s 
plantation, near Hamilton’s Crossing, but ‘he did not 
permit,’ she writes, ‘the presence of his family to interfere 
in any way with his military duties. The greater part of 
each day he spent at his headquarters, but returned as 
early as he could get off from his labours, and devoted 
all his leisure time to his visitors—little Julia having his 
chief attention and his care. His devotion to his child 
was remarked upon by all who beheld the happy pair 
together, for she soon learned to delight in his caresses as 
much as he loved to play with her. An officer’s wife, who 
saw him often during this time, wrote to a friend in 
Richmond that ‘‘the general spent all his leisure time in 
playing with the baby.’’’ 

But these quiet and happy days were soon ended. On 
April 29 the roar of cannon was heard once more at 
April 29. Guiney’s Station, salvo after salvo following in 

quick succession, until the house shook and the. 
windows rattled with the reverberations. The crash of 
musketry succeeded, rapid and continuous, and before the 
sun was high wounded men were brought in to the shelter 
of Mr. Yerby’s outhouses. Very early in the morning a 
message from the pickets had come in, and after making 
arrangements for his wife and child to leave at once for 
Richmond, the general, without waiting for breakfast, had 
hastened to the front. The Federals were crossing the 


THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 401 


Rappahannock, and Stonewall Jackson had gone to his last 
field.! 


' The Army of the Potomac was now constituted as follows:— 
Engineer Brigade. 
First Corps. Reynolds. 
Second Corps. Couch. 
Third Corps. Sickles. 


Birney. 
Divisions. Berry. 
Whipple. 
Fifth Corps. Meade. 


Sixth Corps. Sedgewick. 
Eleventh Corps. Howard. 


McLean. 
Divisions. Von Steinwehr. 
Schurz. 
Twelfth Corps. Slocum. 
ma ae Williams. 
Divisions. | Geary 
Cavalry Corps. Stoneman. 
Pleasonton. 
Divisions. Averell. 
Gregg. 


402 STONEWALL JACKSON 


NOTE 


Headquarters, Second Corps, Army of N. Va. : 
April 13, 1863. 
General Orders, No. 26. 


II. Each division will move precisely at the time indicated in the 
order of march, and if a division or brigade is not ready to move at 
that time, the next will proceed and take its place, even if a division 
should be separated thereby. 

III. On the march the troops are to have a rest of ten minutes 
each hour. The rate of march is not to exceed one mile in twenty- 
five minutes, unless otherwise specially ordered. The time of each 
division commander will be taken from that of the corps commander. 
When the troops are halted for the’ purpose of resting, arms will be 
stacked, ranks broken, and in no case during the march will the troops 
be allowed to break ranks without previously stacking arms. 

IV. When any part of a battery or train is disabled on a march, the . 
officer in charge must have it removed immediately from the road, so 
that no part of the command be impeded upon its march. 

Batteries or trains must not stop in the line of march to waiter ; 
when any part of a battery or train, from any cause, loses its place in 
the column, it must not pass any part of the column in regaining its 
place. . 

Company commanders will march at the rear of their respective 
companies ; officers must be habitually occupied in seeing that orders 
are strictly enforced ; a day’s march should be with them a day of 
labour ; as much vigilance is required on the march as in camp. 

Each division commander will, as soon as he arrive at his camp- 
ing-ground, have the company rolls called, and guard details marched 
to the front of the regiment before breaking ranks; and immediately 
afterwards establish his chain of sentinels, and post his pickets so as 
to secure the safety of his command, and will soon thereafter report to 
their headquarters the disposition made for the security of his camp. 

Division commanders will see that all orders respecting their 
divisions are carried out strictly; each division commander before 
leaving an encampment will have all damages occasioned by his 
command settled for by payment or covered by proper certificates. 

V. All ambulances in the same brigade will be receipted for by the 
brigade quartermaster, they will be parked together, and habitually 
kept together, not being separated unless the exigencies of the service 
require, and on marches follow in rear of their respective brigades. 

Ample details will be made for taking care of the wounded; 


403 


those selected will wear the prescribed badge; and no other person 
belonging to the army will be permitted to take part in this important 
trust. 

Any one leaving his appropriate duty, under pretext of taking care 
of the wounded, will be promptly arrested, and as soon as charges can 
be made out, they will be forwarded. 

By command of Lieutenant-General Jackson, 

A. 8. PENDLETON, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 


404 STONEWALL JACKSON 


CHAPTER XXIII 


CHANCELLORSVILLE 


Ir has already been said that while the Army of Northern 
Virginia lay in winter quarters the omens did not point to 
decisive success in the forthcoming campaign. During 
the same period that Lincoln and Stanton, taught by 
successive disasters, had ceased to interfere with their 
generals, Jefferson Davis and Mr. Seddon, his new Secretary 
of War, had taken into their own hands the complete 
control of military operations. The results appeared in 
the usual form: on the Northern side, unity of purpose: 
and concentration; on the Southern, uncertainty of aim 
and dispersion. In the West the Confederate generals 
were fatally hampered by the orders of the President. In 
the East the Army of Northern Virginia, confronted by a 
mass of more than 130,000 foes, was deprived of three of 
Longstreet’s divisions; and when, at the end of April, it 
was reported that Hooker was advancing, it was absolutely 
impossible that this important detachment could rejoin in 
time to assist in the defence of the Rappahannock. 

A full discussion of the Chancellorsville campaign does 
not fall within the scope of this biography, but in justice 
to the Southern generals—to Lee who resolved to stand his 
ground, and to Jackson who approved the resolution—it 
must be explained that they were in no way responsible for 
the absence of 20,000 veterans. Undoubtedly the situation 
on the Atlantic littoral was sufficiently embarrassing to the 
Confederate authorities. The presence of a Federal force 
at New Berne, in North Carolina, threatened the main line of 
railway by which Wilmington and Charleston communicated 
with Richmond, and these two ports were of the utmost 


OD 
Warrenton Junction 


N 


Rappahannock oe 
_s 


Culpeper, 


RR, 


«edericksburg 
SEDQWICK 58, 000 


E & ALEXANDRIA 


Port Royal © 


ORANG 


°Orange C, 
Hooker’s Plan of Campaign. 


} Scale of Miles 
STONEMAN 12,4 6 8 be) 
? Bowling Green 


10,000 


oGuineas's St. 


Walker & Boutall se. 


FF 


VOL. Il. 


, 


LEE’S ARMY DISPERSED 405 


importance to the Confederacy. So enormous were the 
profits arising from the exchange of munitions of war and 
medicines! for cotton and tobacco that English shipowners 
embarked eagerly on a lucrative if precarious traffic. 
Blockade-running became a recognised business. Com- 
panies were organised which possessed large fleets of swift 
steamers. ‘The Bahamas and Bermuda became vast entre- 
pots of trade. English seamen were not to be deterred 
from a perilous enterprise by fear of Northern broadsides 
or Northern prisons, and despite the number and activity 
of the blockading squadrons the cordon of cruisers and 
gunboats was constantly broken. Many vessels were sunk, 
many captured, many wrecked on a treacherous coast, and 
yet enormous quantities of supplies found their way to the 
arsenals and magazines of Richmond and Atlanta. The rail- 
ways, then, leading from Wilmington and Charleston, the 
ports most accessible to the blockade-runners, were almost 
essential to the existence of the Confederacy. Soon after 
the battle of Fredericksburg, General D. H. Hill was 
placed in command of the forces which protected them, 
and, at the beginning of the New Year, Ransom’s division ” 
was drawn from the Rappahannock to reinforce the local 
levies. A few weeks later? General Lee was induced by 
Mr. Seddon to send Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood 
and Pickett, to cover Richmond, which was menaced both 
from Fortress Monroe and Suffolk.’ 

The Commander-in-Chief, however, while submitting 
to this detachment as a necessary evil, had warned General 
Longstreet so to dispose his troops that they could return 
to the Rappahannock at the first alarm. ‘The enemy’s 
position,’ he wrote, ‘on the sea-coast had ‘been probably 
occupied merely for purposes of defence, it was likely that 
they were strongly intrenched, and nothing would be gained 
by attacking them.’ 

1 Quinine sold in the South for one hundred dollars (Confederate) the 
ounce. O.R., vol. xxv., part li., p. 79. 

2 3,594 officersand men. Report of December 1. O. R., vol. xxi., p. 1082. 

3 Middle of February. 


4 Pickett, 7,165; Hood, 7,956——15,121 officers and men. 
5 Lee thought Pickett was sufficient. O.R., vol. xxi., p. 623. 


FE2 


406 STONEWALL JACKSON 


The warning, however, was disregarded; and that Mr. 
Seddon should have yielded, in the first instance, to the 
influence of the sea-power, exciting apprehensions of sudden 
attack along the whole seaboard of the Confederacy, may 
be forgiven him. Important lines of communication were 
certainly exposed. But when, in defiance of Lee’s advice 
that the divisions should be retained within easy reach of 
Fredericksburg, he suggested to Longstreet the feasibility 
of an attack on Suffolk, one hundred and twenty miles 
distant from the Rappahannock, he committed an un- 
pardonable blunder. 

Had Jackson been in Longstreet’s place, the Secretary’s 
proposal, however promising of personal renown, would 
unquestionably have been rejected. The leader who had 
kept the main object so steadfastly in view throughout the 
Valley campaign would never have overlooked the expressed 
wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Longstreet, however, 
brilliant fighting soldier as he was, appears to have miscon- 
ceived the duties of a detached force. He was already pre- : 
judiced in favour of a movement against Suffolk. Before he 
left for his new command, he had suggested to Lee that one 
army corps only should remain on the Rappahannock, while 
the other operated south of Richmond; and soon after his 
arrival he urged upon his superior that; in case Hooker 
moved, the Army of Northern Virginia should retire to the 
North Anna. In short, to his mind the operations of the 
main body should be made subservient to those of the de- 
tached force; Lee, with 80,000 men, holding Hooker’s 
130,000 in check until Longstreet had won his victory and 
could mareh north to join him. Such strategy was not 
likely to find favour at headquarters. It was abundantly 
evident, in the first place, that the Army of Northern 
Virginia must be the principal objective of the Federals ; 
and, in the second place, that the defeat of the force of 
Suffolk, if it were practicable, would have no effect what- 
ever upon Hooker’s action, except insomuch that his 
knowledge of Longstreet’s absence might quicken his re- 
solution to advance. Had Suffolk been a point vital to 
the North the question would have assumed a different 


A FLAGRANT BLUNDER 407 


shape. As it was, the town merely covered a tract of 
conquered territory, the Norfolk dockyard, and the mouth 
of the James River. The Confederates would gain little 
by its capture; the Federals would hardly feel its loss. 
It was most improbable that a single man of Hooker’s 
army would be detached to defend a point of such 
comparative insignificance, and it was quite possible that 
Longstreet would be unable to get back in time to meet 
him, even on the North Anna. General Lee, however, 
anxious as ever to defer to the opinions of the man on the 
spot, as well as to meet the wishes of the Government, 
yielded to Longstreet’s insistence that a fine opportunity 
for an effective blow presented itself, and in the first week 
of April the latter marched against Suffolk. 

His movement was swift and sudden. But, as Lee had 
anticipated, the Federal position was strongly fortified, with 
the flanks secure, and Longstreet had no mind to bring 

April 17. matters to a speedy conclusion. ‘Hecould reduce 

the place,’ he wrote on April 17, ‘in two or three 
days, but the expenditure of ammunition would be very 
large; or he could take it by assault, but at a cost of 3,000 
men.’ 

The Secretary of War agreed with him that the sacrifice 
would be too great, and so, at a time when Hooker 
was becoming active on the Rappahannock, Lee’s lieutenant 
was quietly investing Suffolk, one hundred and twenty 
miles away. 

From that moment the Commander-in-Chief abandoned 
all hope that his missing divisions would be with him when 
Hooker moved. Bitterly indeed was he to suffer for his selec- 
tion of a commander for his detached force. The loss of 
8,000 men at Suffolk, had the works been stormed, and 
Hood and Pickett marched instantly to the Rappahannock, 
would have been more than repaid. The addition of 12,000 
fine soldiers, flushed with success, and led by two of the 
most brilliant fighting generals in the Confederate armies, 
would have made the victory of Chancellorsville a decisive 
triumph. Better still had Longstreet adhered to his 
original orders. But both he and Mr. Seddon forgot, as 


408 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Jackson never did, the value of time, and the grand 
principle of concentration at the decisive point. 

Happily for the South, Hooker, although less flagrantly, 
was also oblivious of the first axiom of war. As soon as the 
weather improved he determined to move against Richmond. 
His task, however, was no simple one. On the opposite 
bank of the Rappahannock, from Banks’ Ford to Port 
Royal, a distance of twenty miles, frowned line upon 
line of fortifications, protected by abattis, manned by a 
numerous artillery, against which it was difficult to find 
position for the Federal guns, and occupied by the victors 
of Fredericksburg. A frontal attack gave even less promise 
of success than in Burnside’s disastrous battle. But 
behind Lee’s earthworks were his lines of supply ; the Rich- 
mond Railway, running due south, with the road to Bowl- 
ing Green alongside; and second, the plank road, which, 
running at first due west, led past Chancellorsville, a large 
brick mansion, standing in a dense forest, to Orange Court 
House and the depots on the Virginia Central Railroad. 

At these roads and railways Hooker determined to 
strike, expecting that Lee would at once fall back, and give 
the Army of the Potomac the opportunity of delivering a 
heavy blow.! To effect his object he divided his 180,000 
men into three distinct bodies. The cavalry, which, with 
the exception of one small brigade, had moved under 
General Stoneman to Warrenton Junction, was to march by 
way of Rappahannock Station, and either capturing or 
passing Culpeper and Gordonsville, to cut the Confederate 
communications, and should Lee retreat, to hold him fast.? 
General Sedgwick, with two army corps, the First and Sixth, 
forming the left wing of the army, was to cross the river 
below Fredericksburg, make a brisk demonstration of 
attack, and if the enemy fell back follow him rapidly 
down the Bowling Green and Telegraph roads. Then, 
while Lee’s attention was thus attracted, the right wing, 


1 Hooker to Lincoln, April 12, O. R., vol. xxv., part ii., p. 199. 

2 The cavalry was to take supplies for six days, food and forage, depend- 
ing on the country and on captures for any further quantity that might be 
required. 


HOOKER’S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 409 


composed of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, with 
Pleasonton’s brigade of cavalry, under Hooker’s own 
command, would move up the Rappahannock to Kelly’s 
Ford, push forward to the Rapidan, cross at Ely’s and 
Germanna fords, and march upon Chaneellorsville. The 
Third Corps was to remain concentrated on the Stafford 
Heights, ready to reinforce either wing as circumstances 
might require. ‘The Second Corps was to leave one division 
on outpost at Falmouth, and to post two divisions on 
the north bank of the Rappahannock opposite Banks’ 
Ford. 

It will be observed that this design would place a wide 
interval between the two wings of the Federal army, thus 
giving the Confederates, although much inferior in numbers, 
the advantage of the interior lines.!. Hooker, however, who 
knew the Confederate strength to a man, was confident that 
Lee, directly he found his position turned, and Stoneman in 
his rear, would at once retreat on Richmond. Yet he was 
not blind to the possibility that his great adversary, always 
daring, might assume the offensive, and attempt to crush 
the Federal wings in detail. Still the danger appeared 
small. Hither wing was practically equal to the whole 
Confederate force. Sedgwick had 40,000, with the Third 
Corps, 19,000, and a division of the Second, 5,500, close at 
hand; Hooker 42,000, with two divisions of the Second 
Corps, 11,000, at Banks’ Ford; the Third Corps could 
reinforce him in less than four-and-twenty hours; and 
Stoneman’s 10,000 sabres, riding at will amongst Lee’s 
supply depots, would surely prevent him from attacking. 
Still precaution was taken in case the attempt were made. 
Sedgwick, if the enemy detached any considerable part of 
his force towards Chancellorsville, was ‘ to carry the works 
at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph 
road.’? The right wing, ‘if not strongly resisted, was to 
advance at all hazards, and secure a position uncovering 


1 From Franklin’s Crossing below Fredericksburg, where Sedgwick’s 
bridges were thrown, to Kelly’s Ford is 27 miles; to Fly’s Ford 19 miles, 
and to Chancellorsville 11 miles. 

2 QO. R., vol. xxyv., p. 268. 


410 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Banks’ Ford.’1 Were the Confederates found in force near 
Chancellorsville, it was to select a strong position and await 
attack on its own ground, while Sedgwick, coming up 
from Fredericksburg, would assail the enemy in flank and 
rear. 

Such was the plan which, if resolutely carried out, bade 
fair to crush Lee’s army between the upper and the nether 
millstones, and it seems that the size and condition of his 
forces led Hooker to anticipate an easy victory. If the 
Army of the Potomac was not ‘the finest on the planet,’ as 
in an order of the day he boastfully proclaimed it, it 
possessed many elements of strength. Hooker was a strict 
disciplinarian with a talent for organisation. He had not 
only done much to improve the efficiency of his troops, but 
his vigorous measures had gone far to restore their con- 
fidence. When he succeeded Burnside a large proportion 
of the soldiers had lost heart and hope. The generals who 
had hitherto commanded them, when compared with Lee 
and Jackson, were mere pigmies, and the consciousness . 
that this was the case had affected the entire army. The 
Official Records contain much justification of Jackson’s 
anxiety that Burnside should be fought on the North Anna, 
where, if defeated, he might have been pursued. Although 
there had been no pursuit after the battle of Fredericksburg, 
no harassing marches, no continued retreat, with lack of 
supplies, abandoning of wounded, and constant alarms, the 
Federal regiments had suffered terribly in moral. 

‘The winter rains set in,’ said Hooker, ‘and all opera- 
tions were for a while suspended, the army literally find- 
ing itself buried in mud, from which there was no hope of 
extrication before spring. 

‘With this prospect before it, taken in connection with 
the gloom and despondency which followed the disaster of 
Fredericksburg, the army was in a forlorn, deplorable 
condition. Reference to the letters from the army at 
this time, public and private, affords abundant evidence 
of its demoralisation ; and these, in their turn, had their 
effect upon the friends and relatives of the soldiers at 

 O.R., vol. xxy., p. 274, 


THE FEDERAL ARMY 411 


home. At the time the army was turned over to me 
desertions were at the rate of about two hundred a day. 
So anxious were parents, wives, brothers and sisters, to 
relieve their kindred, that they filled the express trains 
with packages of citizens’ clothing to assist them in escap- 
ing from service. At that time, perhaps, a majority of the 
officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the 
policy of the Government in the conduct of the war. The 
emancipation proclamation had been published a short 
time before, and a large element of the army had taken 
sides antagonistic to it, declaring that they would never 
have embarked in the war had they anticipated the action 
of the Government. When rest came to the army, 
the disaffected, from whatever cause, began to show 
themselves, and make their influence felt in and out of 
the camps. I may also state that at the moment I was 
placed in command I caused a return to be made of 
the absentees of the army, and found the number to be 
2,922 commissioned officers and 81,964 non-commissioned 
officers and privates. They were scattered all over the 
country, and the majority were absent from causes 
unknown.’ ! 

In the face of this remarkable report it is curious to read, 
in the pages of a brilliant military historian, that ‘ armies 
composed of the citizens of a free country, who have 
taken up arms from patriotic motives . . . have constantly 
exhibited an astonishing endurance, and possessing a bond 
of cohesion superior to discipline, have shown their power 
to withstand shocks that would dislocate the structure of 
other military organisations.’? A force which had lost 
twenty-five per cent. of its strength by desertion, although 
it had never been pursued after defeat, would not gene- 
rally be suspected of peculiar solidity. Nevertheless, the 
Northern soldiers must receive their due. Want of discipline 
made fearful ravages in the ranks, but, notwithstanding 
the defection of so many of their comrades, those that 
remained faithful displayed the best characteristics of their 


' Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War. 
* Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. By William Swinton, p. 267. 


412 - STONEWALL JACKSON 


race. The heart of the army was still sound, and only 
the influence of a strong and energetic commander was 
required to restore its vitality. This influence was supplied 
by Hooker. The cumbrous organisation of Grand Divisions 
was abolished. Disloyal and unsuccessful generals were 
removed. Salutary changes were introduced into the 
various departments of the staff. The cavalry, hitherto 
formed in independent brigades, was consolidated into a 
corps of three divisions and a brigade of regulars, and under 
a system of careful and uniform inspection made rapid im- 
provement. Strong measures were taken to reduce the 
number of deserters. The ranks were filled by the return 
of absentees. New regiments were added to the army 
corps.. The troops were constantly practised in field- 
exercises, and generals of well-deserved reputation were 
selected for the different commands. ‘ All were actuated,’ 
wrote Hooker, ‘by feelings of confidence and devotion to 
the cause, and I felt that it was a living army, and one 
well wor thy of the Republic.’ 

On April 27, after several demonstrations, inideraaeed 
with a view of confusing the enemy, had been made at 
various points, the grand movement began. 

The Confederate army still held the lines it had 
occupied for the past four months. Jackson’s army corps 
extended from MHamilton’s Crossing to Port Royal. 
McLaws’ and Anderson’s divisions occupied Lee’s Hill 
and the ridge northward, and a brigade watched Banks’ 
Ford. Stuart was with his main body, some 2,400 strong, 
at Culpeper, observing the great mass of Federal horsemen 
at Warrenton J unetion, and the line of the Rappahannock 
was held by cavalry pickets. 

The strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, so far 
as can be ascertained, did not exceed 62,000 officers and 


men. 
Second Corps. 


A. P. Hill’s Division . ‘ , : F é -« 11,500 
Rodes’ Division ; ; , ¢ - 9,500 
Colston’s (Jackson’s ae Division ‘ ; ‘ « | 6,600 
Early’s Division ; ; f e ° . F600 


Artillery . ; ‘ , ; ; : : :. ¥2ER8 


LEE’S DESIGNS 413 


First Corps. 


Anderson’s Division . , 4 ‘ 3 , . 8,100 

McLaws’ Division . : ; : ‘ 2 . 8,600 

Artillery . ‘ : : ; ; : : . 1,000 

Cavalry. 

Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade . ‘ . 1,500 

W. Hz. F. Lee’s Brigade (two regiments) . ; , 900 

Reserve Artillery . . ’ 700 
Add for reinforcements received since 2 March 1, date 

of last return . : ‘ : ; : . 4,000 

Total . . 62,000 

and 170 guns. 


Thus the road to Richmond, threatened by a host of 
130,000 men and 428 guns, was to be defended by a force of 
less than half the size. Ninety-nine generals out of a 
hundred would have considered the situation hopeless. The 
Confederate lines at Fredericksburg were certainly very 
strong, but it was clearly impossible to prevent the Federals 
outflanking them. The disparity in strength was far greater 
than at Sharpsburg, and it seemed that by sheer weight of 
numbers the Southern army must inevitably be driven back. 
Nor did it appear, so overwhelming were the Federal num- 
bers, that counter-attack was feasible. The usual resource 
of the defender, if his adversary marches round his flank, 
is to strike boldly at his communications. Here, however, 
Hooker’s communications with Aquia Creek were securely 
covered by the Rappahannock, and so great was his pre- 
ponderance of strength, that he could easily detach a 
sufficient force to check the Confederates should they 
move against them. 

Yet now, as on the Antietam, Lee and Jackson declined 
to take numbers into consideration. They knew that 
Hooker was a brave and experienced soldier, but they had 
no reason to anticipate that he would handle his vast 
masses with more skill than McClellan. That the Northern 
soldiers had suffered in moral they were well aware, and 
while they divined that the position they themselves had 
fortified might readily be made untenable, the fact that such 
was the case gave them small concern. They were agreed 


414 STONEWALL JACKSON 


that the best measures of defence, if an opening offered, lay 
in a resolute offensive, and with Hooker in command it was 
not likely that the opportunity would be long delayed. 

No thought of a strategic retreat, from one position to 
another, was entertained. Mancuvre was to be met by 
manoeuvre, blow by counterblow.! If Hooker had not 
moved Lee would have forestalled him. On April 16 he 
had written to Mr. Davis: ‘ My only anxiety arises from the 
condition of our horses, and the scarcity of forage and 
provisions. I think it is all important that we should 
assume the ageressive by the Ist of May... . If we could be 
placed in a condition to make a vigorous advance at that 
time, I think the Valley could be swept of Milroy (com- 
manding the Federal forces at Winchester), and the army 
opposite [Hooker’s] be thrown north of the Potomac.’ ? 
Jackson, too, even after Hooker’s plan was developed, 
indignantly repudiated the suggestion that the forthcoming 
campaign must be purely defensive. When some officer 
on his staff expressed his fear that the army would be 
compelled to retreat, he asked sharply, ‘Who said that ? 
No, sir, we shall not fall back, we shall attack them.’ 

At the end of the month, however, Longstreet with his 
three divisions was still absent; sufficient supplies for a 
forward movement had not yet been accumulated ; * two 
brigades of cavalry, Hampton’s and Jenkins’, which had 
been sent respectively to South Carolina and the Valley, 
had not rejoined,t and Hooker had already seized the 
initiative. 

The first news which came to hand was that a strong 
force of all arms was moving up the Rappahannock in the 


1 «The idea of securing the provisions, waggons, guns, of the enemy 
is truly tempting, and the idea has haunted me since December.’ Lee to 
Trimble, March 8, 1862. O. R., vol. xxv., part ii., p. 658. 

2 O.B., vol. xxv., p. 725. 

3 ¢From the condition of our horses and the amount of our supplies I 
am unable even to act on the defensive as vigorously as circumstances 
might require.’ Lee to Davis, April 27, O. R., vol. xxv., p. 752. 

* On April 20 Lee had asked that the cavalry regiments not needed 
in other districts might be sent to the Army of Northern Virginia. His 
request was not complied with until too late. O. R., vol. xxv., pp. 740, 
741. 


HOOKER MOVES 415 


direction of Kelly’s Ford. This was forwarded by Stuart on 

April gg, the evening of April 28. The next the Federal 

movements, which might have been morning 

no more than a demonstration, became pronounced. Under 

April 9, COVer of a thick fog, pontoon bridges were laid 

at Deep Run below Fredericksburg ; Sedgwick’s 

troops began to cross, and were soon engaged with Jackson’s 

outposts ; while, at the same time, the report came in that a 

force of unknown strength had made the passage at Kelly’s 
Ford. 

Lee displayed no perturbation. Jackson, on receiving 
information of Sedgwick’s movement from his outposts, had 
sent an aide-de-camp to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief. 
The latter was still in his tent, and in reply to the message 
said: ‘ Well, I heard firing, and I was beginning to think 
that it was time some of your lazy young fellows were 
coming to tell me what it was about. Tell your good 
general he knows what to do with the enemy just as well 
as I do.’! 

The divisions of the Second Army Corps were at once 
called up to their old battle-ground, and while they were 
on the march Jackson occupied himself with watching 
Sedgwick’s movements. The Federals were busily in- 
trenching on the river bank, and on the heights behind 
frowned the long line of artillery that had proved at 
Fredericksburg so formidable an obstacle to the Con- 
federate attack. The enemy’s position was very strong, 
and the time for counterstroke had not yet come. During 
the day the cavalry was actively engaged between the 
Rappahannock and the Rapidan, testing the strength of 
the enemy’s columns. The country was wooded, the 
Federals active, and as usual in war, accurate information 
was difficult to obtain and more difficult to communicate. 
It was not till 6.30 p.m. that Lee received notice that 
troops had crossed at Ely’s and Germanna Fords at 2 

1 On March 12, before Hooker had even framed his plan of operations, 
Lee had received information that the Federals, as soon as the state of the 
roads permitted, would cross at United States, Falmouth, and some point 


below; the attempt at Falmouth to be a feint. O. R., vol. xxv., part ii, 
p. 664. 


416 STONEWALL JACKSON 


p.m. Anderson’s division was at once despatched to 
Chancellorsville. 

The next message, which does not appear to have been 

received until the morning of the 30th, threw more 

“April 30. light on the situation. Stuart had made prisoners 
from the Fifth, the Eleventh, and the Twelfth Corps, 
and had ascertained that the corps commanders, Meade, 
Howard, and Slocum, were present with the troops. 
- Anderson, moreover, who had been instructed to select and 
intrench a strong position, was falling back from Chan- 
cellorsville before the enemy’s advance, and two things 
became clear :— 

1. That it was Hooker’s intention to turn the Con- 
federate left. 

2. That he had divided his forces 

The question now to be decided was which wing should 
be attacked first. There was much to be said in favour of 
crushing Sedgwick. His numbers were estimated at 35,000 
men, and the Confederates had over 60,000. Moreover, . 
time is a most important consideration in the use of 
interior lines. The army was already concentrated in 
front of Sedgwick, whereas it would require a day’s march 
to seek Hooker in the forest round Chancellorsville. 
Sedgwick’s, too, was the smaller of the Federal wings, and 
his overthrow would certainly ruin Hooker’s combinations. 
‘Jackson at first,’ said Lee, ‘ preferred to attack Sedg- 
wick’s force in the plain of Fredericksburg, but I told him 
I feared it was as impracticable as it was at the first battle 
of Fredericksburg. It was hard to get at the enemy, and 
harder to get away if we drove him into the river, but if 
he thought it could be done, I would give orders for it.’ 
Jackson asked to be allowed to examine the ground, but 
soon came to the conclusion that the project was too 
hazardous and that Lee was right. Orders were then 
issued for a concentration against Hooker, 10,000 men, 
under General Early, remaining to confront Sedgwick on 
the heights of Fredericksburg. 

We may now turn to the movements of the Federals. 

Hooker’s right wing had marched at a speed which had 


THE FEDERAL MOVEMENTS 417 


been hitherto unknown in the Army of the Potomac. At 
nightfall, on April 80, the three army corps, although they 
had been delayed by the Confederate cavalry, were 
assembled at Chancellorsville. In three davs they had 
marched forty-six miles over bad roads, had forded breast- 
high two difficult rivers, established several bridges, and 
captured over a hundred prisoners.!. Heavy reinforcements 
were in rear. The two divisions of the Second Corps 
had marched from Banks’ Ford to United States Ford, 
six miles from Chancellorsville; while the Third Corps, 
ordered up from the Stafford Heights, was rapidly approach- 
ing the same point of passage. Thus, 70,000 men, in the 
highest spirits at the success of their mancuvres, were 
massed in rear of Lee’s lines, and Hooker saw victory 
within his grasp. 

‘It is with heartfelt satisfaction,’ ran his general order, 
‘that the commanding general announces to his army that 
the operations of the last three days have determined that 
our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from 
behind his defences, and give us battle on our own ground, 
where certain destruction awaits him. ‘The operations of 
the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a 
succession of splendid achievements.’ 

Hooker was ‘ skinning the lion while the beast yet lived,’ 
but he had certainly much reason for congratulation. His 
manoeuvres had been skilfully planned and energetically 
executed. The two rivers which protected the Confederate 
position had been crossed without loss; the Second and 
Third Corps had been brought into close touch with the 
right wing ; Lee’s earthworks were completely turned, and 
Stoneman’s cavalry divisions, driving the enemy’s patrols 

1 The troops carried eight days’ supplies: three days’ cooked rations 
with bread and groceries in the haversacks; five days’ bread and groceries 
in the knapsacks; five days’ ‘beef on the hoof.’ The total weight carried 
by each man, including sixty rounds of ammunition, was 45 lbs. The 
reserve ammunition was carried principally by pack mules, and only a 
small number of waggons crossed the Rappahannock. Four pontoon 
bridges were laid by the engineers. One bridge took three-quarters of an 
hour to lay; the other three, one and a half hour to lay, and an hour to 


take up. Each bridge was from 100 to 140 yards long. O.R., vol. xxv., 
pp. 215, 216. 


418 STONEWALL JACKSON 


before them, were already within reach of Orange Court 
House, and not more than twenty miles from Gordonsville. 
Best of all, the interval between the two wings—twenty-six 
miles on the night of the 28th—was now reduced to eleven 
miles by the plank road. 

Two things only were unsatisfactory :— 

1. The absence of information. 

2. The fact that the whole movement had been observed 
by the Confederate cavalry. 

Pleasonton’s brigade of horse had proved too weak for 
the duty assigned to it. It had been able to protect the 
front, but it was too small to cover the flanks; and at the 
flanks Stuart had persistently struck. Hooker appears to 
have believed that Stoneman’s advance against the Central 
Railroad would draw off the whole of the Confederate 
horse. Stuart, however, was not to be beguiled from his 
proper functions. Never were his squadrons more skilfully 
handled than in this campaign. With fine tactical 
insight, as soon as the great movement on Chancellorsville . 
became pronounced, he had attacked the right flank of the 
Federal columns with Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, leaving only 
the two regiments under W. H. F. Lee to watch Stoneman’s 
10,000 sabres. Then, having obtained the information he 
required, he moved across the Federal front, and routing 
one of Pleasonton’s regiments in a night affair near Spotsyl- 
vania Court House, he had regained touch with his own 
army. ‘The results of his manceuvres were of the utmost 
importance. Lee was fully informed as to his adversary’s 
strength; the Confederate cavalry was in superior strength 
at the critical point, that is, along the front of the two 
armies ; and Hooker had no knowledge whatever of what was 
going on in thespace between Sedgwick and himself. Hewas 
only aware, on the night of April 30, that the Confederate 
position before Fredericksburg was still strongly occupied. 

The want, however, of accurate information gave him 
no uneasiness. The most careful arrangements had been 
made to note and report every movement of the enemy the 
next day. 

No less than three captive balloons, in charge of skilled 


PRECAUTIONS 419 


observers, looked down upon the Confederate earthworks.! 
Signal stations and observatories had been established on 
each commanding height; a line of field telegraph had 
been laid from Falmouth to United States Ford, and the 
chief of the staff, General Butterfield, remained at the 
former village in communication with General Sedgwick. 
If the weather were clear, and the telegraph did not fail, it 
seemed impossible that either wing of the Federal army 
could fail to be fully and instantly informed of the situa- 
tion of the other, or that a single Confederate battalion 
could change position without both Hooker and Sedgwick 
being at once advised. 

Moreover, the Federal Commander-in-Chief was so 
certain that Lee would retreat that his deficiency in cavalry 
troubled him not at all. He had determined to carry out his 
ae original design. The next morning—May 1—the 

‘Y “right wing was to move by the plank road and un- 
cover Banks’ Ford, thus still further shortening the line of 
communication between the two wings; and as the chief of 
the staff impressed on Sedgwick, it was ‘expected to be on the 
heights west of Fredericksburg at noon or shortly after, or, 
if opposed strongly, at night.’ Sedgwick, meanwhile, was 
‘to observe the enemy’s movements with the utmost 
vigilance ; should he expose a weak point, to attack him in 
full force and destroy him; should he show any symptom 
of falling back, to pursue him with the utmost vigour.’ ? 

But Hooker was to find that mere mechanical pre- 
cautions are not an infallible remedy for a dangerous 
situation. The Confederates had not only learned long 
since the importance of concealment, and the advantage of 
night marches, but in the early morning of May 1 the 
river mists rendered both balloons and _ observatories 
useless. Long before the sun broke through the fog, both 
McLaws and Jackson had joined Anderson at Tabernacle 


' Balloons, which had been first used in the Peninsular campaign, were 
not much dreaded by the Confederates. ‘The experience of twenty months’ 
warfare has taught them how little formidable such engines of war are.’ 
Special Correspondent of the Times at Fredericksburg, January 1, 1863. 

2 O. B., vol. xxv., p. 306. 


VOL. II. G@ 


420 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Church, and a strong line of battle had been established at 
the junction of the two roads, the pike and the plank, 
which led east from Chancellorsville. The position was 
favourable, running along a low ridge, partially covered 
with timber, and with open fields in front. Beyond those 
fields, a few hundred paces distant, rose the outskirts of 
a great forest, stretching far away over a gently undulating 
country. This forest, twenty miles in length from east to 
west, and fifteen in breadth from north to south, has given 
to the region it covers the name of the Wilderness of Spotsyl- 
vania, and in its midst the Federal army was now involved. 
Never was ground more unfavourable for the manceuvres of 
alargearmy. The timber was unusually dense. The groves 
of pines were immersed in a sea of scrub-oak and luxuriant 
undergrowth. The soil was poor. Farms were rare, and 
the few clearings were seldom more than a rifle shot in 
width. The woodland tracks were seldom travelled ; 
streams with marshy banks and tortuous courses were met 
at frequent intervals, and the only débouchés towards - 
Fredericksburg, the pike, the plank road, an unfinished 
line of railway a mile south of their junction, and the 
river road, about two miles north, were commanded from 
the Confederate position. 

When Jackson arrived upon the scene, Anderson, with 
the help of Lee’s engineers, had strongly intrenched the 
whole front. A large force of artillery had 
already taken post. The flanks of the line were 
covered ; the right, which extended to near Duerson’s Mill, 
by Mott’s Run and the Rappahannock ; the left, which 
rested on the unfinished railroad not far from Tabernacle 
Church, by the Massaponax Creek. For the defence of this 
position, three miles in length, there were present 45,000 
infantry, over 100 guns, and Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade of 
cavalry, a force ample for the purpose, and giving about 
nine men to the yard. On the rolling ground eastward 
there was excellent cover for the reserves, and from the 
breastworks to the front the defiles, for such, owing to 
the density of the wood, were the four roads by which 
the enemy must approach, might be so effectively swept 


8 A.M. 


THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE 421 


as to prevent him from deploying either artillery or 
infantry. 

But Jackson was not disposed to await attack. Only 
10,000 men remained in the Fredericksburg lines to 
confront Sedgwick, and if that officer acted vigorously, 
his guns would soon be heard in rear of the lines at 
Tabernacle Church. Work on the intrenchments was at 
once broken off, and the whole force was ordered to prepare 

10.45 am, fOr an immediate advance on Chancellorsville. 

Before eleven o’clock the rear brigades had closed 
up; and marching by the pike and the plank road, with 
a regiment of cavalry in advance, and Fitzhugh Lee 
upon the left, the Confederate army plunged resolutely 
into the gloomy depths of the great forest. Anderson’s 
division led the way, one brigade on the pike, and two on 
the plank road; a strong line of skirmishers covered his 
whole front, and his five batteries brought up the rear. Next 
in order came McLaws, together with the two remaining 
brigades of Anderson, moving by the pike, while Jackson’s 
three divisions were on the plank road. The artillery 
followed the infantry. 

About a mile towards Chancellorsville the Federal 
cavalry was found in some force, and as the patrols gave 
way, a heavy force of infantry was discovered in movement 
along the pike. General McLaws, who had been placed in 
charge of the Confederate right, immediately deployed his 
four leading brigades, and after the Federal artillery, 
unlimbering in an open field, had fired a few rounds, 
their infantry advanced to the attack. The fight was 
spirited but short. The Northern regulars of Sykes’ 
division drove in the Confederate skirmishers, but were 
unable to make ground against the line of battle. Jackson, 
meanwhile, who had been at once informed of the 
encounter, had ordered the troops on the plank road to 
push briskly forward, and the Federals, finding their right 
in danger of being enveloped, retired on Chancellorsville. 
Another hostile column was shortly afterwards met on the 
plank road, also marching eastward. Again there was a 
skirmish, and again Jackson, ordering a brigade to march 


GG?2 


499 STONEWALL JACKSON 


rapidly along the unfinished railroad, had recourse to a 
turning movement; but before the movement was com- 
pleted, the Federals began to yield, and all opposition 
gradually melted away. The following order was then sent 
to McLaws :— 


‘Headquarters, Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, 
2.30 P.M. ‘May 1, 1868, 2.30 p.m. (received 4 P.m.). 
‘General,—The Lieutenant-General commanding directs 
me to say that he is pressing up the plank road; also, 
that you will press on up the turnpike towards Chancel- 
lorsville, as the enemy is falling back. 
‘ Keep your skirmishers and flanking parties well out, to 
guard against ambuscade. 
‘Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
‘J. G. Morrison, 
‘Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.’ ! 


There was something mysterious in so easy a victory. 
The enemy was evidently in great strength, for, on both 
roads, heavy columns had been observed behind the lines 
of skirmishers. Several batteries had been in action; 
cavalry was present; and the Confederate scouts reported 
that a third column, of all arms, had marched by the river 
road toward Banks’ Ford, and had then, like the others, un- 
accountably withdrawn. The pursuit, therefore, was slow 
and circumspect. Wilcox’ brigade, on the extreme right, 
moved up the Mine road, in the direction of Duerson’s 
Mill; Wright’s brigade, on the extreme left, followed Fitz- 
hugh Lee’s cavalry on the unfinished railroad; while the 
main body, well closed up, still kept to the main highways. 

At length, late in the afternoon, Hooker’s tactics became 
clear. As Jackson’s advanced-guards approached Chancel- 

spu,  lorsville, the resistance of the Federal skirmishers, 

“"  govering the retreat, became more stubborn. From 
the low ridge, fringed by heavy timber, on which the 
mansion stands, the fire of artillery, raking every avenue of 
approach, grew more intense, and it was evident that the 
foe was standing fast on the defensive. 

1 0. BR., vol. xxv., p. 764. 


A NARROW ESCAPE 498 


The Confederate infantry, pushing forward through 
the undergrowth, made but tardy progress; the cavalry 
patrols found that every road and bridle-path was strongly 
held, and it was difficult in the extreme to discover 
Hooker’s exact position. Jackson himself, riding to the 
front to reconnoitre, nearly fell a victim to the recklessness 
he almost invariably displayed when in quest of informa- 
tion. The cavalry had been checked at Catherine Furnace, 
and were waiting the approach of the infantry. Wright’s 
brigade was close at hand, and swinging round northwards, 
drove back the enemy’s skirmishers, until, in its turn, it 
was brought up by the fire of artillery. Just at this 
moment Jackson galloped up, and begged Stuart to ride 
forward with him in order to find a point from which 
the enemy’s guns might be enfiladed. A_ bridle-path, 
branching off from the main road to the right, led to a 
hillock about half a mile distant, and the two generals, 
accompanied by their staffs, and followed by a battery 
of horse-artillery, made for this point of vantage. ‘On 
reaching the spot,’ says Stuart’s adjutant-general, ‘ so 
dense was the undergrowth, it was found impossible to 
find enough clear space to bring more than one gun ata 
time into position; the others closed up immediately 
behind, and the whole body of us completely blocked up the 
narrow road. Scarcely had the smoke of our first shot 
cleared away, when a couple of masked batteries suddenly 
opened on us at short range, and enveloped us in a storm 
of shell and canister, which, concentrated on so narrow a 
space, did fearful execution among our party, men and 
horses falling right and left, the animals kicking and plunging 
wildly, and everybody eager to disentangle himself from the 
confusion, and get out of harm’s way. Jackson, as soon as 
he found out his mistake, ordered the guns to retire; but the 
confined space so protracted the operation of turning, that 
the enemy’s cannon had full time to continue their havoc, 
covering the road with dead and wounded. That Jackson 
and Stuart with their staff officers escaped was nothing 
short of miraculous.’ ! 

1 Memoirs of the Confederate War Heros yon Borcke. 


424 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Other attempts at reconnaissance were more suc- 
cessful. Before nightfall it was ascertained that Hooker 
was in strong force on the Chancellorsville ridge, along the 
plank road, and on a bare plateau to the southward called 
Hazel Grove. ‘ Here,’ in the words of General Lee, ‘ he 
had assumed a position of great natural strength, sur- 
rounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a 
tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks 
of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front, 
so as to form an almostimpenetrable abattis. His artillery 
swept the few narrow roads, by which the position could 
be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent 
woods. The left of his line extended from Chancellors- 
ville towards the Rappahannock, covering the Bark Mill 
(United States) Ford, which communicated with the north 
bank of the river by a pontoon bridge. His right stretched 
westward along the Germanna Ford road (the pike) more 
than two miles. . . . As the nature of the country rendered 
it hazardous to attack by night, our troops were halted 
and formed in line of battle in front of Chancellorsville at 
right angles to the plank road, extending on the right to 
the Mine road, and to the left in the direction of the 
Catherine Furnace.’ 

As darkness falls upon the Wilderness, and the fire of 
the outposts, provoked by every movement of the patrols, 
gradually dies away, we may seek the explanation of the 
Federal movements. On finding that his enemy, instead 
of ‘ingloriously flying,’ was advancing to meet him, and 
advancing with confident and aggressive vigour, Hooker’s 
resolution had failed him. Waiting till his force was con- 
centrated, until the Second and Third Corps had crossed at 
United States Ford, and were close to Chancellorsville, it 
was not till eleven o’clock on the morning of May 1 
that he had marched in three great columns towards Fre- 
dericksburg. His intention was to pass rapidly through 
the Wilderness, secure the open ground about Tabernacle 
Church, and there, with ample space for deployment, to 
form for battle, and move against the rear of Marye’s Hill.! 

1 0. K., vol. xxv., p. 324. 


HOOKER 425 


But before his advanced-guards got clear of the forest 
defiles they found the Confederates across their path, 
displaying an unmistakable purpose of pressing the at- 
tack. Hooker at once concluded that Lee was marching 
against him with nearly his whole force, and of the strength 
of that force, owing to the weakness of his cavalry, he was 
not aware. The news from the Stafford Heights was dis- 
quieting. As soon as the fog had lifted, about nine o’clock 
in the morning, the signal officers and balloonists had 
descriel long columns of troops and trains marching 
rapidly towards Chancellorsville.!. This was duly reported 
by the telegraph,” and it was correctly inferred to signify 
that Lee was concentrating against the Federal right. But 
at the same time various movements were observed about 
Hamilton’s Crossing; columns appeared marching from 
the direction of Guiney’s Station; there was much traffic 
on the railway, and several deserters from Lee’s army 
declared, on being examined, that Hood’s and Pickett’s 
divisions had arrived from Richmond.’ The statements of 
these men--who we may suspect were not such traitors 
as they appeared—were confirmed by the fact that Sedg- 
wick, who was without cavalry, had noticed no diminution 
in the force which held the ridge before him. 

It is easy, then, to understand Hooker’s decision 
to stand on the defensive. With a prudent foresight 
which does him much credit, before he marched in the 
morning he had ordered the position about Chancellors- 
ville, covering his lines of retreat to United States and 
Ely’s Fords, to be reconnoitred and intrenched, and his 
front, as Lee said, was undoubtedly very strong. He would 
assuredly have done better had he attacked vigorously when 
he found the Confederates advancing. His sudden retro- 
gerade movement, especially as following the swift and suc- 
cessful manceuvres which had turned Lee’s position, could 
not fail to have a discouraging effect upon the troops; and 


1 O. R., vol. xxv., pp. 323, 336. 

2 Ibid. p. 326. The telegraph, however, appears to have worked 
badly, and dispatches took several hours to pass from Falmouth to 
Chancellorsville. 

8 Ibid. p. 327. 


426 STONEWALL JACKSON 


if Sedgwick had been ordered to storm the Fredericksburg 
lines, the whole Federal force could have been employed, 
and the Confederates, assailed in front and rear simul- 
taneously, must, to say the least, have been embarrassed. 
But in abandoning his design of crushing Lee between his 
two wings, and in retiring to the stronghold he had pre- 
pared, Hooker did what most ordinary generals would have 
done, especially one who had served on the losing side at 
Fredericksburg. He had there learned the value of in- 
trenchments. He had seen division after division shatter 
itself in vain against a stone wall and a few gun-pits, and 
it is little wonder that he had imbibed a _ profound 
respect for defensive tactics. He omitted, however, to 
take into consideration two simple facts. First, that 
few districts contain two such positions as those of the 
Confederates at Fredericksburg ; and, secondly, that the 
strength of a position is measured not by the impregna- 
bility of the front, but by the security of the flanks. The 
Fredericksburg lines, resting on the Rappahannock and — 
the Massaponax, had apparently safe flanks, and yet he 
himself had completely turned them, rendering the whole 
series of works useless without firing a shot. Were Lee 
and Jackson the men to knock their heads, like Burnside, 
against stout breastworks strongly manned? Would they 
not rather make a wide sweep, exactly as he himself had 
done, and force him to come out of his works? Hooker, 
however, may have said that if they marched across his 
front, he would attack them en route, as did Napoleon at 
Austerlitz and Wellington at Salamanca, and cut their army 
in two. But here he came face to face with the fatal defect 
of the lines he had selected, and also of the disposition he 
had made of his cavalry. The country near Chancellorsville 
was very unlike the rolling plains of Austerlitz or the bare 
downs of Salamanca. From no part of the Federal 
position did the view extend for more than a few hundred 
yards. Wherever the eye turned rose the dark and im- 
penetrable screen of close-growing trees, interlaced with 
wild vines and matted undergrowth, and seamed with 
rough roads, perfectly passable for troops, with which his 


HOOKER 497 


enemies were far better acquainted than himself. Had 
Stoneman’s cavalry been present, the squadrons, posted 
far out upon the flanks, and watching every track, might 
have given ample warning of any turning movement, 
exactly as Stuart’s cavalry had given Lee warning of 
Hooker’s own movement upon Chancellorsville. As it was, 
Pleasonton’s brigade was too weak to make head against 
Stuart’s regiments; and Hooker could expect no early 
information of his enemy’s movements. 

He thus found himself in the dilemma which a general 
on the defensive, if he be weak in cavalry, has almost invari- 
ably to face, especially in a close country. He was ignorant, 
and must necessarily remain ignorant, of where the main 
attack would be made. Lee, on the other hand, by means 
of his superior cavalry, could reconnoitre the position at his 
leisure, and if he discovered a weak point could suddenly 
throw the greater portion of his force against it. Hooker 
could only hope that no weak point existed. Remembering 
that the Confederates were on the pike and the plank road, 
there certainly appeared no cause for apprehension. The 
Fifth Corps, with its flank on the Rappahannock, held the 
left, covering the river and the old Mine roads. Next in 
succession came the Second Corps, blocking the pike. In 
the centre the Twelfth Corps, under General Slocum, covered 
Chancellorsville. The Third Corps, under Sickles, held Hazel 
Grove, with Berry’s division as general reserve; and on the 
extreme right, his breastworks running along the plank road 
as far as Talley’s Clearing, was Howard with the Eleventh 
Corps, composed principally of German regiments. Strong 
outposts of infantry had been thrown out into the woods ; 
the men were still working in the intrenchments ; batteries 
were disposed so as to sweep every approach from the 
south, the south-east, or the south-west, and there were at 
least five men to every yard of parapet. The line, how- 
ever, six miles from flank to flank, was somewhat extensive, 
and to make certain, so far as possible, that sufficient num- 
bers should be forthcoming to defend the position, at 
1.55 on the morning of May 2, Sedgwick was instructed 
to send the First Army Corps to Chancellorsville. Before 


428 STONEWALL JACKSON 


midnight, moreover, thirty-four guns, principally horse- 
artillery, together with a brigade of infantry, were sent 
from Falmouth to Banks’ Ford. 

Sedgwick, meantime, below Fredericksburg, had con- 
tented himself with engaging the outposts on the opposite 
ridge. An order to make a brisk demonstration, which 
Hooker had dispatched at 11.80 a.m., did not arrive, the 
telegraph having broken down, until 5.45 p.m., six 
hours later ; and it was then too late to effect any diversion 
in favour of the main army. 

Yet it can hardly be said that Sedgwick had risen to 
the height of his responsibilities. He knew that a portion 
at least of the Confederates had marched against Hooker, 
and the balloonists had early reported that a battle was in 
progress near Tabernacle Church. But instead of obeying 
Napoleon’s maxim and marching to the sound of the 
cannon, he had made no effort to send support to his 
commander. Both he and General Reynolds! considered 
‘that to have attacked before Hooker had accomplished some ~ 
success, in view of the strong position and numbers in 
their front, might have failed to dislodge the enemy, and 
have rendered them unserviceable at the proper time.’? 
That is, they were not inclined to risk their own commands 
in order to assist Hooker, of whose movements they were 
uncertain. Yet even if they had been defeated, Hooker 
would still have had more men than Lee. 


1 The following letter (O. R., vol. xxv., p. 337) is interesting as showing 
the state of mind into which the commanders of detached forces are liable 
to be thrown by the absence of information :— 


‘ Headquarters, First Corps, May 1, 1863. 


‘ Major-General Sedgwick,—I think the proper view to take of affairs is 
this: If they have not detached more than A. P. Hill’s division from our 
front, they have been keeping up appearances, showing weakness, with a view 
of delaying Hooker, and tempting us to make an attack on their fortified 
position, and hoping to destroy us and strike for our depdt over our 
bridges. We ought therefore, in my judgment, to know something of what 
has transpired on our right. 

‘ Joun F. Reynoups, Major-General’ 


* Dispatch of Chief of the Staff to Hooker, dated 4p.m.,May1. O. R., 
vol. xxv., p. 326. 


429 


CHAPTER XXIV 
CHANCELLORSVILLE (continued) 


At a council of war held during the night at Chancellors- 
ville House, the Federal generals were by no means 
unanimous as to the operations of the morrow. Some of 
the generals advised an early assault. Others favoured a 
strictly defensive attitude. Hooker himself wished to con- 
tract his lines so as to strengthen them ; but as the officers 
commanding on the right were confident of the strength 
of their intrenchments, it was at length determined that 
the army should await attack in its present position. 
Three miles down the plank road, under a grove of oak 
and pine, Lee and Jackson, while their wearied soldiers 
slept around them, planned for the fourth and the last time 
the overthrow of the great army with which Lincoln still 
hoped to capture Richmond. At this council there was no 
difference of opinion. If Hooker had not retreated before 
the morning—and Jackson thought it possible he was 
already demoralised—he was to be attacked. The situation 
admitted of no other course. It was undoubtedly a 
hazardous operation for an inferior force to assault an 
intrenched position ; but the Federal army was divided, 
the right wing involved in a difficult and unexplored country, 
with which the Confederate generals and staff were more 
or less familiar, and an opportunity so favourable might 
never recur. ‘Fortune,’ says Napoleon, ‘is a woman, who 
must be wooed while she is in the mood. If her favours 
are rejected, she does not offer them again.’ The only 
question was where the attack should be delivered. Lee 
himself had reconnoitred the enemy’s left. It was very 
strong, resting on the Rappahannock, and covered by a 


430 STONEWALL JACKSON 


stream called Mineral Spring Run. Two of Jackson’s staff 
officers had reconnoitred the front, and had pronounced 
it impregnable, except at a fearful sacrifice of life. But 
while the generals were debating, Stuart rode in with the 
reports of his cavalry officers, and the weak point of the 
position was at once revealed. General Fitzhugh Lee, to 
whose skill and activity the victory of Chancellorsville 
was in great part due, had discovered that the Federal 
right, on the plank road, was completely in the air; that 
is, it was protected by no natural obstacle, and the breast- 
works faced south, and south only. It was evident that 
attack from the west or north-west was not anticipated, 
and Lee at once seized upon the chance of effecting a sur- 
prise. 

Yet the difficulties of the proposed operation were very 
creat. To transfer a turning column to a point from 
which the Federal right might be effectively outflanked 
necessitated a long march by the narrow and intricate 
roadways of the Wilderness, and a division of the Con- 
federate army into two parts, between which communication 
would be most precarious. To take advantage of the 
opportunity the first rule of war must be violated. But as 
it has already been said, the rules of war only point out 
the dangers which are incurred by breaking them; and, in 
this case, before an enemy on the defensive from whom 
the separation might be concealed until it is too late for 
him to intervene, the risks of dispersion were much reduced. 
The chief danger lay in this, that the two wings, each left to 
its own resources, might fail to act in combination, just as 
within the past twenty-four hours Hooker and Sedgwick 
had failed. But Lee knew that in Jackson he possessed 
a lieutenant whose resolution was invincible, and that the 
turning column, if entrusted to his charge, would be pushed 
forward without stop or stay until it had either joined 
hands with the main body, or had been annihilated. 

Moreover, the battle of Fredericksburg had taught both 
armies that the elaborate constructions of the engineer are 
not the only or the most useful resources of fortification. 
Hooker had ordered his position to be intrenched in the hope 


+ 


THE LAST COUNCIL 43] 


that Lee and Jackson, following Burnside’s example, would 
dash their divisions into fragments against them and thus 
become an easy prey. Lee, with a broader appreciation of 
the true tactical bearing of ditch and parapet, determined 
to employ them as a shelter for his own force until Jackson’s 
movement was completed, and the time had come for a 
general advance. Orders were at once sent to General 
McLaws to cover his front, extending across the pike and 
the plank roads, with a line of breastworks ; and long before 
daylight the soldiers of his division, with the scanty means 
at their disposal, were busy as beavers amongst the timber. 
It only remained, then, to determine the route and the 
strength of the outflanking force; and here it may be 
observed that the headquarters staff appears to have 
neglected certain precautions for which there had been 
ample leisure. So long ago as March 19 a council of war 
had decided that if Hooker attacked he would do so by the 
upper fords, and yet the Wilderness, lying immediately 
south of the points of passage, had not been adequately 
examined. Had Jackson been on the left wing above 
Fredericksburg, instead of on the right, near Hamilton’s 
Crossing, we may be certain that accurate surveys would 
have been forthcoming. As it was, the charts furnished to 
the Commander-in-Chief were untrustworthy, and informa- 
tion had to be sought from the country-people. 
‘About daylight on May 2,’ says Major Hotchkiss, 
‘General Jackson awakened me, and requested that I 
May 2. would at once go down to Catherine Furnace, 
2.30 4M. which is quite near, and where a Colonel Welford 
lived, and ascertain if there was any road by which we could 
secretly pass round Chancellorsville to the vicinity of Old 
Wilderness Tavern. I had a map, which our engineers had 
prepared from actual surveys, of the surrounding country, 
showing all the public roads, but with few details of the 
intermediate topography. Reaching Mr. Welford’s, I 
aroused him from his bed, and soon learned that he him- 
self had recently opened a road through the woods in that 
direction for the purpose of hauling cord-wood and iron ore 
to his furnace. This | located on the map, and having 


St manip arneves Lee, ps asyr 


439 STONEWALL JACKSON 


asked Mr. Welford if he would act as a guide if it became 
necessary to march over that road, I returned to head- 
330 au, duarters. When I reached those I found Generals 
“~ "Tee and Jackson in conference, each seated on a 
cracker box, from a pile which had been left there by the 
Federals the day before. In response to General Jackson’s 
request for my report, I put another cracker box between 
the two generals, on which I spread the map, showed them 
the road I had ascertained, and indicated, so far as I knew 
it, the position of the Federal army. General Lee then 
said, ‘‘General Jackson, what do you propose to do?” 
He replied, ‘‘Go around here,”’ moving his finger over the 
road which I had located upon the map. General Lee 
said, ‘“What do you propose to make this movement 
with?” ‘With my whole corps,” was the answer. 
General Lee then asked, ‘‘What will you leave me?” 
‘‘The divisions of Anderson and McLaws,” said Jackson. 
General Lee, after a moment’s reflection, remarked, “* Well, 
go on,’ and then, pencil in hand, gave his last in- 
structions. Jackson, with an eager smile upon his face, 
from time to time nodded assent, and when the Com- 
mander-in-Chief ended with the words, ‘‘ General Stuart 
will cover your movement with his cavalry,” he rose and 
saluted, saying, “‘ My troops will move at once, sir.’ ”! 
The necessary orders were forthwith dispatched. The 
trains, parked in open fields to the rear, were to move to 
Todd’s Tavern, and thence westward by interior roads ; 
the Second Army Corps was to march in one column, 
Rodes’ division in front, and A. P. Hill’s in rear; the First 
Virginia Cavalry, with whom was Fitzhugh Lee, covered 
the front; squadrons of the 2nd, the 3rd, and the 5th were 
on the right; Hotchkiss, accompanied by a squad of 
couriers, was to send back constant reports to General Lee ; 
the commanding officers were impressed with the im- 
portance of celerity and secrecy; the ranks were to be kept 
well closed up, and all stragglers were to be bayoneted. 


1 Letter to the author. A letter of General Lee to Mrs. Jackson, which 
contains a reference to this council of war, appears as a Note at the end of 
the chapter. 


THE FLANK MARCH 433 


The day had broken without a cloud, and as the troops 
began their march in the fresh May morning, the green 
vistas of the Wilderness, grass under foot, and thick foliage 

45au, Overhead, were dappled with sunshine. The men, 
comprehending intuitively that a daring and de- 
cisive movement was in progress, pressed rapidly forward, 
and General Lee, standing by the roadside to watch them 
pass, saw in their confident bearing the presage of success. 
Soon after the first regiments had gone by Jackson himself 
appeared at the head of his staff. Opposite to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief he drew rein, and the two conversed for afew 
moments. ‘Then Jackson rode on, pointing in the direction 
in which his troops were moving. ‘ His face,’ says an eye- 
witness, ‘was a little flushed, as it was turned to General 
Lee, who nodded approval of what he said.’ Such was 
the last interview between Lee and Jackson. 

Then, during four long hours, for the column covered at 
least ten miles, the flood of bright rifles and tattered uniforms 
swept with steady flow down the forest track. The artillery 
followed, the guns drawn by lean and wiry horses, and the 
ammunition waggons and ambulances brought up the rear. 
In front was a regiment of cavalry, the 5th Virginia, accom- 
panied by General Fitzhugh Lee; on the flanks were some 
ten squadrons, moving by the tracks nearest the enemy’s 
outposts; a regiment of infantry, the 23rd Georgia, was 
posted at the cross-roads near Catherine Furnace ; and the 
plank road was well guarded until Anderson’s troops came 
up to relieve the rear brigades of the Second Army Corps. 

Meanwhile, acting under the immediate orders of 
General Lee, and most skilfully handled by McLaws and 
Anderson, the 10,000 Confederates who had been left in 
position opposite the Federal masses kept up a brisk 
demonstration. Artillery was brought up to every point 
along the front which offered space for action ; skirmishers, 
covered by the timber, engaged the enemy’s pickets, and 
maintained a constant fire, and both on the pike and the 
river road the lines of battle, disposed so as to give an 
impression of great strength, threatened instant assault. 
Despite all precautions, however, Jackson’s movement did 


434 STONEWALL JACKSON 


not escape the notice of the Federals. A mile north of 
Catherine Furnace the eminence called Hazel Grove, clear 
of timber, looked down the valley of the Lewis Creek, and 
as early as 8 a.m. General Birney, commanding 
the Federal division at this point, reported the 
passage of a long column across his front. 

The indications, however, were deceptive. At first, it 
is probable, the movement seemed merely a prolongation 
of the Confederate front; but it soon received a different 
interpretation. The road at the point where Jackson’s 
column was observed turned due south; it was noticed that 
the troops were followed by their waggons, and that they 
were turning their backs on the Federal lines. Hooker, when 
hereceived Birney’sreport, jumped tothe conclusion that Lee, 
finding the directroad to Richmond, through Bowling Green, 
threatened by Sedgwick, was retreating on Gordons- 
ville. About 11 a.m. a battery was ordered into 
action on the Hazel Grove heights. The fire caused some 
confusion in the Confederate ranks ; the trains were forced: 
on to another road ; and shortly after noon, General Sickles, 
commanding the Third Army Corps, was permitted by 
Hooker to advance upon Catherine Furnace and 
to develop the situation. Birney’s division moved 
forward, and Whipple’s soon followed. This attack, which 
threatened to cut the Confederate army in two, was so 
vigorously opposed by Anderson’s division astride the plank 
road and by the 23rd Georgia at the Furnace, that General 
Sickles was constrained to call for reinforcements. Barlow’s 
brigade, which had hitherto formed the reserve of the 
Eleventh Corps, holding the extreme right of the Federal 
line, the flank at which Jackson was aiming, was sent to 
his assistance. Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade followed. 
Sickles’ movement, even before the fresh troops arrived, 
had met with some success. The 28rd Georgia, driven back 
to the unfinished railroad and surrounded, lost 300 officers 
and men. But word had been sent to Jackson’s column, 
and Colonel Brown’s artillery battalion, together with 
the brigades of Archer and Thomas, rapidly retracing 
their steps, checked the advance in front, while Anderson, 


8 A.M. 


11 A.M. 


12.15 p.m. 


THE FLANK MARCH 435 


manceuvring his troops with vigour, struck heavily against 
the flank. Jackson’s train, thus effectively protected, 
passed the dangerous point in safety, and then Archer and 
Thomas, leaving Anderson to deal with Sickles, drew off 
and pursued their march. 

These operations, conducted for the most part in blind 
thickets, consumed much time, and Jackson was already 
far in advance. Moving in a south-westerly direction, he 
had struck the Brock road, a narrow track which runs nearly 
due north, and crosses both the plank road and the pike at 
a point about two miles west of the Federal right flank. 
The Brock road, which, had Stoneman’s three divisions of 
cavalry been present with the Federal army, would have 
been strongly held, was absolutely free and unobstructed. 
Since the previous evening Fitzhugh Lee’s patrol had 
remained in close touch with the enemy’s outposts, and no 
attempt had been made to drive them in. So with no further 
obstacle than the heat the Second Army Corps pressed on. 
Away to the right, echoing faintly through the Wilderness, 
came the sound of cannon and the roll of musketry ; couriers 
from the rear, galloping at top speed, reported that the trains 
had been attacked, that the rear brigades had turned back 
to save them, and that the enemy, in heavy strength, had 
already filled the gap which divided the Confederate wings. 
But, though the army was cut in two, Jackson east no look 
behind him. The battle at the Furnace made no more 
impression on him than if it was being waged on the 
Mississippi. He had his orders to execute; and above 
all, he was moving at his best speed towards the enemy’s 
weak point. He knew—and none better—that Hooker 
would not long retain the initiative; that every man 
detached from the Federal centre made his own chances of 
success the more certain; and trusting implicitly in Lee’s 
ability to stave off defeat, he rode northwards with. re- 
doubled assurance of decisive victory. Forward was the 
cry, and though the heat was stifling, and the dust, rising 
from the deep ruts on the unmetalled road, rose in 
dense clouds beneath the trees, and men dropped fainting 

VOL. II. HH 


436 STONEWALL JACKSON 


in the ranks, the great column pushed on without a 
check.! 

About 2 2.m., as the rear brigades, Archer and Thomas, 
after checking Sickles, were just leaving Welford’s House, 
some six miles distant, Jackson himself had reached 
the plank road, the point where he intended to 
turn eastward against the Federal flank. Here he was 
met by Fitzhugh Lee, conveying most important and sur- 
prising information. 

The cavalry regiment had halted when it arrived on 
the plank road; all was reported quiet at the front; the 
patrols were moving northward, and, attended by a staff 
officer, the young brigadier had ridden towards the turn- 
pike. The path they followed led to a wide clearing at the 
summit of a hill, from which there was a view eastward as 
far as Dowdall’s Tavern. Below, and but a few hundred 
yards distant, ran the Federal breastworks, with abattis in 
front and long lines of stacked arms in rear; but untenanted 
by a single company. Two cannon were seen upon the high- 
road, the horses grazing quietly near at hand. The soldiers 
were scattered in small groups, laughing, cooking, smoking, 
sleeping, and playing cards, while others were butchering 
cattle and drawing rations. What followed is best told in 
General Fitzhugh Lee’s own words. 

‘I rode back and met Jackson. ‘‘ General,” said I, ‘if 
you will ride with me, halting your columns here, out of 
sight, I will show you the great advantage of attacking 
down the old turnpike instead of the plank road, the 
enemy’s lines being taken in reverse. Bring only one 
courier, as you will be in view from the top of the hill.” 
Jackson assented. When we reached the eminence the 
picture below was still unchanged, and I watched him 
closely as he gazed on Howard’s troops. His expression 
was one of intense interest. His eyes burnt with a 
brilliant glow, and his face was slightly flushed, radiant at 
the success of his flank movement. To the remarks made 
to him while the unconscious line of blue was pointed out 


2-P.M. 


' There were three halts during the march of fourteen miles. Letter 
‘from Major Hotchkiss. 


FITZHUGH LEE 437 


he made no reply, and yet during the five minutes he was 
on the hill his lips were moving. ‘Tell General Rodes,” 

he said, suddenly turning his horse towards the courier, 
*‘to move across the plank road, and halt when he gets 

to the old turnpike. I will join him there.’”’ One more 

a at the Federal lines, and he rode rapidly down the 
ill.’ 

The cavalry, supported by the Stonewall Brigade, was 
immediately placed a short distance down the plank road, 
in order to mask the march of the column. At 4 p.m. 

dpm, odes was on the turnpike. Passing down it for 

“about a mile, in the direction of the enemy’s 
position, the troops were ordered to halt and form for battle. 
Not a shot had been fired. <A few hostile patrols had been 
observed, but along the line of breastworks, watched closely 
by the cavalry, the Federal troops, still in the most careless 
security, were preparing their evening meal. Jackson, 
meanwhile, seated on a stump near the Brock road, had 
penned his last dispatch to General Lee. 


‘Near 3 p.m. May 2, 1863. 


‘General,—The enemy has made a stand at Chancellor’s,! 
which is about two miles from Chancellorsville. I hope as 
soon as practicable to attack. I trust that an ever-kind 
Providence will bless us with great success. 

‘ Respectfully, 
‘T. J. Jackson, Lieutenant-General. 


‘The leading division is up, and the next two appear to 
be well closed. 
+The vale 


‘General R. E. Lee.’ 


25,000 men were now deploying in the forest within a 
mile of the Federal works, overlapping them both to north 
and south, and not a single general in the Northern army 
appears to have suspected their presence. The day had 
passed quietly at Chancellorsville. At a very early hour in 


1 Melzi Chancellor’s house; otherwise Dowdall’s Tavern. 
HH 2 


438 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the morning Hooker, anticipating a vigorous attack, had 
ordered the First Army Corps, which had hitherto been 
acting with Sedgwick below Fredericksburg, to recross the 
Rappahannock and march to Chancellorsville. Averell’s 
division of cavalry, also, which had been engaged near 
Orange Court House with W. H. F. Lee’s two regiments, 
was instructed about the same time to rejoin the army as 
soon as possible, and was now marching by the left bank 
of the Rapidan to Ely’s Ford. Anticipating, therefore, 
that he would soon be strongly reinforced, Hooker betrayed 
no uneasiness. Shortly after dawn he had ridden round 
his lines. Expecting at that time to be attacked in front 
only, he had no fault to find with their location or 
construction. ‘As he looked over the barricades,’ says 
General Howard, ‘while receiving the cheers and salutes 
of the men, he said to me, ‘‘ How strong! how strong!” 
When the news came that a Confederate column was 
marching westward past Catherine Furnace, his attention, 
for the moment, was attracted to his right. At 10 a.m. he 
was still uncertain as to the meaning of Jackson’s move- 
ment. As the hours went by, however, and Jackson’s 
column disappeared in the forest, he again grew confident ; 
the generals were informed that Lee was in full retreat 
towards Gordonsville, and a little later Sedgwick received 
the following : 


‘ Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863, 4.10 p.m. 


‘General Butterfield,—The Major-General Commanding 
directs that General Sedgwick cross the river (sic) as soon 
as indications will permit,! capture Fredericksburg with 
everything in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We 
know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains. 
Two of Sickles’ divisions are among them. 

‘J. H. Van Aen, 
‘ Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.’ 


‘(Copy from Butterfield, at Falmouth, to Sedgwick, 
5.50 P.M.).’ 


1 Sedgwick had crossed the river on April 29 and 30, 


THE FEDERAL POSITION 439 


At 4 o’clock, therefore, the moment Jackson’s vanguard 
reached the old turnpike near Luckett’s Farm, Hooker 
believed that all danger of a flank attack had passed away. 
His left wing was under orders to advance, as soon as a 
swamp to the front could be ‘ corduroyed,’ and strike Lee in 
flank; whiletoreinforce Sickles, ‘among the enemy’s trains,’ 
Williams’ division of the Twelfth Corps was ‘sent forward 
from the centre, Howard’s reserve brigade (Barlow’s) from 
the right, and Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade from Hazel 
Grove. 

The officers in charge of the Federal right appear to 
have been as unsuspicious as their commander. During the 
morning some slight preparations were made to defend the 
turnpike from the westward; a shallow line of rifle-pits, 
with a few epaulements for artillery, had been constructed 
on a low ridge, commanding open fields, which runs north 
from Dowdall’s Tavern, and the wood beyond had been 
partially entangled. But this was all, and even when the 
only reserve of the Eleventh Army Corps, Barlow’s brigade, 
was sent to Sickles, it was not considered necessary to make 
any change in the disposition of the troops. The belief that 
Lee and Jackson were retreating had taken firm hold of 
every mind. ‘The pickets on the flank had indeed reported, 
from time to time, that infantry was massing in the thickets; 
and the Confederate cavalry, keeping just outside effective 
range, occupied every road and every clearing. Yet no 
attempt was made, by a strong reconnaissance in force, to 
ascertain what was actually going on within the forest ; 
and the reports of the scouts were held to be exagge- 
rated. 

The neglect was the more marked in that the position of 
the Eleventh Army Corps was very weak. Howard had with 
him twenty regiments of infantry and six batteries ; but 
his force was completely isolated. His extreme right, con- 
sisting of four German regiments, was posted in the forest, 
with two guns facing westward on the pike, and a line of 
intrenchments facing south. On the low hill eastward, 
where Talley’s Farm, a small wooden cottage, stood in the 
midst of a wide clearing, were two more German regiments 


440 STONEWALL JACKSON 


and two American. “Then, near the junction of the roads, 
intervened a patch of forest, which was occupied by four 
regiments, with a brigade upon their left; and beyond, 
nearly a mile wide from north to south, and five or six 
hundred yards in breadth, were the open fields round the 
little Wilderness Church, dipping at first to a shallow 
brook, and then rising gradually to a house called Dowdall’s 
Tavern. In these fields, south of the turnpike, were the 
breastworks held by the second division of the Kleventh 
Army Corps; and here were six regiments, with several 
batteries in close support. The 60th New York and 26th 
Wisconsin, near the Hawkins House at the north end of 
the fields, faced to the west; the remainder all faced south. 
Beyond Dowdall’s Tavern rose the forest, dark and impene- 
trable to the view ; but to the south-east, nearly two miles 
from Talley’s, the clearings of Hazel Grove were plainly 
visible. This part of the line, originally entrusted to 
General Sickles, was now unguarded, for two divisions of the 
Third Corps were moving on the Furnace; and the nearest - 
force which could render support to Howard’s was Berry’s 
division, retained in reserve north-east of Chancellorsville, 
three miles distant from Talley’s Farm and nearly two from 
Howard’s left. 

The Confederates, meanwhile, were rapidly forming for 
attack. Notwithstanding their fatigue, for many of the 
brigades had marched over fifteen miles, the men were in 
the highest spirits. A young staff-officer, who passed 
along the column, relates that he was everywhere re- 
cognised with the usual greetings. ‘Say, here’s one of 
old Jack’s little boys; let him by, boys!’ ‘Have a good 
breakfast this morning, sonny?’ ‘Better hurry up, or 
you'll catch it for gettin’ behind.’ ‘Tell old Jack we’re 
all a-comin’. Don’t let him begin the fuss till we get 
there!’ Buton reaching the turnpike orders were given 
that all noise should cease, and the troops, deploying for 
a mile or more on either side of the road, took up their 
formation for attack. In front were the skirmishers of 
Rodes’ division, under Major Blackford; four hundred 
yards in rear came the lines of battle, Rodes forming the 


THE ORDERS FOR ATTACK 44] 


first line ;! Colston, at two hundred yards distance, the 
second line; A. P. Hill, part in line and part in column, 
the third. In little more than an hour-and-a-half, notwith- 
standing the dense woods, the formation was completed, 
and the lines dressed at the proper angle to the road. 
Notwithstanding that the enemy might at any 
moment awake to their danger, not a single pre- 
caution was neglected. Jackson was determined that the 
troops should move forward in good order, and that every 
officer and man should know what was expected from him. 
Staff-officers had been stationed at various points to maintain 
communication between the divisions, and the divisional 
and brigade commanders had received their instructions. 
The whole force was to push resolutely forward through the 
forest. The open hill, about a thousand yards eastward, on 
which stood Talley’s Farm, was to be carried at all hazard, 
for, so far as could be ascertained, it commanded, over an 
intervening patch of forest, the ridge which ran north from 
Dowdall’s Tavern. After the capture of the heights at 
Talley’s, if the Federals showed a determined front on their 
second line, Rodes was to halt under cover until the artillery 
could come upanddislodgethem. Under no other circum- 
stances was there to be any pause in the advance. A 
brigade of the first line was detailed to guard the right 
flank, a regiment the left; and the second and third lines 
were ordered to support the first, whenever it might be 
necessary, without waiting for further instructions. The 
field hospital was established at the Old Wilderness 
Tavern. 

The men were in position, eagerly awaiting the signal ; 
their quick intelligence had already realised the situation, 
and all was life and animation. Across the narrow clearing 
stretched the long grey lines, penetrating far into the forest 
on either flank; in the centre, on the road, were four 

1 Rodes’ brigades were formed in the following order : 


5.45 p.m. 


SHR E METH e meme Heo Ore eee Ose eeseeD ESE SESE SHED ESE EES D 


: | Iverson O’Neal Doles 
Oolquitt 


Ramseur 


449 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Napoleon guns, the horses fretting with excitement; far 
to the rear, their rifles glistening under the long shafts of 
the setting sun, the heavy columns of A. P. Hill’s division 
were rapidly advancing, and the rumble of the artillery, 
closing to the front, grew louder and louder. Jackson, 
watch in hand, sat silent on ‘ Little Sorrel,’ his slouched 
hat drawn low over his eyes, and his lips tightly com- 
pressed. On his right was General Rodes, tall, lithe, and 
soldierly, and on Rodes’ right was Major Blackford. 

‘Are you ready, General Rodes?’ said Jackson. 

‘Yes, sir,’ said Rodes, impatient as his men. 

‘You can go forward, sir,’ said Jackson. 

A nod from Rodes was a sufficidnt order to Blackford, 
and the woods rang with the notes of a single bugle. 

6p, ack came the responses from bugles to right and 
“left, and the skirmishers, dashing through the 
wild undergrowth, sprang eagerly to their work, followed 
by the quick rush of the lines of battle. For a moment 
the troops seemed buried in the thickets; then, as the 
enemy’s sentries, completely taken by surprise, fired a few 
scattered shots, and the guns on the turnpike came quickly 
into action, the echoes waked; through the still air of the 
summer evening rang the rebel yell, filling the forest far 
to north and south, and the hearts of the astonished 
Federals, lying idly behind their breastworks, stood still 
within them. 

So rapid was the advance, so utterly unexpected the 
attack, that the pickets were at once over-run; and, 
crashing through the timber, driving before it the wild 
creatures of the forest, deer, and hares, and foxes, 
the broad front of the mighty torrent bore down upon 
Howard’s flank. For a few moments the four regiments 
which formed his right, supported by two guns, held 
staunchly together, and even checked for a brief space the 
advance of O’Neal’s brigade. But from the right and from 
the left the grey infantry swarmed round them ; the second 
line came surging forward to O’Neal’s assistance; the 
gunners were shot down and their pieces captured ; and in 
ten minutes the right brigade of the Federal army, sub- 


THE FIRST CHARGE 445 


merged by numbers, was flying in panic across the clearing. 
Here, near Talley’s Farm, on the fields south of the turn- 
pike and in the forest to the north, another brigade, hastily 
changing front, essayed to stay the rout. But Jackson’s 
horse-artillery, moving forward at a gallop, poured in 
canister at short range; and three brigades, O’Neal’s, 
Iverson’s, and Doles’, attacked the Northerners fiercely in 
front and flank. No troops, however brave, could have 
long withstood that overwhelming rush. ‘The slaughter 
was very great; every mounted officer was shot down, and 
in ten or fifteen minutes the fragments of these hapless regi- 
ments were retreating rapidly and tumultuously towards 
the Wilderness Church. 

The first position had been captured, but there was 
no pause in the attack. As Jackson, following the 
artillery, rode past Talley’s Farm, and gazed across the 
clearing to the east, he saw a sight which raised high his 
hopes of a decisive victory. Already, in the green corn- 
fields, the spoils of battle lay thick around him. Squads 
of prisoners were being hurried to the rear. Abandoned 
guns, and waggons overturned, the wounded horses still 
struggling in the traces, were surrounded by the dead and 
dying of Howard’s brigades. Knapsacks, piled in regular 
order, arms, blankets, accoutrements, lay in profusion near 
the breastworks; and beyond, under a rolling cloud of 
smoke and dust, the bare fields, sloping down to the brook, 
were covered with fugitives. Still further eastward, along 
the plank road, speeding in wild confusion towards Chancel- 
lorsville, was a dense mass of men and waggons; cattle, 
maddened with fright, were rushing to and fro, and on the 
ridge beyond the little church, pushing their way through 
the terror-stricken throng like ships through a heavy sea, or 
breaking into fragments before the pressure, the irregular 
lines of a few small regiments were moving hastily to the 
front. At more than one point on the edge of the distant 
woods guns were coming into action; the hill near Talley’s 
Farm was covered with projectiles; men were falling, and 
the Confederate first line was already in some confusion. 

Galloping up the turnpike, and urging the artillery for- 


444 STONEWALL JACKSON 


ward with voice and gesture, Jackson passed through the 
ranks of his eager infantry; and then Rodes’s division, 
rushing down the wooded slopes, burst from the covert, and, 
driving their flying foes before them, advanced against the 
trenches on the opposite ridge. Here and there the rush 
of the first ine was checked by the bold resistance of the 
German regiments. On the right, especially, progress was 
slow, for Colquitt’s brigade, drawn off by the pressure of 
Federal outposts in the woods to the south, had lost touch 
with the remainder of the division; Ramseur’s brigade in 
rear had been compelled to follow suit, and on this flank 
the Federals were most effectively supported by their 
artillery. But Iverson, O’Neal, and Doles, hardly halting to 
reform as they left the woods, and followed closely by the 
second line, swept rapidly across the fields, dashed back 
the regiments which sought to check them, and under a 
hot fire of grape and canister pressed resolutely forward. 
The rifle-pits on the ridge were occupied by the last 
brigade of Howard’s Army Corps. A battery was in rear, » 
three more were on the left, near Dowdall’s Tavern, and 
many of the fugitives from Talley’s Farm had rallied behind 
the breastwork. Buta few guns and four or five thousand 
rifles, although the ground to the front was clear and open, 
were powerless to arrest the rush of Jackson’s veterans. 
The long lines of colours, tossing redly above the swiftly 
moving ranks, never for a moment faltered; the men, 
running alternately to the front, delivered their fire, stopped 
for a moment to load, and then again ran on. Nearer 
and nearer they came, until the defenders of the trenches, 
already half demoralised, could mark through the smoke- 
drift the tanned faces, the fierce eyes, and the gleaming 
bayonets of their terrible foes. The guns were already 
flying, and the position was outflanked ; yet along the whole 
length of the ridge the parapets still blazed with fire; and 
while men fell headlong in the Confederate ranks, for a 
moment there was a check. But it was the check of a 
mighty wave, mounting slowly to full volume, ere it falls in 
thunder on the shrinking sands. Running to the front with 
uplifted swords, the officers gave the signal for the charge. 


HOOKER 445 


The men answered with a yell of triumph ; the second line, 
closing rapidly on the first, could no longer be restrained ; 
and as the grey masses, crowding together in their excite- 
ment, breasted the last slope, the Federal infantry, in every 
quarter of the field, gave way before them ; the ridge was 
abandoned, and through the dark pines beyond rolled the 
rout of the Eleventh Army Corps. 

It was seven o’clock. ‘Twilight was falling on the 
woods; and Rodes’ and Colston’s divisions had become so 
inextricably mingled that officers could not find 
their men nor men their officers. But Jackson, 
galloping into the disordered ranks, directed them to press 
the pursuit. His face was aglow with the blaze of batile. 
His swift gestures and curt orders, admitting of no question, 
betrayed the fierce intensity of his resolution. Although 
the great tract of forest, covering Chancellorsville on the 
west, had swallowed up the fugitives, he had no need of 
vision to reveal to him the extent of his success. 
10,000 men had been utterly defeated. The enemy’s 
right wing was scattered to the winds. The Southerners 
were within a mile-and-a-half of the Federals’ centre and 
completely in rear of their intrenchments; and the White 
House or Bullock road, only half-a-mile to the front, led 
directly to Hooker’s line of retreat by the United States 
Ford. Until that road was in his possession Jackson was 
determined to callno halt. The dense woods, the gathering 
darkness, the fatigue and disorder of his troops, he regarded 
no more than he did the enemy’s overwhelming numbers. 
In spirit he was standing at Hooker’s side, and he saw, as 
clearly as though the intervening woods had been swept 
away, the condition to which his adversary had been reduced. 

To the Federal headquarters confusion and dismay had 
come, indeed, with appalling suddenness. Late in the after- 
noon Hooker was sitting with two aides-de-camp inthe veran- 
dah of the Chancellor House. There were few troops in sight. 
The Third Corps and Pleasonton’s cavalry had long since 
disappeared in the forest. The Twelfth Army Corps, with 
the exception of two brigades, was already advancing against 
Anderson ; and only the trains and some artillery remained 


7 P.M. 


446 STONEWALL JACKSON 


within the intrenchments at Hazel Grove. All was going 
well. A desultory firing broke out at intervals to the east- 
ward, but it was not sustained ; and three miles to the south, 
where, as Hooker believed, in pursuit of Jackson, Sickles and 
Pleasonton were, the reports of their cannon, growing 
fainter and fainter as they pushed further south, betokened 
no more than a lively skirmish. The quiet of the Wilder- 
ness, save for those distant sounds, was undisturbed, and 
men and animals, free from all care, were enjoying the 
calm of the summer evening. It was about half-past 
six. Suddenly the cannonade swelled to a heavier roar, 
and the sound came from a new direction. All were 
listening intently, speculating on what this might mean, 
when a staff-officer, who had stepped out to the front 
of the house and was looking down the plank road with 
his glass, exclaimed: ‘My God, here they come!’ 
Hooker sprang upon his horse; and riding rapidly down 
the road, met the stragglers of the Hleventh Corps—men, 
waggons, and ambulances, an ever-increasing crowd— 
rushing in blind terror from the forest, flying they knew 
not whither. The whole of the right wing, they said, 
overwhelmed by superior numbers, was falling back on 
Chancellorsville, and Stonewall Jackson was in hot pursuit. 

The situation had changed in the twinkling of an eye. 
Just now congratulating himself on the complete success 
of his manceuvres, on the retreat of his enemies, on the 
flight of Jackson and the helplessness of Lee, Hooker 
saw his strong intrenchments taken in reverse, his army 
scattered, his reserves far distant, and the most dreaded of 
his opponents, followed by his victorious veterans, within a 
few hundred yards of his headquarters. His weak point had 
been found, and there were no troops at hand wherewith 
to restore the fight. The centre was held only by the two 
brigades of the Twelfth Corps at the Fairview Cemetery. 
The works at Hazel Grove were untenanted, save by a few 
batteries and a handful of infantry. The Second and Fifth 
Corps on the left were fully occupied by McLaws, for Lee, 
at the first sound of Jackson’s guns, had ordered a vigorous 
attack up the pike and the plank road. Sickles, with 


THE PURSUIT STAYED 447 


20,000 men, was far away, isolated and perhaps sur- 
rounded, and the line of retreat, the road to United States 
Ford, was absolutely unprotected. 

Messengers were despatched in hot haste to recall 
Sickles and Pleasonton to Hazel Grove. Berry’s division, 
forming the reserve north-east of the Chancellor House, was 
summoned to Fairview, and Hays’ brigade of the Second 
Corps ordered to support it. But what could three small 
brigades, hurried into position and unprotected by intrench- 
ments, avail against 25,000 Southerners, led by Stonewall 
Jackson, and animated by their easy victory ? If Berry and 
Hays could stand fast against the rush of fugitives, it was 
all that could be expected ; and as the uproar in the dark 
woods swelled to a deeper volume, and the yells of the Con- 
federates, mingled with the crash of the musketry, were 
borne to his ears, Hooker must have felt that all was lost. 
To make matters worse, as Pleasonton, hurrying back with 
his cavalry, arrived at Hazel Grove, the trains of the Third 
Army Corps, fired on by the Confederate skirmishers, dashed 
wildly across the clearing, swept through the parked artillery, 
and, breaking through the forest, increased the fearful 
tumult which reigned round Chancellorsville. 

The gunners, however, with a courage beyond all 
praise, stood staunchly to their pieces; and soon a long 
line of artillery, for which two regiments of the Third 
Army Corps, coming up rapidly from the south, formed 
a sufficient escort, was established on this commanding 
hill. Other batteries, hitherto held in reserve, took post on 
the high ground at Fairview, a mile to the north-east, and, 
although Berry’s infantry were not yet in position, and 
the stream of broken troops was still pouring past, a strong 
front of fifty guns opposed the Confederate advance. 

But it was not the artillery that saved Hooker from 
irretrievable disaster... As they followed the remnants of 
the Eleventh Army Corps, the progress of Rodes and Colston 
had been far less rapid than when they stormed forward 


1 Lieutenant-Colonel Hamlin, the latest historian of Chancellorsville, 
has completely disposed of the legend that these fifty guns repulsed a des- 
perate attack on Hazel Grove. 


448 STONEWALL JACKSON 


past the Wilderness Church. A regiment of Federal cavalry, 
riding to Howard’s aid by a track from Hazel Grove to the 
plank road, was quickly swept aside ; but the deep darkness 
of the forest, the efforts of the officers to re-form the ranks, 
the barriers opposed by the tangled undergrowth, the diffi- 
culty of keeping the direction, brought a large portion of 
the troops to a standstill. At the junction of the White 
House road the order to halt was given, and although a 
number of men, pushing impetuously forward, seized a line 
of log breastworks which ran north-west through the timber 
below the Fairview heights, the pursuit was stayed in the 
midst of the dense thickets. 

At this moment, shortly after eight o’clock, Jackson was 
at Dowdall’s Tavern. The reports from the front 
informed him that his first and second lines had 
halted ; General Rodes, who had galloped up the plank 
road to reconnoitre, sent in word that there were no 
Federal troops to be seen between his line and the Fairview 
heights; and Colonel Cobb, of the 44th Virginia, brought 
the news that the strong intrenchments, less than a mile 
from Chancellorsville, had been occupied without resistance. 

There was a lull in the battle; the firing had died 
away, and the excited troops, with a clamour that was 
heard in the Federal lines, sought their companies and 
regiments by the dim light of the rising moon. But 
deeming that nothing was done while aught remained to 
do, Jackson was already planning a further movement. 
Sending instructions to A. P. Hill to relieve Rodes and 
Colston, and to prepare for a night attack, he rode for- 
ward, almost unattended, amongst his rallying troops, and 
lent his aid to the efforts of the regimental officers. Intent 
on bringing up the two divisions in close support of Hill, 
he passed from one regiment to another. Turning to 
Colonel Cobb, he said to him: ‘Find General Rodes, and 
tell him to occupy the barricade! at once,’ and then 
added: ‘Ineed your help for atime; this disorder must be 
corrected. As you go along the right, tell the troops from 
me to get into line and preserve their order.’ 

' In the woods west of the Fairview Heights, 


8.15 p.m. 


HIS ORDERS TO A. P. HILL 449 


It was long, however, before the men could be as- 
sembled, and the delay was increased by an unfortunate 
incident. Jackson’s chief of artillery, pressing forward up 
the plank road to within a thousand yards of Chancellorsville, 
opened fire with three guns upon the enemy’s position. 
This audacious proceeding evoked a quick reply. Such 
Federal guns as could be brought to bear were at once 
turned upon the road, and although the damage done was 
small, A. P. Hill’s brigades, just coming up into line, were 
for the moment checked; under the hail of shell and 
canister the artillery horses became unmanageable, the 
drivers lost their nerve, and as they rushed to the rear 
some of the infantry joined them, and a stampede was only 
prevented by the personal efforts of Jackson, Colston, and 
their staff-officers. Colonel Crutchfield was then ordered to 
cease firing; the Federals did the same; and A. P. Hill’s 
brigades, that of General Lane leading, advanced to the 
deserted breastworks, while two brigades, one from Rodes’ 
division and one from Colston’s, were ordered to guard the 
roads from Hazel Grove. 

These arrangements made, Jackson proceeded to join 
his advanced line. {At the point where the track to the 
White House and United States ford strikes 
the plank road he met General Lane, seeking his 
instructions for the attack. They were sufficiently brief: 
‘Push right ahead, Lane; right ahead!’ As Lane galloped 
off to his command, General Hill and some of his staff 
came up, and Jackson gave Hill his orders. ‘ Press them; 
cut them off from the United States Ford, Hill; press 
them.’ General Hill replied that he was entirely unac- 
quainted with the topography of the country, and asked 
for an officer to act as guide. Jackson directed Captain 
Boswell, his chief engineer, to accompany General Hill, 
and then, turning to the front, rode up the plank road, 
passing quickly through the ranks of the 18th North Caro- 
lina of Lane’s brigade. Two or three hundred yards east- 
ward the general halted, for the ringing of axes and the words 
of command were distinctly audible in the enemy’s lines. 

While the Confederates were re-forming, Hooker’s 


8.45 P.M. 


450 STONEWALL JACKSON 


reserves had reached the front, and Berry’s regiments, on 
the Fairview heights, using their bayonets and tin-plates 
for intrenching tools, piling up the earth with their hands, 
and hacking down the brushwood with their knives, were 
endeavouring in desperate haste to provide some shelter, 
however slight, against the rush that they knew was about 
to come. 

After a few minutes, becoming impatient for the ad- 
vance of Hill’s division, Jackson turned and retraced his 
steps towards his own lines. ‘General,’ said an officer who 
was with him, ‘ you should not expose yourself so much.’ 
‘There is no danger, sir, the enemy is routed. Go back 
and tell General Hill to press on.’ 

Once more, when he was only sixty or eighty yards 
from where the 18th North Carolina were standing in the 
trees, he drew rein and listened—the whole party, generals, 
staff-officers, and couriers, hidden in the deep shadows of 
the silent woods. At this moment a single rifle-shot rang 
out with startling suddenness. 

A detachment of Federal infantry, groping their way 
through the thickets, had approached the Southern lines. 

The skirmishers on both sides were now engaged, and 
the lines of battle in rear became keenly on the alert. 
Some mounted officers galloped hastily back to their 
commands. The sound startled the Confederate soldiers, 
and an officer of the 18th North Carolina, seeing a group of 
strange horsemen riding towards him through the darkness 
—for Jackson, hearing the firing, had turned back to his 
own lines—gave the order to fire. 

The volley was fearfully effective. Men and horses fell 
dead and dying on the narrow track. Jackson himself 
received three bullets, one in the right hand, and two in 
the left arm, cutting the main artery, and crushing the bone 
below the shoulder, and as the reins dropped upon his neck, 
‘ Little Sorrel,’ frantic with terror, plunged into the wood 
and rushed towards the Federal lines. An overhanging 
bough struck his rider violently in the face, tore off his cap, 
and nearly unhorsed him ; but recovering his seat, he man- 
aged to seize the bridle with his bleeding hand, and turned 


THE FATAL VOLLEY 451 


into the road. Here Captain Wilbourn, one of his staff- 
officers, succeeded in catching the reins ; and, as the horse 
stopped, Jackson leaned forward and fell into his arms. 
Captain Hotchkiss, who had just returned from a reconnais- 
sance, rode off to find Dr. McGuire, while Captain Wilbourn, 
with a small penknife, ripped up the sleeve of the wounded 
arm. As he was doing so, General Hill, who had himself 
been exposed to the fire of the North Carolinians, reached 
the scene, and, throwing himself from his horse, pulled off 
Jackson’s gauntlets, which were full of blood, and bandaged 
the shattered arm with a handkerchief. ‘ General,’ he said, 
‘are you much hurt?’ ‘I think lam,’ was the reply, ‘and 
all my wounds are from my own men. I believe my right 
arm is broken.’ 

To all questions put to him he answered in a perfectly 
calm and self-possessed tone, and, although he spoke no 
word of complaint, he was manifestly growing weaker. It 
seemed impossible to move him, and yet it was absolutely 
necessary that he should be carried to the rear. He was 
still in front of his own lines, and, even as Hill was speak- 
ing, two of the enemy’s skirmishers, emerging from the 
thicket, halted within a few paces of the little group. 
Hill, turning quietly to his escort, said, ‘Take charge of 
those men,’ and two orderlies, springing forward, seized 
the rifles of the astonished Federals. Lieutenant Morrison, 
Jackson’s aide-de-camp, who had gone down the road to 
reconnoitre, now reported that he had seen a section of 
artillery unlimbering close at hand. Hill gave orders that 
the general should be at once removed, and that no one 
should tell the men that he was wounded. Jackson, 
lying on Hill’s breast, opened his eyes, and said, ‘ Tell 
them simply that you have a wounded Confederate officer.’ 
Lieutenants Smith and Morrison, and Captain Leigh of 
Hill’s staff, now lifted him to his feet, and with their aid 
he walked a few steps through the trees. But hardly had 
they gained the road when the Federal batteries, along their 
whole front, opened a terrible fire of grape and canister. 
The storm of bullets, tearing through the foliage, was for- 
tunately directed too high, and the three young officers, 

vou. II. TI 


452 STONEWALL JACKSON 


laying the general down by the roadside, endeavoured to 
shield him by lying between him and the deadly hail. The 
earth round them was torn up by the shot, covering them 
with dust; boughs fell from the trees, and fire flashed from 
the flints and gravel of the roadway. Once Jackson 
attempted to rise ; but Smith threw his arm over him, hold- 
ing him down, and saying, ‘General, you must be still—it 
will cost you your life to rise.’ 

After a few minutes, however, the enemy’s gunners, 
changing from canister to shell, mercifully increased their 
range; and again, as the Confederate infantry came 
hurrying to the front, their wounded leader, supported by 
strong arms, was lifted to his feet. Anxious that the men 
should not recognise him, Jackson turned aside into the 
wood, and slowly and painfully dragged himself through 
the undergrowth. As he passed along, General Pender, 
whose brigade was then pushing forward, asked Smith 
who it was that was wounded. ‘A Confederate officer ’ 
was the reply ; but as they came nearer Pender, despite the 
darkness, saw that it was Jackson. Springing from his 
horse, he hurriedly expressed his regret, and added that 
his lines were so much disorganised by the enemy’s artillery 
that he feared it would be necessary to fall back. ‘ At this 
moment,’ says an eye-witness, ‘ the scene was a fearful one. 
The air seemed to be alive with the shriek of shells and the 
whistling of bullets ; horses riderless and mad with fright 
dashed in every direction; hundreds left the ranks and 
hurried to the rear, and the groans of the wounded and dying 
mingled with the wild shouts of others to be led again to 
the assault. Almost fainting as he was from loss of blood, 
desperately wounded, and in the midst of this awful uproar, 
Jackson’s heart was unshaken. The words of Pender 
seemed to rouse him to life. Pushing aside those who 
supported him, he raised himself to his full height, and 
answered feebly, but distinctly enough to be heard above 
the din, ‘You must hold your ground, General Pender ; 
you must hold out to the last, sir.’’’ 

His strength was now completely gone, and he asked 
to be allowed to lhe down. His staff-officers, however, 


REMOVAL FROM THE FIELD 453 


refused assent. The shells were still crashing through the 
forest, and a litter having been brought up by Captain 
Leigh, he was carried slowly towards Dowdall’s Tavern. 
But before they were free of the tangled wood, one of the 
stretcher-bearers, struck by a shot in the arm, let go the 
handle. Jackson fell violently to the ground on _ his 
wounded side. His agony must have been intense, and 
for the first time he was heard to groan. 

Smith sprang to his side, and as he raised his head 
a bright beam of moonlight made its way through the 
thick foliage, and rested upon his white and lacerated face. 
The aide-de-camp was startled by its great pallor and still- 
ness, and cried out, ‘General, are youseriously hurt?’ ‘No, 
Mr. Smith, don’t trouble yourself about me,’ he replied 
quietly, and added some words about winning the battle 
first, and attending to the wounded afterwards. He was 
again placed upon the litter, and carried a few hundred 
yards, still followed by the Federal shells, to where his 
medical director was waiting with an ambulance. 

Dr. McGuire knelt down beside him and said, ‘I hope 
you are not badly hurt, General?’ He replied very calmly 
but feebly, ‘I am badly injured, doctor, I fear I am 
dying.’ After a pause he went on, ‘I am glad you 
have come. I think the wound in my shoulder is still 
bleeding.” The bandages were readjusted and he was 
lifted into the ambulance, where Colonel Crutchfield, who 
had also been seriously wounded, was already lying. 
Whisky and morphia were administered, and by the light 
of pine torches, carried by a few soldiers, he was slowly 
driven through the fields where Hooker’s right had so lately 
fled before his impetuous onset. All was done that could 
ease his sufferings, but some jolting of the ambulance over 
the rough road was unavoidable; ‘and yet,’ writes Dr. 
McGuire, ‘his uniform politeness did not forsake him 
even in these most trying circumstances. His complete 
control, too, over his mind, enfeebled as it was by loss of 
blood and pain, was wonderful. His suffering was intense ; 
his hands were cold, his skin clammy. But not a 
groan escaped him—not a sign of suffering, except the 

11 2 


454 STONEWALL JACKSON 


slight corrugation of the brow, the fixed, rigid face, the 
thin lips, so tightly compressed that the impression of the 
teeth could be seen through them. FEixcept these, he con- 
trolled by his iron will all evidence of emotion, and, more 
difficult than this even, he controlled that disposition to 
restlessness which many of us have observed upon the 
battle-field as attending great loss of blood. Nor was he 
forgetful of others. He expressed very feelingly his 
sympathy for Crutchfield, and once, when the latter groaned 
aloud, he directed the ambulance to stop, and requested 
me to see if something could not be done for his relief. 
‘After reaching the hospital, he was carried to a 
tent, and placed in bed, covered with blankets, and another 
drink of whisky and water given him. ‘Two hours and a 
half elapsed before sufficient reaction took place to warrant 
an examination, and at two o’clock on Sunday morning I 
informed him that chloroform would be given him; I told 
him also that amputation would probably be required, and 
asked, if it was found necessary, whether it should be 
done at once. He replied promptly, ‘“‘ Yes, certainly, 
Dr. McGuire, do for me whatever you think best.” 
‘Chloroform was then administered, and the left arm 
amputated about two inches below the shoulder. Through- 
out the whole of the operation, and until all the dressings 
were applied, he continued insensible. About half-past 
three, Colonel (then Major) Pendleton arrived at the 
hospital. He stated that General Hill had been wounded, 
and that the troops were in great disorder. General 
Stuart was in command, and had sent him to see the 
general. At first I declined to permit an interview, but 
Pendleton urged that the safety of the army and success 
of the cause depended upon his seeing him. When he en- 
tered the tent the general said, ‘‘ Well, Major, I am glad 
to see you; I thought you were killed.” Pendleton briefly 
explained the position of affairs, gave Stuart’s message, 
and asked what should be done. Jackson was at once 
interested, and asked in his quick way several questions. 
When they were answered, he remained silent, evidently 
trying to think; he contracted his brow, set his mouth, 


COUNTER ATTACK 455 


and for some moments lay obviously endeavouring to con- 
centrate his thoughts. For a moment we believed he 
had succeeded, for his nostrils dilated, and his eye flashed 
with its old fire, but it was only for a moment: his face re- 
laxed again, and presently he answered, very feebly and 
sadly: ‘I don’t know—I can’t tell; say to General 
Stuart he must do what he thinks best.’’ Soon after this 
he slept.’ 

So, leaving behind him, struggling vainly against the 
oppression of his mortal hurt, the one man who could 
have completed the Confederate victory, Pendleton rode 
wearily through the night. Jackson’s fall, at so critical a 
moment, just as the final blow was to be delivered, had 
proved a terrible disaster. Hill, who alone knew his inten- 
tion of moving to the White House, had been wounded by 
a fragment of shell as he rode back to lead his troops. 
Boswell, who had been ordered to point out the road, had 
been killed by the same volley which struck down his chief, 
and the subordinate generals, without instructions and 
without guides, with their men in disorder, and the 
enemy’s artillery playing fiercely on the forest, had hesi- 
tated to advance. Hill, remaining in a litter near the line 
of battle, had sent for Stuart. The cavalry commander, 
however, was at some distance from the field. Late 
in the evening, finding it impossible to employ his com- 
mand at the front, he had been detached by Jackson, 
a regiment of infantry supporting him, to take and hold 
Ely’s Ford. He had already arrived within view of a 
Federal camp established at that point, and was preparing 
to charge the enemy, under cover of the night, when Haill’s 
messenger recalled him. 

When Stuart reached the front he found the troops still 
halted, Rodes and Colston reforming on the open fields near 
Dowdall’s Tavern, the Light Division deployed within the 
forest, and the generals anxious for their own security. 

So far the attack had been completely successful, but 
Lee’s lack of strength prevented the full accomplishment 
of his design. Had Longstreet been present, with 
Pickett and Hood to lead his splendid infantry, the 


456 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Third Corps and the Twelfth would have been so hardly 
pressed that Chancellorsville, Hazel Grove, and the White 
House would have fallen an easy prize to Jackson’s 
bayonets. Anderson, with four small brigades, was 
powerless to hold the force confronting him, and marching 
rapidly northwards, Sickles had reached Hazel Grove before 
Jackson fell. Here Pleasonton, with his batteries, was 
still in position, and Hooker had not yet lost his head. 
As soon as Birney’s and Whipple’s divisions had come 
up, forming in columns of brigades behind the guns, 
Sickles was ordered to assail the enemy’s right flank and 
check his advance. Just before midnight the attack was 
made, in two lines of battle, supported by strong columns. 
The night was very clear and still; the moon, nearly full, 
threw enough light into the woods to facilitate the advance, 
and the tracks leading north-west served as lines of direction. 

The attack, however, although gallantly made, gained no 
material advantage. The preliminary movements were 
plainly audible to the Confederates, and Lane’s brigade; 
most of which was now south of the plank road, had 
made every preparation to receive it. Against troops 
lying down in the woods the Federal artillery, although 
fifty or sixty guns were in action, made but small impres- 
sion; and the dangers of a night attack, made upon troops 
who are expecting it, and whose moral is unaffected, were 
forcibly illustrated. ‘The confusion in the forest was very 
great; a portion of the assailing force, losing direction, 
fell foul of Berry’s division at the foot of the Fairview 
heights, which had not been informed of the movement, 
and at least two regiments, fired into from front and rear, 
broke up in panic. Some part of the log breastworks which 
Jackson’s advanced line had occupied were recaptured; but 
not a single one of the assailants, except as prisoners, 
reached the plank road. And yet the attack was an ex- 
ceedingly well-timed stroke, and as such, although the losses 
were heavy, had a very considerable effect on the issue of 
the day’s fighting. It showed, or seemed to show, that the 
Federals were still in good heart, that they were rapidly 
concentrating, and that the Confederates might be met by 


STUART 457 


vigorous counter-strokes. ‘The fact,’ said Stuart in his 
official dispatch, ‘that the attack was made, and at night, 
made me apprehensive of a repetition of it.’ 

So, while Jackson slept through the hours of darkness 
that should have seen the consummation of his enterprise, 
his soldiers lay beside their arms; and the Federals, digging, 
felling, and building, constructed a new line of parapet, pro- 
tected by abattis, and strengthened by along array of guns, 
on the slopes of Fairview and Hazel Grove. The respite 
which the fall of the Confederate leader had brought them 
was not neglected; the fast-spreading panic was stayed; 
the First Army Corps, rapidly crossing the Rappahan- 
nock, secured the road to the White House, and Averell’s 
division of cavalry reached Ely’s Ford. On the left, 
between Chancellorsville and the river, where a young 
Federal colonel, named Miles,' handled his troops with con- 
spicuous skill, Lee’s continuous attacks had been success- 
fully repulsed, and at dawn on the morning of May 8 the 
situation of the Union army was far from unpro- 

May 3. mising. A gap of nearly two miles intervened 
between the Confederate wings, and within this gap, on the 
commanding heights of Hazel Grove and Fairview, the 
Federals were strongly intrenched. An opportunity for 
dealing a crushing counterblow—for holding one portion of 
Lee’s army in check while the other was overwhelmed—ap- 
peared to present itself. The only question was whether the 
moral of the general and the men could be depended upon. 

In Stuart, however, Hooker had to deal with a soldier 
who was no unworthy successor of Stonewall Jackson. 
Reluctantly abandoning the idea of a night attack, the 
cavalry general, fully alive to the exigencies of the situa- 
tion, had determined to reduce the interval between him- 
self and Lee; and during the night the artillery was 
brought up to the front, and the batteries deployed 
wherever they could find room. Just before the darkness 
began to lift, orders were received from Lee that the assault 
was to be made as early as possible; and the right wing, 
swinging round in order to come abreast of the centre, 

1 Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, 1898. 


458 STONEWALL JACKSON 


became hotly engaged. Away to the south-east, across 
the hills held by the Federals, came the responding 
thunder of Lee’s guns; and 40,000 infantry, advancing 
through the woods against front and flank, enveloped in 
_acirele of fire a stronghold which was held by over 60,000 
muskets. 

It is unnecessary to describe minutely the events of the 
morning. The Federal troops, such as were brought into 
action, fought well; but Jackson’s tremendous attack had 
already defeated Hooker. Before Sickles made his night 
attack from Hazel Grove he had sent orders for Sedgwick 
to move at once, occupy Fredericksburg, seize the heights, 
and march westward by the plank road ; and, at the same 
time, he had instructed his engineers to select and fortify 
a position about a mile in rear of Chancellorsville. §o, 
when Stuart pressed forward, not only had this new position 
been occupied by the First and Fifth Army Corps, but the 
troops hitherto in possession of Hazel Grove were already 
evacuating their intrenchments. 

These dispositions sufficiently attest the demoralisation 
of the Federal commander. As the historian of the Army 
of the Potomac puts it: ‘ The movement to be executed by 
Sedgwick was precisely one of those movements which, 
according as they are wrought out, may be either the 
height of wisdom or the height of folly. Its successful 
accomplishment certainly promised very brilliant results. 
It is easy to see how seriously Lee’s safety would be com- 
promised if, while engaged with Hooker in front, he should 
suddenly find a powerful force assailing his rear, and grasp- 
ing already his direct line of communication with Rich- 
mond. But if, on the other hand, Lee should be able by 
any slackness on the part of his opponent to engage him 
in front with a part of his force, while he should turn 
swiftly round to assail the isolated moving column, it is 
obvious that he would be able to repulse or destroy that 
column, and then by a vigorous return, meet or attack his 
antagonist’s main body. In the successful execution of 
this plan not only was Sedgwick bound to the most ener- 
getic action, but Hooker also was engaged by every con- 


THE FEDERAL TACTICS 459 


sideration of honour and duty to so act as to make the 
dangerous task he had assigned to Sedgwick possible.”! 

But so far from aiding his subordinate by a heavy 
counter-attack on Lee’s front, Hooker deliberately aban- 
doned the Hazel Grove salient, which, keeping asunder the 
Confederate wings, strongly facilitated such a manceuvre ; 
and more than this, he divided his own army into two 
portions, of which the rear, occupying the new position, 
was actually forbidden to reinforce the front. 

It is possible that Hooker contemplated an early retreat 
of his whole force to the second position. If so, Lee and 
Stuart were too quick for him. The cavalry commander, 
as soon as it became light, and the hills and undulations 
of the Wilderness emerged from the shadows, immediately 
recognised the importance of Hazel Grove. The hill was 
quickly seized; thirty pieces of artillery, established on the 
crest, enfiladed the Federal batteries, facing west, on the 
heights of Fairview ; and the brigade on Stuart’s extreme 
right was soon in touch with the troops directed by General 
Lee. Then against the three sides of the Federal position 
the battle raged. From the south and south-east came 
Anderson and McLaws, the batteries unlimbering on 
every eminence, and the infantry, hitherto held back, 
attacking with the vigour which their gallant commanders 
knew so well how to inspire. And from the west, formed 
in three lines, Hill’s division to the front, came the Second 
Army Corps. The men knew by this time that the leader 
whom they trusted beyond all others had been struck down, 
that he was lying wounded, helpless, far away in rear. 
Yet his spirit was still with them. Stuart, galloping 
along the ranks, recalled him with ringing words to their 
memories, and as the bugles sounded the onset, it was 
with a cry of ‘Remember Jackson!’ that his soldiers 
rushed fiercely upon the Federal breastworks. 

The advanced line, within the forest, was taken at the 
first rush ; the second, at the foot of the Fairview heights, 
protected by a swampy stream, a broad belt of abattis, and 


’ Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, pp. 241-2. 


460 STONEWALL JACKSON 


with thirty guns on the hill behind, proved far more formid- 
able, and Hill’s division was forced back. But Rodes and 
Colston were in close support. The fight was speedily 
renewed ; and then came charge and counter-charge; the 
storm of the parapets; the rally of the defenders; the rush 
with the bayonet; and mowing down men like grass, the 
fearful sweep of case and canister. Twice the Confederates 
were repulsed. Twice they reformed, brigade mingled with 
brigade, regiment with regiment, and charged again in the 
teeth of the thirty guns. 

On both sides ammunition began to fail; the brush- 
wood took fire, the ground became hot beneath the foot, 
and many wounded perished miserably in the flames. Yet 
still, with the tangled abattis dividing the opposing lines, 
the fight went on; both sides struggling fiercely, the 
Federals with the advantage of position, the Confederates 
of numbers, for Hooker refused to reinforce his gallant 
troops. At length the guns which Stuart had established 
on Hazel Grove, crossing their fire with those of McLaws 
and Anderson, gained the upper hand over the Union 
batteries. The storm of shell, sweeping the Fairview 
plateau, took the breastworks in reverse; the Northern 
infantry, after five hours of such hot battle as few fields 
have witnessed, began sullenly to yield, and as Stuart, 
leading the last charge, leapt his horse over the parapet, 
the works were evacuated, and the tattered colours of the 
Confederates waved in triumph on the hill. 

‘The scene,’ says a staff-officer, ‘can never be effaced 
from the minds of those that witnessed it. The troops 
were pressing forward with all the ardour and enthusiasm 
of combat. The white smoke of musketry fringed the front 
of battle, while the artillery on the hills in rear shook the 
earth with its thunder and filled the air with the wild 
shrieking of the shells that plunged into the masses of the 
retreating foe. To add greater horror and sublimity to the 
scene, the Chancellorsville House and the woods surround- 
ing it were wrapped in flames. It was then that General 
Lee rode to the front of his advancing battalions. His 
presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable out- 


LEE’S VICTORY 461 


bursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who have 
not witnessed them. 

‘The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the 
smoke of battle, the wounded, crawling with feeble limbs 
from the fury of the devouring flames, all seemed possessed 
of a common impulse. One long, unbroken cheer, in 
which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth 
blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, 
hailed the presence of the victorious chief. 

‘His first care was for the wounded of both armies, and 
he was among the foremost at the burning mansion, where 
some of them lay. But at that moment, when the 
transports of his troops were drowning the roar of battle 
with acclamations, a note was brought to him from 
General Jackson. It was handed to him as he sat on 
his horse near the Chancellorsville House, and unable 
to open it with his gauntleted hands, he passed it to me 
with directions to read it to him. I shall never forget 
the look of pain and anguish that passed over his face 
as he listened. In a voice broken with emotion he bade 
me say to General Jackson that the victory was his. I 
do not know how others may regard this incident, but for 
myself, as I gave expression to the thoughts of his exalted 
mind, I forgot the genius that won the day in my reverence 
for the generosity that refused its glory.’ 

Lee’s reply ran :— 

‘General,—I have just received your note, informing 
me that you were wounded. I cannot express my regret 
at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, I should 
have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled in 
your stead. 

‘Tcongratulate you upon the victory, which is due to 
your skill and energy. 

‘Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
‘R. EH. Les, General.’ 

Such was the tribute, not the less valued that it was 
couched in no exaggerated terms, which was brought to 
the bedside in the quiet hospital. Jackson was almost 
alone. As the sound of cannon and musketry, borne across 


462 STONEWALL JACKSON 


the forest, grew gradually louder, he had ordered all those 
who had remained with him, except Mr. Smith, to return 
to the battle-field and attend to their different duties. — 

His side, injured by his fall from the litter, gave him 
much pain, but his thoughts were still clear, and his speech 
coherent. ‘General Lee,’ he said, when his aide-de-camp 
read to him the Commander-in-Chief’s brief words, ‘is very 
kind, but he should give the praise to God.’ 

During the day the pain gradually ceased; the general 
grew brighter, and from those who visited the hospital he 
inquired minutely about the battle and the troops engaged. 
When conspicuous instances of courage were related his 
face lit up with enthusiasm, and he uttered his usual ‘ Good, 
good,’ with unwonted energy when the gallant behaviour 
of his old command was alluded to. ‘Some day,’ he said, 
‘the men of that brigade will be proud to say to their 
children, ‘‘ I was one of the Stonewall Brigade.”’ He dis- 
claimed all right of his own to the name Stonewall: ¢ It 
belongs to the brigade and not to me.’ That night he 
slept well, and was free from pain. 

Meanwhile the Confederate army, resting on the 
heights of Chancellorsville, preparatory to an attack upon 
Hooker’s second stronghold, had received untoward news. 
Sedgwick, at eleven o’clock in the morning, had carried 
Marye’s Hill, and, driving Harly before him, was moving 
up the plank road. Wilcox’ brigade of Anderson’s division, 
then at Banks’ Ford, was ordered to retard the advance of 
the hostile column. McLaws was detached to Salem Church. 
The Second Army Corps and the rest of Anderson’s division 
remained to hold Hooker in check, and for the moment 
operations at Chancellorsville were suspended. 

McLaws, deploying his troops in the forest, two hundred 
and fifty yards from a wide expanse of cleared ground, 
pushed his skirmishers forward to the edge, and awaited 
the attack of a superior force. Reserving his fire to close 
quarters, its effect was fearful. But the Federals pushed 
forward ; a school-house occupied as an advanced post was 
captured, and at this point Sedgwick was within an ace of 
breaking through. His second line, however, had not yet 


THE FEDERALS RETREAT 463 


deployed, and a vigorous counterstroke, delivered by two 
brigades, drove back the whole of his leading division in 
great disorder. As night fell the Confederates, careful not 
to expose themselves to the Union reserves, retired to the 
forest, and Sedgwick, like Hooker, abandoned all further 
idea of offensive action. 
The next morning Lee himself, with the three remain- 
ing brigades of Anderson, arrived upon the scene. Sedg- 
May 4 wick, who had lost 5,000 men the preceding day, 
' had fortified a position covering Banks’ Ford, 
~ and occupied it with over 20,000 muskets. Lee, with the 
divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and Early, was slightly 
stronger. The attack was delayed, for the Federals held 
strong ground, difficult to reconnoitre; but once begun 
the issue was soon decided. Assailed in front and flanks, 
with no help coming from Hooker, and only a single bridge 
at Banks’ Ford in rear, the Federals rapidly gave ground. 
Darkness, however, intensified by a thick fog, made 
pursuit difficult, and Sedgwick re-crossed the river with 
many casualties but in good order. During these 
operations, that is, from four o’clock on Sunday afternoon 
until after midnight on Monday, Hooker had not moved a 
single man to his subordinate’s assistance.! So extra- 
ordinary a situation has seldom been seen in war: an 
army of 60,000 men, strongly fortified, was held in check for 
six-and-thirty hours by 20,000; while not seven miles 
away raged a battle on which the whole fate of the 
campaign depended. 
Lee and Jackson had made no false estimate of 
Hooker’s incapacity. Sedgwick’s army corps had suffered 
so severely in men and in moral that it was not available 
for immediate service, even had it been transferred to 
Chancellorsville; and Lee was now free to concentrate his 
whole force against the main body of the Federal army. 
His men, notwithstanding their extraordinary exertions, 
were confident of victory. ‘As I sheltered myself,’ says an 
1 Tt is but fair, however, to state that Hooker, during the cannonade 


which preceded the final assault at Chancellorsville, had been severely 
bruised by a fall of masonry. 


464 STONEWALL JACKSON 


eye-witness, ‘in a little farmhouse on the plank road 
vee the brigades of Anderson’s division came splash- 

Y°: ing through the mud, in wild tumultuous spirits, 
singing, shouting, jesting, heedless of soaking rags, drenched 
to the skin, and burning again to mingle in the mad 
revelry of battle.’1 But it was impossible to push forward, 
for a violent rain-storm burst upon the Wilderness, and the 
spongy soil, saturated with the deluge, absolutely precluded 
all movement across country. Hooker, who had already 
made preparations for retreat, took advantage of the 

May 6. weather, and as soon as darkness set in put his 

army in motion for the bridges. By eight o’clock 

on the morning of the 6th the whole force had crossed ; 

and when the Confederate patrols pushed forward, Lee 
found that his victim had escaped. 

The Army of the Potomac returned to its old camp on 
the hills above Fredericksburg, and Lee reoccupied his 
position on the opposite ridge. Stoneman, who had scoured 
the whole country to within a few miles of Richmond, 
returned to Kelly’s Ford on May 8. The raid had effected 
nothing. The damage done to the railroads and canals was 
repaired by the time the raiders had regained the Rap- 
pahannock. lLee’s operations at Chancellorsville had not 
been affected in the very slightest degree by their presence 
in his rear, while Stoneman’s absence had proved the ruin 
of the Federal army. Jackson, who had been removed by 
the Commander-in-Chief’s order to Mr. Chandler’s house, 
near Guiney’s Station, on the morning of May 5, was asked 
what he thought of Hooker’s plan of campaign. His reply 
was: ‘It was in the main a good conception, an excellent 
plan. But he should not have sent away his cavalry ; that 
was his great blunder. It was that which enabled me to 
turn him without his being aware of it, and to take him in 
the rear. Had he kept his cavalry with him, his plan 
would have been a very good one.’ This was not his only 
comment on the great battle. Among other things, he said 
that he intended to cut the Federals off from the United 
States Ford, and, taking a position between them and the 

1 Hon. Francis Lawley, the Times, June 16, 1863. 


COMMENTS 465 


river, oblige them to attack him, adding, with a smile, 
‘My men sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a 
position, but they always fail to drive us away.’ He 
spoke of General Rodes, and alluded in high terms to his 
splendid behaviour in the attack on Howard. He hoped 
he would be promoted, and he said that promotion should 
be made at once, upon the field, so as to act as an incentive 
to gallantry in others. He spoke of Colonel Willis, who 
had commanded the skirmishers, and praised him very 
highly, and referred most feelingly to the death of Paxton, 
the commander of the Stonewall Brigade, and of Captain 
Boswell, his chief engineer. Inspeaking of his own share 
in the victory he said: ‘Our movement was a great success ; 
I think the most successful military movement of my life. 
But I expect to receive far more credit for it than I 
deserve. Most men will think I planned it all from the 
first; but it was not so. I simply took advantage of cir- 
cumstances as they were presented to me in the provi- 
dence of God. I feel that His hand led me—let us give 
Him the glory.’ 

It must always be an interesting matter of speculation 
what the result would have been had Jackson accomplished 
his design, on the night he fell, of moving a large part of 
his command up the White House road, and barring the 
only line of retreat left open to the Federals. 

Hooker, it is argued, had two corps in position which 
had been hardly engaged, the Second and the Fifth; and 
another, the First, under Reynolds, was coming up. Of 
these, 25,000 men might possibly, could they have been 
manceuyred in the forest, have been sent to drive Jackson 
back. And, undoubtedly, tothose who think more of numbers 
than of human nature, of the momentum of the mass 
rather than the mental equilibrium of the general, the fact 
that a superior force of comparatively fresh troops was at 
Hooker’s disposal will be sufficient to put the success of 
the Confederates out of cour. Yet the question will 
always suggest itself, would not the report that a victorious 
enemy, of unknown strength, was pressing forward, in the 
darkness of the night, towards the only line of retreat, 


466 STONEWALL JACKSON 


have so demoralised the Federal commander and the 
Federal soldiers, already shaken by the overthrow of 
the Eleventh Army Corps, that they would have thought 
only of securing their own safety? Would Hooker, whose 
tactics the next day, after he had had the night given him 
in which to recover his senses, were so inadequate, have 
done better if he had received no respite? Would the sol- 
diers of the three army corps not yet engaged, who had 
been witnesses of the rout of Howard’s divisions, have 
fared better, when they heard the triumphant yells of 
the advancing Confederates, than the hapless Germans ? 
‘The wounding of Jackson,’ says a most careful historian 
of the battle, himself a participator in the Union disaster, 
‘was a most fortunate circumstance for the Army of 
the Potomac. At nine o’clock the capture or destruction 
of a large part of the army seemed inevitable. There was, 
at the time, great uncertainty and a feeling akin to panic 
prevailing among the Union forces round Chancellors- 
ville; and when we consider the position of the troops 
at this moment, and how many important battles 
have been won by trivial flank attacks—how Richepanse 
(attacking through the forest) with a single brigade ruined 
the Austrians at Hohenlinden—we must admit that the 
Northern army was in great peril when Jackson arrived 
within one thousand yards of its vital point (the White 
House) with 20,000 men and 50 cannon.’! He must be a 
great leader indeed who, when his flank is suddenly rolled 
up and his line of retreat threatened, preserves sufficient 
coolness to devise a general counterstroke. Jackson had 
proved himself equal to such a situation at Cedar Run, but 
it is seldom in these circumstances that Providence sides 
with the ‘big battalions.’ 

The Federal losses in the six days’ battles were heavy: 
over 12,000 at Chancellorsville, and 4,700 at Fredericks- 
burg, Salem Church, and Banks’ Ford; a total of 17,287. 
The army lost 18 guns, and nearly 6,000 officers and men 
were reported either captured or missing. 

The casualties were distributed as follows :— 

1 Chancellorsviile, Lt.-Colonel A. C. Hamlin. 


THE LOSSES 467 


First Army Corps . . : ‘ : #.4).\8 « 185 
Second : 5 ' F p : i » 1,925 
Third he ; : : : Ale . 4,119 
Fifth ‘3 ° i AO, oh : . : - 700 
Sixth 9 ’ : . . . ‘ . . 4,590 
Eleventh _,, i : : i : ? ‘ . 2,412 
Twelfth _,, ; : ‘ ; : ; . . 2,822 
Pleasonton’s Cavalry Brigade . : p . . 141 

16,844 


The Confederate losses were hardly less severe. The 
killed and wounded were as under :— 


SEconp Army Corps. 


A. P. Hill’s Division . : : ‘ ; ‘ « 2,583 
Rodes’ ae ‘ : ; : : : sien bass 
Colston’s s : ; F ; , . 1,868 
Early’s : ‘ ; : : . ‘ 851 
Anderson’s ,, F \ : ; : : . 1,180 
McLaws’ 4 3 : ‘ : : . 1,879 
Artillery . ; ‘ : ; 3 : ; Dae ey 
Cavalry : : : : : : : ey eae 11 
Prisoners (estimated) . ‘ ; ; - ; . 2,000- 

12,277 


But a mere statement of the casualties by no means re- 
presents the comparative loss of the opposing forces. Victory 
does not consist in merely killing and maiming a few thou- 
sand men. ‘This is the visible result; it is the invisible that 
tells. ‘The Army of the Potomac, when it retreated across 
the Rappahannock, was far stronger in mere numbers than 
the Army of Northern Virginia; but in reality it was far 
weaker, for the moral of the survivors, and of the general 
who led them, was terribly affected. That of the Con- 
federates, on the other hand, had been sensibly elevated, and 
it is moral, not numbers, which is the strength of armies. 
What, after all, was the loss of 12,200 soldiers to the Con- 
federacy? In that first week of May there were probably 
20,000 conscripts in different camps of instruction, more 
than enough to recruit the depleted regiments to fullstrength. 
Nor did the slaughter of Chancellorsville diminish to any 
appreciable degree the vast hosts of the Union. 

VOL. II. KK 


468 STONEWALL JACKSON 


And yet the Army of the Potomac had lost more than 
all the efforts of the Government could replace. The Army 
of Virginia, on the other hand, had acquired a superiority 
of spirit which was ample compensation for the sacrifice 
which had been made. Itis hardly too much to say that 
Lee’s force had gained from the victory an increase of 
strength equivalent to a whole army corps of 30,000 men, 
while that of his opponent had been proportionately 
diminished. Why, then, was there no pursuit ? 

It has been asserted that Lee was so crippled by his 
losses at Chancellorsville that he was unable to resume 
operations against Hooker for a whole month. This ex- 
planation of his inactivity can hardly be accepted. 

On June 16 and 18, 1815, at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo, 
the Anglo-Dutch army, little larger than that of Northern 
Virginia, lost 17,000 men; and yet on the 19th Wellington 
was marching in pursuit of the French; nor did he halt 
until he arrived within sight of Paris. And on August 28, 
29, and 80, 1862, at Groveton and the Second Manassas, — 
Stonewall Jackson lost 4,000 officers and men, one-fifth of 
his force, but he was not left in rear when Lee invaded 
Maryland. Moreover, after he had defeated Sedgwick, on 
the same night that Hooker was recrossing the Rappa- 
hannock, Lee was planning a final attack on the Federal 
intrenchments, and his disappointment was bitter when he 
learned that his enemy had escaped. If his men were 
capable of further efforts on the night of May 5, they were 
capable of them the next day; and it was neither the 
ravages of battle nor the disorganisation of the army that 
held the Confederates fast, but the deficiency of supplies, 
the damage done to the railways by Stoneman’s horsemen, 
the weakness of the cavalry, and, principally, the hesitation 
of the Government. After the victory of Chancellorsville, 
strong hopes of peace were entertained in the South. 
Before Hooker advanced, a large section of the Northern 
Democrats, despairing of ultimate success, had once more 
raised the cry that immediate separation was better than a 
hopeless contest, involving such awful sacrifices, and it 
needed all Lincoln’s strength to stem the tide of disaffection. . 


THE BATTLEFIELDS OF 
CHANCELLORSVILLE, SALEM CHURCH 
AND FREDERICKSBURG, 


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From Actual Surveys made immediately 4 hie JACKSON'S HEADOTRS. xe 
| after the Battle, by order of Gen. R.E. LEE. ° SAUNA, FO Be eens é 


Walker & Boutall se. 


THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 469 


The existence of this despondent feeling was well known to 
the Southern statesmen; and to such an extent did they 
count upon its growth and increase that they had over- 
looked altogether the importance of improving a victory, 
should the army be successful; so now, when the chance 
had come, they were neither ready to forward such an 
enterprise, nor could they make up their minds to depart 
from their passive attitude. But to postpone all idea of 
counterstroke until some indefinite period is as fatal in 
strategy as in tactics. By no means an uncommon policy, 
it has been responsible for the loss of a thousand oppor- 
tunities. 

Had not politics intervened, a vigorous pursuit—not 
necessarily involving an immediate attack, but drawing 
Hooker, as Pope had been drawn in the preceding August, 
into an unfavourable situation, before his army had had 
time to recover—would have probably been initiated. It 
may be questioned, however, whether General Lee, even 
when Longstreet and his divisions joined him, would have 
been so strong as he had been at the endof April. None felt 
more deeply than the Commander-in-Chief that the absence 
of Jackson was an irreparable misfortune. ‘Give him my 
affectionate regards,’ he said to an aide-de-camp who was 
riding to the hospital; ‘tell him to make haste and get 
well, and come back to me as soon as he can. He has lost 
his left arm, but I have lost my right.’ ‘Any victory,’ he 
wrote privately, ‘would be dear at such a price. I know 
not how to replace him.’ 

His words were prophetic. Hxactly two months after 
Chancellorsville the armies met once more in the clash of 
battle. During the first two days, on the rolling plain 
round Gettysburg, a village of Pennsylvania, four Federal 
army corps were beaten in succession, but ere the sun set 
on the third Lee had to admit defeat. 

And yet his soldiers had displayed the same fiery 
courage and stubborn versistence which had carried them 
victorious through the Wilderness. But his ‘right arm’ 
had not yet been replaced. ‘If,’ he said after the war, with 
unaccustomed emphasis, ‘I had had Jackson at Gettys- 

K K 2 


470 | S§TONEWALL JACKSON 


burg I should have won the battle, and a complete victory 
there would have resulted in the establishment of Southern 
independence.’ | 

It was not to be. Chancellorsville, where 180,000 men 
were defeated by 60,000, is up to a certain point as much 
the tactical masterpiece of the nineteenth century as was 
Leuthen of the eighteenth. But, splendid triumph as it 
was, the battle bore no abiding fruits, and the reason seems 
very clear. The voice that would have urged pursuit was 
silent. Jackson’s fall left Lee alone, bereft of his alter ego; 
with none, save Stuart, to whom he could entrust the 
execution of those daring and delicate manceuvres his 
inferior numbers rendered necessary ; with none on whose 
resource and energy he could implicitly rely. Who shall 
say how far his own resolution had been animated and 
confirmed at other crises by the prompting and presence 
of the kindred spirit? ‘They supplemented each other,’ 
said Davis, ‘and together, with any fair opportunity, Wes 
were absolutely invincible.’ 

Many a fierce battle still lay before the Army of 
Northern Virginia; marvellous was the skill and audacity 
with which Lee manceuvred his ragged regiments in the 
face of overwhelming odds; fierce and unyielding were the 
soldiers, but with Stonewall Jackson’s death the impulse of 
victory died away. 

It is needless to linger over the closing scene at Guiney’s 
Station. For some days there was hope that the patient 
would recover ; pneumonia, attributed to his fall from the 

M litter as he was borne from the field, supervened, 
and he gradually began tosink. On the Thursday 

his wife and child arrived from Richmond; but he 
was then almost too weak for conversation, and on 
Sunday morning it was evident that the end was near. 
May 10 As yet he had scarcely realised his condition. 

" Tf, he said, it was God’s will, he was ready to go, 

but he believed that there was still work for him to do, and 
that his life would be preserved to do it. At eleven o’clock 
Mrs. Jackson knelt by his side, and told him that he could 
not live beyond the evening. ‘You are frightened, my 


HIS LAST WORDS 471 


child,’ he replied, ‘death is not so near; I may yet get 
well.’ She fell upon the bed, weeping bitterly, and told 
him again that there was no hope. After a moment’s 
pause, he asked her to call Dr. McGuire. ‘ Doctor,’ he 
said, ‘ Anna tells me I am to die to-day; is it so?’ When 
he was answered, he remained silent for a moment or two, 
as if in intense thought, and then quietly replied, ‘ Very 
good, very good; it is all right.’ 

About noon, when Major Pendleton came into the 
room, he asked, ‘ Who is preaching at headquarters to- 
day?’ He was told that Mr. Lacy was, and that the whole 
army was praying for him. ‘Thank God,’ he said; ‘ they 
are very kind tome.’ Already his strength was fast ebbing, 
and although his face brightened when his baby was 
brought to him, his mind had begun to wander. Now he 
was on the battle-field, giving orders to his men; now at 
home in Lexington; now at prayers in the camp. © Occa- 
sionally his senses came back to him, and about half-past 
one he was told that he had but two hours to live. Again 
he answered, feebly but firmly, ‘ Very good; it is all right.’ 
These were almost his last coherent words. For some time 
he lay unconscious, and then suddenly he cried out: ‘ Order 
A. P. Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to the 
front! ‘Tell Major Hawks * then stopped, leaving the 
sentence unfinished. Once more he was silent; but a 
little while after he said very quietly and clearly, ‘Let us 
cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees,’ 
and the soul of the great captain passed into the peace of 
God. 


472 STONEWALL JACKSON 


NOTE I 


[From General Lee’s letter-book.] 


Lexington, Va., 25th January, 1866. 
Mrs. T. J. JACKSON :— 

My pear Mrs. Jackson,—Dr. Brown handed me your note of the 
9th, when in Richmond on business connected with Washington 
College. I have delayed replying since my return, hoping to have 
sufficient time to comply with your request. Last night I received a 
note from Mrs. Brown, enclosing one from Dr. Dabney, stating that 
the immediate return of his manuscript was necessary. I have not 
been able to open it; and when I read it when you were here, it was 
for the pleasure of the narrative, with no view of remark or correction; — 
and I took no memoranda of what seemed to be errors. I have not 
thought of them since, and do not know that I can now recall them; 
and certainly have no desire that my opinions should be adopted in 
preference to Dr. Dabney’s. . . . Iam, however, unable at this time 
to specify the battles to which my remark particularly refers. The 
opinion of Gen. Jackson, in reference to the propriety of attacking the 
Federal army under Gen. McClellan at Harrison’s Landing, is not, IL 
think, correctly stated. Upon my arrival there, the day after Gen. 
Longstreet and himself, I was disappointed that no opportunity for 
striking Gen. McClellan, on the retreat, or in his then position, had 
occurred, and went forward with Gen. Jackson alone, on foot; and 
after a careful reconnaissance of the whole line and position, he 
certainly stated to me, at that time, the impropriety of attacking. I 
nim misrepresented at the battle of Chancellorsville in proposing an 
attack in front, the first evening of our arrival. On the contrary, I 
decided against it, and stated to Gen. Jackson, we must attack on our 
left as soon as practicable; and the necessary movement of the troops 
began immediately. In consequence of a report received about that 
time, from Gen. Fitz Lee, describing the position of the Federal army, 
and the roads which he held with his cavalry leading to its rear, 
Gen. Jackson, after some inquiry concerning the roads leading to the 
T'urnace, undertook to throw his command entirely in Hooker’s rear, 
which he accomplished with equal skill and boldness; the rest of the 
army being moved to the left flank to connect with him as he 
advanced. I think there is some mistake, too, of a regiment. of 
infantry being sent by him to the ford on the Rapidan, as described by 
Dr. Dabney. The cavalry was ordered to make such a demonstration. 
Gen. Stuart had proceeded to that part of the field to co-operate in 
Gen. Jackson’s movement, and I always supposed it was his dis- 
mounted cavalry. As well as I now recollect, something is said by 


NOTE I 473 


Dr. Dabney as to Gen. Jackson’s opinion as to the propriety of 
delivering battle at Sharpsburg. When he came upon the field, having 
preceded his troops, and learned my reasons for offering battle, he . 
emphatically concurred with me. When I determined to withdraw 

across the Potomac, he also concurred; but said then, in view of all 

the circumstances, it was better to have fought the battle in Maryland 

than to have left it without a struggle. After crossing the Potomac, 

Gen. Jackson was charged with the command of the rear, and he 

designated the brigades of infantry to support: Pendleton’s batteries. 

I believed Gen. McClellan had been so crippled at Sharpsburg that he 

could not follow the Confederate army into Virginia immediately ; 

but Gen. Stuart was ordered, after crossing the Potomac, to recross 

at once at Williamsport, threaten his right flank, and observe his 

movements. Near daylight the next morning, Gen. Pendleton re- 

ported to me the occurrence at Shepherdstown tke previous evening, 

and stated that he had made a similar report to Gen. Jackson, who 

was lying near me on the same field. From his statement, I thought 

it possible that the Federal army might be attempting to follow us; 

and I sent at once to General Jackson to say that, in that event, I 

would attack it; that he must return with his whole command if 
necessary; that I had sent to Longstreet to countermarch the rest of 
the army ; and that upon his joining me, unless I heard from him to 

the contrary, I should move with it to his support. Gen. Jackson 

went back with Hill’s division, Gen. Pendleton accompanying him, 

and soon drove the Federals into Maryland with loss. His report, 

which I received on my way towards the river, relieved my anxiety, 

and the order of the march of the troops was again resumed. I have’ 
endeavoured to be as brief as possible in my statement, and with the 

single object of calling Dr. Dabney’s attention to the points referred 

to, that he may satisfy himself as to the correctness of his own 

statements ; and this has been done solely in compliance with your 

request. Other points may have attracted my attention in the 

perusal of the narrative; but I cannot now recall them, and do not 

know that those which have occurred to me are of importance. I 

wish I could do anything to give real assistance, for I am very 

anxious that his work should be perfect. 

With feelings of great esteem and regard, I am, 
Very truly yours, 
(Signed) R. H. Les. 


The production of this letter is due to the kindness of Dr. Henry 
A. White, and of R. E. Lee, Esq., of Washington, youngest son of 
General Lee. 


NOTE II 


The following details, communicated to the author by one of Lee’s 
generals, as to the formations of the Confederate infantry, will be 
found interesting :— 


474 STONEWALL JACKSON 


‘Our brigades were usually formed of four or five regiments, each 
regiment composed of ten companies. Troops furnished by the same 
State were, as far as possible, brigaded together, in order to stimulate 
State pride, and a spirit of healthy emulation. 

‘The regiment was formed for attack in line two-deep, covered by 
skirmishers. 

‘The number of skirmishers, and the intervals between the men on 
the skirmish line, depended altogether on the situation. Sometimes 
two companies were extended as skirmishers ; sometimes one company ; 
sometimes a certain number of men from several companies. In rear 
of the skirmishers, at a distance ranging from three hundred to one 
hundred and fifty paces, came the remainder of the regiment. 

‘When a regiment or a brigade advanced through a heavily 
wooded country, such as the Wilderness, the point of direction was 
established, and the officers instructed to conform to the movements 
of the “ guide company ”’ or “ guide regiment ”’ as the case might be, the 
“ suide”’ company or regiment governing both direction and alignment. 

‘The maintenance of direction under such circumstances was a 
very difficult matter. Our officers, however, were greatly assisted by 
the rank and file, as many of the latter were accomplished woodsmen, 
and accustomed to hunt and shoot in the dense forests of the South. 
Each regiment, moreover, was provided with a right and a left “ general 
guide,’’ men selected for their special aptitudes, being good judges of 
distance, and noted for their steadiness and skill in maintaining the 
direction. 

‘Then, again, the line of battle was greatly aided in maintaining 
the direction by the fire of the skirmishers, and frequently the line 
would be formed with a flank resting on a trail or woods-road, a ravine 
or watercourse, the flank regiment in such cases acting as the guide: 
(at Chancellorsville, Jackson’s divisions kept direction by the turnpike, 
both wings looking to the centre.) In advancing through thick woods 
the skirmish line was almost invariably strengthened, and while the 
‘line of battle,’ covered by the skirmishers, advanced in two-deep 
line, bodies in rear usually marched in columns of fours, prepared to 
come, by a “forward into line,” to the point where their assistance 
might be desired. I never saw the compass used in wood-fighting. 
In all movements to attack it was the universal custom for the brigade 
commander to assemble both field and company officers to the “ front 
and centre,” and instruct them particularly as to the purpose of the 
movement, the method in which it was to be carried out, the point of 
direction, the guide regiment, the position of other brigades, &c., &e. 
Like action was also taken by the regimental commander when a 
regiment was alone. 

‘This precaution, I venture to think, is absolutely indispensable to 
an orderly and combined advance over any ground whatever, and, so 
far as my knowledge goes, was seldom omitted, except when haste 
was imperative, in the Army of Northern Virginia. Practical experi- 
ence taught us that no movement should be permitted until every 


NOTE III 475 


officer was acquainted with the object in view, and had received his 

instructions. I may add that brigade and regimental commanders 
were most particular to secure their flanks and to keep contact with 
other troops by means of patrols; and, also, that in thick woods it was 
found to be of very great advantage if a few trustworthy men were 
detailed as orderlies to the regimental commander, for by this means 
he could most easily control the advance of his skirmishers and of his 
line of battle. 

‘N. H. Harris, 
General, late Army of Northern Vurgmia.’ 


NOTE III 


Before the campaign of 1864, the theatre of which embraced the 
region between the Rappahannock and Petersburg, including the 
Wilderness, corps of sharp-shooters, each 180 strong, were organised 
in many of the brigades of Lee’s army. These ‘light’ troops under- 
took the outpost, advanced, flank, and rear guard duties. The men 
were carefully selected; they were trained judges of distance, skilful 
and enterprising on patrol, and first-rate marksmen, and their rifles 
were often fitted with telescopic sights. In order to increase their 
confidence in each other they were subdivided into groups of fours, 
which messed and slept together, and were never separated in action. 
These corps did excellent service during the campaign of 1864, 


476 STONEWALL JACKSON 


CHAPTER XXV 


THE SOLDIER AND THE MAN! 


To the mourning of a sore-stricken nation Stonewall 
Jackson was carried to his rest. As the hearse passed to 
the Capitol, and the guns which had so lately proclaimed 
the victory of Chancellorsville thundered forth their requiem 
to the hero of the fight, the streets of Richmond were 
thronged with a silent and weeping multitude. In the 
Hall of Representatives, surrounded by a guard of infantry, 
the body lay in state; and thither, in their thousands, 
from the President to the maimed soldier, from the generals 
of the Valley army to wondering children, borne in their 
mothers’ arms, the people came to look their last upon the 
illustrious dead. The open coffin, placed before the Speaker’s 
chair, was draped in the Confederate standard ; the State 
colours were furled along the galleries ; and the expression 
on the face, firm and resolute, as if the spirit of battle still 
lingered in the lifeless clay, was that of a great conqueror, 
wise in council, mighty in the strife. But as the evening 
drew on the darkened chamber, hung with deep mourning, 
and resounding to the clash of arms, lost its sombre and 
martial aspect. Garlands of soft spring flowers, the tribute 
of the women of Virginia, rose high above the bier, and 
white pyramids of lilies, the emblems of purity and meek- 
ness, recalled the blameless life of the Christian soldier. 
From Richmond the remains were conveyed to Lexing- 
ton, and, under the charge of the cadets, lay for the night in 
the lecture-room of the Institute, which Jackson had quitted 
just two years before. The next morning he was buried, as 
he himself had wished, in the little cemetery above the town. 


1 Copyright 1898 by Longmans, Green, & Co. 


LEE’S OPINION 477 


Many were the mourners that stood around the grave, 
but they were few in number compared with those whose 
hearts were present on those silent hills. From the cities 
of the Atlantic coast to the far-off settlements of Texas the 
news that Stonewall Jackson had fallen came as a stunning 
blow. The people sorrowed for him with no ordinary grief, 
not as a great man and a good, who had done his duty 
and had gone to his reward, but as the pillar of their hopes 
and the sheet-anchor of the Confederate cause. Nor will 
those familiar with the further history of the Civil War, 
from the disaster of Gettysburg to the surrender at Appo- 
mattox, question the truth of this mournful presage. The 
Army of Northern Virginia became a different and less 
manageable instrument after Chancellorsville. Over and 
over again it failed to respond to the conceptions of its 
leader, and the failure was not due to the soldiers, but to 
the generals. Loyal and valiant as they were, of not one 
of his lieutenants could Lee say, as he had said of Jackson, 
‘Such an executive officer the sun never shone on. Ihave 
but to show him my design, and I know that if it can be 
done it will be done. No need for me to send or watch 
him. Straight as the needle to the pole he advances to 
the execution of my purpose.’ ! 

These words have been quoted as an epitome of 
Jackson’s military character. ‘He was essentially,’ says 
Swinton, ‘an executive officer, and in that sphere he was 
incomparable; but he was devoid of high mental parts, and 
destitute of that power of planning a combination, and of 
that calm, broad, military intelligence which distinguished 
General Lee.’? And this verdict, except in the South, has 
been generally accepted. Yet itrestson a most unsubstan- 
tial basis. Because Jackson knew so well how to obey it 
is asserted that he was not well fitted for independent 
command. Because he could carry out orders to the letter 
it is assumed that he was no master of strategy. Because 
his will was of iron, and his purpose, once fixed, never 
for a moment wavered, we are asked to believe that 


1 Hon. Francis Lawley, the Times, June 16, 1863. 
2 Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, p. 289. 


478 STONEWALL JACKSON 


his mental scope was narrow. Because he was silent in 
council, not eager in expressing his ideas, and averse to 
argument, it is implied that his opinions on matters of 
sreat moment were not worth the hearing. Because he was 
shy and unassuming; because he betrayed neither in face 
nor bearing, save in the heat of battle, any unusual power 
or consciousness of power, it is hastily concluded that he was 
deficient in the initiative, the breadth, and the penetration 
which are the distinguishing characteristics of great generals. 
In these pages, however, it has been made clear that 
Jackson’s quiet demeanour concealed a vivid imagination, 
a fertile brain, and an extraordinary capacity for far- | 
reaching combinations. After he had once made up his 
mind when and where to strike, it is true that his methods 
of war were very simple, and his blows those of a sledge- 
hammer. But simplicity of design and vigour of execution 
are often marks of the very highest military ability. 
‘Genius,’ says Napier, ‘is not extravagant; it is ardent, 
and it conceives great projects; but it knows beforehand © 
how to attain the result, and it uses the simplest means, 
because its faculties are essentially calculating, industrious, 
and patient. It is creative, because its knowledge is vast ; 
it is quick and peremptory, not because it is presumptuous, 
but because it is well-prepared.’ And Swinton’s verdict 
would have been approved by few of the soldiers of the 
Civil War. It was not the verdict of Lee. Significant in- 
deed was the cry of the great Confederate, the soul of truth 
as of generosity, when Jackson was wounded: ‘ Could I 
have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of 
the country, to have been disabled in your stead.’ It was 
not the verdict of the Southern people. ‘No man,’ it was 
said by one who knew them well, ‘had so magnificent 
a prospect before him as General Jackson. Whether he 
desired it or not, he could not have escaped being Governor 
of Virginia, and also, in the opinion of competent judges, 
sooner or later President of the Confederacy.’! Nor 
was it the verdict of the foe. ‘Stonewall Jackson,’ 
wrote General Howard, commanding the Eleventh Corps 
1 Hon. Francis Lawley, the Times, June 11, 1863. 


THE AMERICAN GENERALS 479 


at Chancellorsville, ‘was victorious. Even his enemies 
praise him ; but, providentially for us, it was the last battle 
he waged against the American Union. For, in bold 
planning, in energy of execution, which he had the power 
to diffuse, in indefatigable activity and moral ascendency, 
he stood head and shoulders above his confréres, and after 
his death General Lee could not replace him.’! 

It can hardly be questioned that, at the time of his 
death, Jackson was the leader most trusted by the Con- 
federates and most dreaded by the Federals. His own 
soldiers, and with them the whole population of the South, 
believed him capable of any task, invincible except by fate. 
It never, indeed, fell to Jackson’s lot to lead a great army or 
to plana great campaign. The operations in the Valley, 
although decisive in their results, were comparatively insig- 
nificant, in respect both of the numbers employed and of the 
extent of the theatre. Jackson was not wholly independent. 
His was but a secondary réle, and he had to weigh at every 
turn the orders and instructions of his superiors. His hand 
was never absolutely free. His authority did not reach 
beyond certain limits, and his operations were confined to one 
locality. He was never permitted to cross the border, and 
‘carry the war into Africa.’ Nor when he joined Lee before 
Richmond was the restraint removed. In the campaign 
against Pope, and in the reduction of Harper’s Ferry, he 
was certainly entrusted with tasks which led to a complete 
severance from the main body, but the severance was merely 
temporary. He was the most trusted of Lee’s lieutenants, 
but he was only a lieutenant. He had never the same 
liberty of action as those of his contemporaries who 
rose to historic fame—as Lee himself, as Johnston or 
Beauregard, as Grant, or Sherman, or as Sheridan—and 
consequently he had never a real opportunity for revealing 
the height and breadth of his military genius. 

The Civil War was prolific of great leaders. The young 
American generals, inexperienced as they were in dealing 
with large armies, and compelled to improvise their tactics 
as they improvised their staff, displayed a talent for com- 

1 Battles and Leaders, vol. iii. p. 202. 


480 STONEWALL JACKSON 


mand such as soldiers more regularly trained could hardly 
have surpassed. Neither the deficiencies of their material 
nor the difficulties of the theatre of war were to be lightly 
overcome; and yet their methods displayed a refreshing 
originality. Not only in mechanical auxiliaries did the 
inventive genius of their race find scope. The principles 
which govern civilised warfare, the rules which control the 
employment of each arm, the technical and mechanical arts, 
were rapidly modified to the exigencies of the troops and 
of the country. Cavalry, intrenchments, the railway, the 
telegraph, balloons, signalling, were all used in a manner 
which had been hitherto unknown. Monitors and torpedoes 
were for the first time seen, and even the formations of 
infantry were made sufficiently elastic to meet the require- 
ments of a modern battle-field. Nor was the conduct of the 
operations fettered by an adherence to conventional practice. 
From first to last the campaigns were characterised by 
daring and often skilful manceuvres ; and if the tactics of 


the battle-field were often less brilliant than the preceding © 


movements, not only are parallels to these tactics to be 
found in almost every campaign of history, but they would 
probably have escaped criticism had the opponent been 
less skilful. But among the galaxy of leaders, Confederate 
and Federal, in none had the soldiers such implicit confi- 
dence as in Stonewall Jackson, and than the Southern 
soldiers, highly educated as many of them were, no better 
judges of military capacity were ever known. 

Nevertheless, the opinion of the soldiers is no convincing 
proof that Jackson was equal to the command of a large 
army, or that he could have carried through a great cam- 
paign. Had Lee been disabled, it might be asked, would 
Jackson have proved a sufficient substitute ? 

It has already been explained that military genius shows 
itself first in character, and, second, in the application of 
the grand principles of warfare, not in the mere manipula- 
tion of armed masses. It cannot well be denied that Jackson 
possessed every single attribute which makes for success in 
war. Morally and physically he was absolutely fearless. 
He accepted responsibility with the same equanimity that 


= - wtiies 3 ls 


HIS AGGRESSIVE NATURE 48] 


he faced the bullets of the enemy. He permitted no obstacle 
to turn him aside from his appointed path, and in seizing 
an opportunity or in following up a victory he was the very 
incarnation of untiring energy. He had no moments of 
weakness. He was not robust, and his extraordinary exer- 
tions told upon his constitution. ‘My health,’ he wrote to 
his wife in January 1863, ‘is essentially good, but I do not 
think I shall be able in future to stand what I have already 
stood;’ and yet his will invariably rose superior to bodily 
exhaustion. A supreme activity, both of brain and body, 
was a prominent characteristic of his military life. His 
idea of strategy was to secure the initiative, however 
inferior his force; to create opportunities and to utilise 
them; to waste no time, and to give the enemy no rest. 
‘War,’ he said, ‘means fighting. The business of the soldier 
is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to 
throw up breastworks, to live in camps, but to find the 
enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him 
all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This 
will involve great destruction of life and property while it 
lasts ; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continu- 
ance, and so would be an economy of life and property in 
the end. To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all 
the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war.’ 

That he felt to the full the fascination of war’s tremendous 
game we can hardly doubt. Not only did he derive, as all 
true soldiers must, an intense intellectual pleasure from 
handling his troops in battle so as to outwit and defeat 
his adversary, but from the day he first smelt powder in 
Mexico until he led that astonishing charge through the 
dark depths of the Wilderness his spirits never rose higher 
than when danger and death were rife about him. With 
all his gentleness there was much of the old Berserker 
about Stonewall Jackson, not indeed the lust for blood, but 
the longing to do doughtily and die bravely, as best becomes 
aman. His nature was essentially aggressive. He was 
never more to be feared than when he was retreating, and 
where others thought only of strong defensive positions he 
looked persistently for the opportunity to attack. He was 


482 STONEWALL JACKSON 


endowed, like Masséna, ‘ with that rare fortitude which 
seems to increase as perils thicken. When conquered he 
was as ready to fight again as if he had been conqueror.’ 
‘L’audace, l’audace, et toujours l’audace’ was the main- 
spring of all his actions, and the very sights and sounds 
of a stricken field were dear to his soul. Nothing had such 
power to stir his pulses as the rebel yell. ‘I remember,’ 
says a staff-officer, ‘one night, at tattoo, that this ery 
broke forth in the camp of the Stonewall Brigade, and was 
taken up by brigades and divisions until it rang.out far over 
field and wood. The general came hastily and bareheaded 
from his tent, and leaning on a fence near by, listened in 
silence to the rise, the climax, and the fall of that strange sere- 
nade, raising his head to catch the sound, as it grew fainter 
and fainter and died away at last like an echo among the 
mountains. Then, turning towards his tent, he muttered in 
half soliloquy, ‘‘ That was the sweetest music I ever heard.” ’ 
Yet least of all was Jackson a mere fighting soldier, 
trusting to his lucky star and resolute blows to pull him 
through. He was not, indeed, one of those generals who 
seek to win victories without shedding blood. He never 
spared his men, either in marching or fighting, when a great 
result was to be achieved, and he was content with nothing 
less than the complete annihilation of the enemy. ‘ Had 
we taken ten sail,’ said Nelson, ‘and allowed the eleventh 
to escape, when it had been possible to have got at her, I 
could never have called it well done.’ Jackson was of the 
same mind. ‘With God’s blessing,’ he said before the 
Valley campaign, ‘let us make thorough work of it.’ When 
once he had joined battle, no loss, no suffering was permitted 
to stay his hand. He never dreamed of retreat until he 
had put in his last reserve. Yet his victories were won 
rather by sweat than blood, by skilful manceuvring rather 
than sheer hard fighting. Solicitous as he was of the comfort 
of his men, he had no hesitation, when his opportunity was 
ripe, of taxing their powers of endurance to the utter- 
most. But the marches which strewed the wayside with 
the footsore and the weaklings won his battles. The enemy, 
surprised and outnumbered, was practically beaten before 


HIS INSIGHT 483 


a shot was fired, and success was attained at a trifling 
cost. 

Yet, despite his energy, Jackson was eminently patient. 
He knew when to refuse battle, just as well as he knew 
when to deliver it. He was never induced to fight except 
on his own terms, that is, on his own ground, and at his 
own time, save at Kernstown only, and there the strategical 
situation made attack imperative. And he was eminently 
cautious. Before he committed himself to movement he 
deliberated long, and he never broke camp until he had 
ample information. He ran risks, and great ones, but in 
war the nettle danger must be boldly grasped, and in Jack- 
son’s case the dangers were generally more apparent than 
real. Under his orders the cavalry became an admirable 
instrument of reconnaissance. He showed a marked sagacity 
for selecting scouts, both officers and privates, and his system 
for obtaining intelligence was well-nigh perfect. He had the 
rare faculty, which would appear instinctive, but which is the 
fruit of concentrated thought allied to a wide knowledge of 
war, of divining the intention of his adversary and the state 
of his moral. His power of drawing inferences, often from 
seemingly unimportant trifles, was akin to that of the 
hunter of his native backwoods, to whom the rustle of a 
twig, the note of a bird, a track upon the sand, speak more 
clearly than written characters. His estimate of the de- 
moralisation of the Federal army after Bull Run, and of 
the ease with which Washington might have been cap- 
tured, was absolutely correct. In the middle of May, 
1862, both Lee and Johnston, notwithstanding Jackson’s 
victory over Milroy, anticipated that Banks would leave 
the Valley. Jackson thought otherwise, and Jackson was 
right. After the bloody repulse at Malvern Hill, when 
his generals reported the terrible confusion in the Con- 
federate ranks, he simply stated his opinion that the 
enemy was retreating, and went to sleep again. A week 
later he suggested that the whole army should move 
against Pope, for McClellan, he said, would never dare 
to march on Richmond. At Sharpsburg, as the shells 
cut the trees to pieces in the West Wood, and the heavy 


VOL. II. Li 


484 STONEWALL JACKSON 


masses of Federal infantry filled the fields in front, he told 
his medical director that McClellan had done his worst. 
At Fredericksburg, after the first day’s battle, he believed 
that the enemy was already defeated, and, anticipating 
their escape under cover of the darkness, he advised a night 
attack with the bayonet. His knowledge of his adversary’s 
character, derived, in great degree, from his close observation 
of every movement, enabled him to predict with astonishing 
accuracy exactly how he would act under given cirecum- 
stances. 

Nor can he be charged in any single instance with 
neglect of precautions by which the risks of war are dimi- 
nished. He appears to have thought out and to have 
foreseen—and here his imaginative power aided him— 
every combination that could be made against him, and to 
have provided for every possible emergency. He was never 
surprised, never disconcerted, never betrayed into a false 
manceuvre. Although on some occasions his success fell 
short of his expectations, the fault was not his ; his strategy 
was always admirable, but fortune, in one guise or another— 
the indiscipline of the cavalry, the inefficiency of subordi- 
nates, the difficulties of the country—interfered with the full 
accomplishment of his designs. But whatever could be 
done to render fortune powerless that Jackson did. By 
means of his cavalry, by forced marches, by the careful 
selection of his line of march, of his camps, of his positions, 
of his magazines, and lastly, by his consistent reticence, he 
effectually concealed from the Federals both his troops and 
his designs. Never surprised himself, he seldom failed to 
surprise his enemies, if not tactically—that is, while they were 
resting in their camps—at least strategically. Kernstown 
came asa surprise to Banks, M’Dowell to Frémont. Banks 
believed Jackson to be at Harrisonburg when he had 
already defeated the detachmentat Front Royal. At Cross 
Keys and Port Republic neither Frémont nor Shields 
expected that their flying foe would suddenly turn at bay. 
Pope was unable to support Banks at Cedar Run till the 
battle had been decided. When McClellan on the Chicka- 
hominy was informed that the Valley army had joined Lee 


HIS BREADTH OF VIEW 485 


it was too late to alter his dispositions, and no surprise was 
ever more complete than Chancellorsville. 

And the mystery that always involved Jackson’s move- 
ments was undoubtedly the result of calculation. He knew 
the effect his sudden appearances and disappearances would 
have on the moral of the Federal generals, and he relied 
as much on upsetting the mental equilibrium of his oppo- 
nents as on concentrating against them superior numbers. 
Nor was his view confined to the field of battle and his 
immediate adversary. It embraced the whole theatre of 
war. ‘The motive power which ruled the enemy’s politics as 
well as his armies was always his real objective. From the 
very first he recognised the weakness of the Federal posi- 
tion—the anxiety with which the President and the people 
regarded Washington—and on this anxiety he traded. 
Hvery blow struck in the Valley campaign, from Kernstown 
to Cross Keys, was struck at Lincoln and his Cabinet ; 
every movement, including the advance against Pope on 
Cedar Run, was calculated with reference to the effect it 
would produce in the Federal councils ; and if he consist- 
ently advocated invasion, it was not because Virginia would 
be relieved of the enemy’s presence, but because treaties 
of peace are only signed within sight of the hostile capital. 

It has been urged that the generals whom Jackson 
defeated were men of inferior stamp, and that his capacity 
for command was consequently never fairly tested. Had 
Grant or Sheridan, it is said, been pitted against him in the 
Valley, or Sherman or Thomas on the Rappahannock, his 
laurels would never have been won. The contention is fair. 
Generals of such calibre as Banks and Frémont, Shields 
and Pope, committed blunders which the more skilful 
leaders would undoubtedly have avoided; and again, had 
he been pitted against a worthy antagonist, Jackson would 
probably have acted with less audacity and greater caution. 
It is difficult to conceive, however, that the fact would either 
have disturbed his brain or weakened his resolution. Few 
generals, apparently, have been caught in worse predica- 
ments than he was; first, when his army was near Harper’s 
Ferry, and Frémont and Shields were converging on his 

LL2 


486 STONEWALL JACKSON 


rear; second, when he lay in the woods near Groveton, 
with no news from Longstreet, and Pope’s army all around 
him ; third, when he was marching by the Brock road to 
strike Hooker’s right, and Sickles’ column struck in between 
- himself and Lee. But it was at such junctures as these 
that his self-possession was most complete and his skill 
most marked. The greater the peril, the more fixed became 
his purpose. The capacity of the opponent, moreover, 
cannot be accepted as the true touchstone of general- 
ship. ‘The greatest general,’ said Napoleon, ‘is he who 
makes the fewest mistakes,’ 2.e. he who neither neglects an 
opportunity nor offers one. 

Thus tested Jackson has few superiors. During the 
whole of the two years he held command he never com- 
mitted a single error. At Mechanicsville, and again at 
Frayser’s Farm, the failure to establish some method of 
intercommunication left his column isolated ; this, however, 
was a failure in staff duties, for which the Confederate 
headquarters was more to blame than himself. And 
further, how sure and swift was the retribution which 
followed a mistake committed within his sphere of action! 
What opportunity did Jackson miss? His penetration was 
unerring ; and when, after he had marked his prey, did he 
ever hesitate to swoop? ‘What seemed reckless audacity,’ 
it has been well said by one of the greatest of Southern 
soldiers, ‘ was the essence of prudence. His eye had caught 
at a glance the entire situation, and his genius, with 
marvellous celerity and accuracy, had weighed all the 
chances of success or failure. While, therefore, others 
were slowly feeling their way, or employing in detail insuffi- 
cient forces, Jackson, without for one moment doubting his 
success, hurled his army like a thunderbolt against the 
opposing lines, and thus ended the battle at a single blow.’ 

But if Jackson never failed to take advantage of his 


1 General J.B. Gordon, Commanding 2nd Army Corps, Army of Northern © 
Virginia. ‘Jackson,’ says one of his staff, ‘never changed an order on the 
battlefield when he had once given it. I have seen Ewell, Early, A. P. Hill, 
and even Lee send an aide with an order, and in afew minutes send another 
messenger to recall or alter it.’ Letter to the author. 


HIS TACTICS 487 


opponent’s blunders, it might be said that he sometimes 
laid himself open to defeat. Grant and Sheridan, had they 
been in place of Shields and Frémont, would hardly have 
suffered him to escape from Harper’s Ferry ; Sherman 
would probably have crushed him at the Second Manassas; 
Thomas would not have been surprised at Chancellorsville. 
But Jackson only pushed daring to its limits when it 
was safe to do so. He knew the men he had to deal with, 
and in whatever situation he might find himself he in- 
variably reserved more than one means of escape. 

On the field of battle his manceuvres were always sound 
and often brilliant. He never failed to detect the key-point 
of a position, or to make the best use of the ground. On the 
defensive his flanks were always strong and his troops con- 
cealed both from view and fire; on the offensive he invari- 
ably attacked where he was least expected. He handled the 
three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the closest 
combination and with the maximum of effect. LHxcept at 
Kernstown, where Garnett interfered, his reserve was in- 
variably put in at exactly the right moment, and he so 
manipulated his command that he was always strongest at 
the decisive point. Nor did he forget that a battle is only 
half won where there is no pursuit, and whenever he held 
command upon the field, his troops, especially the cavalry, 
were so disposed that from the very outset the enemy’s 
retreat was menaced. The soldiers, sharers in his achieve- 
ments, compared his tactical leading with that of others, 
and gave the palm to Jackson. An officer of his staff, who 
served continuously with the Army of Northern Virginia, 
says: ‘I was engaged in no great battle subsequent to 
Jackson’s death in which I did not see the opportunity 
which, in my opinion, he would have seized, and have 
routed our opponents ;’! and General Lane writes that on 
many a hard-fought field, subsequent to Chancellorsville, he 
heard his veterans exclaim: ‘Oh for another Jackson !’ 

Until Jackson fell the Army of Northern Virginia, except 
when his advice was overruled, had never missed an 
opening. Afterwards it missed many. Gettysburg, which 

1 Major Hotchkiss, C.8.A. 


488 STONEWALL JACKSON 


should have been decisive of the war, was pre-eminently a 
battle of lost opportunities, and there are others which fall 
into the same category. It is a perfectly fair assumption, 
then, that Jackson, so unerring was his insight, would not 
only have proved an efficient substitute for Lee, but that he 
would have won such fame as would have placed him, as it 
placed his great commander, among the most illustrious 
soldiers of all ages. With any of his contemporaries, not 
even excepting Lee, he compares more than favourably. 
Most obedient of subordinates as he was, his strategical views 
were not always in accordance with those of his Commander- 
in-Chief. If Jackson had been in charge of the operations, 
the disastrous battle of Malvern Hill would never have been’ 
fought ; Pope would have been cut off from the Rappahan- 
nock ; McClellan would have found the whole Confederate 
army arrayed against him at South Mountain, or would have 
been attacked near Frederick; and Burnside would have — 
been encountered on the North Anna, where defeat would 
probably have proved his ruin. It is difficult to compare 
him with Lee. A true estimate of Lee’s genius is im- 
possible, for it can never be known to what extent his 
designs were thwarted by the Confederate Government. 
Lee served Mr. Davis; Jackson served Lee, wisest and 
most helpful of masters. It would seem, however, that 
Jackson in one respect was Lee’s superior. His courage, 
physical and moral, was not more brilliant or more 
steadfast; his tactical skill no greater; but he was made 
of sterner stuff. His self-confidence was supreme. He 
never doubted his ability, with God’s help, to carry out any 
task his judgment approved. Lee, on the other hand, was 
oppressed by a consciousness of his own shortcomings. 
Jackson never held but one council of war. Lee seldom 
made an important movement without consulting his corps 
commanders. Jackson kept his subordinates in their place, 
exacting from his generals the same implicit obedience he 
exacted from his corporals. Lee lost the battle of 
Gettysburg because he allowed his second in command to 
argue instead of marching. Nor was that political courage, 
which Nelson declared is as necessary for a commander as 


GRANT AND JACKSON 489 


military courage, a component part of Lee’s character.! On 
assuming command of the Army of Northern Virginia, in 
spite of Mr. Davis’ protestations, he resigned the control 
of the whole forces of the Confederacy, and he submitted 
without complaint to interference. Jackson’s action when 
Loring’s regiments were ordered back by the Secretary of 
War is sufficient proof that he would have brooked no 
meddling with his designs when once they had received the 
sanction of the Cabinet. At the same time, it must remain 
undetermined whether Jackson was equal to the vast re- 
sponsibilities which Lee bore with such steadfast courage ; 
whether he could have administered a great army, under 
the most untoward circumstances, with the same success ; 
whether he could have assuaged the jealousies of the 
different States, and have dealt so tactfully with both 
officers and men that there should have been no friction 
between Virginians and Georgians, Texans and Carolinians. 

It is probable that Jackson’s temper was more akin to 
Grant’s than Lee’s. Grant had the same whole-hearted 
regard for the cause; the same disregard for the individual. 
He was just as ready as Jackson to place a recalcitrant 
subordinate, no matier how high his rank, under instant 
arrest, and towards the incompetent and unsuccessful he 
was just as pitiless. Jackson, however, had the finer in- 
tellect. The Federal Commander-in-Chief was unquestion- 
ably a great soldier, greater than those who overlook his 
difficulties in the ’64 campaign are disposed to admit. As 
a strategist he ranks high. But Grant was no master of 
stratagem. There was no mystery about his operations. 
His manceuvres were strong and straightforward, but he had 
no skill in deceiving his adversary, and his tactics were not 
always of a high order. It may be questioned whether 
on the field of battle his ability was equal to that of 
Sherman, or of Sherman’s great antagonist, Johnston. 
Elsewhere he was their superior. Both Sherman and 
Johnston were methodical rather than brilliant; patient, 
confident, and far-seeing as they were, strictly observant 
of the established principles of war, they were without a 

1 Lord Wolseley, Macmillan’s Magazine, March, 1887. 


490 STONEWALL JACKSON 


touch of that'’aggressive genius which distinguished Lee, 
Grant, and Jackson. 

Nevertheless, to put Jackson above Grant is to place him 
high on the list of illustrious captains. Yet the claim is not 
extravagant. If his military characteristics are compared 
with those of so great a soldier as Wellington, it will be seen 
that in many respects they run on parallel lines. Both 
had perfect confidence in their own capacity. ‘I can do,’ 
said Jackson, ‘ whatever I will to do;’ while the Duke, when 
a young general in India, congratulated himself that he 
had learned not to be deterred by apparent impossibilities. 
Both were patient, fighting on their own terms, or fighting 
not at all. Both were prudent, and yet, when audacity 
was justified by the character of their opponent and the 
condition of his troops, they took no counsel of their 
fears. They were not enamoured of the defensive, for they 
knew the value of the initiative, and that offensive strategy 
is the strategy which annihilates. Yet, when their enemy 
remained concentrated, they were content to wait till they 
could induce him to disperse. Both were masters of ruse 
and stratagem, and the Virginian was as industrious as 
the Englishman. And in yet another respect they were 
alike. ‘In issuing orders or giving verbal instruction, 
Jackson’s words were few and simple; but they were so 
clear, so comprehensive and direct, that no officer could 
possibly misunderstand, and none dared disobey.’! Exactly 
the same terms might be applied to Wellington. Again, 
although naturally impetuous, glorying in war, they had 
no belief in a lucky star; their imagination was always 
controlled by common-sense, and, unlike Napoleon, their 
ambition to succeed was always subordinate to their 
judgment. Yet both, when circumstances were imperative, 
were greatly daring. The attacks at Groveton and at Chan- 
cellorsville were enterprises instinct with the same intensity 
of resolution as the storm of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, the 
passage of the Douro, the great counterstroke of Salamanca. 
On the field of battle the one was not more vigilant nor 
imperturbable than the other, and both possessed a due 

1 General J. B. Gordon. 


SURPRISE 49] 


sense of proportion. They knew exactly how much they 
could effect themselves, and how much must be left to 
others. Recognising that when once the action had opened 
the sphere in which their authority could be exercised was 
very -limited, they gave their subordinates a free hand, 
issuing few orders, and encouraging their men rather by 
example than by words. Both, too, had that ‘most rare 
faculty of coming to prompt and sure conclusions in sudden 
exigencies—the certain mark of a master-spirit in war.’ ! 
At Bull Run, Jackson was orderedsto support Evans at the 
Stone Bridge. Learning that the left was compromised, 
without a moment’s hesitation he turned aside, and placed 
his brigade in the only position where it could have held its 
ground. At Groveton, when he received the news that the 
Federal left wing was retreating on Centreville across his 
front, the order for attack was issued almost before he had 
read the dispatch. At Chancellorsville, when General Fitz- 
hugh Lee showed him the enemy’s right wing dispersed and 
unsuspecting, he simply turned to his courier and said, 
‘Let the column cross the road,’ and his plan of battle 
was designed with the same rapidity as Wellington’s at 
Salamanca or Assaye. 

It has been already pointed out that Jackson’s disposi- 
tions for defence differed in no degree from those of the 
great Duke. His visit to Waterloo, perhaps, taught the 
American soldier the value and importance of concealing 
his troops on the defensive. It was not, however, from 
Wellington that he learned to keep his plans to himself and 
to use every effort to mislead hisadversary. Yet no general, 
not eveh Napoleon himself, brought about so many startling 
surprises as Wellington. The passage of the Douro, the 
storm of the frontier fortresses, the flank attack at Vittoria, 
the passage of the Adour, the passage of the Bidassoa— 
were each and all of them utterly unexpected by the French 
marshals; and those were by no means the only, or the 
most conspicuous, instances. Was ever general more sur- 
prised than Masséna, when pursuing his retreating foe 
through Portugal, in full anticipation of ‘ driving the leopards 

1 Napier. ; 


t 


492 STONEWALL JACKSON 


into the sea,’ he suddenly saw before him the frowning 
lines of Torres Vedras, the great fortress which had sprung 
from earth, as it were, at the touch of a magician’s wand ? 

The dispatches and correspondence of the generals who 
were opposed to Wellington are the clearest evidence of his 
extraordinary skill. Despite their long experience, their 
system of spies, their excellent cavalry, superior, during 
the first years of the Peninsular War, both in numbers and 
training, to the English, it was seldom indeed that the 
French had more than the vaguest knowledge of his move- 
ments, his intentions, or his strength. On no other theatre 
of war—and they were familiar with many—had they encoun- 
tered so mysterious anenemy. And what was the result ? 
Constantly surprised themselves, they at length hesitated 
to attack even isolated detachments. At Guinaldo, in 1812, 
Marmont, with 80,000 soldiers, refused to assault a ridge 
occupied by no more than 13,000. The morning of Quatre- 
Bras, when that important position was but thinly held, 
even Ney was reluctant to engage. In the judgment of 
himself and his subordinates, who had met Wellington 
before, the fact that there were but few red jackets to be 
seen was no proof whatever that the whole allied army was 
not close at hand, and the opportunity was suffered to 
escape. Other generals have been content with surprising 
the enemy when they advanced against him; Wellington 
and Jackson sought to do so even when they were confined 
to the defensive. 

And in still another respect may a likeness be 
found. Jackson’s regard for truth was not more scrupulous 
than Wellington’s. Neither declined to employ every 
legitimate means of deceiving their enemies, but both were 
absolutely incapable of self-deception. And this character- 
istic was not without effect on their military conduct. 
Although never deterred by difficulties, they distinguished 
clearly between the possible and the impossible. ‘To gain 
great ends they were willing to run risks, but if their plans 
are carefully considered, it will be seen that the margin left 
to chance was small. The odds were invariably in their 
favour. In conception as in execution obstacles were 


NAPOLEON 498 


resolutely faced, and they were constitutionally unable to 
close their eyes to contingencies that might prove ruinous. 
The promise of great results was never suffered to cajole 
them into ignoring the perils that might beset their path. 
Imagination might display in vivid colours the success that 
might accrwe from’ some audacious venture, but if one step 
was obscure the idea was unhesitatingly rejected. Un- 
dazzled by the prospect of personal glory, they formed ‘a 
true, not an untrue, picture of the business to be done,’ and 
their plans, consequently, were without a flaw. Brilliant, 
indeed, were the campaigns of Napoleon, and astonishing 
his successes, but he who had so often deceived others in the 
end deceived himself. Accustomed to the dark dealings of 
intrigue and chicanery, his judgment, once so penetrating, 
became blunted. He believed what he wished to believe, 
and not that which was fact. More than once in his later 
campaigns he persuaded himself that the chances were 
with him when in reality they were terribly against 
him. He trusted to the star that had befriended him at 
Marengo and at Aspern; that is, he would not admit the 
truth, even to himself, that he had been overdaring, that 
it was fortune, and fortune alone, that had saved him from 
destruction, and Moscow and Vittoria, Leipsic and Water- 
loo, were the result. 

But although there was a signal resemblance, both in 
their military characters as in their methods of war, 
between Wellington and Jackson, the parallel cannot be 
pushed beyond certain well-defined limits. It isimpossible 
to compare their intellectual capacity. Wellington was 
called to an ampler field and far heavier responsibilities. 
Not as a soldier alone, but as financier, diplomatist, 
statesman, he had his part to play. While Napoleon 
languished on his lonely island, his great conqueror, the 
plenipotentiary of his own Government, the most trusted 
counsellor of many sovereigns, the adviser of foreign Ad- 
ministrations, was universally acknowledged as the master- 
mind of Europe. Nor was the mark which Wellington left 
on history insignificant. The results of his victories were 
lasting. The freedom of the nations was restored to them, 


494 STONEWALL JACKSON 


and land and sea became the thoroughfares of peace. 
America, on the other hand, owes no single material benefit 
to Stonewall Jackson. In the cause of progress or of peace 
he accomplished nothing. The principle he fought for, the 
right of secession, lives no longer, even in the South. He 
won battles. He enhanced the reputation of American 
soldiers. He proved in his own person that the manhood 
of Virginia had suffered no decay. And this was all. But 
the fruits of a man’s work are not to be measured by a mere 
utilitarian standard. In the minds of his own countrymen 
the memory of Wellington is hallowed not so much by his 
victories, as by his unfaltering honesty and his steadfast 
regard for duty, and the life of Stonewall Jackson is fraught 
with lessons of still deeper import. 

Not only with the army, but with the people of the 
South, his influence while he lived was very great. From 
him thousands and ten thousands of Confederate soldiers 
learned the self-denial which is the root of all religion, 
the self-control which is the root of all manliness.' Beyond 
the confines of the camps he was personally unknown. In 
the social and political circles of Richmond his figure was 
unfamiliar. When his body lay in state the majority of 
those who passed through the Hall of Representatives looked 
upon his features for the first time. He had never been 
called to council by the President, and the members of the 
Legislature, with but few exceptions, had no acquaintance 
with the man who acted while they deliberated. But his 
fame had spread far and wide, and not merely the fame of 
his victories, but of his Christian character. The rare 
union of strength and simplicity, of child-like faith and the 
most fiery energy, had attracted the sympathy of the whole 
country, of the North as well as of the South; and beyond 
the Atlantic, where with breathless interest the parent 
islands were watching the issue of the mighty conflict, it 
seemed that another Cromwell without Cromwell’s ambition, 
or that another Wolfe with more than Wolfe’s ability, had 
arisen among the soldiers of the youngest of nations. 
And this interest was intensified by his untimely end. 

1 See Note at end of volume. 


HIS INFLUENCE 495 


When it was reported that Jackson had fallen, men mur- 
mured in their dismay against the fiat of the Almighty. 
‘Why,’ they asked, ‘ had one so pure and so upright been 
suddenly cut down?’ Yet a sufficient answer was not far 
to seek. To the English race, in whatever quarter of the 
clobe it holds dominion, to the race of Alfred and De Mont- 
fort, of Bruce and Hampden, of Washington and Gordon, 
the ideal of manhood has ever been a high one. Self-sacrifice 
and the single heart are the attributes which it most 
delights to honour ; and chief amongst its accepted heroes 
are those soldier-saints who, sealing their devotion with 
_ their lives, have won 


Death’s royal purple in the foeman’s lines. 


So, from his narrow grave on the green hillside at 
Lexington, Jackson speaks with voice more powerful than 
if, passing peacefully away, in the fulness of years and 
honours, he had found a resting-place in some proud 
sepulchre, erected by a victorious and grateful common- 
wealth. And who is there who can refuse to listen? His 
creed may not be ours; but in whom shall we find a firmer 
faith, a mind more humble, a sincerity more absolute? He 
had his temptations like the rest of us. His passions were 
strong; his temper was hot ; forgiveness never came easily 
to him, and he loved power. He dreaded strong liquor 
because he liked it; and if in his nature there were great 
capacities for good, there were none the less, had it been once 
perverted, great capacities for evil. Fearless and strong, 
self-dependent and ambitious, he had within him the 
making of a Napoleon, and yet his name is without spot or 
blemish. From his boyhood onward, until he died on the 
Rappahannock, he was the very model of a Christian gentle- 
man :— 

H’en as he trod that day to God, so walked he from his birth, 

In simpleness, and gentleness, and honour, and clean mirth. 


Paradox as it may sound, the great rebel was the most 
loyal of men. His devotion to Virginia was hardly sur- 
passed by his devotion to his wife, and he made no secret 


496 STONEWALL JACKSON 


of his absolute dependence on a higher power. Every action 
was a prayer, for every action was begun and ended in the 
name of the Almighty. Consciously and unconsciously, 
in deed as in word, in the quiet of his home and in the 
tumult of battle, he fastened to his soul those golden chains 
‘that bind the whole round earth about the feet of God.’ 
Nor was their burden heavy. ‘He was the happiest man,’ 
says one of his friends, ‘ I ever knew,’ and he was wont to 
express his surprise that others were less happy than himself. 

But there are few with Jackson’s power of concentra- 
tion. He fought evil with the same untiring energy that he 
fought the North. His relations to his moral duties were 
governed by the same strong purpose, the same clear 
perception of the aim to be achieved, and of the means 
whereby it was to be achieved, as his manoeuvres on the 
field of battle. He was always thorough. And it was 
because he was thorough—true, steadfast, and consistent, 
—that he reached the heroic standard. His attainments 
were not varied. His interests, so far as his life’s work 
was concerned, were few and narrow. Beyond his religion 
and the army he seldom permitted his thoughts to stray. 
His acquaintance with art was small. He meddled little 
with politics. His scholarship was not profound, and he 
was neither sportsman nor naturalist. Compared with 
many of the prominent figures of history the range of his 
capacity was limited. 

And yet Jackson’s success in his own sphere was pheno- 
menal, while others, perhaps of more pronounced ability, 
seeking success in many different directions, have failed to 
find it in a singleone. Even when we contrast his recorded 
words with the sayings of those whom the world calls great 
—statesmen, orators, authors—his inferiority is hardly 
apparent. He saw into the heart of things, both human 
and divine, far deeper than most men. MHe had an ex- 
traordinary facility for grasping the essential and discarding 
the extraneous. His language was simple and direct, 
without elegance or embellishment, and yet no one has 
excelled him in erystallising great principles in a single 
phrase. The few maxims which fell from his lips are 


THE CHRISTIAN HERO 497 


almost a complete summary of the art of war. Neither 
Frederick, nor Wellington, nor Napoleon realised more 
deeply the simple truths which ever since men first took 
up arms have been the elements of success; and not 
Hampden himself beheld with clearer insight the duties 
and obligations which devolve on those who love their 
country well, but freedom more. 

It may be that the conflicts of the South are not yet 
ended. In America men pray for peace, but dark and 
mysterious forces, threatening the very foundations of civic 
liberty, are stirring even now beneath their feet. The War 
of Secession may be the precursor of a fiercer and a mightier 
struggle, and the volunteers of the Confederacy, enduring 
all things and sacrificing all things, the prototype and 
model of a new army, in which North and South shall 
march to battle side by side. Absit omen! But in what- 
ever fashion his own countrymen may deal with the 
problems of the future, the story of Stonewall Jackson will 
tell them in what spirit they should be faced. Nor has that 
story a message for America alone. The hero who lies 
buried at Lexington, in the Valley of Virginia, belongs to a 
race that is not confined to a single continent; and to 
those who speak the same tongue, and in whose veins the 
same blood flows, his words come home like an echo of all 
that is noblest in their history: ‘What is life without 
honour? Degradation is worse than death. We must 
think of the living and of those who are to come after 
us, and see that by God’s blessing we transmit to them 
the freedom we have ourselves inherited.’ 


498 STONEWALL JACKSON 


NOTE I 


Mr. W. P. St. John, President of the Mercantile Bank of New 
York, relates the following incident :—A year or two ago he was in the 
Shenandoah Valley with General Thomas Jordan, C.S.A., and at the 
close of the day they found themselves at the foot of the mountains in 
a wild and lonely place; there was no village, and no house, save a 
rough shanty for the use of the ‘track-walker’ on the railroad. It 
was snot an attractive place for rest, yet here they were forced to pass 
the night, and to sit down to such supper as might be provided in so 
desolate a spot. The unprepossessing look of everything was com- 
pleted when the host came in and took his seat at the head of the 
table. A bear out of the woods could hardly have been rougher, with 
his unshaven hair and unkempt beard. He answered to the type of 
border ruffian, and his appearance suggested the dark deeds that might 
be done here in secret, and hidden in the forest gloom. Imagine the 
astonishment of the travellers when this rough backwoodsman rapped 
on the table and bowed his head. And suchaprayer! ‘ Never,’ says 
Mr. St. John, ‘did I hear a petition that more evidently came from 
the heart. It was so simple, so reverent, so tender, so full of humility 
and penitence, as well as of thankfulness. We sat in silence, and as 
s00n as we recovered ourselves I whispered to General Jordan, ‘* Who 
can he be ?”’ To which he answered, “I don’t know, but he must be 
one of Stonewall Jackson’s old soldiers.” And he was. As we. 
walked out in the open air, I accosted our new acquaintance, and 
after a few questions about the country, asked, “Were you in the 
war?” ‘Oh, yes,’ he said with a smile, “I was out with Old Stone- 
wall.’’’—Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. xix. p. 371. 


499 


NOTE II 


List or Kinnep AND WoUuNDED (EXCLUDING PrisoneRs) IN Great Batrurs 


(The victorious side is given first) 


bo | 80 ty 
Name of battle Number of troops |Aied_ and) Total a5 cE 
OOS ae eae retina ae a 80 
‘hs le 1704 : Trench, 60,000 ala \ 31,000 96 | 19 
Bani 1705.) Alin 69000-13800 Ih ss00| 0 | 
Oudenarde, 1708 Heh heen ath bape 11} 11 
ah gS ome | French, 100,000 20,000 | 34,000 17), 14 
Dettingen, 1743. | aa te | 9,350 | 9| 6 
Fontenoy, 1745. LE ino 7300 | 13,300 | 14 | 12 
Bre 8 eee ae) | E82EG | nope 30] 36 
Som ADT © 7 | Brassians, 34,000 |] 11/000 |} 19000 | 24 | 35 
Beni ate =| Ress: sie |} seat | 8 | 9 
[Renta ATT pee 208 | ane |] 8,000 | 24 | a 
eer, | Serene 208 oh £98 |e | 0 | 9 
oun At: ae ana yee ; aie 132,000 | 38 | 37 
a ne : an ea oie he 1 14,000 10! 8 
me ERG inhi French £7 000 raat } 5,700 | 7] 5 
ennctat aygy | Emsstanara00 | S000 (110800 | 10, @ 
Bette ra] ie ee he way a 

Minden, 1759.  .| Allies, 37,000. .|. 2,800 
French and Saxons, | 9.200 11 iy 

52,000 7,000 


VOL. II. MM 


500 


Name cf battle 


Torgau, 1760 . 
Leignitz, 1760. 
Lonato and Casti- 
glione, 1796 

Rivoli, 1797 

| Marengo, 1800 
Hohenlinden, 1800 . 
Austerlitz, 1805 
Jena, 1806 
Auerstadt, 1806 
Hylau, 1807 
Heilsberg, 1807 
Friedland, 1807 
Vimiero, 1808 . 
Eekmihl, 1809 
Aspern, 1809 
Wagram, 1809 
Talavera, 1809 


Albuera, 1811 . : 
Salamanca, 1812 
Borodino, 1812 
Bautzen, 1813 
Vittoria, 1813 . 
Leipsic, 1813 . k 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


| 


Number of troops 


Prussians, 46,000 
Austrians, 60,000 
Prussians, 30,000 
Austrians, 35,000 
French, 44,000 
Austrians, 46,000 
French, 18,000 
Austrians, 28,000 
French, 28,000 
Austrians, 30,000 
French, 56,000 
Austrians, 50,000 
French, 65,000 A 
Allies, 83,000 . . 
French, 58,000 ; 
Prussians, 40,000 
French, 28,000 
Prussians, 45,000 
French, 70,000 
Russians, 63,500 
Russians, 84,000 
French, 85,000 
French, 75,000 
Russians, 67,000 
English, 18,000 
French, 14,000 
French, 65,000 
Austrians, 80,000 
Austrians, 75,000 
French, 95,006 
French, 220,000 
Austrians, 150,000 . 
English and Spanish, 
53,000 . ; . 
French, 56,000 
Allies, 32,000 . 
French, 22,500 
Allies, 44,000 . 
French, 47,000 
French, 125,000 
Russians, 138,000 
French, 190,000 
Allies, 110,000 
Allies, 83,000 . 
French, 60,000 
Allies, 290,000 
French, 150,000 


Killed and 
wounded 


22,000 


7,200 
8,300 
6,750 
7,000 
5,000 
10,000 
30,000 
45,000 
12,000 
12,000 
5,000 
5,000 
42,000 
50,000 


Total 


} 14,500 
} 13,000 
} 14,500 
| 25,000 
} 17,000 
} 15,500 
\ 42,000 
} 29,000 
} 34,000 
} 2,720 
} 15,000 
| 45,000 
} 44,000 
|15.00 
| 13,750 
| 15,000 
} 75,000 
| 24,000 
} 10,000 
|. 92,000 


Total 
percentage 


eS) 
bo bw 


18 


Percentage 
of victor 


Name of battle 


Orthez, 1814 . 2 


Toulouse, 1814 

La Rothiére, 1814 
Montmirail, 1814 
Laon, 1814 . : 
Ligny, 1815 
Quatre-Bras, 1815 
Waterloo, 1815 
Alma, 1854. 
Inkermann, 1854 
Magenta, 1859 ° 
Solferino, 1859 ‘ 
Bull Run, 1861 
Perryville, 1862 
Shiloh, 1862 . : 
Seven Pines, 1862 
Gaines’ Mill, 1862 . 
Malvern Hill, 1862 . 
Cedar Run, 1862 


Second Managsas, 


1862 
Sharpsburg, 1862 


redericksburg, 1862 


Chickamauga, 1868 . 


Chancellorsville, 
1863 


NOTE {II 


Number of troops 


Allies, 37,000 . 
French, 40,000 
Allies, 52,000 . 
French, 38,000 
Allies, 80,000 . 
French, 40,000 
French, 25,000 
Allies, 39,000 . 
Allies, 60,000 . 
French, 52,000 
French, 73,000 
Prussians, 86,000 
Allies, 31,000 . 
French, 21,500 
Allies, 100,000 
French, 70,000 
Allies, 51,000 . 
Russians, 35,000 
Allies, 15,700 . 
Russians, 68,000 
Allies, 48,000 . 
Austrians, 60,000 
Allies, 135,000 ‘ 
Austrians, 160,000 . 
Confederates, 18,000 
Federals, 18,000 
Federals, 27,000 
Confederates, 16,000 
Federals, 58,000 . 
Confederates, 40,000 
Federals, 51,000 . 
Confederates, 39,000 
Confederates, 54,000 
Federals, 36,000 
Federals, 80,000 
Confederates, 70,000 
Confederates, 21,000 
Federals, 12,000 . 
Confederates, 54,000 
Federals, 73,000 . 
Confederates, 41,000 
Federals, 87,000 
Confederates, 70,000 
Federals, 120,000 
Confederates, 71,000 
Federals, 57,000 
Confederates, 62,000 
Federals, 130,000 


Killed and 
wounded 


14,000 


Total 


10,550 
12,500 
5,000 
9,000 
24,000 
8,700 
42,000 
9,100 
13,787 
11,000 
31,500 


16,971 
35,100 
24,000 


Total 
percentage 


«J 


502 STONEWALL JACKSON 
i ai|23 
Name of battle Number of troops seco ry Total 58 ap 
B/E 
Gettysburg, 1863 Federals, 93,000 . | 19,000 
Confederates, 70,000 | 18,000 |} 87-000 | 24 | 20 
Chattanooga, 1863 . {| Federals, 60,000 ./| 5,500 } 8500! 8} 9 
Confederates, 33,000 | 3,000 : 
Stone’s River, 1863. | Federals, 43,000 .j| 9,000 
Confederates, 37,712 | 9,500 } 18,500 24 | 20 
The Wilderness, | Confederates, 61,000 | 11,000 
1864 Federals, 118,000. | 15,000 |} 26:000 | 14 | 18 
Spotsylvania Court | Confederates, 50,000 | 8,000 
House, 1864 Federals, 100,000. | 17,000. |} 25:000 | 16 | 16 
Cold Harbour, 1864. | Confederates, 58,000 1,700 lu 700 | 6 3 
Federals, 110,000 10,000 J 
Nashville, 1864 Federals, 55,000 3,000 | 6500! 61 5 
Confederates, 39,000 | 3,500 : 
Koniggratz, 1866 Prussians, 211,000 .j| 8,894 
Austrians, 206.000 .| 18,000 |}26:894| 6) 4 
Worth, 1870 Germans, 90,000 10,642 
French, 45,000 so00 |} 18642 | 13 | 11 
Spicheren, 1870 Germans, 37,000 .| 4,871 
French, 39,000 .| 4,000 |} 8871 | 18 | 18 
Colombey, 1870 Germans, 34,000 5,000 
French, 54,000 3700 |f 8700 | 9 | 14 
Vionville, 1870 Germans, 70,000 15,800 
French, 98,000 . | 17,000. |} 82800 | 19 | 22 
Gravelotte, 1870 Germans, 200,000 20,000 
French, 120,000 10,000 |} 30,000 | 9 | 10 
Noisseville, 1870 Germans, 52,000 .| 3,078 } 6.620! 4/1 5 
French, 100,000 4 8,542 f 
Plevna, July 20,1877 | Turks, 20,000 . 1,000 
Russians, 7,000 .| 2.850 |f 3:850| 18] 5 
Plevna, July 30,1877 | Turks, 20,000 . - | 4,000 
Russians, 30,000 .| 7,300 | 24300 | 22 | 20 
Pelishat, August 31, | Russians, 20,000 .!| 1,350 | 23501 71 6 
1877 Turks, 15,000 . 5 1,000 : 
Lovtcha, 1877 . - | Russians, 20,000 1,500 
Turks, 5,000. . 9000 |f 3500) 14) 7 
Plevna, September | Turks, 35,000 . 3,000 
11, 1877 Russians, 80,000 16000 |} 19,000 | 16 | 8 
Plevna, December | Russians, 24,000 2,000 | 8000/17 1 8 
10, 1877 Turks, 20,000 . 6,000 5 
Aladja Dagh, 1877 . | Russians, 60,000 1,450 
Turks, 35,000 . 4500 |} 5950] 6} 2 
Shipka, 1878 . Russians, 25,000 5,500 5,500 | — | 22 
; Turks, 30,000 . dens pan EMT) 
Tel-el-Kebir, 1882 .{ English, 17,000 439 
Egyptians, 25,000 3,000 |} 3489) 9} 2 


NOTE II 503 


Although this return has been compiled from the most trustworthy 
sources, it can only be taken as approximately accurate. 


Bririsa Losszs 
Strength Killed and Percentage 


wounded 

* Dettingen, 1743 . : . 12,000 821 6 
* Fontenoy, 1745 ° : . 16,600 4,002 24 
Alexandria, 1801 . A . 12,000 1,521 12 
*+ Assaye, 1803 . : 4 . 4,500 1,566 34 
Coruna, 1809 . : 4 - 14,500 1,000 6 
* Talavera, 1809 . : - 20,500 6,250 30 
* Albuera, 1811 . : : . 8,200 3,990 48 
Barossa, 1811 . ; : - 4,400 1,210 27 
* Salamanca, 1812 . : . 26,000 3,386 13 
* Quatre-Bras, 1815 . . - 12,000 2,504 20 
* Waterloo, 1815 / ; ~ 23,991 6,932 29 
t+ Maharajpore, 1843 . . - 6,000 790 13 
+ Moodkee, 1845 —. ‘ - 9,000 874 9 
+ Ferozeshah, 1845 . ; - 16,000 2,415 15 
t Aliwal, 1846. ; i - 10,500 580 5 
+ Sobraon, 1846 . : ‘ - 15,500 2,063 13 
+ Chillianwalla, 1849 . ‘ - 15,000 2,388 15 
* Alma, 1854 =. ‘ ‘ . 21,500 2,002 7) 
* Inkermann, 1854 . é . 7,464 2,357 34 


* In those marked by an asterisk the force formed part of an allied army. 
¢ In these battles Indian troops took part. 


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INDEX 


Axo.itionists, i. 80, 81-2, 84-6, 88-9, 
93, 98, 102 

Abolitionists, Southern, i. 82, 85, 88 

Adour, passage of river, ii. 491 

Agincourt, battle of, ii. 164 

Albuera, battle of, ii. 148 

Alexander, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 177 

Allan, Col. W., C.S.A., i, 274, 309, 
352; ii. 9, 125 

Alvinzi, Gen., i. 419 

American soldier (see also Northern 
and Southern soldier), i. 106; ii. 
342, 345-8, 381 

American volunteer, i. 33, 48-9; ii. 
109, 169, 354, 373 

Anderson, Col. G. T., C.S.A., ii. 250, 
252, 254, 255, 271 

Anderson, Gen. R. H., C.8.A., ii. 138, 
162, 166, 208, 218, 234, 238, 242-3, 
254, 257, 272, 329, 412-3, 416, 419- 
21, 482-5, 445, 459-60, 462-4, 467 

Anglo-Saxon race, i. 93; ii. 339-40, 
355 

Antietam. (See Sharpsburg) 

Archduke Charles of Austria, quoted, 
i. 406 

Archer, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 95-6, 153, 
159, 271, 309-10, 316-8, 434, 436 

Armament. (See under Tactics, Arms) 

Armies and soldiers, regular, i. 48-9, 
114, 183, 137, 147, 169, 220-2, 227, 
427, 429-30; ii. 32-3, 180-1, 360, 
362-3, 373 

Armies, Northern, i. 105, 110-11, 120, 
124, 157, 172; 208, 222; ii. 839, 
345-6, 378, 396-7 


Armies, Southern, i. 115, 208; ii. 339, 
397, 494 

Armies, Western. (See Western) 

Armistead, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 61-3, 253, 
272 

Army, Austrian, i. 110; ii. 466 

Army, English, i. 208, 427; ii. 340, 
355-6, 468 

Army, French, i. 110, 221, 419; ii. 
338, 356, 362, 372-3, 491 

Army, German, i. 256, 426, 427; ii. 
21-2, 24, 278, 342, 355, 356 

Army, Mexican, i. 26, 30,34, 35, 44-5 

Army of Mexico (U.8.), i. 48-9 

Army of Northern Virginia (strength, 
etc.), i. 172, 174, 232, 271, 389 ; ii. 
13, 72, 74, 111-2, 118, 123-4, 165-6, 
168, 196, 208, 225, 228-30, 235-6, 
242, 267, 271-2, 274-5, 280, 289, 
294, 296, 303, 308, 331, 338, 341-4, 
347-60, 370-1, 879, 382, 386-7, 
398-9, 406, 412-3, 440, 467-8, 487 

Army of Prussia, i. 110; ii. 338 

Army of the Potomac (strength, etc.), 
i. 202, 213, 216, 218, 231, 235, 250, 
252, 265, 389; ii. 2, 3, 9, 30, 43, 46, 
72, 75, 84, 122, 124, 167, 198, 213, 
228-31, 243, 267, 272-5, 278-9, 
294-5, 299, 300, 314, 327, 329, 331-2, 
337, 339, 341-4, 381, 401, 410-2, 
466-8 

Army of the Rappahannock, Federal, 
under McDowell (strength, etc.), i. 
292, 293-4, 304, 355-6, 386 

Army of the Shenandoah, Confederate, 
i, 123, 167, 168 


506 


Army of the Shenandoah, Federal, 
under Banks (strength, etc.), i. 213-4, 
224-6, 269, 293-4, 316-7, 355-6, 447 

Army of the Valley (strength, etc.), i. 
219-25, 228, 235, 253-5, 260, 274, 
284, 304, 309-13, 333, 349, 355-6, 
371, 373-4, 385, 419, 424-5, 434, 
437-8 ; ii. 3, 9, 17-8, 20, 26, 29-30, 
34, 68, 79, 83, 85-6, 97, 102, 109, 
111, 119, 126-7, 152-3, 160, 164, 
169, 178, 247, 268 

Army of Virginia, Federal, under Pope 
(strength, etc.), i. 401; ii. 78, 97, 
100, 103, 113, 116, 122-3, 124, 182, 
135, 151, 165-6, 171, 176 

Army of Western Virginia, Federal, 
under Rosecrans and Frémont 
(strength, etc.), i. 186, 188, 205, 
218, 217, 269, 275, 293-4, 295, 303, 
355-6, 446 

Army, United States (strength, etc.), 
(see also Officers), i. 24-5, 33, 58, 
104-5, 111, 120; ii. 30, 33, 36-7, 
39, 180 

Ashby, Gen. Turner, C.S.A., i. 178, 
220, 222-5, 227-8, 230, 236-9, 241-2, 
246, 259, 264, 265-6, 268-70, 273-4, 
284, 288, 291, 303,309, 320-2,328-9, 
331-4, 342, 345, 350-2, 354, 355-6, 
359, 360-3, 368, 481, 436, 446; ii. 
189, 286 

Aspern, battle of, ii. 277, 493 

Assaye, battle of, ii. 491 

Atkinson, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 319-20 

Aulic Council, i. 419 

Austerlitz, battle of, i. 59, 418, 423; 
ii. 187-8, 395, 426 

Averell, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 46, 298, 438, 
457 


Bapasos, siege of, ii. 490 

Balloons, ii. 307, 418-9, 425, 480 

Banks, Gen. N. P., U.S.A. (see also 
Army of the Shenandoah), i. 184, 
189, 196, 202, 213, 216, 218-9, 224-8, 
230-2, 235, 247-8, 251-2, 259-60, 
263-72, 274-8, 280-4, 287-94, 297, 
301-3, 306-8, 311, 314-7, 321, 323- 
80, 333-4, 336, 342-4, 347-50, 
355-6, 372, 392, 398, 400-1, 405, 
408, 411-3, 415, 426, 427, 429-80, 
432-3, 441, 447; ii. 75, 79, 82, 84, 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


86, 90, 92, 97, 100-3, 116, 140, 
169-70, 182-3, 199, 205, 247, 273, 
285, 295, 334, 341, 345, 370, 392-3, 
485 

‘Barbara Fritchie,’ i. 65 

Barksdale, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 259, 271, 
306-7 

Barlow, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 434, 439 

Barossa, battle of, i. 254 

Bartow, Gen., C.S.A., i. 185, 141-3, 
145-6, 150, 160, 168 

Bath, skirmish near, i. 190 

Bautzen, battle of, ii. 19, 192 

Bayard, Gen., U.S.A., i. 344, 352, 354, 
355-6, 359, 446; ii. 79, 83, 87-8, 
92, 165-6, 180 

Beaulieu, Gen., i. 413, 419 

Beauregard, Gen., C.S.A., i. 38, 50, 
124, 131-3, 136, 141, 147, 151-2, 
156, 159-60, 165, 175-6, 201; ii. 15 

Beaver Dam Creek, Va., engagement 
at, 11. 16 

Bee, Gen., C.8.A., i. 185, 141-7, 150, 
151, 160, 168 

Belle Boyd, i. 327 eae 

Benjamin, Hon. J. P., i. 178, 184, 
187, 199, 200-1, 203-6, 209-10, 273 

Berry, Gen., U.§.A., ii. 427, 440, 
447, 450, 456 

Bidassoa, passage of river, ii. 491 

Bigelow, Capt., U.S.A., i. 423 

Birney, Gen., U.§8.A., ii. 316, 318-9, 
328 

‘Black Republicans,’ i. 81, 86, 96, 102 

Blenker, Gen., U.S.A., i. 248, 260, 266, 
277, 295, 302, 364, 373-4, 379, 415 

Blockade, i. 112-3, 124, 213; ii. 108, 
207, 334, 397, 405 

Bliicher, Field-Marshal, i. 75-6, 259 

Bonham, Gen., C.S.A., i. 142, 150, 168 

Boots, i. 222, 312, 4283 ii. 203, 205, 
209, 235, 349, 350, 353, 382 

Borcke, Major Heros von, C.S$.A., ii. 
282-3 

Boswell, Capt. J. K., C.S.A., ii. 125-6, 
449, 455, 465 

Boteler, Hon. R., Col., C.8.A., i. 272, 
348 ; ii. 77, 202 . 

Boteler’s Ford, engagement at, chap. 
Rix.) 1. 272-3 

Braddock, Gen., i. 227 

Branch, Gen., C.S.A., i. 306-8, 311, 


INDEX 507 


411; ii. 18, 15, 20, 21, 95-6, 153, | 


157, 161, 271, 366-7 

Brandy Station, battle of, ii. 112 

Bridges, i. 266, 359, 361, 364, 378, 
381, 387; ii. 7-8, 12, 17, 20, 27, 44, 
49, 50, 52, 119, 121, 136, 240, 301, 
306-7, 409, 415, 417, 424 

Bristoe Station, Va., engagement at, 
115183) 136 

Brown, Col., C.8.A., ii. 280, 434 

Brown, John, i. 76 

Buchanan, President, i. 97, 226 

Buena Vista, battle of, i. 30 

Buford, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 79, 83, 87, 
106, 139, 165-6, 171, 180 

Bull Run, battle of. (See Manassas) 

Bunker’s Hill, battle of, 1776, i. 106 

Burks, Col., C.S.A., i. 220, 240, 
262, 264 

Burns, Gen., U.S.A., il. 328 

Burnside, Gen. A. B., U.S.A., i. 168; 
ii. 73, 79, 84, 103, 106, 111, 113, 
117, 187, 243, 258, 299-301, 303, 
306-7, 320, 324-5, 329, 333, 
336-7, 342, 405, 410, 488 

Busaco, battle of, ii. 191, 228, 330 

Butterfield, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 419, 428, 
438 


Capvets, Military Institute, i. 56, 
58-60, 62-3, 98-9, 104, 295 

Cadets, West Point, i. 12-20, 22, 55 

Cesar, i. 75, 409; ii. 338 

Campbell, Col., U.S.A.,i. 309, 332 ; ii. 
91-2 

Camp Lee, Va., i. 104 

Canne, battle of, ii. 332 

Carrington, Capt., C.S.A., i. 369-70 

Carroll, Gen., U.S.A., i. 371 

Catholic Church, i. 53 

Cavaliers, the English, i. 2, 83 

Cedar Run, Va., battle of, chap. xv., il. 
109, 186, 235, 247, 279, 287, 342, 
370, 375, 484-5 

Cedarville, Va., cavalry engagement 
near, i. 319-20 

Cerro Gordo, battle of, i. 30-2, 35, 38, 
45 

Chancellorsville, battle of, chapters 
xxiii. and xxiv., i. 423, 433; ii. 187, 
370, 485, 487, 490, 491 


Chantilly or Ox Hill, engagement at, 
ii. 183-5, 287 

Chaplains, i. 444; ii. 399 

Chapultepec, battle of, i. 40-3, 45-6, 
50, 64 

Chew, Capt., C.S.A., i. 220; ii. 375 

Churubusco, battle of, 1.38-9, 50 

Ciudad Rodrigo, siege of, ii. 490 

Clausewitz, Gen., i. 407; ii. 196 

Clyde, Field-Marshal Lord, ii, 355 

Cobb, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 226, 271, 448 

Coercion, i. 93-7, 101-2 

Cold Harbour, battle of. (See Gaines’ 
Miil) 

Cold Harbour, second battle of, 1864, 
ii, 228 

Colli, Gen., i. 413, 418 

Colquitt, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 271, 441, 444 

Colston, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 412, 441, 
447-9, 455, 460, 467 

Columbia, district of, i. 108-9 

Command, selections for, i. 226; ii. 
300, 344-5 

Command, system of, ii. 342-4 

Comte de Paris, ii. 215, 223 

Confederacy, the resources of, i. 111-2; 
ii. 205 

Confederate territory, i. 108-9 

Conscription Act, Southern, i. 273, 
303 

Conscripts, ii. 348 

Contreras, battle of, i. 836-7, 39, 64 

Cooke, Col., C.S.A., i. 348 

Cooking, i. 222; ii. 349 

Corbin, ii. 364, 383 

Cornwallis, Lord, i. 278 

Cortez, i. 26, 28, 35, 43 

Couch, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 267 

Council of War, i. 37 

Cox, Gen., U.S.A., i. 314; ii. 85 

Crampton’s Gap, engagement at, ii. 
224-6 

Crawford, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 247-8 

Crecy, battle of, ii. 340 

Crimean campaign, i. 171, 208, 226, 
422 

Cromwell, i. 64, 78, 83, 101, 108, 412, 
443; 11, 494 

Cross Keys, battle of, chapter xi., i. 
405, 408, 412, 423, 424, 427, 443, 
446; ii. 200, 484-5 

Crown Prince of Prussia, ii. 278 


508 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Crutchfield, Col. 8., C.S.A., i. 369; ii. 

50, 57, 222, 449, 453-4 
Cunningham, Col., C.8.A., ii. 26, 35 
Cutts, Col., C.S.A., ii, 249 


Dasney, Rev. Dr., Major, C.S.A., i. 181, 
206, 253, 255, 274, 276, 286, 295, 
298,300, 303, 309, 322, 333, 379, 381, 
385, 395, 417, 429, 440, 442; ii. 
i221, 23, 33-4, 67, 69, 7X, 77, 
89, 164, 212, 313, 368-9, 385-7, 
472-3 

Davis, President, i. 79, 131, 172-6, 
186, 201, 203, 207-8, 210, 215, 
218-9, 226, 280, 289, 294, 302, 305, 
310, 388, 409, 428; ii. 69, 77-8, 122, 
207, 274-6, 280, 303, 331, 333, 
336, 345, 382, 396, 404, 488-9 

D’Erlon, Count, ii. 59 

Desaix, Gen., i. 111 

Deserters, i. 290; ii. 111, 275-6, 
356, 364, 366, 385, 411, 425 

Discipline (see also Straggling), i. 
16-8, 45, 48-9, 64, 104, 106, 
111, 117-8, 152-3, 161-2, 169, 179, 
193-5, 197, 208-9, 212, 214, 221, 
223, 252-4, 278, 362; ii. 36, 75, 
188, 204, 209, 276, 350, 353, 355, 
357-63, 411 

Doles, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 441, 443 

Donnelly, Gen., U.S.A., i. 338, 341, 
447 

Doubleday, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 146, 245, 
246, 316, 318, 328 

Douglas, Col. H. K., C.S.A., ii. 210, 
914, 223 

Douro, passage of river, ii. 490 

Drayton, Gen., C.8.A., ii. 272 

Dresden, campaign of, i. 418 

Dress, i. 63, 105, 115, 129, 221-2; 
ii. 205, 209, 282, 351, 353 


Earty, General Jubal A., C.S.A., 
1.152, 168; ii. 93-6, 101, 118-22, 145, 
148, 153-4, 157, 161-2, 165, 249, 
251, 254, 269-71, 303, 306, 308, 
310, 318-20, 329, 412, 416, 462-3, 
467 

Earthworks andintrenchments (see also 
under Tactics), i. 30-1, 35-40, 106, 


158, 170, 232, 233, 278, 307, 308, 
388, 391; ii. 9, 14-6, 18-9, 112, 
182-3, 200, 305, 325, 327, 347 

Kekmiihl, campaign of, i. 418 

Edict of Emancipation, ii. 289-90, 
335, 411 

Elk Run Valley, position in, ii. 199 

Hizey, Gen., C.8.A., i. 151, 309, 337, 
339-401, 443 

Episcopal Church, i. 55 

Eugéne, Prince, i. 409 

Evans, Gen. N. G., C.S.A., i. 142-4, 
146-7, 151, 160, 172; ii. 178, 208, 
242, 258, 491 

Ewell, Gen. R. §., C.S.A., i. 25, 50, 274, 
276-7, 280-4, 288, 290, 294, 302-3, 
806-10, 314-5, 327-30, 332, 334, 
337-9, 341, 348, 345, 351, 355, 359, 
365, 367-8, 372, 374-7, 380-3, 391, 
393, 400, 415, 427, 431, 433, 438-41 ; 
ii. 18, 21, 26, 32-5, 38, 42, 44, 61, 
64-5, 85, 87-8, 90-1, 94-6, 104-5, 
125-6, 129, 131, 133, 136-7, 139, 141, 
144-5, 147, 149, 155, 204, 208, 210, 
242, 271, 280, 287-8, 303 

Hylau, battle of, i. 259; ii. 19 


Farr Oaks, Va., battle of. (See Seven 
Pines) 

Falling Waters, Va., engagement at, 
i. 128-30, 165 


Faulkner, Col. Charles, OC.§8.A., 
li. 379 

Field exercises, ii. 412 

Field, Gen., ©C.S.A., i. 280, 282; 
ii. 95, 97, 153, 158-9, 161, 164, 
271, 309 


Flodden, battle of, ii. 332 

Flournoy, Col., C.8.A., i. 310, 320, 
342 

‘Fog of War, the,’ ii. 194-5 

Forno, Col., C.S.A., ii. 145, 148, 
153, 159, 164 

Forrest, Gen., C.S.A., i. 333 

Fortifications, i. 16, 30, 35, 39, 40, 
125, 158, 213, 233, 250, 389; ii. 185, 
198-9, 305, 347, 350, 383, 408, 
430-1, 480 

Fortresses, i. 28-9, 40, 109, 125; ii, 
199 

Fox-hunting, i. 9, 161 


INDEX 509 


Franklin, Gen. W. B., U.S.A., i. 168 ; 
ii. 54, 56-7, 138, 170, 182, 186, 
224-5, 229, 233, 248, 272, 313-6, 
320-2, 324, 328 

Frayser’s Farm, Va., battle of, chapter 
xiv., ii. 279, 486 

Frederick the Great, i. 75, 173, 227, 
404, 409, 410, 414, 419, 441; ii. 338, 
497 

Fredericksburg, battle of, chapter xx., 
ii. 109, 370, 484 

Frémont, Gen. John C., U.S.A., i. 213, 
248, 250, 269, 271-2, 275, 277, 280, 
293-5, 801-3, 314, 344-6, 348-54, 
355-6, 359-61, 363, 365, 367-8, 
372-3, 375-6, 379, 381, 384, 386, 
391-3, 398-401, 404-5, 408, 412-3, 
415, 423-4, 426, 429, 431-2, 434, 
442, 446; ii. 19, 75, 155, 199, 
342-3, 345, 393, 484-5 

French, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 40, 43, 251, 
257, 328 

Front Royal, engagement at, chapter 
x., 1. 837-8, 405, 412, 447; ii. 392-3 

Fuentes d’Onor, battle of, ii. 228, 330 

Fulkerson, Col., C.S.A., i. 220, 240-1, 
243, 262; ii. 26, 35 

Funsten, Col., C.S.A., i. 237 


Garnzs’ Mitu, Va., battle of, chapter 
xlii., ii. 201, 228, 279, 341, 348 

Garland, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 271 

Garnett, Gen., C.8.A., i. 190, 194, 220, 
229, 243-5, 253, 255, 257; ii. 175, 
272, 370, 487 

Garnett, Lieut.-Col., C.8.A., ii. 92, 94, 
104 

Geary, Gen., U.S.A., i. 316, 321, 350, 
355-6, 424, 447 

German soldiers in America, i. 352, 
373, 375; ii. 155, 339, 466 

Getty, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 328 

Gettysburg, battle of, i. 169, 254, 433 ; 
ii. 278, 469, 487-8 

Gibbon, Gen. John, U.S.A., ii. 146-8, 
244-6, 316-9, 325, 328 

Gneisenau, i. 75 

Gordon, Gen. G. H., U.S.A., i. 264, 
266, 270, 323-5, 329, 334, 338-9, 
447; ii. 115, 134, 247-8, 252, 275 

Gordon, Gen. J. B., C.S.A., ii. 396, 
486 


Graham, Rev. Dr., i. 199, 212, 229-30, 
258 

Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., U.S.A., i. 26, 
44-5, 48-50, 58, 87, 208, 255, 276, 
433; ii. 188, 223, 228, 371, 479, 
485, 487, 489, 490 

Gravelotte, battle of, i. 259; ii, 21-2, 
24, 71, 356 

Green, Gen., C.S.A., i. 333 

Greene, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 247-9, 251 

Gregg, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 90, 153, 156-7, 
161, 164, 271, 309, 317-8, 325-6 

Griffin, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 328 

Grigsby, Col., C.8.A., i. 303; ii. 247, 
249, 251 

Grouchy, Marshal, ii. 59, 260 

Grover, Gen., U.S8.A., ii. 159 

Groveton, battle of, chapter xvi., 
ii. 279, 287, 468, 490, 491 

Guerillas, i. 44, 45-6; ii. 82 

Guinaldo, 1812, ii. 492 

Gustavus Adolphus, i. 409 


Hauieck, Gen., U.S8.A., ii. 83-5, 100, 
103, 107, 113, 181, 133, 182-3, 185, 
211, 226, 289, 299 

Hampden, ii. 495, 498 

Hampton, Gen. Wade, C.S.A., i. 143-4, 
150-1, 160, 168, 333; ii. 122, 167, 
205, 208, 242-3, 291, 294, 331, 336, 
337, 414 

Hancock, Gen. W. 8., U.S.A., ii. 328 

Hancock, skirmish near, i. 191 

Hannibal, i. 75, 409; ii. 11, 196, 338 

Hanover Court House, Va., engage- 
ment at, ii. 4 

Harman, Col. W. A., C.8.A., i. 253; 
li, 268 

Harman, Major,C.§.A., i. 182, 228 

Harper’s Ferry, investment of, chapter 
xviii. ii. 280, 288, 376, 479 

Harris, Gen. N. G., C.8.A., ii. 475 

Hartsuff, Col., U.S.A., i. 294 

Hasdrubal, ii. 196 

Hatch, Gen., U.S.A., i. 288, 332, 334, 
447 ii. 163, 173, 175, 178 

Hawks, Major, C.S8.A., i. 182; ii. 471 

Hayes, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 447 

Hays, Gen., ©.8.A., ii. 184, 271 

Heintzleman, Gen. S. P., U.S.A., i. 
142-3, 168; ii. 53, 122 


510 


Hill, Gen. A. P., C.S.A., i. 50, 395, 
397; ii. 9, 12-4, 15-6, 21-6, 28-32, 
85, 38, 42, 45, 47-8, 54, 61-2, 65, 
80, 83-5, 88, 90-1, 94, 104-5, 125, 
131, 141, 145, 149, 152-3, 156-62, 
208, 215, 219, 221-4, 235-6, 241-3, 
254, 258-9, 261, 269-70, 304, 308, 
310-1, 316, 319, 320, 366, 370, 412, 
432, 441, 442, 448-51, 455, 459-60, 
467, 473 

Hill, Gen. D. H., C.S.A., i. 27, 50, 55, 
176, 200, 202, 216-8, 397 ; 11. 9, 12-4, 
17-8, 29, 30, 32-6, 40, 42, 52, 55-8, 
61-5, 79, 111, 122, 167, 205, 208, 
220, 224-6, 236, 238, 241-2, 244, 
247-51, 254-5, 257, 271, 276, 280, 
303, 305, 308, 310-1, 320, 329, 357, 
361, 375, 382, 405 

Hitchcock, Gen., U.S.A., i. 294 

Hoche, Gen., i. 111 

Hohenlinden, battle of, ii. 466 

Hoke, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 319 

Holmes, Gen., C.§.A., ii. 9, 11, 47-8, 
59, 61, 65 

Hood, Gen. J. B., C.S.A., i. 3943 ii. 
26, 35-6, 38, 42, 119, 163, 236, 
941-2, 944, 247-9, 251, 254-5, 262, 
272, 310, 322-3, 329, 348, 353, 407, 
425, 455 

Hooker, Gen. Joseph, U.S.A., i. 50; 
ii. 68, 122, 136, 139-40, 156-9, 
166, 179, 187-8, 216, 226, 237, 
240-50, 255, 261, 272, 275, 306, 
314, 328, 337, 341, 404, 406-10, 
412-19, 422-98, 430-1, 434, 438-9, 
445, 449, 453, 457-60, 462-6, 468-9, 
472, 486 

Horsemanship, i. 70, 161, 198, 224, 
362; ii. 339-40 

Horse-masters, i. 225 

Horse-racing, i. 9 

Horses, i. 9, 111, 161, 224; ii. 115, 
186, 189, 273, 292-3, 299, 414 

Hotchkiss, Major J., C.S.A., i. 181, 303, 
349, 381, 416, 440; ii. 87, 110, 215, 
941, 327, 431-2, 436, 451, 487 

Howard, Gen. O. O., U.S.A., i. 152, 
168; ii. 328, 416, 427, 436, 488-40, 
442, 444, 465-6 

Huger, Gen., C.S.A., i. 50; ii. 9, 11, 14, 
45, 47-8, 52-4, 58-9, 61-2, 65 

Humphreys, Gen., U.8.A., ii. 267, 328 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


Hundley’s Corner, Va., engagement at, 
ii. 16, 22 

Hunt, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 66 

Hunter, Gen., U.S.A., i. 142-3, 168 ; ii. 
73, 84 


ImpopEn, Gen., C.8.A., i. 121, 144-5, 
149, 163, 378, 420, 439 

‘Immortals,’ the, i. 15-6 

India, i. 58 

Indians, i. 5-6, 24-5 

Information in war. (See Intelligence, 
etc. 

ale battle of, ii. 175, 340 

Intelligence Department and Informa- 
tion, i. 224, 232, 258-9, 287, 326-7, 
412-4, 422-3; ii. 39, 82-3, 89, 120, 
145, 170-1, 188-9, 193-5, 213, 415, 
418-9, 427 

Interior lines. (See Strategy) 

Irish soldiers in America, i. 242, 311; 
ii. 340 

Tronsides, the, i. 225, 443 

Italy, campaign of, i. 418, 419 

Iverson, Col., C.S.A., ii. 441, 443 


Jackson, Cummins, uncle of Gen. T J. 
Jackson, i. 7, 8, 10, 11 
Jackson, Elizabeth, i. 5 
Jackson family, characteristics of, i. 
3, 5-6 
Jackson family, origin of, i. 3-4 
Jackson, Gen., President of the United 
States, i. 4, 15, 106 
Jackson, John, i. 4-6 
Jackson, John, father of Gen. T. J. 
Jackson, i. 5-6 
Jackson, Julia, mother of Gen. T. J. 
Jackson, i. 6-7, 11, 52; ii. 384 
Jackson, Julia, daughter of Gen. T. 
J. Jackson, ii. 384-5, 400, 470 
Jackson, Mary Anna, wife of Gen. T. 
J. Jackson, i. 59, 61, 67-73, 76, 
103-4, 116, 156, 161, 176-8, 257-8, 
272; ii. 55, 280, 384-5, 396, 400, 
470-1, 495 
Jackson, Thomas Jonathan, ‘ Stone- 
wall,’ Lieut.-Gen., C.S.A.: 
Advice overruled, ii. 61, 78, 109, 
114, 489 
Anecdotes of, i. 10, 19, 20, 27, 
46-7, 68, 100, 114, 130, 134, 


INDEX 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan— 


Anecdotes of :—cont. 
145, 154, 163, 165-6, 177, 190, 
212, 230, 247, 300, 303, 312-3, 
336, 347-8, 370, 394, 396, 439- 
41; ii. 50-1, 57-8, 67, 69, 70, 
71-2, 82, 95, 115, 126-7, 143-4, 
160, 164, 202, 210, 214-5, 223, 
253, 256, 259-60, 264-7, 282-4, 
302, 312-3, 315, 318, 326, 364-7, 
381, 387-8, 389, 399, 400, 482, 
499 
Appointments : 
To Cadetship, i. 13 
First. Regiment of artillery 
U.S.A, 1. 24 
Magruder’s Field Battery, i. 33 
Professorship at Military In- 
stitute, i. 56 
Topographical 
0.8.A., i. 114 
Virginia Volunteers, i. 114 
Command at Harper’s Ferry, 
1861, i. 115 
First Brigade of Army of 
Shenandoah, i. 123 
Command of District of 
Shenandoah Valley, i. 164 
Command of Second Army 
Corps, ii. 280 
Birth, 1. 5 
Birthplace, i. 5, 131, 163 
Boyhood, i. 8-10, 410 
Brother, i. 6, 9 
Caricatures of, i. 65; ii. 370, 390 
Childhood, 1. 7-9 
Compared with : 
Cromwell, ii. 494 
Grant, 11. 489 
Hasdrubal, ii. 196 
Johnston, ii. 489 
Lee, ii. 488 
Napoleon, i. 22-3 ; ii. 493 
Ney, ii. 191, 193 
Prince Frederick Charles, ii. 
196 
Sherman, ii. 489 
Wellington, ii. 191, 490-3 
Wolfe, ii. 494 
Criticism of his manceuvres re- 
futed, i. 258; ii. 16-24, 54, 57- 
8, 100-5 


Department, 


SE 


511 


Death, ii. 470-1 
Devotion of his men, i. 77, 165, 
286, 434; ii. 281-2, 366, 370-1, 
373-4 
Dispatches, ii. 373 
Dissatisfaction with conduct of 
war, i. 154, 175-6, 203-4 ; ii. 70, 
71, 391 
Estimate of : 
Banks’, i. 315 
Lee’s, ii. 469-70, 477-8 
Letcher’s, i. 205 
Lexington’s, i. 63-5, 76 
McClellan’s, ii. 109 
Northern generals’, i. 232-3, 
314, 325, 399; ii. 54, 109, 479 
Northern press’, ii. 109 
Northern soldiers’, ii. 223, 381 
President Davis’, ii. 470 
President of Baltimore and 
Ohio Railway, i. 314 
Southern people’s, ii. 74, 109, 
477, 479 
Southern soldiers’, i. 129, 165, 
177-8, 437-8 ; ii. 279, 284-5, 
373-4, 381, 480 
Swinton’s, ii. 477 
First estimate of : 
His friends’, i. 114 
His officers’, i. 196-7, 283, 438- 
40; ii. 370-1 
His troops’, i. 197-8 
Funeral, ii. 476-7 
Guards the camp, i. 134 
Horsemanship, i. 9, 18, 70, 115 
Influence on his soldiers, i. 117, 
429, 432, 436; ii. 398, 494, 499 
Influence on the Southern people, 
ii, 494 
Letters of : 
On faith, i. 71, 72, 272-3 
On his travels, i. 70-1 
On state of country, i. 76 
On promotion, i. 114, 130; ii. 
280 
On necessity of secrecy, i. 116, 
258 


After First Manassas, i. 155 

On defence of Harper’s Ferry, 
i. 125 

On battle of First Manassas, i. 
156-7 


512 STONEWALL JACKSON 


At Groveton, ii. 146, 287 
At Second Manassas, ii. 164, 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan— 
Letters of :—cont. 


On leave of absence, i. 161; ii. 
385-6 

On parting with Stonewall 
Brigade, i. 164 

On selection of staff officer, i. 
179-80 

On appointment of staff-officer, 
i. 183 

On discipline, i. 195 

On resignation of command, 
i. 204-5 

On defence of Valley, i. 217-8 

On threatening Washington, 
i. 252, 306 

On fighting on Sunday, i. 257 

On making ‘thorough work ’ of 
campaign, i. 272 

On attacking Banks, i. 276, 
281-4 

On Banks’ character, i. 278 

On obedience of orders, i. 281, 
308 

On qualities of West Virginia 
troops, i. 298 

On straggling, i. 427 

On surrender of MHarper’s 
Ferry, ii. 224 

On promotion of officers, ii. 374 

On giving over guns of Army 
Corps, li. 375 

On the people of the Valley, 
li. 376 

On birth of his daughter, ii. 
384-5 

On peace, il. 385 


Library, i. 69 
Losses: 


At Falling Waters, i. 129 
At First Manassas, i. 157 
On Romney expedition, i. 195 
At Kernstown, i. 253, 260 
At M‘Dowell, i. 299 

At Cedarville, i. 320 

At Front Royal, i. 353 

At Winchester, i. 353 

At Cross Keys, i. 376 

At Port Republic, i. 385 

At Valley Campaign, i. 424 
At Gaines’ Mill, ii. 42 

At Cedar Run, ii. 105, 287 


287 
At Chantilly, ii. 185, 287 
At Harper’s Ferry, ii. 223, 288 
At Sharpsburg, ii. 255, 271-2, 
288 
At Boteler’s Ford, ii. 270 
On the Rappahannock, ii. 287 
At Bristoe Station, ii. 287 
At Fredericksburg, ii. 329 
At Chancellorsville, ii. 467 


Marriage, i. 59 
Military Maxims of, ii. 496 


Attack, i. 162-3 

Infantry fire, i. 162 

Use of bayonet, i. 163, 229 

Cavalry in touch with the 
enemy, i. 342 

Strategy of weaker army, i. 
412, 415, 420; ii. 398 

Defensive strategy, i. 418 

Value of time, i. 417-8 ; ii. 481 

Mystifying and misleading, i. 
420 . 

Pursuit, i. 420; ii. 76-7, 481 

A routed army, i. 420 

Battle against odds, i. 420 

Point of attack, i. 420 

Vigour in attack, i. 420; ii. 31, 
76-7, 179, 481 

Rapidity, i. 420; ii. 481 

Rest on the march, i. 426 

Forced marches, i. 426-7 

Invasion, i. 174-5; ii. 77, 481 

Concentration of force, i. 175; 
vi ea BY 

Councils of War, i. 230 

Reaping fruits of victory, ii. 
322, 481 

Defensive positions, ii. 305 

Meeting superior numbers, 
ii. 326 

Unsuccessful officers, ii. 342 

Promotion of officers, ii. 374, 465 

Example to be set by superior 
officers, ii. 386 

Activity, i. 412, 419-20; ii. 398 

Secret of success in war, ii. 480 

Earthworks, ii. 481 

Loss in forced marches, ii. 482 

Patriotism, ii. 497 


INDEX 513 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan—cont. Carelessness of comfort, i. 161, 

Narrow escapes of, i. 369; ii. 41-2, 187, 192, 196, 246, 435-6, 
160 438 

Personal characteristics of : 


Ability, i. 47-8 
Absence of show and assump- 
tion, i. 115, 117, 164-5, 
435-6, 444-5; ii. 71, 478 
Absent-minded, i. 63, 77; ii. 
390, 398 
Abstemiousness, i. 60, 336, 436; 
i. 495 
Abstraction, power of, i. 21, 69, 
743; i. 391 
Accuracy of statement, i. 62-3 ; 
ii. 379 
Admiration of Lee, i. 3807, 
397293 11.77 
Admiration of Napoleon’s 
genius, i. 58, 416 
Admiration of Confederate 
soldier, i. 437; ii. 373-4, 
462 
Affection, i. 8, 22; ii. 495-6 
Ambition, i. 11, 21, 23, 46, 71, 
157, 196 ; ii. 381, 495 
Anger, i. 19, 436, 441-2; ii. 71, 
370 
Appearance : 
On the batile-field, i. 147, 
149, 165, 243-4, 340; ii. 
34, 50, 94, 311-2, 432, 
436 
As a cadet, 1. 14, 18, 22 
In camp, ii. 388-9 
In childhood, i. 9 
At councils of war, i. 229- 
30, 397; il. 69, 123 
At Lexington, i. 61, 63 
At reviews, i. 164-5 
On service, i. 115, 312-3; 
li. 478 
Application, i. 10, 15-17, 20-1, 
33, 46; ii. 490 
Audacity, i. 411; ii. 487, 491 
Bible: 
His guide, i. 61, 73 
Literal interpretation of the, 
i. 61, 257 
Study of the, i. 61, 69 
Camaraderie, i. 436-7, 439; 
ii. 373 


Careless of popular opinion, i. 
155-6 ; ii. 376 

Catholicity, i. 438-9 

Cheerfulness, i. 8, 66-73 ii. 
315, 377-8 

Choice of companions, i. 21 

Clanship, i. 11 

Concentration, power of, i. 20, 
66, 74; ii. 391, 396, 496 

Consideration for others, i. 19- 
20, 438 ; ii. 374, 376 

Conversation, i. 165; ii. 389-90 

Coolness under fire, i. 41-2, 47, 
130, 147, 149, 163, 165, 437; 
ii. 318, 396 

Courage, moral, i. 12, 21, 77, 
437; ii. 480 

Courage, physical, i. 10, 39, 
41-2, 77, 130, 163, 165, 244; 
li. 480-2 

Courtesy, i. 9, 66, 116, 436, 
438 ; ii. 376, 389-90, 453 

Decision, i. 10, 12 

Decision in emergencies, ii. 
490-1 

Devotion to duty, i. 19, 21, 33, 
78, 116, 161 

Devotion to Virginia, i. 99, 
103, 204, 209-10 ; ii. 346, 495 

Devotion to his wife, i. 116 

Dislike of profanity, i. 145 

Distaste of show, i. 115, 129- 
30, 221 

Early rising, ii. 50, 55, 68, 
284-5 

Earnestness, i. 12, 20, 66, 77, 
117, 257 ; ii. 390 

Economical habits, i. 70 

Endurance, i. 438; ii. 189, 481 

Energy, i. 10, 43, 60, 191, 192, 
377-9, 412, 436; ii. 189, 233, 
478, 481, 494 

Enthusiasm, i. 66 

Estimate of time, i. 13, 187-8 

Faith, i. 71-3, 77, 163,;-211; 
ii. 462, 465, 488, 495 

Family pride, i. 11 

Fearlessness of responsibility, 
i. 77; ii. 480 


514 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan— Personal magnetism, i. 197, 
Personal characteristics of :—cont. 437 


Finesse, i. 116; ii. 280 
Freedom from cant, i, 73 
Gentleness, i. 20, 71, 436, 439 
Gravity, i. 8, 66; ii. 390 
Health, i. 9, 11, 21, 60, 69, 78, 
160-1, 214; ii. 55, 76, 385, 
A481 
Horror of war, i. 103, 257; ii. 
385 
Hospitality, i. 70; ii. 388-9 
Humility, i. 445 ; ii. 495 
Imagination, i. 66, 74, 417; ii. 
478, 484 
Industry. (See Application) 
Inflexibility, i. 19, 63 
-Information, range of, ii. 390 
Intellectual development, i. 21, 
~ 23 
Intellectual training for war, i. 
74-6, 78; ii. 394-6 : 
Kindness, i. 8, 20, 67, 76; ii. 
364, 389 
Knowledge of military history, 
i. 58, 420; ii. 390, 394-5 
Language, 1. 73 
Literary facility, ii. 379 
Love of art, i. 71; ii. 390 
Love of children, i. 68, 212 ; ii. 
302, 364, 400 
Love of fighting, i. 27, 33, 43, 
149, 209, 439; ii. 481 
Love of history, i. 69-70; ii. 
390 
Love of home, i. 9, 71, 199, 
210; ii. 346 
Love of Nature, i. 66, 70, 71, 
366 
Love of peace, i. 103, 257; ii. 
385 
_ Love of theological discussion, 
i. 165, 212 
Love of truth, i. 62 
Manners. (See Courtesy) 
Modesty, 1.47, 198, 210; ii. 370, 
380, 390, 462, 465 
Neatness, i. 63 
Never knew when he was beaten, 
1. 150, 244, 252, 438 
Peculiar gestures, i. 149, 166 
Perseverance, i. 10, 15-6, 22 


Playfulness, i. 65, 177, 212 

Power of drawing inferences, ii. 
483, 486 

Power of expression, ii. 379 

Prayer, i. 61, 68, 73, 103, 165, 
210, 443-4; ii. 496 

Pride in his soldiers, i. 156-7, 
166-7, 195, 443 ; ii. 341 

Purity, i. 10, 23, 74; ii. 399 

Recreations, i. 18, 60, 69, 70 

Reflective habits, ii. 391, 396 

Religion on service, i. 443-4 ; 
ii. 899 

Religious views, i. 72, 163 

Reserve, i. 18, 66, 74 

Resolution, ii. 435, 445, 481, 
491 

Reticence, i. 115-6 ; ii. 89, 284— 
5, 483 

Reticence as regards his achieve- 
ments, i. 155, 157; ii. 374 

Self-control, i. 210; ii. 494 

Self-possession, ii. 478 

Self-reliance, i. 21, 23, 48; ii. 
488, 490, 495 . 

Self-sacrifice, i. 204, 209; ii. 
494 

Sense of honour, i. 20 


» *Shrewdness, i. 14 


Shyness, i. 18, 27, 60; ii. 478 
Silence, i. 22, 63, 64, 115, 197, 
436; ii. 390, 391, 398, 478 
Simplicity, i. 23, 115, 435-6 ; 
ii. 494 

Studious habits, i. 18, 22, 68-9, 
74, 410 

Study, method of, i. 20, 69; 
ii. 391 

Study of, and training for, war, 
i. 48, 57-9, 69, 74-5, 78, 250, 
410, 416; ii. 394-5 

Sunday, observance of, i. 61, 
257, 273, 287, 302, 443 

Tact, i. 19, 117-8, 165, 438 

Taste for strong liquor, ii. 495 

Temper, i. 14, 71, 210, 436 ; ii, 
370, 495 

Temperance, i. 60; ii. 399 

Thankfulness, i. 71, 130, 156 

Thoroughness, i. 421 ; ii. 496 


INDEX 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan— 
Personal characteristics of :—cont. 
Truthfulness and sincerity, i. 


8, 20, 23, 62, 74; ii. 370, 380, 
492, 496 


Vindictiveness, i. 19; ii. 370, 


495 


Practice and principles of, mili- 
tary: 
Administration : 


Care for comfort of men, i. 
165, 192, 448; ii. 374 

Care of private rights, i. 
166, 197-8 

Care of wounded, i. 260, 
300, 437 ; ii. 402-3 

Examination of officers, i. 
182 

Hospitals, i. 437 

Medical service, i. 118, 437, 
444; ii. 386 

Supply, i. 118; ii. 374, 386, 
417 


Transport, i. 118; ii. 374, 
386 


Command: 


VOL. 


‘ 


Application of military code 
to volunteers, ii. 355 

Councils of War, i. 229-30; 

' ti. 488 

Courtesy to men, i. 165; ii. 
366 

Duties of commanding offi- 
cers, i. 161, 179, 193 

Employment of regular 
officers with volunteers, i. 
181 

Employment of unsuccess- 
ful officers, ii. 342, 489 


Encouragement of initiative, © 


ii. 343 
Official reports, i. 436; ii. 
379-81 
Recommendations for pro- 
motion, ii. 364, 374 
Relations with his officers, 
i. 436, 438-42; ii. 325-6, 
363-4, 366-70, 874, 488-9 
Relations with his soldiers, 
iv 486-7 ; ii. 366, 376 
Relations with his staff, i. 
439-41; ii. 389 


II, 


515 


Scope on battlefield, ii. 343 - 
491 


Selection of officers for the 
staff, i. 179-83; ii. 364 
Supervision, i. 376, 436; ii. 
189 
System of, i. 117-8, 179; 
ii. 363-4 
Tact and consideration, i. 
165 ;. ii. 376 
Trusts his subordinates, i. 
3753 ii. 318, 491 
Discipline: i. 117, 161, 162, 
178-9, 195, 197-8, 208-9, 
214, 253, 254, 303, 350, 
376, 436, 441-2; ii. 175, 
363-6,-373 
Dealing with mutiny, i. 303 
Demands exact obedience, 
1. 3763 ii. 57, 488 
Gives exact obedience, ii. 
58, 435 y 
Punishment of officers, ii. 
366 
Punishment of soldiers,. ii. 
364-5 
Refuses to take furlough, ii: 
384 ; 
Strict conception of duty, i. 
197, 204, 376; ii. 364-5 
Drill, i. 117, 162, 365; ii. 400 
Instruction, i. 117-8, 162, 178, 
188-9 
Marches, i. 183—4, 189-93, 230, 
236, 263, 274, 284-6, 290, 
295-6, 302, 308, 312-14, 
327, 345-6, 349, 351-3, 
360-1, 393-5, 401, 412-3, 
425-7; ii. 11, 15-23, 25- 
6, 29, 49, 50, 87-9, 124-9, 
138, 183, 189-90, 203, 
208-9, 214-6, 233, 235, 


302-3 
Marching, i. 183, 427; ii. 285, 
482 
Karly start, i. 183; ii. 49, 
55, 90, 284 


Forced marches, ii. 482, 484 

Rules for, i. 426 

Standing orders for, ii. 402 
Orders : 

Anticipates orders, ii. 269 


NN 


516 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan— 
Practice and principles of, military: 


Orders :—cont. 


Character of, i. 115; ii. 
490 

Method of issue, i. 377 ; ii. 
57 

For counterstroke, ii. 92, 
94-5, 154, 190, 252, 260, 
323 

For attack, ii. 141-2 

For assault, ii. 35 

For attack of Second Line, 
ii. 33 

For night march, i. 298 

For rear guard action, i. 377 

For retreat, i. 349 

To Ewell, i. 307 

To Ewell at Cross Keys, i. 
365 

On dregs, i. 221 

For fiank attack, i. 380 

At Cedar Run, ii. 92-5, 98 

At Chancellorsville, ii. 421- 
2, 432, 437, 441-2, 448-9, 
401-2 

General orders, i. 302, 436, 
443 

To Federal gunners at Port 
Republic, i. 370 

For defence of position, ii. 
154, 190 

For bombardment of Har- 
per’s Ferry, ii. 218-20 

At Fredericksburg, ii. 318, 
323, 325 

Verbal, ii. 33 

Incomplete, ii. 88 

Interpretation of, i. 259-60, 
281-2; ii. 23 

Miscarriage of, i. 322; ii. 
34 


Orders and instructions re- 
ceived by Feb. 1862, i. 
219-20, 259-60; April, 
1862, i, 280, 294, 411; 
May, 1862, i. 306, 345, 
411; June, 1862, i. 390-3 ; 
li, 13,/15,-23,:30, 46, 57; 
Sept. 1862, ii. 212-3, 217, 
226, 259 ; before Chancel- 
lorsyille, ii. 415, 424 


} 


Strategy: 


Activity, 1.418; ii. 189, 398, 
479, 481-2 

Breadth of view, i. 282, 306, 
432 ; ii. 213, 396, 406, 478, 
485, 486 

Calculation, i. 201-2, 321, 
353, 377, 415, 421; ii. 
105, 140, 141, 189, 391, 
484-6 

Compels enemy to biunder, 
i. 272, 423 

Concealment of movements 
and intentions, i. 116, 290, 
309, 313-6, 393-6, 398- 
402, 412, 420-1, 423, 439- 
40; ii. 11, 85-7, 116, 
125-6, 132, 135, 187, 139- 
42, 483 ; 

Concentration of superior 
force, i. 423; ii. 200 

Counterstroke, i. 365, 374; 
ii. 182 

Deals with enemy in detail, 
i. 189-90, 361-2, 412-3, 
419, 423; ii. 79, 85, 199 

Defensive, ii. 199-201, 297 

Estimate of time, i.174, 187, 
237, 257, 259, 302, 334, 
412; ii. 19, 77, 114, 400, 
407 

Induces enemy to divide, i. 
386 

Intelligence Department, i. 
118, 202, 327; ii. 347, 
483 

Keeps enemy’s columns 
apart, ii. 199, 200 

Looks for annihilation of 
enemy, ii. 482 

Looks for opportunity, i. 
214; ii. 481 

Lures enemy into false posi- 
tion, i. 267, 272; ii. 79, 
91, 106, 110, 199, 485 

Mystifying the enemy, i. 
129, 228, 392-5; ii. 119, 
121-2, 327, 484-5 

Never fights except on his 
own terms, ii. 199, 490 

Never gives the enemy time, 
i. 175; ii. 189, 231, 398 


INDEX 517 


108-9, 135, 140, 143-4, 
146, 149, 212-3, 227-32, 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan— 
Practice and principles of, military: 


Strategy :—cont. 

Never misses an opportunity, 
i. 413 ; ii. 487 

No slave to rule, i. 433 

Objectives, i. 189, 219, 247 ; 
ii. 390-1, 485 

Patience, ii. 483, 490 

Plays on enemy’s fears, ii. 
391, 485 

Reaps fruits of victory, ii. 
470 

Regards enemy’s difficulties, 
i. 306, 347, 351, 354, 415 ; 
ii. 395 

Regards moral aspect of war, 
i. 342, 424; ii. 342, 395, 
483 

Secrecy, i. 115-6, 181, 183, 
187,197, 257, 286, 378, 439, 
440; ii. 89 

Spreads false information, 
i. 392, 395, 400 

Stratagems, i. 121-2, 270, 
309, 389, 391; ii. 83, 85, 
106, 118, 199, 327, 490 

Strikes at mental equili- 
brium of opponent, i. 307 ; 
ii. 395, 485 

Strikes at vital point, i. 306, 
342; ii. 76, 416 

Strikes where least ex- 
pected, i. 401 

Surprise, ii. 484, 491 

Takes advantage of mis- 
takes, i. 270 


Threatens enemy’s com-) 


munications, i. 187, 193, 
271, 283, 325-6, 328; ii. 
24 

Trades on knowledge of 
enemy’s character, i. 49- 
50, 227-8, 276, 281; ii. 
220, 234, 396, 483-4 

Vigilance, i. 198, 358, 436 

Strategical Plans: i. 174-5, 

184-8, 193-4, 201-3, 214, 
217, 251-2, 269, 271, 278, 
280, 288, 286-7, 299, 
301-2, 306-7, 365 ; ii. 77, 
83-5, 99, 101-2, 105-6, 


334, 336, 398, 413-4, 483, 
485, 488 
Strategical Views: 

Advantages of North-west 
Virginia, i. 164 

Counteracting enemy’s su- 
periority of numbers, i. 
189, 412; ii. 76-7, 297 

Criticism of Hooker’s plan 
in Chancellorsville cam- 
paign, ii. 464 

Defensive, the, i. 413 

Evils of civilian control, 
i. 199-200, 203-10 ; ii. 489 

Importance of recruiting- 
grounds, 1. 164 

Importance of Washington, 
i. 219, 247, 405 

Invasion, i. 164, 174-6, 
185; ii. 77-8, 481, 485 

Offensive, the, ii. 490 

Proper action for weaker 
belligerent, i. 412, 420; 
li. 398 

Tactics : 

Advanced guards, ii. 426 

Artillery, use of, i1. 190 

Attack, formation for, i. 
239, 296-7, 338-9, 368, 
379-80, 481; ii. 90, 94, 
122, 421-2 

Attack, night, 1. 133, 229, 
335-7 

Attack, vigour of, ii. 31, 
179, 458, 481, 486 

Attacks where least expect- 
ed, i. 239, 251, 412; u. 
483-4, 487 

Caution, ii. 96-7, 484, 486, 
490 


Cavalry, use of, i. 178, 223, 
237, 263, 309, 318-21, 
392, 394, 422, 432; ii. 
188, 483, 487 

Combination of three arms, 
ii. 487 

Concealment of troops on 
defensive, i. 146, 149, 151, 
298 ; ii. 172, 191, 315, 487, 
491 


NN 2 


518 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan— 
Practice and principles of, military: 
Tactics :—cont. 


Vigilance, i. 214, 360, 420, 
486 


Concentration of superior 
force, i. 250, 340; ii. 487 

Counter-attack, i. 149, 151- 
2, 239, 244, 365, 373-4; 
ii. 94-6, 104, 154-9, 161- 
2, 175-6, 178-9, 252-3, 
256, 259-61, 318, 321-3 

Defensive, ii. 230, 487 

Defensive position, ii. 152-4, 
158, 304-5 

Earthworks, i. 307; ii. 481 

Flank attacks, i. 239, 298, 
338-9, 379-80, 431; ii. 90, 
94, 121, 421-8, 432, 472 

Guides, i. 136, 240; ii. 97, 
120, 126 

Insight, i. 218, 227, 320, 
350, 353, 413, 431; ii. 67, 
70, 77, 181, 256, 445, 483, 
491 

Intercommunication, i. 202; 
li. 485 

Night marches, i. 300; ii. 
127, 130, 186, 141, 190 

Patience, ii. 483, 490 

Plans of attack, i. 239, 296, 
317-8, 328, 338, 365-7, 
879; i1..32, 51-2, 61, 90- 
1, 103, 145, 220-2 

Positions, i. 140-1, 145-6, 
151, 218, 228, 270, 274, 
275, 353-4, 363-6 ; ii. 98, 
139, 152-4, 244, 248, 304— 
5, 309-11 

Pursuit, i. 65, 153-5, 299, 
330-3, 340-2, 427 ; ii. 69, 
70, 96-7, 380, 422, 438-9, 
470, 481-6, 487 

Reconnaissance, ii. 51, 60-1, 
92, 160, 183, 189, 315, 
318 

Reliance on the bayonet, 
i. 146, 151, 229, 253; ii. 
35, 96, 175, 191 

Retreat and rear guards, i. 
213-4, 218 

Surprise, i. 239, 250, 317, 
412, 419, 424, 431; ii. 
483, 491 


Professor at Military Institute: 
Duties as, i. 58 
Inculcates discipline at, i. 64 
Unpopular as, i. 63 
Want of success as, i. 59 
Promotion : 
Second Lieutenant, i. 29 
First Lieutenant, i. 29 
Brevet-captain, i. 46 
Brevet-major, i. 47 
Colonel, i. 114 
Brigadier-general, i. 130 
Lieutenant-general, ii. 250 
Resigns his command, i. 201 
Resigns his commission, i. 57-8 
Staff officers, i. 115, 180-1, 404, 
425, 438 
‘Stonewall,’ origin of the name, 
i. 145 
Strength of command: 
First Brigade, July, 1861, i. 
153 
Romney expedition, i. J89 . 
Army of Valley, February, 
1861, i. 219-20, 228; March, 
i. 230-1; at Kernstown, i. 
250, 263-3; April, i. 267, 
270, 271; at M’Dowell, i. 
297-8, 301; before Win- 
chester, i. 309-10; at Cross 
Keys, i. 368; at Port Re- 
public, i. 885; in Peninsula, 
ii, 9; at Cedar Run, ii. 85, 
91, 95-6; at Groveton, ii. 
146 ; at Second Manassas, ii. 
153-5, 168; at Sharpsburg, 
li, 235-6, 255, 275-6; at 
Harper’s Ferry, ii. 235; 
Sept. 30, 1862, ii. 275; 
Second Army Corps, October, 
ii. 281; at Fredericksburg, 
ii. 310; at’ Chancellorsville, 
li. 412-3 
Sunday-school, i. 61, 64 
Travels, i. 59, 70-1; ii. 390 
Usefulness of Mexican  experi- 
ences, i. 48-51, 410 
Views: 
On Secession, i. 99 
On slavery, i. 89 


INDEX 519 


Jackson, Thomas Jonathan — 
Views :—cont. 
On special correspondents, i. 
156, 258 
On States’ rights, i. 99 
On war, i. 103 
Wounded, i. 149, 160-1, 163; ii. 
450 
Jena, battle of, i. 59, 259; ii. 332 
Jenkins, Gen., C.8.A., ii. 272, 414 
‘Jim,’ i. 300, 396, 442; ii. 72 
Johnson, Gen. Bradley T., C.S.A., ii. 
26, 38, 142, 145, 147, 159, 280, 
374 
Johnson, Gen. Edward, C.S.A., i. 50, 
206, 284, 286-8, 291, 295-8, 303, 
306, 309, 415; ii. 393 
Johnston, Gen. A. §., C.S.A., i. 304 
Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., C.S.A., i. 
50, 122, 125-6, 130, 132-3, 139, 140, 
147, 153-4, 156, 157, 159-60, 164, 
172, 175-6, 185, 187-9, 199-202, 
204-7, 213, 217-9, 232-3, 235, 250, 
258, 260, 264-5, 267, 271-2, 274, 
278-82, 292, 294, 301, 307-8, 345, 
388, 410-1; ii. 4,199, 373, 392, 479, 
483, 489 
Jomini, Baron, i. 75, 407 
Jones, Col. W. E., C.S.A., ii. 291 
Jones, Gen. D. BR., C.S.A., ii. 178, 180, 
208, 242 
Jones, Gen. J. R., C.S.A., ii. 208, 220- 
2, 244-8, 254, 255, 259, 271 
Jones, Rev. W., D.D., i. 395 
Junkin, Miss, i. 59 
Junkin, Rev. Dr., i. 59; ii. 8327 


Kearney, Gen. Philip, U.S.A., ii. 122, 
140, 156, 157-8, 161, 179, 184 

Kelley, Col., C.S.A., i. 383 

Kelly, Gen., U.S.A., i. 184, 190 

Kemper, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 178, 179, 
272 

Kenly, Col., U.S.A., i. 316-9, 321, 
323-6, 328, 342, 412 

Kernstown, battle of, chapter viii., 1. 
273, 276, 337, 405, 407; ii. 32, 103, 
175, 247, 302, 332, 341, 348, 370, 
379, 483-5, 487 

Kershaw, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 271 

Keyes, Gen., U.S.A., i. 168 


Kimball, Gen. N., U.S.A., i. 238, 242- 
8, 251, 252 

King, Gen., U.S.A., i. 8349, 355-6, 400; 
li. 79, 99, 140, 143-6, 150-1, 163, 
190, 193, 195 

Kirby Smith, Gen., 
150-1, 168 

Knapsacks, i. 222; ii. 125 

K6éniggratz or Sadowa, battle of, 
i. 422; ii. 197 

Kriegsakademie, i. 410 


O.5.A055 1) 135, 


Lanper, Gen., U.S.A., i. 201-2, 213, 
227 

Lane, Gen., C.8.A., ii. 95-6, 309-10, 
316-7, 366-7, 449, 456, 487 

Law, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 26, 35, 37-8, 
272 

Lawley, Hon. F., special correspondent 
of the ‘ Times,’ ii. 280, 390, 461, 477, 
478 

Lawrences, the, i. 4 

Lawton, Gen., C.8.A., i. 391, 393, 
408; ii. 26, 32, 35, 40, 42, 90, 119, 
145, 147, 153, 159, 161, 172-3, 177, 
208, 220-2, 235, 242, 244-5, 247, 
255, 259, 269, 271, 275, 287 

Lee, Gen. Fitzhugh, C.S.A., i. 333; 
ii. 7, 114, 116, 133, 207-8, 227, 
241-2, 294, 331, 413, 418, 420-2, 
430, 432-3, 435-6, 472, 491 

Lee, Gen. Robert Edward, C.S.A., 
bJ'8, 31,36, 37, 589) $6,..88). 90, 
125-6, 130, 131,-141, 173, 204, 
207-8, 215, 225, 280-4, 295, 305-8, 
352, 388-93, 397-8, 407-12, 419, 
429, 431-3, 436; ii. 1, 3-6, 8-19, 
21-3, 25-6, 28, 29, 30, 35, 39, 41, 
43-8, 54, 57-62, 65, 67,69, 70, 72-4, 
75, 77-81, 84, 88, 109, 111-7, 122-5, 
128, 131-4, 135, 138, 139, 142, 150-1, 
156, 162-3, 167-9, 176-8, 183, 185- 
90, 192-4, 196, 199, 200, 202, 205- 
13, 216-7, 220, 223-4, 226-8, 236, 
239, 242-3, 250-1, 254, 258-9, 262-9, 
273-4, 276-80, 289-93, 295-9, 300, 
303, 305, 307-8, 312, 322, 324-5, 
330, 332-4, 336, 3841-5, 348, 353-4, 
358-60, 364, 369, 370, 373-6, 382, 
387, 390, 392-3, 398-9, 404-10, 
413-9, 424-35, 437-9, 446, 455, 


520 STONEWALL JACKSON 


457-64, 468-70, 472-5, 477-80, 
483-4, 486, 488-90 

Lee, R. E., Esq., C.S.A., ii. 473 

Lee, Gen. Stephen D., C.8.A., ii. 168, 
175, 208, 244, 246, 249, 252, 263-7, 
272 

Lee, Gen. W. H. F., C.S.A., i. 333; 
ii. 120, 291, 331, 413, 438 

Leigh, Captain, C.S.A., ii. 451, 453 

Leipsic, campaign and battle of, 
1. 418; ii. 192, 493 

Letcher, Governor, i. 205, 210 

Leuthen, battle of, ii. 470 

Ligny, battle of, i. 259; ii. 59 

Lincoln, Abraham, i. 81, 86, 97-8, 
101, 105, 120, 158, 171-2, 208, 215, 
216, 226, 231, 233-5, 249-50, 252, 
260, 265, 277, 279, 289, 2938-4, 305- 
6, 314-5, 344, 349-50, 358, 386, 399, 
A401, 405-9, 411, 415; ii. 5, 73, 75, 
77, 80, 83, 210, 213, 273, 276, 289, 
295-7, 302, 320, 334-5, 337, 341, 
392, 408, 468, 485 

Little Sorrel, i. 198 ; ii. 209, 256, 281, 
311, 442, 450 

Long, Gen., C.§8.A., ii. 54, 188, 327, 
359, 360 

Longstreet, Gen., C.S.A., i. 50, 139, 
265, 8973 ii. 9; 12, 14, 18, 24, 26, 
28-31, 36, 42, 45, 47-9, 53-7, 59, 
61-2, 65, 69-71, 100, 111, 137, 144, 
150-3, 156-7, 162-3, 165-6, 168-70, 
171, 178, 175-7, 179, 181, 183, 187- 
90, 198, 208, 210, 212-8, 217-8, 
224-7, 230, 233, 236, 238, 241, 244, 
249, 257-61, 276-7, 280, 286, 293, 
298-301, 304, 308-9, 311, 313, 316, 
3820-2, 336, 341, 351, 404, 406-7, 
414, 455, 469, 486 

Loring, Gen., C.S.A., i. 185, 187-9, 
193-7, 199-201, 205, 211; ii. 370, 
489 

Louis XIV., ii. 283 


McCat1, Gen., U.S.A., i. 349, 386 ; ii. 
10, 48 

McClellan, Gen., U.S.A.,i. 50, 58, 155, 
171, 174~5, 184, 187, 196, 202-3, 
218, 215-6, 218-20, 227, 281-2, 
235-6, 247-50, 252, 259, 265-7, 
269-72, 274, 277-80, 292-3, 304-6, 


314, 344-5, 386-91, 393, 398, 400-1, 
404-5, 407-9, 411, 413, 415, 420, 
429; ii. 2, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 15, 18-9, 
28, 30, 32, 39, 40, 43-8, 57, 60, 65- 
77,81, 83-4, 102, 109-11, 113, 
116-7, 122-5, 135-6, 142, 145, 152, 
167, 185, 187, 194, 198-9, 205, 
210-3, 216-8, 224-7, 230-4, 236-7, 
241, 243, 245-8, 250, 253-4, 256, 
258, 260, 263, 267-8, 270, 273-5, 
277-9, 289, 291-7, 299, 332-4, 341, 
343, 371-2, 392, 413, 488 

M’ Dowell, battle of, chapter ix., i. 412, 
424-5, 446; ii. 484 

McDowell, Gen., U.S.A., i. 50, 131-3, 
135-6, 138-9, 144, 147, 150, 152, 
154-5, 158-9, 171, 248-50, 279-80, 
289, 292-4, 304, 306, 314-5, 325, 
344-6, 349-58, 358, 364, 386-91, 
395, 398-401, 404, 408, 412-3, 415, 
420; ii. 3, 5, 10, 60, 79, 84, 97, 99, 
101, 103, 116 

McGuire, Dr. Hunter, C.S.A., i. 260, 
369, 439; ii. 30, 51, 55, 57-8, 69, 
86, 123, 164, 1938, 257, 324-5, 373, 
391, 451, 453-4, 471 

McLaws, Gen., C.8.A., ii. 62, 111, 122, 
169, 204, 208, 213, 216-21, 223-5, 
233-4, 238, 243, 250, 252-6, 271, 
329, 413, 421-2, 431-3, 446, 459, 
462-3, 467 

Magruder, Gen., C.8.A., i. 32-3, 36-7, 
quoted 39, 42, quoted 47, 50, 278-9 ; 
ii. 9, 11, 12, 14, 44-5, 47, 53, 55, 
59, 61-3, 65 

Mahan, Capt., U.S.N., quoted, ii. 332 

Mahone, Gen., C.8.A., i. 306, 4113; ii. 
272 

Malvern Hill, battle of, chapter xiv., ii. 
75, 80, 201, 274, 330, 341, 483, 488 

Manassas, first battle of, chapter vi., 
i. 173-4, 198, 209, 216, 255, 425; 
ii. 274, 348, 483, 491 

Manassas, second battle of, chapters 
xvi. and xvii., ii. 187-8, 192, 202, 212, 
228, 231, 253, 311, 341, 344, 370, 
468, 487 

Mansfield, Gen., C.8.A., ii. 237, 241-3, 
247-8, 250, 255, 261, 272 

Maps, i.136, 183, 416-7, 440; ii. 46, 
59, 110, 431-2 

Marches. (See under Jackson) 


INDEX 521 


Marcus Aurelius, i. 21 

Marengo, battle of, i. 255; ii. 493 

Marlborough, Duke of, i. 75, 215 

Marmont, Marshal, ii. 187, 492 

Mars-la-Tour, battle of, i. 259 

Mason and Dixon’s Line, i. 82-4 

Masséna, Marshal, ii. 482, 491 

Meade, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 155, 181, 188, 
244-5, 247, 275, 314-9, 321, 323, 
328, 416 

Meagher, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 40, 43 

Mechanicsville, Va., engagement at, 
chapier xii., ii. 486 

Medicines, i. 112; ii. 205, 346, 405 

Meigs, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 337 

Merrimac, the, 1. 278, 301 

Metaurus, battle of, ii. 196 

Mexico, city of, i. 26, 30, 35 

Mexico, evacuation of, i. 53 

Mexico, occupation of city of, i. 51-2 

Mexico, Republic of, i. 26 

Mexico, surrender of city of, i. 45 

Mexico, valley of, i. 30, 34 

Middletown, engagementat, chapter x., 
i. 328-30 

Miles, Col., U.S.A., ii. 457 

Military Academy. (See West Point) 

Military Institute, Lexington, Va., i. 
55-8, 60, 63-4, 68, 71, 76, 98-100, 
104 

Militia, American, i. 17, 56, 79, 101, 
105 

Milroy, Gen., U.S.A., i. 269, 275, 284, 
288, 291-2, 295, 297-8, 300, 315, 
875, 412, 414-5, 431, 446; ii. 155-6, 
414 

Molino del Rey, battle of, i. 39, 45 

Moltke, Field-Marshal Count, i. 8, 
25, 357, 430, 433; ii. 11, 19, 58, 
187, 197, 342, 347 

Monitor, the, i. 278 

Monterey, battle of, i. 27, 28 

Moore, Capt., C.S.A., i. 370 

Moore, Gen. Sir John, ii. 363 

Morell, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 122, 174, 
175 

Morrison, Capt. J. G., C.S.A., ii, 422, 
451 

Morrison, Miss A. M., i. 59 

Moscow, i. 109; ii. 493 

Mule battery, i. 378 

Munford, Col.,C.8.A., i. 310, 321, 391-3, 


398, 421; ii. 49, 55-6, 129, 181, 
208, 224-5, 242, 294 
Murat, Prince, i. 259 


Napier, Gen. Sir Charles, i. 4; quoted, 
li. 359 

Napier, Gen. Sir William, i. 4; quoted, 
i. 419, 423, 427; ii. 345, 478 

Napiers, the, i. 4 

Napoleon, i. 22-3, 48, 57, 75, 78, 109, 
110, 182, 186, 193, 197, 221, 232, 
247, 250-1, 259, 336, 347, 357, 406, 
409, 410, 413-4, 416, 417-9, 422-3, 
433-4; ii. 19, 109, 138, 170, 187, 
196, 197, 199, 260, 338, 340, 343, 
362, 370, 372, 391, 394-5, 426, 428, 
429, 486, 491, 493, 495 

Naval and military expeditions (see 
also Transport by Sea), i. 28, 213, 
233-6, 249-50, 252, 279 

Navy, U.S., i. 27, 106, 112, 124, 305 

Nelgon, s1..75, 167, 197": 14.370, 371, 
482 

Newton, Gen., U:S.A., ii. 316, 318, 328 

Ney, Marshal, i. 75-6; ii. 191-2, 492 

North Anna, battle of, ii. 228 

North Anna, position on, ii. 301, 303, 
805, 329-30, 332-3, 410, 488 

Northern soldier, i. 132, 137, 139, 
152-8, 158-60; ii. 75, 148, 180, 
229, 244-5, 247, 274-5, 279, 331-2, 
341-2, 344-8, 381 


OrFIcERs, corps of, ii. 348 

Officers, U.S. army, i. 17-8, 25, 50, 
104, 186; ii. 480-1 

‘Old Dominion,’ the, i. 2, 98 

O’Neal, Col., C.S.A., ii. 441-3 

Ord, Gen., U.S.A., 1. 344, 354, 355-6, 
386 

‘Order, the lost,’ ii. 217, 238, 277-8 

Orderlies, 1. 322; i1. 150 

Orders (see also under Jackson), ii. 20, 
24, 30, 33, 57, 63, 87-8, 94-5, 105, 
113-4, 140, 144, 149, 189, 191, 217, 
219, 359, 432 

Organisation and recruiting, i. 17-8, 
33, 104-11, 115, 117-8, 120, 123, 
136-8, 154-5, 158-9, 161, 169-70, 
215, 225-6, 231, 248-9, 254, 273, 


522 STONEWALL JACKSON 


312, 322, 333, 405-6, 427-9; ii. 30, 
203-6, 231, 273, 275-6, 280, 289, 
331, 348, 410, 412, 468 

Ox Hill. (See Chantilly) 


Paurrey, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 229, 252, 
261 

Palo Alto, battle of, i. 27, 28, 32 

Patrick, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 146, 246 

Patterson, Gen., U.S.A., i. 126, 128-9, 
131-8, 135, 139, 227 

Patton, Col,, C.S.A., i. 377, 384 

Paxton, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 465 

Pelham, Major John, ©.S.A., 11. 147, 
314, 316, 323 

Pender, Gen., ©.S.A., il. 95-6, 153, 
158, 160, 271, 309, 318, 322, 452 

Pendleton, Lieut. Col. A. §., C.S.A., i. 
369; ii. 57, 403, 454-5, 471 

Pendleton, Rev. Dr., Gen., C.S.A., i. 
123, 146; ii. 208, 230, 251, 269, 
276, 473 

Peninsular campaign, 1862, ii. 86, 109, 
186, 200, 331, 348 

Peninsular War, 1808-14, i. 170, 221, 
419; ii. 200, 201, 492 

Pickett, Gen., C.S.A., 1. 50; ii. 329, 
356, 405, 407, 425, 455 

Pierce, Gen., U.S.A., i. 33 

Pillow, Gen., U.S.A., i. 33, 36-7, 46 

Pleasonton, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 293, 418, 
427, 435, 439, 446-7 

Plevna, battle of, 1. 232; 11. 174 

Plunder, ii. 352-4 

Poague, Col., C.S.A., i. 370 

Pope, Gen., U.S.A., i. 401; ii. 78-85, 
87, 89, 90, 92, 97-100, 102-3, 106-7, 
109-11, 113-25, 127-9, 131-2, 134, 
136-42, 145, 149-51, 157, 161-2, 
165-73, 176-7, 181-3, 185, 187-96, 
199, 208, 205, 207, 210, 229, 235, 
295-6, 300, 341, 343-5, 469, 479, 
483 6, 488 

Population of North and South, i. 
106.-7 

Port Republic, battle of, chapter xi., 
i, 865, 424, 425, 441; ii. 247, 341, 
484 

Porter, Gen. FitzJohn, U.S.A., i. 51; 
ii. 10, 12-8, 16, 19, 25, 27-9, 36, 
38-9, 48, 61, 64, 66, 122, 140, 157, 


162-3, 170, 171-3, 175-8, 180, 228, 
243, 268-70, 272, 341, 344 
Presbyterian Church, i. 53, 59, 61 
Prescott, W. F., the historian, i. 26 
Preston, Col., C.S.A., i. 187 
Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, 
Gen., ii. 196 
Prussia, i. 75, 1103 ii. 196 
Puritans, the, i, 73, 83 


QuatRE-Bras, battle of, i. 414; ii. 59, 
192, 468, 492 


Raetan, Field-Marshal Lord, ii. 355 

Railroads in war, i. 107-9, 120-1, 135, 
150, 235, 266, 277, 286-7, 391, 393, 
395; ii. 10, 78-80, 101-2, 111, 121, 
124, 129, 138, 140, 182, 192, 291, 
297, 397, 404, 480 

Ramseur, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 441, 444 


Ransom, Gen., C.8.A., ii. 272, 329, 
405 

Rebel Yell, i. 340; ii. 482 

Reconnaissance. (See Tactics) 


Regimental life in 1851, i. 57 

Reno, Gen., U.S.A., 1. 503 a aaees 
116, 137, 140, 156-9, 161, 184 

Resaca de la Palma, battle of, i. 27, 32 

Revolution, American, and War of 
Independence, i. 6, 57, 91-2, 95-6, 
106, 113, 221, 425; ii. 340 

Reynolds, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 44, 122, 
140, 143, 155-7, 162, 171, 173, 180, 
195, 428, 465 

Richardson, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 53, 251, 
257 

Richepanse, Gen., ii. 466 

Ricketts, Gen., U.S.A., i. 386, 401; 
ii. 79, 84, 92, 140, 143, 150, 171, 
173—4, 176, 179, 244, 247 

Ripley, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 271 

Rivoli, battle of, i. 429 

Roads, American, i. 108 

Roads, Virginian, i. 211, 232, 237, 
426; ii. 198, 203 

Robertson, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 116-7, 208, 
224, 235 

Rodes, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 38, 271, 3381, 
412, 432, 437, 440-2, 444, 447-9, 
455, 460 


INDEX 523 


Romney, expedition to, chapter vii. 
Ropes, John C., i. 92; ii, 101 
Rosecrans, Gen., U.S.A.,i. 186, 189, 294 
Rupert, Prince, i. 83 

Russia, i. 79, 108, 109 


Sapowa. (See Kéniggrdtz) 

Salamanca, battle of, i. 423; ii. 187, 
188, 426, 490, 491 

Santa Anna, President of Mexico, i. 
27, 28-31, 39, 45 

Sauroren, battle of, i. 427 

Savage’s Station, engagement at, li. 47 

Saxton, Gen., U.S.A., i. 845-6, 355-6, 
372, 413, 425 

Schenck, Gen., U.S.A., i. 168, 269, 
295, 298, 875, 446 ; ii. 155-6 

Schurz, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 155-6, 401 

Scotland, i. 3, 11, 93, 102; ii. 332 

Scott, Col., C.S.A., i. 309, 337, 339, 
385 

Scott, Gen. Winfield, U.S.A., i. 27-30, 
36-9, 46-50, 52, 111, 132, 136, 171 

Sea, command of. (See Strategy) 

Sea power, i. 112-3. (See Sea, Com- 
mand of) 

Sebastopol, i. 422 

Secession, i. 78-9, 81-2, 86-7, 90-102 

Sedan, campaign and battle of, i. 
427; li. 332 | 

Seddon, Hon. Mr., ii. 404, 406, 407 

Sedgwick, Gen., U.S.A., i. 235; ii. 
58, 251-3, 255-6, 408-10, 416, 
418-9, 421, 425-8, 430, 434, 438, 
458, 462-3 

Semmes, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 252, 271 

Seven Days’ Battles, chapters xiii., 
xiv., ii. 109, 201 

Seven Pines, battle of, i. 443; ii. 3, 5 

Seymour, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 155 

Sharpsburg, battle of, chapter xix., 
i. 169; ii. 288, 289, 335, 341, 356, 
370, 380, 483 

Sheridan, Gen., U.S.A., i. 426, 428; 
ii. 394, 479, 485, 487 

Sherman, Gen., U.S.A., i. 
168; ii. 479, 485, 487, 489 

Shields, Gen., U.S.A., i. 38, 218, 230, 
235-6, 238, 242-3, 248, 251, 259-60, 
262-8, 277, 279, 288, 290, 293-4, 
298, 314-5, 344, 346, 349-56, 358- 
60, 363-5, 367-9, 371-2, 375-6, 378, 


58, 144, 


A 


381, 384, 386, 391, 400, 424, 426, 
429, 431; ii. 19, 73, 75, 101, 199, 
247, 341, 393, 484-5 

Sickles, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 318, 328, 
401, 427, 434-5, 438-40, 446-7, 
456, 486 

Sigel, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 79, 97-9, 101, 
103, 116, 137, 140, 143, 149, 155-6, 
173, 179, 195 

Signalling, i. 143, 368, 368; ii. 87, 
111, 137, 218, 279, 418-9, 425, 480 

Skobeleff, Gen., i. 197, 255; ii. 174 

Slave owners, i. 79-81, 84-8, 90-1, 
95, 124 

Slavery, 1. 79-80, 82, 84-96, 98, 102 

Slaves, i. 61, 79, 81, 85-90 

Slocum, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 27, 39, 53-4, 
254, 401, 416, 427 

Smith, Captain (Rev. Dr.), C.S.A., 
li. 315, 327, 331, 352, 380, 451-3, 
462 

Smith, Gen. G. W., C.S.A., i. 388 

Smith, Gen., U.S.A., i. 174-6, 388 

Smolensko, i. 109 

Soldier, American (see also Northern 
and Southern Soldier, and Volun- 
teer), i. 106; ii. 345-8, 382 

Solferino, battle of, i. 422 

Southern soldier, i. 104-5, 115, 117, 
193, 161,166,174, 178; 193; 200, 
254-5, 273, 299, 308, 333, 335, 
394-5, 435-8; ii. 126-7, 133, 204, 
209, 229, 235-6, 263, 273, 279-85, 
331, 344, 346-61, 363, 381, 386-7, 
398-9, 440-1, 444-5, 469, 477, 480, 
487, 497 

South Mountain, battle of, chapter 
xix., li. 488 

South, the, i. 
93-9, 100-2 

Spicheren, battle of, i. 259, 430 

Spies, i. 290, 421; ii. 89 

Spotsylvania, battle of, i. 
201 

Staff, i. 105-6, 111, 115, 136, 153, 154, 
165, 169, 179-83, 212, 215, 227, 229, 
237, 388, 392, 421, 425, :430-1, 438, 
440-1; ii. 20-1, 26, 34, 41-2, 57, 
59, 62, 68, 71, 89, 143, 150, 169, 
178, 236, 252, 264, 269, 283, 327, 
345, 364, 384, 386-7, 389-91, 423, 
446, 486 


76, 79-81, 83-6, 90, 


433 3. il. 


524 STONEWALL JACKSON 


Stafford, Col., C.S.A., ii. 95-6, 97 

Starke, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 145, 153, 159, 
177, 184-5, 244, 246, 271 

States’ rights, i. 79, 86, 92-4, 96, 
98-102 

Stanton, Hon. Mr., i. 155, 208, 265, 
275, 277, 281, 292, 294, 304, 314-6, 
325-6, 344, 348, 351, 360, 386, 
388-9, 400, 401, 406-7, 409, 447 ; 
ii. 5, 83, 113, 299, 392, 404 

Steinwehr, Gen. von, U.S.A., ii. 82, 
155-6, 159, 401 

Steuart, Gen., C.S.A., i. 310, 328, 
331-2, 334, 341-2, 360; ii. 370 

Stevens, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 179 

Stoneman, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 408-9, 
417-8, 464, 468 Sy 

‘Stonewall Brigade,’ i,, 162, 165-7, 
178-9, 183, 194-5, 197, 209, 220, 
241, 252-4, 262, 295, 299, 309, 
834-5, 338, 340, 345, 347, 349, 351, 
355, 883; ii. 26, 35, 76, 93-5, 104, 
145, 148, 173, 235-6, 271, 487, 465, 
482 

Stores, ii. 30, 129, 1381-2, 136 

Straggling, 1.138, 150, 152-3, 313, 
428-9: ii. 50, 180, 185, 204, 227, 
235, 249, 262, 273, 275-7, 303, 358, 
411, 482 

Strategist, qualities of, i. 48, 75-6, 
409, 413-4 

Strategy. (See also under Jackson) 
Application of principles of, i. 409, 

415 


Art of, i. 25, 75-6, 406, 409, 432-3; 
ii. 391 

Factors of, i. 75; ii. 391, 893-4 

Importance of, i. 401, 406, 409; ii. 
338 

Problems of, i. 75; ii. 891 

Rules of, i. 406, 409; ii. 188, 430 

Study of, i. 227; ii. 391, 394, 
396 

Training in, i. 74-6, 409-10; ii. 
396 

Practice and Elements of : 

Action of weaker belligerent, i. 154, 
174-5, 418; ii. 199 

Activity, i. 418-9 

Audacity, ii. 11 

Base of operations, i. 44, 1093; ii. 
295 


Civilian strategy, i. 172-3, 206-8, 
252, 406-8 

Command of the sea, i. 27, 112-3, 
124, 213, 217; ii. 31, 207, 406 

Compelling the enemy to make 
mistakes, i. 270 

Concealment of movements, i. 412, 
421-8; ii. 79, 80, 83, 126, 187-42, 
190 

Concentration of effort, i. 173, 
187-8, 418; ii.135, 207, 407, 
416 

Concentration of superior force at 
decisive point, i. 418, 420, 423 ; 
ii. 407-8, 423 

Concentration on the battlefield, i. 
131, 390, 418, 420, 422-3; ii. 
10, 37, 90, 127, 187, 196, 277, 
297 

Converging columns, i. 359, 372, 
412,419; ii. 16-7, 19, 22, 46, 48, 
58-9, 85, 139, 423 

Counterstroke, i. 173, 298; ii. 200-1, 
414, 469 

Dealing with enemy in detail, i. 
189-90, 418; ii. 84-5, 89, 102, 
125, 199, 213, 298, 408-9, 416 

Deceiving the enemy, i. 282, 391-3 

Defensive, the, i. 172-3, 401, 4183. 
ii. 199, 200, 231, 332, 413 

Demonstrations, ii. 408-9 

Detached force, duties of, i. 75, 
281; ii. 406-7 

Dispersion, i. 131, 219, 231, 277, 
314, 858, 418, 483; ii. 79, 85, 
149-51, 187, 195-7, 207, 212-3, 
307, 404-5, 418 

Dividing to unite, i. 411, 423; ii. 
124, 138, 187, 192, 196-7, 295, 
307, 416 

Exterior and interior lines, i. 293; 
ii. 83-4, 113, 122, 124-5, 135, 
151, 195, 213, 217, 226, 408-9 

Finance as a factor, i. 234 

Forcing the enemy out of a strong 
or intrenched position, i. 308-9, 
391; ii. 10, 124, 183, 408-9, 
A417 

Holding enemy fast, ii. 142, 232, 408 

Human factor, the, ii. 297 

Inducing enemy to divide, i. 330, 
386, 418; ii. 392 


INDEX 525 


Strategy— 
Practice and Elements of :—cont. 

Initiative, i. 415, 418; ii. 231, 
305, 435 

Invasion, i. 107-10, 175, 185-6, 
203, 305-6; ii. 78, 199, 200, 
202-4, 231 

Knowledge of enemy’s character, 
i. 50, 227, 276, 291, 325-6, 330, 
376, 415; ii. 4, 11, 28, 187, 
188, 202, 220, 238, 243, 277 

Lines of communication, i. 34, 
107-9, 112, 142, 164, 175, 188, 
224, 272, 288, 38935 ii. 24, 30, 
111, 114, 124, 182, 151, 199, 
211-2, 295-8, 305, 329, 404, 408, 
413, 458 

Lines of operation, i. 27-8, 30; ii. 
393 

Lines of supply, ii. 79, 131, 295-7, 
300, 408 

Luring enemy into false position, 
i. 267, 270, 272; iis 79, 83, 106, 
110, 199, 307, 415 

Moral factors, i. 110, 155, 232, 270, 
347, 351-2, 372,415; ii. 47, 201, 
346-7, 349, 369-70, 395 

Objectives, ii. 391-4, 406 

Obstacles, topographical, i. 267-9, 
365-7 ; ii. 81-2, 87, 135, 196, 
266-7 

Offensive, i. 418, 425; ii. 102, 111, 
123, 142, 231, 336, 413-4 

Politics, i. 206, 231, 234, 401; ii. 
289-90, 292 

Prestige, ii. 201 

Pursuit, i. 153-4, 420; ii. 43, 45-6, 
59, 77, 470 

Recruiting-grounds, i. 
ii. 207 

Retreat, i. 213; ii. 106, 125 

Space, i. 109 

Stratagems, i. 271, 391-4, 420-1 

Strategical points, i. 178, 199, 
206, 233-4, 249-50, 408; ii. 206, 
392, 393 

Surprise, i. 398-9 

Time, i. 415; ii. 19, 24, 231, 234, 
307-8, 407 

Topographical factors, i. 75, 232, 
416-7 


119, 164; 


Turning movements, i. 35 


Uncertainty, i. 347, 350-52, 372, 
384 ; i1. 47, 193, 428 
Vital points, i. 219, 233-4, 306, 
408; ii. 305, 406 
Zone of manceuvre, ii. 199 
Strother, Col., U.S.A., i. 8325, 340 
Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., C.S.A., i. 126-7, 
129, 135, 146, 149, 165, 333; ii. 6-9, 
12, 14, 20-1, 31, 41, 44, 47, 55, 69- 
72, 80, 98, 100, 114, 116, 118-21, 
130, 133-4, 186, 141, 144-5, 147, 
149, 152-3, 157, 165-6, 178, 181-5, 
189, 193-4, 210, 213, 217, 224, 230, 
235, 238, 241-2, 246, 249, 252, 255, 
259-61, 264, 266-7, 270, 273, 282-3, 
287, 291-2, 299, 308, 311, 322-3, 
330-3, 336, 886-8, 398-9, 412, 414, 
416, 418, 423, 427, 430, 454-5, 
457-60, 473 
Sturgis, Gen., U.S.A., i. 328 
Summer, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 170, 182, 
186, 248, 250, 254, 254, 256, 321 
Sumter, Fort, i. 100 
Supply, i. 30, 34, 44, 106-8, 111, 118, 
138, 153-4, 173, 187, 208, 216, 265, 
275, 288-9, 364; ii. 30, 114, 125, 
128, 131, 187, 204, 207, 209, 231, 
333, 382, 405, 409, 412, 414, 417, 
468 
Supply by requisition, ii. 81 
Supply depots and magazines, i. 44, 
107 ; ii. 80, 125, 129, 199, 291, 408 
Supply trains, ii. 88, 90, 111, 140, 183, 
231, 234, 297, 330 
Suvoroff, Field-Marshal, i. 197 
Swinton, W. H., ii. 101, 191, 411, 
477-8 
Sydnor, Capt. J. W., C.S.A., ii. 16 
Sykes, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 31-2, 53, 122, 
174, 179, 180, 328, 421 


Tactics. (See also under Jackson) 

Advanced guards, i. 240,277, 317-8, 
8337, 364, 382 5/i1.'60,' 71, 90-1, 
109, 119-20, 146, 184, 199, 202, 
208, 269, 306-7, 421 

Ambuscade, i. 1839, 226, 242, 259; 
ii. 106 

Ammunition columns, i. 35, 374, 
378, 426; ii. 234, 330 

Arms, i. 105, 112, 140, 215, 220 
225, 292; ii. 11, 205, 270, 346 


526 


Tactics—cont. 


Artillery, i. 144, 146, 159, 220, 222, 
225, 404; ii. 28, 31-2, 36, 39, 
51-3, 60-3, 66, 91-8, 95, 104, 
148, 154-6, 172-3, 175-6, 179, 
181, 190, 218-24, 230, 241, 245- 
7, 249-50, 253-5, 261, 264-6, 
305-6, 310-1, 314-6, 320, 323-4, 
3380-1, 434, 446-7, 457, 459 

Assault of second line, ii. 36-8, 
445 

Attack, 1. 38, 138, 148, 160, 229, 
239, 250, 296, 338-9, 347, 350, 
370-1, 373-4, 380-8, 387, 420; 
ii. 15, 56, 59, 62-3, 100, 114, 
145, 147, 155, 158-60, 247, 250-3, 
270, 277-9, 314-6, 320, 323, 340, 
458 

Attack, at dawn, i. 345, 360, 379 

Attack, night, ii. 456 

Attack, secondary, i. 240, 339 

Attack, signal for, ii. 62, 441-2 

Audacity, i. 251 

Cavalry and Mounted Rifiemen, 
i. 31, 36, 38, 49, 105, 127, 149, 
161, 178, 215, 222-6, 237, 245-6, 
264, 273, 290, 318-21, 329, 332- 
6, 339, 341-3, 360-3, 385, 394, 
425; ii. 5-6, 20, 36, 41, 70, 80, 
82, 88, 90, 96, 105, 114, 117, 131, 
133, 145, 149, 157, 179-81, 186, 
188-9, 194, 208, 211, 223, 227, 
230, 291, 301, 304, 323, 330-1, 
412, 415, 418, 425, 428, 434, 
436, 462-3, 468 

Cavalry raids, ii. 6-9, 48, 59, 120- 
2, 291-3, 336-7, 409, 418, 462- 
3, 468 

Combination, i. 311; ii. 15-6, 29, 
46, 62-3, 180, 187-8, 245, 278, 
357, 362, 430, 457-8 

Communication between columns, 
i. 193, 195-6, 280-1, 440; ii. 12, 
20-3, 132, 134-5, 139, 154, 181 

Concealment of force, ii. 161, 168, 
171-2, 187, 233, 240-1 

Concentration of superior force, 
li. 8357, 362 

Counter-attack, i. 37, 151, 239, 
244-5, 255-6, 301, 374, 380; 
li. 32, 49, 66, 94-5, 104-5, 155-9, 
161-2, 168, 176-7, 179, 187-8, 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


190-1, 200, 230, 241, 247-8, 250, 
252-3, 256-61, 264, 267, 269-70, 

. 805, 318-23, 325, 329-30, 332, 
413, 427, 457-9, 463, 465 

Counter-attack, time for, ii. 168, 
176-7, 252, 415, 429, 457, 465, 
478 

Counter-attack, unreadiness for, ii. 
15, 19, 65-6, 190 

Defensive positions, i. 145-6, 148, 
160, 238-9, 267, 276, 296-7, 334, 
345, 367-8, 372, 379; ii. 10, 
26-7, 52-3, 59-61, 72, 102, 123, 
152-4, 200, 224-5, 239-41, 244, 
248-9, 264-6, 304, 308-9, 330, 
332, 341, 424, 427-30, 439-40, 
462-3 

Defensive, the, i. 106-7, 160; ii. 
14, 190-1, 199, 227-8, 332, 341, 
425-7, 429 

Demonstrations, i. 243, 260, 329, 
392 ; ii. 53-4, 56, 119, 305, 408- 
9, 412, 433-4 

Flank guards, i. 329; ii. 433, 435, 
441 

Formations for attack, ii. 347-8, 
440-1, 473-5 

Front of defence, ii. 104, 153-4 
310-1, 427 

Hasty intrenchments, ii. 3847, 
415-6, 420-1, 426, 429, 431, 
439, 450, 457-8 

Hour of marching, i. 183; ii. 87, 
90, 116, 125, 182, 284 

Initiative, ii. 279, 342-3, 346, 
362 

Investment, ii. 213, 216, 218-21 

Marching to sound of cannon, ii. 
22-41, 58, 278 

Mobility, ii. 199 

Musketry and marksmanship, i. 
136-7, 161-3, 220, 298, 373, 375, 
404; ii. 63-5, 339-40 

Mutual support, ii. 278-9 

Offensive, the, i. 136-7, 172; ii. 
229, 243, 340-1 

Outposts, i. 139, 161, 223, 265, 
316-7, 368-9, 394, 396; ii. 18, 
203, 291, 347, 350-1, 362-3, 439- 
40, 442, 475 

Panic, i. 47, 153, 256, 340; ii. 41, 
356, 358, 449 


INDEX §27 


Tactics—cont. 

Passage of rivers, ii. 12, 44-6, 49, 
116-8, 165-6, 230-1, 293, 304-8, 
409, 415, 417 

Patrolling, i. 220-1, 
394; ii. 847, 357, 362 

‘Pivot of operation,’ ii. 14, 199 

Preliminary arrangements for 
attack, ii. 441 

Pursuit, i, 65, 1538, 193, 251-2, 
263, 299, 301-2, 818, 331-5, 
340-3, 385, 420; ii. 39-41, 59, 
69, 106, 176, 182, 226, 293, 305, 
330, 332, 422, 468, 470 

Rapidity, i. 311, 353, 419 

Rear guards, i. 239, 245, 332-4, 
343, 360, 394; ii. 59, 136, 268 

Reconnaissance, i. 116, 139, 223-4, 
225; ii. 104, 183-4, 186, 189, 234, 
347, 423, 429, 439 

Reconnaissance in force, i. 128-9, 
172, 297-8; ii. 1387-8, 163, 171, 
184, 293, 433-4 

Reserves, i. 142, 299, 339; ii. 38, 
40, 64, 66, 103, 159, 161, 190, 
250, 268, 310, 420, 440 

Retreat, i. 147, 213, 218, 239-40, 
245, 256; 11. 59, 60, 67, 69, 70, 
106, 116, 170, 226-7, 230, 410 

Skirmishing, i. 221, 377; ii. 160, 
346, 357, 363 

Slopes of positions, i. 298; ii. 240 

Steadiness and precision of move- 
ment, ii. 357, 359, 362 

Surprise, i. 239, 317, 348, 373; ii. 
12, 70-1, 113-4, 146, 430, 442 

Turning movements, i. 31, 160, 
239, 251, 318, 418, 430; ii. 99, 
183, 185, 196, 200, 228 

Wood fighting, i. 329; ii. 32-3, 
93, 95-8, 148, 155-6, 159, 181-2, 
184,190, 195, 218-9, 227, 309-10, 
316-7, 415-6, 423-4, 426-7, 442, 
447-8, 466, 474-5 

Talavera, battle of, ii. 191, 228, 271 

Taliaferro, Col. A. G., C.S.A., ii. 145, 
244, 271 

Taliaferro, Gen. W. B., C.S.A., i. 309, 
339; ii. 92-3, 95, 125, 131, 141-3, 
145, 147, 149, 153, 304, 308, 310, 
318, 320, 374 

Tariff, i. 83 


223, 226, 


Taylor, Col. Frank, U.S.A., i. 52, 55 

Taylor, Gen. R., ©.8.A., i. 309-11, 
313-4, 327-8, 332-3, 336, 339-40, 
352, 355, 375, 379-81, 383, 431, 
434; ii. 26, 69 

Taylor, Gen., U.S.A., i. 28-9, 48-9 

Telegraph, i. 108, 194, 202, 351; ii. 7, 
121, 291, 336-7, 419, 425, 428, 480 

Tenis, i. 222; ii. 203, 205 

Theatres of war, i. 107-8, 426 

‘ Thinking bayonet,’ the, ii. 361-3 

Thomas, Gen., C.S8.A., ii. 95, 153, 156, 
158-9, 161, 271, 309, 434, 436 

Thomas, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 485, 487 

Toombs, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 272 

Torres Vedras, i. 221, 419; ii. 330, 
492 

Toulouse, battle of, 1814, ii. 197 

Transport, i. 30, 106, 108, 138, 154, 
173, 190, 192, 213, 236, 266, 346-7; 
ii. 31, 46 

Transport of troops by sea, i. 28, 233, 
235, 250, 252, 278-9; ii. 31, 73, 84, 
109-11, 122, 194 

Trimble, Gen., C.S.A., i. 309-11, 328, 
337-9, 341, 373-7, 384, 434; ii. 23-4, 
26, 33, 38, 66, 91, 118, 145, 147-8, 
153, 164, 184, 271, 414 

Turenne, Marshal, i. 108; ii. 338 

Twiggs, Gen., U.S.A., i. 33 

Tyler, Gen., U.S.A., i. 142, 144, 150-1, 
168, 242-3, 251-2, 371, 379, 382-5, 
431 


Um, campaign of, i. 418, 4253 ii. 197 

Ulster, 1. 3, 4, 6, 93 

Uniform. (See Dress) 

Unionist feeling in the South, i. 91, 
95-6, 98, 102 


VALLEY campaign, 1862, i. 104, 110, 
330-1; ii. 19, 80-1, 186, 200, 204, 
484-6, chapter xii. 

Valley of the Shenandoah, the, i. 56, 
119, 178, 267, 276, 317, 329, 366-7, 
425 

Valley of Virginia, the, i. 56 

Vera Cruz, siege of, i. 27-9 

Vimiera, battle of, ii. 191 

Vionville, battle of, ii. 71 


528 


Vittoria, battle of, i. 419; ii. 196, 493 

Volunteer officers, i. 48, 104, 117, 254, 
333; ii. 203, 303, 348 

Volunteers, American. (See also under 
Northern and Southern Soldiers), 
i. 17-8, 33, 48-9; ii., 109, 168, 
354, 373 


Waker, Col., C.S.A., ii. 308-9, 317 

Walker, Gen. J. G., C.S.A., ii. 123, 167, 
204, 208, 213, 216, 218-21, 224, 
233-4, 236, 238, 241-2, 250, 252-5, 
257, 259, 272 

Warren, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 173, 177 

Washington, Gen., President, U.S.A., 
i. 6, 48, 75, 96, 101, 177, 224, 410; 
ii. 343, 395, 494 

Waterloo, battle of, i. 208, 254, 418, 
430; ii. 59, 468, 491, 493 

Weissembourg, battle of, 1870, ii. 71 


Wellington, i. 4, 75, 146, 162,170, 180, 


208, 215, 221, 357, 414; ii. 187, 191, 
199, 201, 228, 330, 343, 347, 355, 
371, 426, 468, 490-4 

Western armies and campaigns, i. 124, 
213, 218, 224-5, 304 ; ii. 15, 73-5, 
206-7, 232, 330-1, 344, 397, 404 

West Point, graduates of, i. 104 

West Point, Military Academy at, i. 
12-4, 16-9, 24 

Wheeler, Gen., C.S.A., i. 333 


STONEWALL JACKSON 


Whipple, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 328, 434, 
456 

White, Dr. H. A., ii. 18 

White, Gen., U.S.A., ii. 215, 223, 473 

White Oak Swamp, engagement at, ii. 
49-57 

White, Rev. Dr., i. 155, 161, 164 

Whiting, Gen., C.S.A., i. 391, 393, 
408, 439-40; ii. 3, 18, 23, 24, 32, 
34_5, 37-8, 42, 52, 61, 64-5, 79 

Whittier, i. 65 

Wilbourn, Capt., C.8.A., il. 451 

Wilcox, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 178, 180-1, 
272, 422, 462 

Williams, Gen., U.S.A., 1. 235, 238, 
248-9, 259-60, 263 

Willis, Col., C.S.A., i. 8369 ' 

Winchester, battle of, chapter x., i. 424, 
427, 447; ii. 202, 247, 341 

Winder, Gen., C.S.A., i. 295, 309, 345- 
6, 349, 351-2, 354, 380-5, 431; ii. 
18, 26, 32, 35, 40, 64, 90-3, 101, 287 

Wolfe, Gen., i. 4, 111; ii. 494 

Wolseley, Field-Marshal Lord, quoted, 
i. 215, 413, 420; ii. 280, 390, 489 

Woodson, Capt., i. 6 

Worth, battle of, i. 256, 430; ii. 239, 
278 

Worth, Gen., U.S.A., i. 28, 33, 36 

Wright, Gen., C.S.A., ii. 52-4, 61, 63, 
272, 422 

Wiirmser, Gen., i. 413 


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